W.P.(C)/7805/2012 of UOI & ORS Vs VINOD KUMAR & ORS

THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment delivered on: 17.12.2012

W.P.(C) 7805/2012

UOI & ORS

... Petitioners

versus

VINOD KUMAR & ORS

... Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case:For the PetitionersFor the Respondent

: Mr Rajinder Nischal: Mr Padma Kumar S.: Mr Padma Kumar S.

CORAM:-HON’BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMEDHON’BLE MR JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL

JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

CAV 1269/2012

The learned counsel for the respondents is present.The caveat stands discharged.

WP(C) 7805/2012 & CM 19648/2012

1.The petitioners are challenging the order dated 15.05.2012 passed

by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi inOA 3178/2011, which was allowed by the said Tribunal.

2.There were 13 petitioners before the Tribunal in the said OA. Twoout of the 13 persons were Data Entry Operators Group ‘D’ and the other11 persons were Data Entry Operators Group ‘B’. The post DEO ‘B’ isthe feeder group for DEO ‘D’.

3.The post of DEO ‘D’ was placed in the scale of ` 5500-9000 (pre-revised). The respondents were claiming that the revised scale ought tobe ` 6,500-10,500/-. The persons who were functioning as DEO ‘B’ arealso interested because they have been given the financial upgradationunder the ACP scheme and, therefore, they are also claiming the scale of` 6,500-10,500/-.

4.It may be pointed out at this stage itself that earlier five persons,who were holding the post of DEO ‘D’, had filed an Original Applicationunder Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 claiming thescale of ` 6,500-10,500/-. Those persons were granted that scale by theTribunal by virtue of an order dated 03.02.2005 in OA 1288/2004.Thereafter, another set of persons, which included three persons whowere in service and other retired persons, filed OA 1574/2005 claimingthe same scale of ` 6,500-10,500/- insofar as the post of DEO ‘D’ was

concerned. That Original Application was also allowed by the Tribunalby virtue of its order dated 07.04.2006.It is pertinent to note theobservations of the Tribunal in OA 1574/2005 decided on 07.04.2006,which are to the following effect:-

“Applicantsare,therefore,similarlycircumstancedasapplicants in those cases.In view of the Coordinate Benchdecision with the matter of Sh. M. Krishnamoorty (supra) andthat of the Apex Court in K. C. Sharma and ors. Vs. UOI 1987(3) ATC 1177 they cannot be denied the similar benefits asaccorded to identically situated persons. Respondents as suchwill be well advised to extend the benefit of the aforesaidjudgments to the similarly placed applicants and they shouldnot have driven them to seek redressal of their grievance beforethe Tribunal.”

5.The said order dated 07.04.2006 was not challenged by thepetitioners and was implemented.Once that was the position, thepetitioners ought to have extended the benefit of the said decisions of the

Tribunal in OA 1288/2004 and OA 1574/2005 to similarly circumstanced

individuals. But the petitioners did not do so, as result of which therespondents were compelled to file the said OA 3178/2011 which hasbeen allowed by the Tribunal.

6.The Tribunal noticed that as result of the inaction on the part ofthe petitioners to extend the benefits of the said two decisions to allsimilarly circumstanced individuals, persons holding the same post havebeen categorized into two categories carrying different pay scales, thoughboth were at par in all other respects. The Tribunal also noticed that outof ten posts of DEO ‘D’, eight individuals were getting pay scale of` 6,500-10,500/-, while the remaining two (respondent Nos. 1 and 2herein) were getting the pay scale of ` 5,500-9,000/-. The Tribunal alsonoticed that the other respondents (respondent Nos. 3-13 herein), who hadbeen granted ACP, have been placed in the pay scale of ` 5,500-9,000/-instead of ` 6,500-10,500/-.After noticing this anomaly, the Tribunalquashed the order dated 31.03.2011, whereby the respondents herein weredenied the benefit of the higher pay scale merely on the ground that theywere not parties to the earlier litigation, namely, OA 1288/2004 andOA 1574/2005.The Tribunal, accordingly, allowed the OriginalApplication No. 3178/2011 and directed the petitioners herein to grant therespondents herein the same pay scale of ` 6,500-10,500/- as has beengranted to the DEO ‘D’ in the earlier litigation.

7.The petitioners are aggrieved by this decision of the Tribunal andare before us by way of this writ petition. We fail to see as to why thiswrit petition has been filed when the position in law is very clear. Thelearned counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to threedecisions of the Supreme Court, which we shall mention presently. The

first decision is in the case ofAmrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central

Excise: (1975) 4 SCC 714, wherein the Supreme Court observed as

under:-

“24.…………….We may, however, observe that when acitizen aggrieved by the action of government department hasapproached the Court and obtained declaration of law in hisfavour, others, in like circumstances, should be able to rely onthe sense of responsibility of the department concerned and toexpect that they will be given the benefit of this declarationwithout the need to take their grievances to court.”

8.The next decision is in the case of Inder Pal Yadav and Others v.

Union of India and Others: (1985) 2 SCC 648, wherein the Supreme

Court, inter alia, stated as under:-

“5.…………..It is Hobson’s choice. Therefore, those whocould not come to the court need not be at comparativedisadvantage to those who rushed in here. If they are otherwisesimilarly situated, they are entitled to similar treatment, if notby anyone else at the hands of this Court.”

9.Finally, in the case of State of Karnataka and Others v. C.Lalitha: (2006) 2 SCC 747, the Supreme Court categorically observed asfollows:-

“29.Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time totime postulates that all persons similarly situated should betreated similarly. Only because one person has approached thecourt that would not mean that persons similarly situated shouldbe treated differently……………”

10.The dictum of the Supreme Court is absolutely clear that in servicejurisprudence all persons similarly situated should be treated similarlyand only because some persons had approached the court, would notentitle the employers to treat persons similarly situated, but who have notapproached the court, in different manner.

11.As result, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned orderpassed by the Tribunal as that follows the law laid down by the Supreme

Court. The writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J

DECEMBER 17, 2012SR

SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J