LPA/342/2008 of EAST INDIA HOTEL LTD. & ANR. Vs UOI & ANR.

Reserved on: 08.05.2013Decided on: 10.10.2013

LPA 342/2008, C.M. 12746/2008

EAST INDIA HOTEL LTD. AND ANR...... Petitioner

Through : Sh. Dushyant. A. Dave, Sr.Advocate with Sh. R. Singh, Sh. Ravi Sikriand Sh. Aniruddha Deshmukh, Advocates.versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR...... RespondentsThrough : Sh. Rajeeve Mehra, ASG with Sh.B.V. Niren, CGSC, Sh. Prasouk Jain, Sh.Kartikey Mahajan and Sh. Aditya Malhotra,Advocates.

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHATHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI

MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

1.This is an unsuccessful writ petitioner’s appeal against thejudgment and order dated 03.07.2008 of the learned learned SingleJudge rejecting its claim.

2.The facts leading up to this dispute can be divided into threephases. The first starts in 1981, when the Land and DevelopmentOfficer (L&DO) of the Ministry of Urban Affairs, Government ofIndia, allotted 2.762 acres of land (the property in question in thepresent dispute and hereafter called “the plot”) to the Appellant tobuild 250 room hotel and other related facilities for the AsianGames in terms of letter dated 21.02.1981. As the construction was

to be completed in time for the Asian Games in 1982, the Appellantinformed the L&DO that such project was not feasible in that timespan and thus, the allotment was cancelled. This cancellation is notdisputed by either party in this case.

3.The second phase begins on 18[th]June, 1983, when the land wasallotted by the Ministry of Urban Affairs, Government of India to theDelhi Tourism Development Corporation Ltd (DTTDC) to construct abudget hotel. Clause 8 of the said agreement is pertinent to thisdispute. It reads:

“8.The DTTDC shall not sub-lease the land in favourof any other party. They can, however, make sucharrangement for constructing and running the hotel aswill not involve sub leasing of the plot.”

For eight years, no action was taken by DTTDC under this agreementto construct such hotel. Ultimately, on 24[th]February, 1992, anadvertisement was issued, inviting global tenders for the constructionof the hotel. The present Appellant responded with bid, along with12 other bidders. The Appellant’s bid was subsequently accepted(through the DTTDC’s letter dated 8[th]May, 1992) for building andrunning, on its behalf, three star hotel on license basis for period of33 years. license agreement was then entered into between theAppellant and DTTDC on 24.07.1992. Before construction began,however, the Union Ministry of Urban Development informed theManaging Director, DTTDC, New Delhi by letter (No. L-III/8/13(16)/83/392 dated 01.02.1993) that the allotment to it (theDTTDC) of the plot had been cancelled as result of its failure toconstruct budget hotel up until that time, and for violation of Clause

8 of the Agreement between the two parties by way of entering into alicense agreement with the Appellant. This letter of cancellation, in itsrelevant part, reads as follows:

“This land was allotted to you at highly concessionalrates without recovery of premium for setting up aBudget Hotel charging low tariff. However, the BudgetHotel has not been constructed and commissioned. But ithas come to the notice that you have entered into anagreement with M/s East India Hotels Ltd. to run thehotel which is against the terms and conditions of theallotment offered on 18.6.83.”

Notice of this cancellation was also provided to the DTTDC byanother letter dated 04.06.1993 [No. L.III/8/13(16)/83/107].

4.The Appellant made several representations, subsequent tocancellation of the allotment, to the concerned authorities, claiming tobe aggrieved (by the letter of cancellation). Eventually decision wastaken by the Union Ministry of Urban Development to cancel theallotment to the DTTDC, but allot the land directly to the Appellant.This is clear from the Counter Affidavit of one Mr. LD Ganotra,Engineering Officer with L&DO, Union Ministry of Urban Affairs inW.P.(C) 3016/2000, where it was stated in paragraph 3 that:

“Since the DTTDC had acted in clear breach of the termsand conditions of allotment, the allotment was cancelledby the L& DO on 1.2.1993. The DTTDC as well as theDelhi Government made representations to the Union ofIndia against the said cancellation. The matter wasdiscussed in number of meetings in the variousdepartments and finally on 19th October 1993 in ameeting presided by the Secretary, Union Ministry ofUrban Development (in the meeting representatives ofDTTDC were present), decision was taken to allot the

land to the Appellant. The minutes suggest that thedecision was that the land would be allotted on the termsand conditions as those contained in the Agreement forLicense Agreement executed between the DTTDC and thePetitioner.”

5.The Union Government later issued an order on 7[th]June, 1995to the L&DO conveying its sanction in the following terms:

“3.Sanction of the President is conveyed to theutilization of land by the East India Hotels Ltd. as per thetermsandconditionsenumeratedinthelicenseagreementdated24.7.92whichshallbesuitablymodified / endorsed and executed for compliance by thehotelier with the Land and Development Office on usualterms and conditions, which shall inter alia, include thefollowing;(i)The terms and conditions as enumerated in theLicense Agreement for construction / running of the hotelwill be the same as contained in the enclosed Agreementand license - thereof will be in accordance withstatement annexed in Schedule II thereto.

XXXXXX”

6.The third and operative phase of the dispute began after this. Byan allotment letter/license deed (No. I. III/8/13(16)/82-187, dated27.06.1995), the plot was allotted to the Appellant for the purposes ofsetting up budget hotel. This letter indicated that an agreement onthe lines of the earlier agreement between the Appellant and DTTDCwas to be executed to give effect to the allotment letter. The L&DO,however, did not – for reasons which would be apparent hereafter –conclude any agreement with the Appellant. Consequently, the

Appellant filed W.P.(C) 3016/2000, seeking writ of mandamusagainst the Respondents to act pursuant to the allotment letter dated27.06.1995. As measure of interim relief, the Respondents wererestrained from dispossessing the Appellant from the land in question.This Court also directed the Respondents to take final decision onthe allotment and the conclusion of the agreement by its order dated24.01.2005.

7.Pursuant to this Court’s order, the Appellant received letter(No. L-III/8/13(16)/82/148, dated 11.04.2005) stating that after dueconsideration, decision had been taken to cancel the earlierallotment to the Appellant. It is this action of the Respondents that isin question in the present proceedings.

8.The appellant instituted writ proceedings. In those writproceedings, it was contended that the allotment made to theAppellant was concluded contract and that amounts had been paidtowards consideration. Accordingly, it was argued that the UnionGovernment was estopped from contending that its decision to makethe allotment was in any manner flawed or procedurally irregular,because the earlier allotment to the DTTDC was consciouslycancelled and direct allotment of the plot (to the appellant/Petitioner)was resorted to.

9.The Learned Single Judge considered the questions involvedand held that whilst the Respondents were entitled to cancel theallotment of land – because of irregularities in the manner ofallotment to the Appellant and the consequent arbitrariness that werediscovered later – it (the Appellant) was entitled to the refund of the

entire sum of `3.35 crores paid in instalments as regards the hotelconstruction project along with 18% interest per annum from therespective dates of payment till the time of refund. The LearnedSingle Judge also noted that the correct forum for decision on thequestion of facts which arose in the case would be the civil courts toenforce private law remedies available to the Appellant, rather thanthrough public proceedings in writ court.

10.Two issues arise from the present proceedings: first, whetherthe Appellant has any remedy under public law – i.e. whether theremedy that the Appellant is seeking for – that of specificperformance of the allotment letter that came to be cancelled – can beand should be granted by this Court in the circumstances of this case,and secondly, as corollary, whether the correct forum for suchdisputes are the civil courts with original jurisdiction.

11.The Appellants argue firstly, that the cancellation of theallotment to DTTDC for violation of the terms of the allotment onaccount of sub-licensing was incorrect. Learned senior counsel, ShriDushyant Dave argued that the original allotment was made afterfollowing publicly advertised global tender, followed by evaluationby duly constituted committee which consisted representatives ofthe Union of India. That committee chose the Appellant’s bid over theothers, since it afforded the best terms for the plot. The acceptancewas subject to signing the contract and furnishing security deposit of`1 crore. Later license deed was entered into for the specificpurpose of constructing hotel; the arrangement envisaged was to lastfor 33 years. The Union Government’s concerns were adequately

addressed because Clause 18 of the License Deed categorically statedthat no interest in the land was passing to the licensee/Appellant. It isalso argued that the license deed had calculated the fixed annual rentalat `720.50 crores for period of 30 years and further provides thepercentage of gross turnover at 10% to 11% from the operating periodof first year till the thirtieth year, three years being kept for planningand construction. On 28[th]July, 1992, the Appellant was givenpossession of the plot. Learned counsel claims that despite this, andalso the circumstance that the requisite amounts were paid, the UnionGovernment cancelled allotment to DTTDC on 01.02.1993 for anutterly untenable reason, i.e. allotment had been made to the presentAppellant contrary to terms of the allotment to DTTDC. It is arguedthat the Union Government was aware of the tendering process whichpreceded the allotment to the appellant; the advertisement was underits aegis and its officer was part of the tender evaluation process.Though the appellant’s representation was initially rejected, the UnionGovernment ultimately decided in its highest quarters to allot the landdirectly, on 19.10.1993, as evidenced by the affidavit of an officer ofthe L&DO in W.P.(C) 3016/2000.12.Mr.Davesubmittedthatfollowingthedecision,theGovernment of India issued letter conveying sanction of thePresident to allot the plot directly to the Appellant, sanctioning theutilization of the land by the terms and condition of the Agreementdated 24.07.1992 to be suitably modified to indicate that thearrangement is license and would not be considered as leasewithout perpetual deed.

13.It was argued next that the decision to allot land directly to theAppellants was based on due consideration of the facts by all relevantauthorities and is thus not arbitrary. Counsel stressed on the fact that adetailed note dated 17.07.1995 was prepared by the concernedMinistry which was then sent to the Office of the Prime Minister whohaving seen the same on 14.08.1995 had directed the matter to bereferred to the Finance Ministry. The Ministry of Finance hadaccordingly examined the file dated 24.08.1995, which was discussedin the said Ministry in August 1995, and necessary approval wasgiven by the said Ministry. Accordingly, on 03.02.1996, after thereceipt of the file by the concerned Ministry from the FinanceMinistry, necessary notings were made to the clearance by the PrimeMinister and Finance Ministry to the effect that there were nodeviations in the procedure followed by this Ministry and henceretracing our steps at that juncture was not recommended. Counselstated that these were followed by notes by the Finance Ministrydated 06.03.1996, leading to decision on 06.06.1996 in favour ofallotment, culminating in the Union Urban Affairs Ministry’s decisiondated 11.06.1996 to execute the lease deed in favour of the appellant,especially when competitive bidding process is not mandatedprerequisite in all cases. Counsel also laid emphasis on the allotmentletter issued to the appellant on 27.06.1995 and the amountsappropriated towards the first five years’ license fee, by the CentralGovernment.ReliancewasplacedonthedecisionsinShriSachidanand Pandey and Another v. State of West Bengal and Ors.,AIR 1987 SC 1109 and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K

and Anr., 1980 (4) SCC 1 to justify the argument that there was nonecessity for the Central Government to again re-advertise and seekbids and that in any case, the allotment to the Appellants waspremised on the earlier joint global tender issued by DTTDC and theMinistry of Tourism. Counsel also relied on the Constitution Benchruling of the Supreme Court, in its advisory jurisdiction under Article143 of the Constitution (In re Special Reference No 1 of 2012 (2012(3) SCR 147), where it was held that auction is not the invariablemethod for disposal of public property by the state:

“…in conclusion, the submission that the mandate ofArticle 14 is that any disposal of natural resource forcommercial use must be for revenue maximization, andthus by auction, is based neither on law nor on logic.There is no constitutional imperative in the matter ofeconomic policies- Article 14 does not pre-define anyeconomic policy as constitutional mandate. Even themandate of 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the meansadopted to subserve the public good and uses the broadterm ‘distribution’, suggesting that the methodology ofdistribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes thatalienation/allocation of natural resources to the highestbidder may not necessarily be the only way to subservethe common good, and at times, may run counter topublic good. Hence, it needs little emphasis that disposalof all natural resources through auctions is clearly not aconstitutional mandate.”

14.The third submission made was that the internal functions andprocedural requirements are not be known by citizens in their dealingswith the Government, and that once dealings between the citizen andGovernment are transparent, it is not open to Court, much less theGovernment which took the decision in the first place, to question the

legality and propriety of the decision on grounds of proceduralirregularity (reliance here is placed on the decisions in Collector ofBombay v. Municipal Corporation of City of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC469 and Bejgam Veeranna Venkata Narasimloo and Ors. v. State ofA.P. and Ors., 1998 (1) SCC 563. Likewise, the Appellants rely onthe judgment reported as State of Punjab v Nestle India Ltd. and Anr.2006 (4) SCC 465 where it was held that:

“44…………………the Government cannot rely on arepresentationmadewithoutcomplyingwiththeprocedure prescribed by the relevant statute, but acitizen may and can compel the Government to do so ifthe factors necessary for founding plea of promissoryestoppel are established. Such proposition would not"fall foul of our constitutional scheme and publicinterest…………………"

The Appellants contend that the representations made to it trigger aright in equity through the doctrines of legitimate expectation andpromissory estoppel and that the Union Government cannot resilefrom its decisions. It is contended that apart from the license fee paid,ithasexpendedconsiderableamountsforplanningtowardsdevelopment of the property. Learned senior counsel also highlightedthe fact that the Central Government’s actions have resulted in thedeprivation of sum of over ` 700 crores to the public exchequer,which would have been earned if the period for which the license hadbeen allowed to stand.

15.Mr. Dave urged that allotment to DTTDC on 18.06.1983 didnot enable grant of any sub-lease. However Clause 8 enabled DTTDCto make arrangements for constructing and running the hotel as would

not involve sub-lease of the plot. The advertisement issued on24.02.1992 was relied on to say that it invited offers from hotel chainsfor setting up and running new hotel. This was not contrary toCondition No.8. The licence agreement of 24.07.1992, was not leaseor sub-lease but merely licence. It did not confer any right orinterest in the land, as apparent from Clauses 17 and 18 of which readas under:

"17. The Licensee / Sub-Licensee shall not furtherunderlet, sublet, encumber, assign, alienate or otherwisetransfer their rights and interest or part with possessionof the land and the building thereon or any part thereofor share therein to any person, directly or indirectlywithout the previous written consent of the Licensorexcept as provided in clause 24 & 25 (twenty four &twenty five) of this agreement.

18. The Licensee has been granted licence only to enterupon the piece of land to be made available by theLicensor for the purpose of facilitating setting up of 3(Three) Star Hotel as specified hereinabove and grantingof such Licence shall in no case confer, create anyright or interest or demise in the said land in favour ofthe Licensee or the Sub-licensee nor shall this Licenceimply an exclusion of the possession title, legal orotherwise or interest of the Licensor in the land licencedforthepurposeoffacilitatingandsecuringtheconstruction of hotel and that this Licence is understoodby the parties in all respects to be in conformity with therights and powers of the party of the first part in thematter of the grant of this Licence.”

16.It was urged that the licence agreement of 24.07.1992 wasentered into between DTTDC and the Appellants after global offerswere invited, bids were submitted by various parties and the

appellant's bid was accepted after following transparent process. Itwas contended that the argument and finding of the learned singlejudge that the license was granted without following properprocedure was unsustainable.

17.The learned Additional Solicitor General, who appeared for theUnion, argued that the DTTDC’s allotment on 18.06.1983 wasexclusively for the setting-up of budget hotel. It was urged that theadvertisement of 24.02.1992 was not issued by the Government butby DTTDC, which could not lease out the lands; clause 5 stipulatedthat DTTDC itself had to establish and manage hotel. Clause 7mandated that construction was to be completed within 24 months,before the grant of lease could be considered. Clause 8 of theallotment letter stipulated that DTTDC could not sub-let the landthough it could make arrangements for constructing and running thehotel. The ASG stated that DTTDC was never lessee. For over 10years it did nothing. The allotment in favour of DTTDC being only alicence, (as evident from Clause 14) the invitation to invest in newhotel contravened Clause 5 of the 1983 allotment letter. In terms,specific permission of the Union Government was necessary. TheASG argued that DTTDC had no authority to issue any suchadvertisement. Since DTTDC did not even have lease in its favour,the acceptance of the offer by DTTDC on 08.05.1992, the grant alicence in favour of the Appellants to set up three star hotel for aperiod of 33 years was untenable.

18.As regards the licence agreement between the first appellantand DTTDC and Oberoi Palaces & Resorts International Ltd.executed on 24.07.1992, it was urged that DTTDC was licencee ofthe Union Government which unauthorizedly described itself as alicensor. The first appellant was called "licencee" and the OberoiPalaces & Resorts Ltd was described as the "sub-licencee". The ASGrelied upon the recitals which stated that the licence was for use of theplot by Novotel. Referring to various clauses of the agreement, hesubmitted that the same could not be entered into by DTTDC and wasin complete violation of the allotment made by the Government ofIndia in favour of DTTDC.

19. The learned ASG argued that in terms of the (Transaction ofBusiness) Rules, 1961 of the Government of India, grant of land /lease / licence had to be approved by the Finance Ministry. It wassubmitted that no concurrence of the Finance Ministry was given tothe arrangement. The ASG then argued that the property in questioncould not have been handed over to the first petitioner. Reliance wasplaced on the letter dated 01.02.1993 (under which the allotment infavour of DTTDC was cancelled). Referring next to the allotmentlettersof07.06.1995and27.06.1995issuedbytheCentralGovernment, Ministry of Urban Affairs, Land & Development Officeas well as the letter dated 01.07.1996 (issued by the CentralGovernment, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment to the Land& Development Officer informing the latter that it may go ahead withthe execution of the licence agreement with the first appellant after

modifying the earlier licence agreement- executed between DTTDCand the said appellant) it was submitted that between 07.06.1995 and27.06.1995, no approval from the Finance Ministry was obtained.Therefore, the allotment letter of 27.06.1995 was without anyauthority. Likewise, the clearance given by the letter of 01.07.1996was not concurred with by the Finance Ministry. In this context, itwas submitted that the Finance Ministry having not cleared theallotment, determinations or decisions of the Ministry of UrbanAffairs and Employment could not prevail.

20. The Central Government next argues that the challenge to theletter dated 11.04.2005 by which the allotment of the plot to theappellant on 27.06.1995 was cancelled is misplaced as the said letteritself indicates that the reason for cancellation was that there wereimproprieties. The allotment was made without following the properprocedure and without resorting to transparent and open procedure.He further submitted that the letter dated 07.06.1995 indicated thatthere would be licence agreement executed in favour of the firstappellant after suitably modifying the earlier licence agreement dated24.07.1992. No such licence agreement was executed. The appellant,therefore, could not claim any enforceable right.

21.It was contended in the appellant’s counter-affidavit that on theissue of utilisation of the land, the Union Ministry of Finance advisedthat the plot should be disposed to private party for hotel etc., onlyafter an open auction to ensure free and fair transaction. TheMinistry of Finance alternatively suggested that the plot could be used

by the Central Government itself. Based on request from DTTDC,the plot was offered for allotment to it for construction of budgethotel, on specified terms and conditions in consultation with theMinistry of Finance. It was argued that the allotment was made athighly concessional rates which required an annual payment @ 6 ½%of the notional premium calculated on the residential rates of `2,000/-per sq. mtr; thus no premium was charged and only the licence fee atconcessional rates was levied. The allotment was subject to the termsand conditions contained in the letter of allotment dated 18.06.1983. Itwas also pointed out that DTTDC failed, during the period 1984-1992, to set up the budget hotel as per the terms of the allotment andalso failed to pay the licence fee. In 1992, DTTDC, without obtainingany permission from the Government of India, violating theconditions of allotment, invited tenders from private parties for settingup 3-5 Star Hotel on the plot of land.The terms of allotmentenvisioned the setting up of budget hotel by DTTDC alone. TheCentral Government asked DTTDC to immediately stop its violationof the allotment terms and also to pay arrears of licence fee.TheASG argued that there was no rationale for DTTDC to pass on theadvantages of highly concessional licence fee to third party or tosub-lease the land. Therefore, the allotment and agreement with thefirst was found to be in gross violation of the conditions of theallotment letter and the allotment in favour of DTTDC was cancelledby the said letter dated 01.02.1993.22.The Central Government stated that DTTDC representedagainstthecancellation.IntermsoftheproceduresoftheGovernment, before taking any final decision in favour of privateparty, in such matter, the case should have been shown to theMinistry of Finance. Relying on the file notings, which were madeavailable to the Court, and copies of which were also made availableto the appellants’ counsel, it was argued that during the earlierconsultation, the Ministry of Finance had given its opinion that theplot of land should be disposed off by open auction to ensure freeand fair transaction. These procedures were not adhered to whileissuing the letter of allotment to the petitioner on 27.06.1995. Theearlier licence agreement was adopted and the fee payable by theAppellants to the L&DO were kept at the same despite lapse of time.It was submitted that in spite of the allotment letter of 27.06.1995, nolicence deed was drawn up nor was formal contract entered intobetween the Government of India and the Appellants.

23.It was pointed out from the counter-affidavit, that in the courseof the review of the case, the Union Urban Development Secretarywas of opinion that the transaction would result in heavy financiallosses. Besides, the Union Government would in effect have enteredinto commercial deal with private party, without following thenormal procedure of competitive bidding and without consulting theMinistry of Law on the terms and conditions of such contract. In thecourse of re-examination of the allotment, the case was referred to thePrime Minister's Office, which, in turn, advised that the opinion of the

Attorney General be sought. The opinion of the Attorney General wasreceived on 21.05.2000. But, before final decision could be taken bythe Central Government on the basis of the advice, the appellants hadalready filed the earlier writ petition and an order was maderestraining the Government of India from dispossessing the appellantsfrom the plot. This Court had directed the Government to take finaldecision in the matter within six weeks. The Central Governmentreviewed the matter in the light of the Attorney General’s opinion andhad decided to cancel the allotment letter. This resulted in theimpugned cancellation letter of 11.04.2005. The ASG relied on thedecisions reported as Godavari Shamrao Parulkar v State ofMaharastra & Ors AIR 1964 SC 1128; State of Uttar Pradesh v OmPrakash Gupta AIR 1970 SC 679 and Narmada Bachao Andolan vState of Madhya Pradesh 2011 (12) SCR 84 and contended that theRules of Business framed under the Constitution have to be adheredto for decision to be considered as binding and enforceable upon theGovernment. It is not all decisions and determinations that arecommunicated to third parties, but only those which can be validlysupported as binding decisions, that are enforceable. In the presentcase, the allotment made on 27.06.1995 could not be supported ascommunication of valid decision, despite some of the later notingsof various Central Government functionaries. The highest authoriseddecision makers, upon being made aware of the irregularitiesapparent, decided not go to ahead with the allotment, and later theseculminated in the cancellation order of 2005 impugned in the writ

petition. In these circumstances, argued the ASG, the impugnedjudgment and order did not require any interference.

24.On the first question of the cancellation of the allotment to theDTTDC based on violation of the terms of the allotment through asub-license, the Appellant argues that the agreement between itselfand the DTTDC was only sub-lease for the purposes of constructionof the hotel under Clause 8 of the allotment letter and not licensecontrary to the terms of allotment. This question, however, need notbedecidedbythisCourtastheAppellant’ssubsequentrepresentations to the Government to allot the land afresh to it – withwhich these present proceedings are concerned – and silence on theillegality of that action for period of almost 15 years forecloses itsabilitytoagitatethatquestioncurrently.Nevertheless,sinceconsiderable arguments were made on this aspect, the Court deems itappropriate to record its opinion on the issue.

25.The kingpin of the appellant’s submission on this score is thatthe Central Government was privy to – as well as party to – theentire decision making process which led to the previous allotment of1992, because the advertisement issued in the public domain, invitingbids for running hotel on the plot, was that of DTTDC as well as theCentral Government. The only reason for this is the statement in theadvertisement that it was issued by the “Delhi Tourism andTransportation Development Corporation, Government of India”.Apart from this assertion, there is no support for the allegation that theCentral Government was ever involved in the processing of the bids,or that it had at any stage approved the license arrangement between

DTTDC and the appellants. The license deed of 24.07.1992 similarlydid not involve the Central Government, or recite its approval to thearrangement. Rather, the two parties to the agreement were theDTTDC and the East India Hotels Ltd. No other party signed thedocument. The schedule to the document proposed the licensing fee –an arrangement which indicated that the property was given out onlicense for 33 years for total fee of ` 720.50 crores. It was in thesecircumstances that the Central Government issued the cancellationletter dated 01.02.1993. That letter cited two reasons: non-payment oflicense fee by the DTTDC and its violation of the lease terms, since itentered into the license arrangement for 33 years, without CentralGovernment approval. The Central Government went on to recordthat the action of DTTDC was unsupportable because it had beengiven the land at highly concessional rates for constructing budgethotel, condition which stood violated by the terms of the licensedeed of 24[th]July, 1992. This Court fails to see how this cancellationcan be termed either as unfair or arbitrary. The mere recital ornomenclature of an arrangement as license is never determinative ofits true nature. What has to be seen is the intent of the parties,emerging from an overall consideration. The grant of land for 33years, with permission to put up constructions and at license feesdecided without reference to the owner of the land, amount to creationof long term arrangements which can even be termed irrevocable.That is the reason why the Central Government cancelled theallotment to DTTDC. The appellant – by its own concession merelicense – could not possibly object to this action; it did not question

the Central Government’s action. In the circumstances, this courtholds that it is too late in the day for the appellants to say that thecancellation of the DTTDC’s allotment in 1993 was not legal.Crucially, the validity of that cancellation is independent of thepresent cancellation, the reasons for both being separate and distinct,and indeed, the cancellation of the first allotment being necessaryfactual requisite for the present allotment to have been given. ThisCourt, therefore, holds the appellants’ arguments on this aspect to beinsubstantial and meritless.

26.The second and third questions are whether the cancellationwas justified in this case. The relevant question here – though thedistinction may appear slight – is not whether the original allotmentletter (of 27.06.1995) was arbitrary, but whether the cancellationmade on 11.04.2005 is arbitrary. The Appellants contended that theLearned Single Judge erred in holding that the Central Governmentwas entitled to cancel the allotment based on the reason that theearlier allotment suffered from procedural irregularities and theabsence of competitive bidding process. It is contended that after thecancellation of the land allotment to DTTDC, fresh representationswere made by the Appellant to the Ministry of Urban Affairs, and thedecision to allot the land to the Appellants was made only after adetailed consideration of this request, as displayed by the counter-affidavit of Shri L.D. Ganotra, Engineering Official, in the firstW.P.(C) 3016/2000:

“The matter was discussed in number of meetings inthe various departments and finally on 19th October

1993 in meeting presided by the Secretary, UnionMinistryofUrbanDevelopment(inthemeetingrepresentatives of DTTDC were present), decision wastaken to allot the land to the Appellant. The minutessuggest that the decision was that the land would beallotted on the terms and conditions as those containedin the Agreement for License Agreement executedbetween the DTTDC and the Petitioner.”

27.Furthermore, on 7[th]June, 1995, the Government directed theLand and Development Officer in the following terms, indicating thatthe matter had indeed been considered in detail and the concurrenceof the Finance Ministry had been taken:

“In compliance of the above, the modified allotmentletter should be issued by Land and Development Officeand shown to Ministry before issue. In the process, ifnecessitated modified agreement with East India HotelsLtd/CIF can even be executed.

This (sic) issues with the concurrence of FinanceDivision vide their U.O. No. 757-F dated 6.6.1995.”.

TheAppellantsrelyonvariouscommunicationswithintheGovernment between July 17, 1995 and June 11, 1996 considering thegrant of the allotment letter to demonstrate that the decision wasindeed taken after due consideration, concluding the followingobservation from the Government to the Land and DevelopmentOfficer on July 1, 1996:

“XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

In continuation of this Ministry’s letter of even numberdated 7.6.95, this is to inform you that you may go aheadwith the execution of the license agreement after suitably

modifyingthelicenseagreementearlierexecutedbetween the DTDC and East India Hotels Ltd”.

28.On the aspect of propriety of allotment without an action orcompetitive bidding process, it is clear that an auction or competitivebidding process is not necessary in all circumstances. In ShriSachidanand Pandey and Another v. The State of West Bengal, AIR1987 SC 1109, the Supreme Court noted that:

“40.On consideration of the relevant cases cited atthe bar the following propositions may be taken as wellestablished. State-owned or public-owned property is notto be dealt with at the absolute discretion of theexecutive. Certain precepts and principles have to beobserved. Public interest is the paramount consideration.One of the methods of securing the public interest, whenit is considered necessary to dispose of property, is tosell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders.Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariablerule. There may be situations where there are compellingreasons necessitating departure from the rule but thenthe reasons for the departure must be rational andshouldnotbesuggestiveofdiscrimination………………..”

29.In that case, an arm’s length negotiation between the CentralGovernment and Taj Hotels was considered to be sufficient, and theCourt did not insist upon an auction or competitive bidding processto ensure conformity with Article 14. In the present case, the questionbefore the Court is not whether the mere fact of the absence of abidding process rendered the allotment arbitrary and thus subject tocancellation by the Court, but whether the absence of such processentitled the Government itself to cancel its allotment based on the

principle of public interest that is paramount in such decisions, andimportantly, subject to the evaluation of the Union executive, whichowns the property.

30.In this background, the Court must examine the discussions thatprecede the cancellation in the present case. Here, to note broadly, thefile notings demonstrate that subsequent to the allotment to theAppellants, several dissident voices appeared within the Ministry’sdiscussions: the Secretary (Urban Development), who felt that thetransaction would result in heavy financial losses [Para 7 noting inLands Division; Counter-Affidavit, pg. 206, para 7], and the AttorneyGeneral (whose opinion was requested by the Prime Minister’sOffice) on 21.05.2000. Indeed, the Principal Secretary to the PrimeMinister recorded on 30.10.1998 – after the allotment of land – thatthe matter was

“XXXXXX

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Discussed with PM. He is of the opinion that as matterof abundant caution, Minister (UAE)’s decision may bereferred to the Attorney General of India before it isimplemented” (emphasis supplied).

Subsequently, the Urban Development Minister noted on 08.10.1999that no competitive bids were issued and thus, ` 720.50 crores willaccrue from Appellants as opposed to at least ` 1802 crores whichcould be reasonably expected. The Minister also noted, significantlythat the concurrence of the Finance Ministry had never been elicited,or obtained.

31.In this case, it is clear that the sub-license between the

Appellant and the DTTDC of 24.07.1992 traced its existence to thelicense granted to DTTDC on 18.06.1983. Thus, once the latter wascancelled due to violation of its terms, the former’s existence wasalsovitiated.Subsequently,theMinistryofUrbanAffairs,Government of India revived the arrangement in substance throughthe allotment of 27.06.1995 by substituting itself for the DTTDC andallotting land to the Appellants directly. Crucially, this allotment wasnot subject to any global tender. Indeed, the decision to cancel theallotment was based on the fact that it was made without acompetitive bidding process in respect of this allotment.The reasoningof the Single Judge relies in the fact that after the cancellation of thelicense agreement between the DTTDC and Appellant, the globaltender and its results stood vitiated ipso facto, thus unavailable to bethe basis for any subsequent allotment. In this case, the decision tocancel the allotment was based on subsequent assessment of thefactsbyvariousauthorities,andnotbasedonirrelevantconsiderations,as thefilenotingsaboveclearly demonstrate,concluding that the absence of competitive bidding process qua thesecond allotment mandated cancellation. The question, thus, is notwhether the Government must have had competitive bidding processwhen it allotted the land to the Appellant (as was the dispute inKasturi Lal and Shri Sachidanand Pandey), but whether, it is open forthe Government to have such process now, and thus, cancel theallotment on that basis. Indeed, the validity of competitive biddingprocess is beyond question and thus, the decision to cancel theallotment letter cannot be characterized as arbitrary. As to the

Appellant’s contention that the Government may not back-track on itsdecision based on procedural irregularities in its own functioning, theAppellants rely on various decisions of the Supreme Court (SunilPannalal Banthia and Ors. v. City and Industrial DevelopmentCorporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2007 SC 1529;Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of The City of Bombayand Ors., AIR 1951 SC 469, and Bejgam Veeranna VenkataNarasimloo and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Ors., 1998 (1) SCC 563 toargue that the cancellation letter was arbitrary and that Governmentmay not rely on its own irregularities to defeat the rights of citizens.However, these decisions do not support such blanket and broadlegal principle. Not only has the Supreme Court recognized in VishalProperties Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2007 (11) SCC 172 that“we are not bound to direct any authority to repeat the wrong actiondone by it earlier”, repeating similar ratio in Hira Tikkoo v. UnionTerritory, Chandigarh and Ors., 2004 (6) SCC 765 that:

“19………………… When scheme of development ofland and the allotments made thereunder are found to bein contravention of any law and contrary to generalpublic interest, no claim based on so-called vested rightcan be countenanced……………….”land and the allotments made thereunder are found to bein contravention of any law and contrary to generalpublic interest, no claim based on so-called vested rightcan be countenanced……………….”

In Sunil Pannalal, the Court negated the argument that the decision ofthe City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra toallot land cannot be backtracked based on an assessment on facts thatits original decision was not opposed to public policy on facts; inCollector of Bombay, the decision revolved around the limited

question of the effects of Government resolution within the meaningof Section 8 of the Bombay Act II of 1876; in Bejgam Veeranna, theGovernment’s argument was that it was entitled to recoveries ofexcess payment to rice farmers based on notification that it claimedwas not notified was rejected. This, however, was because theGovernment itself collected rice compulsorily from the farmers basedon that memorandum and thus could not claim that it had no legaleffect. The question of whether sufficient reasons existed, as in thiscase, to revoke an earlier decision was never considered.32.Traversing the discussions in this case between and within therelevant ministries, clear picture emerges as to why the allotmentwas cancelled. To begin with, the official notings from the file of theCentral Government no doubt show that on 11.06.1996, view wasexpressedthathavingregardtothepreviousconspectusofcircumstances, the request made by the appellants to allot the landdirectly, since it had participated in the previous auction of 1992 andwas the highest bidder, was accepted. It was in these circumstancesthat it was issued. similar note of the concerned Director (in theMinistry of Urban Development), i.e. Sh. B.R. Dhiman, who alsomade the note of 11.06.1996, was reiterated on 31.07.1996. When theofficial decision had to be taken, the Minister of State, UA&E on31.07.1996 was of the view that comprehensive note had to beprepared. The subsequent observations of the Joint Secretary (UrbanDevelopment) wondered why direct allotment was proposed insteadof an auction of the land, which was the normal method adopted bythe Ministry on 23.09.1996. In these circumstances, detailed note

waspreparedon22.01.1998bytheDirector(UD),CentralGovernment. This noticed that before the allotment order was issued,the file was marked to the Finance Division of the UrbanDevelopment Ministry and that the Director was clearly of the opinionthat:

“legal opinion be taken in this case before any order isissued. However, JS (F) ruled that since the Minister hasagreed to allocate the land to EIH on the same terms &conditions, the draft order may be agreed to. It isextremely important to note at this stage that the clear-cut instructions of the Government that before taking anyofficial decision in favour of private party in such acase, each case should be shown to the Ministry ofFinance, were neither mentioned nor taken note of, eventhough these instructions were issued on 11.11.94 by theLands Division …”.

The note went on to state that the appellants had sought for executionof lease and the matter was sent to the Legal Advisor who, in hisopinion of 08.09.1996 expressed doubts and returned the file. It washighlighted more than once in this note that the absence ofconsultation with the Finance Ministry rendered the whole decisiondubious.

33.In these circumstances, the Minister of UA&E, on 16.10.1998noted that it was stated that since the appellant was in possession ofland and had paid ` 4.61 crores, it would be illegal to avoid thecontract. This note of 16.10.1998 appears to have received theconcurrence of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister on30.10.1998. It was in these circumstances that the Attorney General’sopinion was sought. In the meanwhile, the Union Minister of UA&E,

in another note of 08.10.1999, reviewed the entire matter and noticedthat the allotment to the appellant after cancellation of DTTDC’sallotment was not preceded by competent bids as required by theofficial rules and that the Ministry of Finance and Law Ministry wereconsulted.

34.The Minister noted that “[c]learly, there is huge financialloss. If competitive bids had been invited by the Ministry, the amountof premium and ground rent would have been much higher. Evencalculations made, on conservative assumptions, at the portionmarked ‘X’ on page 335/N, show that Rs. 1802 crores would haveaccrued as against Rs. 720.50 crores which East India Hotels wouldpay under the present arrangements, in thirty-three years as licensefee”.

35.The Minister went on to state that his views could also bereferred to the Attorney General. The Attorney General’s writtenopinion of 17.05.2000 discussed the various nuances of the matter andstated that the decision of 27.06.1995 was questionable and wasarrived at by following procedure not sanctioned by the BusinessRules. He also expressed the opinion that the said allotment should becancelled. All these materials appear to have been taken into accountby the Central Government which decided not to go ahead with thelicense arrangement and also later decided to issue the impugnedletter of 2005.

36.As noticed previously, the decision impugned in this case is notthe allotment of land itself but the Central Government’s later opinionthat the public interest would not lie in going ahead with the

transaction. During the hearing, the petitioner’s counsel had attemptedto state that the decision of the Central Government was not onlyillegal but that it was based on fundamentally erroneous propositionsand sought to rely upon calculations about the return of investments insuch circumstances. In this Court’s opinion, delving into that aspectwould not be appropriate. What is at issue here is fundamentallywhether the Central Government’s communication of 27.06.1995,alienating the plot to the appellants resulted in an enforceable right.The Central Government heavily relies upon the Government of India(Transaction of Business Rules), 1961 as amended upto 1982 framedunder Article 77 (3) of the Constitution of India. Rule 4 (which, dealswith the inter-departmental communications), provides by sub-rule 2that:

(2)Unless the case is fully covered by powers tosanction expenditure or to appropriate or reappropriatefunds, conferred by any general or special orders madeby the Ministry of Finance, no department shall, withoutthe previous concurrence of the Ministry of Finance,issue any orders which may-

(a) involve any abandonment of revenue or involveany expenditure for which no provision has been made inthe appropriation act;

(b)involve any grant of land or assignment ofrevenue or concession, grant, lease or license of mineralor forest rights or right to water power or anyeasement or privilege in respect of such concession.

(c) relate to the number or grade of posts, or to thestrength ofa service, or to the pay or allowances ofGovernment servants or to any other conditions of their

service having financial implications; or

(d) otherwise have financial bearing whetherinvolving expenditure or not.”

37.In the present case, the entire relevant records were shown tothe Court. The only approval of the Minister on the record – the noteof 06.03.1996 expressly stated that the concurrence was given forcancellation of allotment made earlier to DTTDC as it had defaultedon the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. However, there isno note or approval of the Finance Minister or the competentauthority empowered to decide or approve the allotment of the plot, inthe Finance Ministry. It was thus glaring omission which compelledvarious officials in the Urban Affairs Ministry at middle and seniorlevels, the Minister of State and eventually the Union CabinetMinister in 1999 to state that the allotment could not be sustained.

38.As observed earlier, there can be no quarrel with theproposition that allocation of natural and public resources need notinvariably be preceded by public auction. As long as the Court issatisfied that the method adopted by the State – even for allowing ordisposing of the land or other valuable asset, is through transparentand fair method, the public agency or the state’s exercise of discretionwould not be interfered with. In this case, however, what is in issue isnot grant of land; it is the decision of the Government not to proceedahead with its previous opinion, embodied in the allotment letter of27.06.1995. The Central Government relies upon the Government ofIndia (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 as well as some

judgments of the Supreme Court. The judgments relied upon by theCentral Government – Smt. Godavari Shamrao Parulekar (supra);State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta (supra) and NarmadaBachao Andolan (supra) have held that the provisions in theGovernment of India (Transaction of Business) Rules should becomplied with. In Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), the Court reliedupon later rulings, i.e. MRF Limited v. Manohar Parrikar & Ors 2010(11) SCC 374 to hold that substantial compliance with the rules canvalidate the action. In the present case, however, the Transaction ofBusiness Rules, which unequivocally mandate prior consultation withthe Finance Ministry before land is dealt with, were not observed.There is nothing on record to show that the file was ever referred tothe Finance Ministry; rather, only Director level officials in theMinistry of Urban Affairs expressed their concurrence with the viewthat direct allotment could be made to the appellant after the previousarrangement with DTTDC was cancelled.39.In these circumstances, the argument of the appellant at bothlevels that the decision, i.e. allotment of 27.06.1995 was legal andenforceable and also that in any event it was the highest bidder in1992, leading to the allotment by DTTDC, cannot prevail. TheCentral Government’s has unquestionable power to review its owndecisions. The decision communicated to the appellant through theallotment letter was not complete or sustainable for the reasons that itwasnotconcurredwiththeFinanceMinistry.TheCentralGovernment, therefore, acted within its rights to say that it would notproceed ahead and enter into the lease arrangement which theappellant wanted. The power of administrative review is inherent withthe executive agency and can be exercised having regard to thepeculiar exigencies and circumstances. In this case, concededly, theCentral Government was not exercising its statutory power whilemaking the allotment. It was dealing with its own property held forand on behalf of the general public under the Constitution. Its decisionnot to go ahead and enter into lease deed, therefore, was in exerciseof such inherent administrative power and is, therefore, supportable inlaw, taken to correct flawed decision (ref. R. R. Verma and Ors. v.Union of India (UOI) and Ors., 1980 (3) SCC 402 andState of U.P.v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh,(1989) 2 SCC 505). In R.R.Verma, the Court held that:

“5.…………………….Surely, any Government must befree to alter policy or its decision in administrativematters. If they are to carry on their daily administrationthey cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions ofjudicial procedure though of course they are bound toobey all statutory requirements and also observe theprinciples of natural justice where rights of parties maybe affected……………………”

In another decision, i.e M. Satyanandam v. Deputy Secretary to Govt.of A.P. and Anr., (1987) 3 SCC 574, it was observed that “In the factsof this case as noted by the High Court, we are unable to entertainthese contentions. We are unable to accept the contention that theGovernment cannot review its own order.”

40.As far as the argument with respect to the appellants being thehighest bidders in the bidding process conducted by the DTTDC in1992 is concerned, as discussed earlier, that process ended with the

cancellation of allotment to DTTDC. The Central Government’sobjection to that process precisely was that long time arrangementwas sought to be entered into without its involvement, approval orconcurrence. Once that allotment – to the DTTDC – became final, oneof the steps leading upto the cancellation, i.e. the bidding process,cannot, in the opinion of this Court, be assaulted to uphold theappellant’s contention. In other words, the entire decision of theDTTDC to allot the plot to the appellant, being case for cancellationof the DTTDC’s own allotment, the appellant cannot be permitted torely upon the fact that it was the highest bidder in such process. Thefact remains that the allotment made directly to the appellant on27.06.1995 was not preceded by any fair or transparent procedureinviting or involving other interested bidders – either through opentender bidding or by calling eligible parties for negotiations. Had sucha process been resorted to, the appellant could have been justified instating that the decision of the Central Government to review suchallotment could not be allowed to stand on account of estoppel orother compelling principles.

41.The Appellants have also argued that under Section 199 of theContract Act, the Central Government has by way of subsequentdecision to allot the plot in favour of the Appellant directly ratified theaction of the DTTDC. While the effect of ratification is indeed whatthe Appellants claim to be – that of relating back to the date of theoriginal contract (Central National Bank Ltd. v. United IndustrialBank Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 181), in this case, the allotment to theAppellants was distinct, in the legal form, from the sub-license

granted by the DTTDC – thus rendering this argument incorrect. In acase of ratification, the original action which is sought to be ratifiedcomes into existence once again, whereas in this case, fresh offerwas made by the Government on 27.06.1995. Indeed, the admittedposition of the Appellants is that the license agreement (thecontractual agreement that may act as ratification) has not yet beenconcluded by the Land and Development Officer although, it isalleged, that the Government had mandated the Officer do so. In sucha case, the argument that ratification fails as there is neither anexpress nor an implied ratification of the previous act “as its (theGovernment’s) own”, where in fact, the letter of cancellation of theallotment to DTTDC qualifies as “clear repudiation” (KadiresanChettiar v. Ramanathan Chetti and Another, AIR 1927 Mad 478, para23)

42.This brings us to the fourth question of any right vested createdin the Appellants in equity, i.e. through the doctrines of promissoryestoppelandlegitimateexpectation,whichcouldinjuncttheGovernment. The Appellants note that over the passage of 13 years,equities had been created in its favour, as also the fact that therepresentation made by the Land and Development Officer throughthe letter of allotment on 27[th]June, 1995, precludes the Governmentfrom back-tracking on that promise or assurance:“Accordingly, I amdirected to convey the sanction of the President to the constructionandcommissioningoftheHotelbytheEastIndiaHotelLtd.,/Centurion Hotels Ltd. on the aforesaid plot of land subject tocompliance of the terms and conditions as enumerated in the license

agreement dated 24.07.92 (copy enclosed) on usual terms andconditions which shall, inter alia, includes (sic) the following …” Forthis, the Single Judge has rightly noted that the doctrine cannot createan expectation as against public authority acting in public interest.The Supreme Court noted in Hira Tikoo v. Union Territory,Chandigarh, (2004) 6 SCC 765 that:

“22. In public law in certain situations, relief to theparties aggrieved by action or promises of publicauthorities can be granted on the doctrine of legitimateexpectation but when grant of such relief is likely toharm larger public interest, the doctrine cannot beallowed to be pressed into service………………………..”

In this case, the larger public interest would no doubt be servedthrough fresh competitive bidding process today which will lead togreater accrual of revenue, as the Secretary, Urban Ministry has alsoalluded to.

43.Crucially, once the Central Government itself formed theopinion that disposal of its property by the allotment letter dated27.06.1995 was not preceded by any fair or transparent procedure –which in the opinion of the Court is not faulted conclusion – theargument of estoppel cannot prevail or apply. Estoppel as has beenreiterated time and again is an equitable principle which would yieldto substantive provisions. The State cannot, consistent with itsmandate to follow the non-discriminatory principle underlying Article14, be bound down by what essentially was an unsupportable bargainshrouded in secrecy as the allotment of 27.06.1995 unquestionablywas. To direct the Central Government in the facts and circumstances

to follow up the allotment letter dated 27.06.1995 by application ofthe principle of promissory estoppel would be, in the opinion of theCourt, contrary to its obligations under the Constitution to dispose ofpublic property through fair and transparent process.

44.Furthermore,thedoctrinesofpromissoryestoppelandlegitimate expectations – doctrines of equity – translate into specificperformance of the promise made. Indeed, such remedies of specificperformance – even, for example, under the Specific Relief Act,though it is not applicable here – are available when “injustice can beavoided only by enforcement of the promise” (M/s. Motilal PadampatSugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1979 SC621). As observed in Att. Gen. For New South Wales v. Quin 1990(64) Aus LJ.Rep 327 the doctrine of legitimate expectations ought notto " unlock the gate which shuts the court out of review on the merits,"and that the Courts should not trespass "into the forbidden field of themerits.” Thus, the argument of the cancellation (of allotment dated27.06.1995) contravening the legitimate expectations of the appellantand the resultant arbitrariness is of no avail. In this case, the SingleJudge has ordered return of the investment made by the Appellant inthe property by way of payment to the Government. Indeed, neitherhas the Appellant has referred in its pleadings to any independentdamage that cannot be compensated but for the specific remedy itrequests.

45.Finally, it is important to note that the present proceedingsinvolve the writ jurisdiction of this Court, and are not an alternative tothe ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts. Indeed, if the Appellants

believe that contractual or quasi-contractual right exists betweenthem and the Government, or if any right under common law orequity is violated, in such opinion, the proper forum for such disputewould be the civil courts, with the proceedings in the writ courtslimited to question of arbitrariness on the part of the State or publicagency’s action. In this case, it is disputed between the partieswhether contract actually existed between them, in that the Land andDevelopment Officer did not, in fact, conclude the license agreementon the terms of the DTTDC agreement as was the order of theGovernment through its letter dated 7[th]June, 1995. The questionwhether contract was formed between the parties under the IndianContract Act, and if breach occurred as to justify either damages orspecific performance, would engage the writ court in matterproperly reserved for the civil courts. contrary conclusion wouldmean that any matter involving the State, sovereign, in plausiblecontractual relationship with private entity would engage thisCourt’s writ jurisdiction – proposition contrary to well-settled law.46.Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, this Court finds noreason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge; theappeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT(JUDGE)

OCTOBER 10, 2013

NAJMI WAZIRI(JUDGE)