CRL.M.C./3749/2015 of BHOOPENDRA SINGH VERMA Vs THE STATE ( NCT OF DELHI) & ANR
Parties
- BHOOPENDRA SINGH VERMAPetitionerThroughMr.D.K. Singh, Adv.ThroughMr.D.K. Singh, Adv (PETITIONER)
- THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR (RESPONDENT)
Cites (1 resolved of 6 detected)
Statutes cited (6)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+CRL.M.C. 3749/2015+CRL.M.C. 3749/2015
Date of Decision: November 05, 2015
BHOOPENDRA SINGH VERMAPetitionerThroughMr.D.K. Singh, Adv.ThroughMr.D.K. Singh, Adv.
versus
THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.....RespondentsThrough Mr.Panna Lal Sharma, APP for theState with SI Yogesh Kumar, PSTimarpur.Mr.Udai Raj Singh, Adv. withR-2 in person.Through Mr.Panna Lal Sharma, APP for theState with SI Yogesh Kumar, PSTimarpur.Mr.Udai Raj Singh, Adv. withR-2 in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI
P.S.TEJI, J.
1.The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filedby the petitioner, namely, Shri Bhoopendra Singh Verma for quashingof FIR No. 178/2013 dated 15.07.2013, under Sections 287/304A IPCregistered at Police Station Timarpur on the basis of compromise deedarrived at between the petitioner and respondent no.2, namely, KamalSingh on 08.09.2015.by the petitioner, namely, Shri Bhoopendra Singh Verma for quashingof FIR No. 178/2013 dated 15.07.2013, under Sections 287/304A IPCregistered at Police Station Timarpur on the basis of compromise deedarrived at between the petitioner and respondent no.2, namely, KamalSingh on 08.09.2015.
2.Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-Statesubmitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has beenidentified to be the complainant/first-informant of the FIR in questionsubmitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has beenidentified to be the complainant/first-informant of the FIR in question
Crl.M.C. 3749/2015
by his counsel.
3. Respondent No.2 present in the Court, submitted that thedispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per thecompromise deed, the matter has been resolved with the interventionof common friends and respected elders of the society. It has alsobeen agreed that the petitioner shall pay sum of Rs.60,000/- to therespondent no.2 towards the compensation of the death of his son.Respondent No.2 affirms the contents of the aforesaid compromisedeed and of his affidavit dated 09.09.2015. As per the affidavit filedby respondent no.2, he has settled all his disputes with the petitioner.All the disputes and differences have been resolved through mutualconsent. Now no dispute with petitioner survives and so, theproceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end.Statement of the respondent No.2 has been recorded in this regard inwhich he stated that he has entered into compromise with thepetitioner and has settled all the disputes with him. He further statedthat he has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed.4.In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 ApexCourt has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in
cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-
"61. In other words, the High Court must consider whetherit would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice tocontinue with the criminal proceedings or continuation ofcriminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of processof law despite settlement and compromise between thevictim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends ofjustice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an endand if the answer to the above question(s) is in theaffirmative, the High Court shall be well within itsjurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."
5. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in
recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC
466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh
(Supra) are as under:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and laydown the following principles by which the High Court wouldbe guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlementbetween the parties and exercising its power under Section482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashingthe proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement withdirection to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to bedistinguished from the power which lies in the Court tocompound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Nodoubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court hasinherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even inthose cases which are not compoundable, where the partieshave settled the matter between themselves. However, thispower is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on thatbasis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed,the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form anopinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutionswhich involve heinous and serious offences of mentaldepravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Suchoffences are not private in nature and have serious impact onsociety. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have beencommitted under special statute like the Prevention ofCorruption Act or the offences committed by public servantswhile working in that capacity are not to be quashed merelyon the basis of compromise, between the victim and theoffender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,particularly those arising out of commercial transactions orarising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputesshould be quashed when the parties have resolved their entiredisputes among themselves.
6. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to
prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.The respondent no.2 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question andhas stated that the matter has been settled out of his own free will. Asthe matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, therewould be an extraordinary delay in the process of law if the legalproceedings between the parties are carried on. So, this Court is ofthe considered opinion that this is fit case to invoke the jurisdictionunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law andto secure the ends of justice.
7.The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provisionof law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process isabused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; toavoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provisionof Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery ofjustice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised tocircumvent the express provisions of law.8.It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court underSection 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble ApexCourt in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. VikramAnatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/084212014 and in the case ofInder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/080812009has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must beexercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when theCourt comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injusticeor there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power isnot exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.
9. elt is well settled law that where the High Court is convincedthat the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do notaffect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing ofsuch proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peaceand would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time andenergy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in[[entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is]]compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.Joshi and others v. Stale of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions ofSection 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are notcompoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose ofsecuring the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be bar to the exercise of power ofquashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified theexercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash theproceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts
1 [[entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is]]
and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-compoundable.
In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view thatnotwithstanding the fact the offences under Sections 287/304A IPCare non-compoundable offences, there should be no impediment inquashing the FIR under these sections, if the Court is otherwisesatisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.
10.In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view ofstatement made by the respondent No.2, the FIR in question warrantsto be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to bequashed.statement made by the respondent No.2, the FIR in question warrantsto be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to bequashed.
11.Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No. 178/2013dated 15.07.2013, under Sections 287/304A IPC registered at PoliceStation Timarpur and the proceedings emanating therefrom arequashed against the petitioner.dated 15.07.2013, under Sections 287/304A IPC registered at PoliceStation Timarpur and the proceedings emanating therefrom arequashed against the petitioner.
12.This petition is accordingly disposed of.
NOVEMBER 05, 2015dd
.LIii'(P.S1TEJJ)'JUDG1