CRL.L.P./487/2015 of THE STATE ( NCT OF DELHI) Vs KALYAN SINGH @ KALLA

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+CRLX.P.No. 487/2015

%Date of decision: 18"' April, 2016

STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Petitioner

Through : Ms. Aashaa Tiwari, AFP for State withSI Sanjay Rana, PS-Mahendra Park.

versus-

KALYAN SINGH@ KALLA '

Respondent

Through : Ms. Inderjeet Sidhu, Advocate (DHCLSC)

CORAM: V > r '' ^ %HON'BLEMR^ JUSTICE G. Si SIST4NI ^ IIHON'BLE MSI JUSTICE SANGIT^DHINGRA SEHGAlJ

SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J.

CRL.MA. 8514/2015

1. This is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with

Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the State seekingcondonation of 10 days' delay-in-filing the present leave to appealpetition.condonation of 10 days' delay-in-filing the present leave to appealpetition.

2. Having regard to the submissions made and in the interest of justice,present application is allowed.present application is allowed.

3. Application stands disposed of.

CRL.L.P. 487/2015

4. The State by this Criminal Leave Petition, under Section 378(3) of theCode of Criminal Procedure, seeks leave to appeal against theCode of Criminal Procedure, seeks leave to appeal against the

Crl. L. P.487/2015

Signature Not Verified

judgment dated 24.12.2014 passed by Sh. Yashwant Kumar,Additional Sessions Judge-03, Rohini Courts, Delhi in Sessions CaseNo. 01/13 thereby acquitting the respondent under Section 302 of theIndian Penal Code.

5. The necessary and relevant facts, as projected by the prosecution are

as under

"On 10.09.2012, on receipt of information vide DD No. 6PP,NS Mandi, Azadpur, 10 Inspector Darshan Singh along withpolice staff in Govt. gypsy bearing registration No. DLICM-3521 reached at the spot i.e. near shed No. 15-16, FruitMandi, Azadpur where SI Shailendra Kumar along with staffwere present. loaded truck bearing registration No.MP06- Hc-1613 make Ashok Leyland of ten tyres wasparked at the spot and in the cabin of that truck, dead bodyof person aged about 25 years, wearing T- shirt and tracksuit lower was found and there were injury marks on hishead and ear. The head of the driver was towards steeringand legs were towards the conductor seat. The glass ofdriver seat window was broken. In the cabin, one blood -stained iron rod, one blanket, one old cloth and one bloodstained nut wrench were found. lO gave information toControl Room, North West Distt through wireless. CrimeTeam inspected the spot and photographs were taken. Onthe spot. Complainant Amar Nath Singh met who got hisstatement recorded that he was working as Muneem (clerk)with Sh. Sanjeev Kumar Sachdeva, owner of Manu Fruits, A-1102, Fruit Mandi, Azadpur, Delhi. On 09.09.2012 at about05.00 pm, truck bearing registration No. MP-06-HC-1613loaded with Mausami (sweet lemon) came to their Adhat atShed No. 15, Azadpur Fruit Mandi from Hyderabad, AndhraPradesh which was to be unloaded at their Adhat but due toSunday, the same could not be unloaded. In the truck, twodrivers namely Deepak and Kalla Came. APMC staff camefor cleaning at the Adhat and there was some problem instarting the said truck. Driver Deepak brought another

battery from somewhere and at that time an altercation tookplace between both drivers. After cleaning, driver Deepakagain parked the truck at Adhat. At about 05.45 pm, AmarNath went to his house after giving instructions to both thedrivers not to take the truck anywhere else in any condition.On 10.09.2012 at about 05.15 am, Amar Nath came toMandi from his house and saw that truck was not at theAdhat. He gave the information to his owner who told him tolook around for the truck. Amar Nath searched the truck andfound it parked at distance of 50 feet. He peeped in thedriver cabin of the truck from conductor side and found thedriver Deepak lying dead and smeared in blood. Heimmediately dialed at 100 number. The other driver Kallawas found missing. The condition of cabin driver revealedthat there might be quarrel between both the drivers anddriver Kalla fled away from there after killing driverDeepak. He was sure that driver Kalla murdered driverDeepak. On his statement, FIR u/s 302 IPG was gotregistered through HC Ranjan. "■ |

6. Further it is the case of the prosecution that on 11.09.2012, the brotherof the deceased namely Raj Kumar identified the dead body and heraised suspicion over the respondent as he was missing from the dayof incident. Raj Kumar also^isclosed to the police that his brotherused to keep one mobile with the number [REDACTED]. On12.09.2012, on the basis of secret information the respondent wasarrested from outside Nizamuddin Railway Station and on the basis ofthe disclosure statement the blood stained clothes of the respondentand the mobile phone of the deceased Deepak were seized. Therespondent had the injury of human bite over the right index fingerand also injury at right eye. The respondent refused for judicial TestIdentification Parade.of the deceased namely Raj Kumar identified the dead body and heraised suspicion over the respondent as he was missing from the dayof incident. Raj Kumar also^isclosed to the police that his brotherused to keep one mobile with the number [REDACTED]. On12.09.2012, on the basis of secret information the respondent wasarrested from outside Nizamuddin Railway Station and on the basis ofthe disclosure statement the blood stained clothes of the respondentand the mobile phone of the deceased Deepak were seized. Therespondent had the injury of human bite over the right index fingerand also injury at right eye. The respondent refused for judicial TestIdentification Parade.

CrL L. P.487/2015

7. Upon Committal of the case to the court of Sessions, the respondentwas charged with having committed the offence under Section 302 ofthe Indian Penal Code. The respondent pleaded not guilty to theaforesaid charges and accordingly prosecution was called upon to leadevidence.was charged with having committed the offence under Section 302 ofthe Indian Penal Code. The respondent pleaded not guilty to theaforesaid charges and accordingly prosecution was called upon to leadevidence.

8. To bring home the guilt against the respondent, the prosecutionexamined 26 witnesses in all. The statement of the respondent wasrecorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedurewherein he denied all the incriminating facts and circumstances of the'' ii ^examined 26 witnesses in all. The statement of the respondent wasrecorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedurewherein he denied all the incriminating facts and circumstances of the'' ii ^case put by thefprosecution against him and claimed trial. However,the respondent did not lead any evidence in his defence.the respondent did not lead any evidence in his defence.

9. Ms. Aashaa Tiwari, learned APP for the State contended that theimpugned judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judgefri If ff 1 .impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judgefri If ff 1 .is based upon conjunctures and surmises and is bad in law. Thelearned Trial Court failed to apj^reciate the factual matrix of the caseand also failed in appreciating the evidence surfaced during the courseof trial. ' ~ 'learned Trial Court failed to apj^reciate the factual matrix of the caseand also failed in appreciating the evidence surfaced during the courseof trial. ' ~ '10. Further it was urged by the counsel of the State that the case of theprosecution was based upon circumstantial evidence which wereestablished cogently and firmly and therefore could not be brushedaside.prosecution was based upon circumstantial evidence which wereestablished cogently and firmly and therefore could not be brushedaside.

11. Counsel for the State urged that the Trial Court erred in completelyignoring the testimonies of PWll, PW14, PW15 and PW16 and notgiven any credence to the same.ignoring the testimonies of PWll, PW14, PW15 and PW16 and notgiven any credence to the same.

12. Counsel for the State further contended that the Trial court erred innot appreciating that PWll was witness to the heated altercationnot appreciating that PWll was witness to the heated altercation

between the respondent and the deeeased and had also seen themtogether on 09.09.2012 when he left the spot giving them instructionsnot to leave the shed. Counsel further submitted that PW15 hadspecifically deposed that the deeeased and respondent left Hyderabadtogether on 01.09.2012 with the truck loaded with mausami (sweetlemon) giving way to the fact that they were both together.

13. Per Contra, supporting the impugned judgment, it was submitted byMs. Inderjeet Sidhu, counsel for the respondent that while recordingthe findings of acquittal in favour of the respondent, very sound andcogent reasons have been assigned by the learned Trial Judge.

14. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that the guarrel between

the respondent and the deceased involved only shouting loudly at eachother due to non functioning of the truck as admitted by PWll andSil y 1? IT unowhere resulted into physical fight. Counsel vehemently urged thatthe investigation was not conducted fairly and no public person wasjoined at the time of arrest and recovery.

15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record andalso examined the judgment in-detail rendered by the Trial Court.16. It is cardinal principle of criminal; jurisprudence that the prosecutionhas to stand on its own legs. The burden is so heavy on theprosecution that blemishes in the story of the accused cannot give aright to the prosecution to claim that the version of the prosecutionshould be preferred, whereas the burden on the accused is slightlylight as he has to discharge the burden by preponderance ofprobabilities.

17. PW3 Dr. V.K Jha, Medical officer conducted postmortem andprepared the examination report Ex.PW3/A opined as under;prepared the examination report Ex.PW3/A opined as under;

"On the basis of examination, I opined the cause ofdeath as cranio cerebral damage as result of bluntforce diverted upon head by other party. All injurieswere anti mortem in nature and injury no. 5 wassufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.Time since death was approximately 35 hours,xxxxx

On opening, one iron rod was taken out. Afterexamination, I had examined the iron rod and was ofthe opinion that the dnjuries mentioned in the PMreport now Ex PW3/A could have been caused by theweapon/of offence sent in sealed packet by the 10 withthe seal of DS or similar such weapon. " i^^ ^ "'ftexamination, I had examined the iron rod and was ofthe opinion that the dnjuries mentioned in the PMreport now Ex PW3/A could have been caused by theweapon/of offence sent in sealed packet by the 10 withthe seal of DS or similar such weapon. " i^^ ^ "'ft18. Perusal of the.ubovementioried , at testimony clearly establishes athe factthat it \yas homicidal death'.Now it would be |ignificant todetermine! whether the prosecutioh;has established beyohd doubt thatthe death pf the deceased person „herein was caused by or was theresult of the act done by the respondent herein.that it \yas homicidal death'.Now it would be |ignificant todetermine! whether the prosecutioh;has established beyohd doubt thatthe death pf the deceased person „herein was caused by or was theresult of the act done by the respondent herein.

19. PW8 Raj Kumar, brother of-deceased in his examination in chiefdeposed as under: . .deposed as under: . .

"My brother was driver on truck along with accusedKalyan Singh @ Kala. Accused Kalyan Singh @ Kalais resident of same village in which I reside. I knowaccused Kalyan Singh@ Kala who is present in thecourt today (correctly identified). I am of firmbelieve that accused Kala had committed the murderof my brother Deepak. My brother Deepak wascarrying mobile phone at the time of the incident. "Kalyan Singh @ Kala. Accused Kalyan Singh @ Kalais resident of same village in which I reside. I knowaccused Kalyan Singh@ Kala who is present in thecourt today (correctly identified). I am of firmbelieve that accused Kala had committed the murderof my brother Deepak. My brother Deepak wascarrying mobile phone at the time of the incident. "

20. This witness in his cross examination stated as under:

"No quarrel had taken place between accused and mybrother in my presence but otherwise I cannot tell.When my brother used to pass through the village onthe truck, he came to house. "

21. PWll Amar Nath Singh, complainant in the present case in hisexamination in ehief deposed as under:

"On 09.09.2012 on the day of Sunday, One truckN0.MPO6 HC 1613 was parked at Shed no. 15,Azadpur Fruit Mandi in front of our Shed/shop. Thesaid truck came from Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh)with Mosami. f)ue to Sunday, the truckMas unloaded.In the truck) jtheijrwers' ■^erkiSqmely Beepak andKala At about *05:00 pmr^ the sweepers of APMCalong with their staff came there for cleaning purpose.The driver of the truck Deepak tried to start the truckbut it CQuld not be started and thereafter he broughtthe) battery from some other truck and started thetruck. Due to non- stdrtihg of truck, there was aquarrel between drivemDeepah and other driver Kala.After starting the truck through another batteip bydriver Deepak the staff of APMC cleaned the arda andthereafter T directed the - driver Deepak to park histruck infront of ounshop (Adath). 1 directed both thedrivers Deepak and. Kala~hot4o remove the truckfromin front of our shop and 1 left-the Shed.

On 10.09.2012 at about 05:15 am when I came backat Shed No. 15 in our shop 1 had not seen the TruckNo. MP06 HC 1613 in front of our shop (Adath).Thereafter, 1 made call to my owner and informedabout the missing of truck and he told me to trace thetruck as it was parked nearby our shop. 1 went insearch of the truck and at distance of 50 feet aheadof our shop, 1 found said truck was parked there. 1climbed the truck from the side of conductor andlooked inside the cabin and found the driver Deepakwas lying in pool of blood and his legs were towards

the side of conductor seat and head was towards thedriver seat. I was shocked and scared and made callat 100 number from own mobile number i.e.[REDACTED]. The other driver Kala was not presentthere. 1 had suspicion that there was quarrelbetween driver Deepak and Kala and Kala had killedthe driver Deepak and left the truck,xxxxx

On 09.09.12 there was no injury mark visible on the^faces of deceased Deepak as well as accused Kalyan/Singh @ Kala. "

22. This witness in his cross examination stated

"The quarrel between accused and deceased was notturned intofighting. They were only shouting loudlyto each other due to nbn starting'of their truck 1 hadseen the accused and ^deceased only on (M09:2012.Pribr to that day they were not known to me and ckmefir$ time at our shop. time at our shop. at our shop. our shop. shop. ,

fir$ time at our shop. time at our shop. at our shop. our shop. shop. , |p* s«Ip* s«IBhujbal in his cross examination stated as under;|in his cross examination stated as under;|his cross examination stated as under;|cross examination stated as under;|examination stated as under;|stated as under;|as under;|under;|^^ ^ *> ^^^ ^ *> ^"My statement was recorded byr the police on03.11 2012 at PS Mahendra Park, Delhi. Phad statedto the police that Pwas drivingdhe truck of one ShivSingh Gurjar (confronted- with the statementEx.PW16/DA, where it is- not so recorded). 1 hadtelephoned the deceased Deepak from Sikri in MP. Inmy presence, no quarrel had ever taken place betweenthe accused Kalyan and deceased Deepak and theyhad cordial relations with each other. "03.11 2012 at PS Mahendra Park, Delhi. Phad statedto the police that Pwas drivingdhe truck of one ShivSingh Gurjar (confronted- with the statementEx.PW16/DA, where it is- not so recorded). 1 hadtelephoned the deceased Deepak from Sikri in MP. Inmy presence, no quarrel had ever taken place betweenthe accused Kalyan and deceased Deepak and theyhad cordial relations with each other. "23. PW 16 Bhujbal in his cross examination stated as under;|in his cross examination stated as under;|his cross examination stated as under;|cross examination stated as under;|examination stated as under;|stated as under;|as under;|under;|

24. PW14 Dr. Sandeep Haldar on 12.09 2012 was posted as SR Medicineson BJRM hospital who examined the respondent and deposed in hisexamination in chief ihsX the patient Kalyan Singh was having allegedon BJRM hospital who examined the respondent and deposed in hisexamination in chief ihsX the patient Kalyan Singh was having alleged

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history of human bite four days back therefore, I prescribed himtetanus injection and anti-biotic.

25. PW15 Dr. Gopal Krishna, medical officer, BJRM Hospital deposed in

his examination in chief as under:

"On 12.09.2012, 1 was posted as CMC in the abovementioned hospital and on that day HC Raj Kumarbrought one Kalyan Singh @ Kalla who was in custodyfor medical examination at 09:45 pm. The patient had thealleged history of human bite and physical assault fourdays back. On local examination, no fresh external injurywas seen at the time of examination: Healing wound rightindex finger'and lateral side^ of'right'ear.... "

26. PW26 Ms. Sunita Gupta, Sr.^ Scientific-officer who prepared the FSLreport deposed that on analysis blood-was detected'on 'EXl, 2, 3, 7, 8,10a, 10b,il0c, 12a, 12b, 13, 14a, 14b, 15, F1 toFlO. She further statedf' n ^that blood could not be detected Jon Ex.4, 5a, 5b, &6nMy detailedreport is ftEx.PW26/A which'b,ears\ %•»: , s my X signature at point JJA&B. Onserological examination, Exl,J2,J0b,'13,. Ma," 14b, Fl, F2, F4, F6, F8& FIO was found to be human in_origin and of Group in ABO'Grouping. - ' ' 27. From the perusal of the above testimonies of the witnesses, it has beenestablished that quarrel had taken place between the deceased andthe respondent which restrained only to the extent of shouting. It isclear from the above mentioned testimonies that the alleged history ofhuman bite occurred four days prior to 12.09.2012 and there is nodefinite evidence to prove that the bite on the respondent was causedby the deceased. Moreover, no fresh external injury was seen at thetime of examination on the respondent. The FSL report shows that

blood was detected on the iron rod but there was no reaction in thecolumn of ABO grouping/ remarks.

28. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between thepoint of time when the accused and deceased were last seen alive andwhen the deceased found dead is so small that possibility of anyperson other than the accused being the author of the crime becomesimpossible. It would be difficult in the present case to positivelyestablish that the deceased was last seen with the accused as there wasa long gap and the,possibility pf other persons coming in betweenexisted. There js no |yp"witness fo the alleged-incident. Merely on theground that PW8 -firmly' believ^ed or, PWll had" suspicion that therespondent had killed the deceased, it would not be/|ustified to convictf[ ,-^1 I . . 'ftthe respondent only on the basis i of suspicion and circumstantialft'i tV r ft' I* s " ftjSevidence llinless and until the 'evidence is corroborative with direct.ftftproof given by the prosecution:\Wejh'ave scrutinized scrupulously andexamined carefully the circumstances appearing in this case againstthe respondent and we arc of the view that the prosecution has failedto complete the chain of circurnstances holding respondent guilty ofthe crime beyond reasonable *ddubt.

29. It is well settled law that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannottake the place of proof. In Raj Kiimar Singh @ Raju @ Baiya Vs.State of Rajasthan: (2013) 5 SCC 722, the Hon'ble Apex Court held

that:

"17. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take theplace of proof, and there is large difference betweensomething that 'may be'proved and 'will be proved'. In acriminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannotsomething that 'may be'proved and 'will be proved'. In acriminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot

and rnust not be permitted to take place of proof. This isfor the reason, that the mental distance between 'may be'and must be is quite large and divides vague conjecturesfrom sure conclusions. In criminal case, the Court hasa duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion donot take the place of legal proof. The large distancebetween 'may be'true and 'must be' true, must be coveredby way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidenceproduced by the prosecution, before an accused iscondemned as convict, and the basic and golden rulemust be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind thedistance between 'may bel-true and 'must be' true, theCourt must .^;maintain the vital "•^-idistance betweenconjectures and sure conclusions^ to be arrived at, on thetouchstone of dispassionate:jMdicial scrutiny based upona complete and,comprehensive appreciation of allfeatwes of the case, as welLas the quality and credibilityPf ^idence brought hn ^^fecord. The Court musten^re, that miscarriage ^-ofiusfice is avoided an'^ if thefd(^ and circumstances\of case so demand, tlfen theber^t of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping inmind that reasonable doubt is not an imaginarf, trivialor a%erely prdbable ddubt, buta famdoubt tka^is basedupon reason, and common sense., ffjde: HanumantGovind Narguhdkar and Anr. v. Statejof MP.: AIR 1952SC 343; Shivaji Sahabrdo Bobade^ and Anr. v. State ofMahrashtra: AIR 1973 SC 2622; Sh'arad BirdhichandSarda v. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1984 SC 1622;Subhash Chand v. State of Rajqsthan: (2002) 1 SCC 702;Ashish Batham v. State of M:P. : AIR 2002 SC 3206;Narendra Singh and Anr. v. State of M.P. : AIR 2004 SC3249; State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya: AIR2011 SC 1017; and Ramesh Harijan v. State of UP. :AIR 2012 SC 1979)It is case of circumstantial evidenceand it is well-settled that the prosecution has to establisheach circumstance by independent evidence arid thecircumstances so established should form Completechain without giving room to any other hypothesis and

should be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent withhis innocence. "

30. In Rajiv Singh Vs State of Bihar and Ors.: 2016 (1) ACR 510, theApex Court reiterated the aforesaid principle held as under:

"60. It is well entrenched principle of criminalJurisprudence that charge can be said to be provedonly when there is certain and explicit evidence towarrant legal conviction and that no person can be heldguilty on pure moraLconvictipn. Howsoever grave thealleged offencp may be, iOthepvise stirring the conscienceof any court', ^uspicidn'-alone cannot take the place oflegal proof^^The well {established cannon of criminaljustice isfiifoulep'^the^ch P^pof. Inunmistakable terms, it ^sythe mandate of law xthat theprokecution II • in order to "v sucpeed t % 'X'" < ^in criminalftridh has toproye the charge (s) beyond all reasonable |doubt. 6n^The above enunSiatiohslresonated umpteen ti^es tobe Reiterated in Raj 'Kumior^Singh @ Raju @| BatyaV. Stpte of Rajasthan ; ,(2013) ,5 SCC 722 as siAcinctlysumiharized in paragraph 21 as hereunder: Jf21. Suspicion, however grave it may/be, carm^ take theplace of proof and there is largddifference betweensomethingihat "rnayfej-proved and "will be proved". Ina criminal trial, suspicion no matter-how strong, cannotand must not be permitted to lake place of proof. This isfor the reason that the mental distance between "may be"and "must be" is quite large and divides vagueconjectures from sure conclusions. In criminal case,the court has duty to ensure that mere conjectures orsuspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The largedistance between "may be" true and "must be" true, mustbe covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachableevidence produced by the prosecution, before an accusedis condemned as convict, and the basic and golden rulemust be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the

distance between "may be" true and "must be" true, thecourt must maintain the vital distance betweenconjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on thetouchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upona complete and comprehensive appreciation of allfeatures of the case, as well as the quality and credibilityof the evidence brought on record. The court must ensurethat miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts andcircumstances of case so demand, then the benefit ofdoubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind thata reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or amerely probable doubt, but fair doubt that is basedupon reason and-common;sense. '.'

31. In Prabhoo Vs. State of UP, AIRi J963 Supmme Court 1113, it hasbeen held that circumstantial .bvidbnce must be such as to lead to aconclusion which on any reasonab,le hypothesis is consistent only withI >the guilt of the accused person and not with his innocenc|:fl > 1

"idk Therefore, the question before us is thisf Is theproduction of the blood-stained'axe and clothef read inthe light of the evidence regarding motive sufficient tolead to the 'conclusion that the appellant must be themurderer? It is well-settled that circumstantial evidencemust be much as to lead to conclusion which on anyreasonable hypothesis in -consistent only with the guilt ofthe accused person and not with his innocence. Themotive alleged in this case would operate not only on theappellant but on his father as well. From the mereproduction of the blood stained articles by the appellantone cannot come to the conclusion that the appellantcommitted the murder. Even if somebody else hadcommitted the murder and the blood stained articles hadbeen kept in the house, the appellant might produce theblood stained articles when interrogated by the Sub-Inspector of Police. It cannot be said that the fact of.

production is consistent only with the guilt of theappellant and inconstant with his innocence. We are ofthe opinion that the chain of circumstantial evidence isnot complete in this case and the prosecution hasunfortunately left missing links, probably because theprosecution adopted the shortout of ascribing certainstatements to the appellant which were clearlyinadmissible."

32. In the case of Dr. Sunil Clifford Daniel Vs. State of Punjab : (2012)

11 see 205, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held :

"In case of circumstantial evidence, the prosecutionmust establish each instance of incriminatingcircumstance, by way of reliable and clinching evidence,and the circumstances so proved must form completechain of events, on the basis of which, no conclusionother than one of guilt of the accused can be reached.Undoubtedly, suspicion, however grave it may be, cannever be treated as substitute for proof. While dealingwith case of circumstantial evidence, the court musttake utmost precaution whilst finding an accused guilty,solely on the basis of the circumstances proved before it."

33. criminal offence is crime not' only against an individual but alsoagainst the society, the inyestigating agency have sanctified, legaland social obligation to exhaiisf all its experience and expertise toferret out the truth and bring the culprit to book. The manifest defectsin the investigation in the instant case demonstrate an inexcusablefailure on the part of the authorities concerned to abide by theirparamount imperative.against the society, the inyestigating agency have sanctified, legaland social obligation to exhaiisf all its experience and expertise toferret out the truth and bring the culprit to book. The manifest defectsin the investigation in the instant case demonstrate an inexcusablefailure on the part of the authorities concerned to abide by theirparamount imperative.

34. In Mrinal Das and Ors. Vs. The State of Tripura reported in AIR2011 SC 3753, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:2011 SC 3753, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:

"It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in theabsence of perversity in the judgment and order.

interference by this Court exercising its extraordinaryjurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appealis heard by an appellate court, being the final court offact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsiderand review the evidence and take its own decision. Inother words, law does not prescribe any limitation,restriction or condition on exercise of such power andthe appellate court is free to arrive at its ownconclusion keeping in mind that acquittalprovides for presumption in favour of the accused.The presumption of innocence is available to theperson and in criminalfmkpmdence every person ispresumed to bp innocent unless lie Is'proved guilty bythe competent, court If two rdafdnable Mews arepossible on .theMasis of'the\ evidence on record, theappellate^ court should\ noV disturb thC'findings ofacquittal. There is no. limitation on the part of theapp(f late'court to review the evidence upon whic\ theorder of acquittal is"^ found and to come to its ownconclusion. The appellate i court can also reviewf heconclusion arrived at. by the trial Court withrespect to both facts and law. While dealing withthe appeal against acquittal preferred by the Stqte, itis thefuty^of the appellate court to 'marshal the entireevidence on record' and only by giving cogent andadequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal.An order of acquittal is to be interfered withonly when there are "compelling and substantialreasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearlyunreasonable", it is compelling reason forinterference. When the trial Court has ignored theevidence or misread the material evidence or hasignored material documents like dyingdeclaration/report of ballistic experts etc., theappellate court is competent to reverse the decision ofthe trial Court depending on the materials placed."35. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh & Ors., reportedin 2013 (8) SC 625, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that theappellate court while considering the appeal against the judgment ofacquittal shall interfere only when there are compelling and substantialreasons for doing so and if the judgment is unreasonable and relevantmaterials have been unjustifiably ignored, it would be compellingreason for interference.in 2013 (8) SC 625, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that theappellate court while considering the appeal against the judgment ofacquittal shall interfere only when there are compelling and substantialreasons for doing so and if the judgment is unreasonable and relevantmaterials have been unjustifiably ignored, it would be compellingreason for interference.

36. While deciding the present leave to appeal, the aforestated principlesculled out by the Apex Courtrare to be keptJn view. In the presentVJ »culled out by the Apex Courtrare to be keptJn view. In the presentVJ »case from the evidence which has emerged on record, we conclude,T-,? -i'',T-,? -i''that the learned Trial Courf rightly observed that the prosecutionfailed to prove its case against the respondenfTbeyd|id reasonabledoubt, the prosecution has not made but case to grani the leave tofi4^ I i \ 5 < 1 ? j S r- 5?'1failed to prove its case against the respondenfTbeyd|id reasonabledoubt, the prosecution has not made but case to grani the leave tofi4^ I i \ 5 < 1 ? j S r- 5?'1appeal arid the view taken by .the learned Trial Court for acquitting theI• ' I ,1I• ' I ,1responderit, was possible and plausibles ^ $37. In totality df the facts and circumstances, we do not find any infirmityin the impugned judgment ; Accordingly, no: ,pounds are made out tointerfere in the impugned judgrhent passed by learned Trial court andthe leave to appeal petition is dismissed.in the impugned judgment ; Accordingly, no: ,pounds are made out tointerfere in the impugned judgrhent passed by learned Trial court andthe leave to appeal petition is dismissed.

SANGEfsCDHSEHGAL, JG.S.SISTANI, J

April 18, 2016 / gr//