CRL.M.C./5819/2014 of DARSHAN KHURANA & ORS Vs THE STATE ( GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+CRL.M.C. 5819/2014

Date of Decision : April 04[th], 2016

DARSHAN KHURANA & ORS

..... Petitioners

ThroughMr.Anvar Qamaruddin, Adv.

versus

THE STATE ( GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI) & ANR ... RespondentsThroughMr.Amit Chadha, APP for the StateInspt.G. SinghRespondent no.2 in person.

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

P.S.TEJI, J.

1.The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed bythe petitioners, namely, Sh. Darshan Khurana, Sh. Sanjeev Khuranaand Sh. Narinder Kaushal for quashing of FIR No.537/2006 dated25.07.2006, under Sections 406/420/468/471/120B IPC registered atPolice Station Shalimar Bagh on the basis of the compromise deedarrived at between petitioner nos. 1 & 2 and respondent no.2, namely,Sh. Pradeep Bhushan Goel along with others on 01.10.2009 and thecompromise deed arrived at between respondent no.2 on behalf ofothers and petitioner no.3 on 26.05.2010.

2.Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-Statesubmitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has beenidentified to be the one of the complainants/first-informants in the FIR

in question by Inspector G. Singh.

3.The factual matrix of the present case is that the FIR in questionwas lodged by the complainant on the allegation that on 04.11.1996,alleged persons namely Darshan Khurana and others formed welfaresociety under the name and style of “Greater Delhi Awas VikasSociety” and collected money from public through advertisements.The true fact was that the registration of Housing Societies in Delhiwas not permitted legally in Delhi at that time and they got themselvesregistered as Charitable and Welfare Association thereby misleadingthe members of the public and collected Rs. 45 lacs in the bankaccount besides collecting cash as per membership. After acceptanceof the money, the management never called any General Bodymeeting and their books of accounts were never audited. The memberswho booked the plot/flat were totally kept in dark about their trueaffairs. Shri Narinder Kaushal in almost all the cases, personallypresented the affairs of the society to lure the members of the public togettheirmoneyetc.TheaccusedDharshanKhuranaafterincorporation of the society came in contact of Narender Kaushal andauthorized him to assist in the business of the society. All the threeaccusedpersonswereinstrumentalinalluringthecomplainants/victims to part away from their money.

Thereafter, the matter got compromised between the parties.

4.Respondent No.2 present in the Court submitted that the disputebetween the parties has been amicably resolved. As per thecompromise deed dated 09.10.2009, it has been agreed that petitionernos.1 & 2 shall pay sum of Rs. 1 Lakh in cash on 09.10.2009 to

respondent no.2 and others, who have been named as parties of theFirst Part in the said compromise deed.It is also agreed thatrespondent no.2 shall receive the above mentioned cash for and onbehalf of others, who have been named as parties of the First Part inthe said compromise deed. It has also been agreed that on 12.10.2009,petitioner nos.1 & 2 shall issue one post dated cheque of Rs. 1 Lakhonly dated 10.11.2009, which will also be received in the name ofrespondent no.2 for and on behalf of others, who have been named asparties of the First Part in the said compromise deed. It is also agreedthat on 12.10.2009, petitioner nos.1 & 2 shall issue 15 post datedcheques for sum of Rs. 50,000/- each in the name of respondent no.2received for and on behalf of others, who have been named as partiesof the First Part in the said compromise deed. It is also agreed that the15 post dated cheques shall be payable on the 10[th]day of every monthfrom December 2009 and that the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 shall pay thelast installment of Rs.50,000/- by way of draft/cheque at the time ofquashing of the FIR in question before this Court. It is also agreed thatthe respondent no.2 along with others, who have been named asparties of the First Part in the said compromise deed shall withdraw allcomplaint cases under Section 138 N.I. Act filed against petitionernos. 1 & 2 after receipt of the total compromise amount. It is alsoagreed that the bail granted in view of the compromise shall beconditional upon the fact that the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 shall pay thepost dated cheques on the date mentioned above and also undertakethat the post dated cheques issued by the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 shall beduly honoured on its presentation. It is also agreed that the in case any

cheque of the compromise amount is dishonoured, then the petitionernos. 1 & 2 shall be liable to pay the entire amount as due on30.04.2003, i.e. Rs.12,49,015/- along with interest @ 24% per annumfrom 30.04.2003 and the bail granted to the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 shallbe liable to be cancelled and the respondent no.2 along with others,who have been named as parties of the First Part in the saidcompromise deed shall be at liberty to move appropriate applicationfor cancellation of the bail before the appropriate Court. It is alsoagreed that the respondent no.2 along with others, who have beennamed as parties of the First Part in the said compromise deed shallcooperate with petitioner nos. 1 & 2 at the time of quashing of the FIRin question before this Court. As per the compromise deed dated26.05.2010, the first party i.e. respondent no.2 and others shall receivea sum of Rs. 2.5 lacs from the petitioner no.3. The Cheque No. 205683dated 28.02.2010 was duly paid on presentation. The first party was inpossession of the second Cheque No. 205684 dated 31.03.2010 forRs.1 lacs pending towards discharge of the obligation. In compliancewith the order dated 26.03.2010, demand draft No. 576173 dated27.03.2010 for Rs. 1.5 lacs drawn in the name of respondent no.2 wasmade out and deposited in the Court on 29.03.2010. The first partyaccepted the said draft through IO of the case and was paid on09.04.2010. Respondent no. 2 affirmed the contents of the aforesaidcompromise deeds and of his affidavit dated 26.11.2014, supportingthis petition. In the affidavit, he has stated that he has been authorizedby other complainants of the FIR in question to proceed in the matteron their behalf. He further stated that he has no objection if the FIR inquestion is quashed. All the disputes and differences have beenresolved through mutual consent. Now no dispute with petitionerssurvives and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question bebrought to an end. Statement of the respondent no. 2 has beenrecorded in this regard in which he stated that he has entered into acompromise with the petitioners and has settled all the disputes withthem. He further stated that he has no objection if the FIR in questionis quashed.

5.In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 ApexCourt has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes incases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

“61.In other words, the High Court must considerwhether it would be unfair or contrary to the interestof justice to continue with the criminal proceedingsorcontinuationofcriminalproceedingswouldtantamount to abuse of process of law despitesettlement and compromise between the victim andthe wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends ofjustice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to anend and if the answer to the above question(s) is in theaffirmative, the High Court shall be well within itsjurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.”whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interestof justice to continue with the criminal proceedingsorcontinuationofcriminalproceedingswouldtantamount to abuse of process of law despitesettlement and compromise between the victim andthe wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends ofjustice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to anend and if the answer to the above question(s) is in theaffirmative, the High Court shall be well within itsjurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings.”

6.The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in

recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh(Supra) are as under:-

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum upand lay down the following principles by which theHigh Court would be guided in giving adequatetreatment to the settlement between the parties andexercising its power under Section 482 of the Codewhile accepting the settlement and quashing the

proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement withdirection to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Codeis to be distinguished from the power which lies in theCourt to compound the offences under Section 320 ofthe Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code,the High Court has inherent power to quash thecriminal proceedings even in those cases which arenot compoundable, where the parties have settled thematter between themselves. However, this power is tobe exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlementand on that basis petition for quashing the criminalproceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such caseswould be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to forman opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in thoseprosecutionswhich involveheinous and seriousoffences of mental depravity or offences like murder,rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private innature and have serious impact on society. Similarly,for the offences alleged to have been committed underspecial statute like the Prevention of Corruption Actor the offences committed by public servants whileworking in that capacity are not to be quashed merelyon the basis of compromise between the victim andthe offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,particularlythosearisingoutofcommercialtransactions or arising out of matrimonial relationshipor family disputes should be quashed when the partieshave resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

7.The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to

prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.Respondent no. 2 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question andstated that the matter has been settled out of his own free will. As thematter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, there would bean extraordinary delay in the process of law if the legal proceedingsbetween the parties are carried on. So, this Court is of the consideredopinion that this is fit case to invoke the jurisdiction under Section482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure theends of justice.

8.The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provisionof law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process isabused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured; wherethe process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to avoid thecausing of harassment to any person by using the provision of Cr.P.C.or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of justice.Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to circumvent theexpress provisions of law.

9.It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court underSection 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon’ble ApexCourt in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. VikramAnatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case ofInder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercisedsparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the Courtcomes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there

would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is notexercised, Court would quash the proceedings.

10.It is well settled law that where the High Court is convincedthat the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do notaffect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing ofsuch proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peaceand would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time andenergy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction inentering into compromise.In certain cases, the main offence iscompoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions ofSection 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are notcompoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose ofsecuring the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be bar to the exercise of power ofquashing.In the nutshell, the Hon’ble Apex Court justified theexerciseofpowersunderSection482Cr.P.C.toquashtheproceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special factsand circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-compoundable.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view thatnotwithstanding the fact that the offences under Sections 471/468 IPCare non-compoundable offences, there should be no impediment in

quashing the FIR under these sections, if the Court is otherwisesatisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.

11.In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view ofstatement made by the respondent no. 2, the FIR in question warrantsto be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to bequashed.

12.Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.537/2006dated25.07.2006,underSections406/420/468/471/120BIPCregistered at Police Station Shalimar Bagh and the proceedingsemanating therefrom are quashed against the petitioners.

13.This petition is accordingly disposed of.

APRIL 04, 2016

(P.S.TEJI)JUDGE