W.P.(CRL)/3197/2017 of VIMAL SHARMA & ORS Vs STATE & ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+W.P.(CRL) 3197/2017

VIMAL SHARMA & ORS..... Petitioners

ThroughMs. Abhigya and Ms. VandanaSharma, Advs.Sharma, Advs.

versus

STATE & ANR..... RespondentsThroughDr. M.P. Singh, APP for Ms. RichaKapoor, ASCSI Azad Singh, P.S. RanholaThroughDr. M.P. Singh, APP for Ms. RichaKapoor, ASCSI Azad Singh, P.S. Ranhola

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMARO R R%17.11.2017

CRL. M.A.18867/2017 (Exemption)

Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.

Application stands disposed of.

Crl.M.A.18868/2017 (delay)

For the reasons stated in the application, delay of 42 days in re-filingthe writ petition is condoned.

Application stands disposed of.

W.P.(CRL) 3197/2017

The petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 06/2013 dated 08.01.2013(P.S Ranhola) instituted for offences under Sections 498A and 406 of theIPC.

The petitioner No.1 is the husband of respondent No.2 whereas other

petitioners are closely related to petitioner No.1. The petitioner No.1 wasmarried to respondent No.2 on 08.02.2011. However, the marriage could notsubsist for long and only within few years of the marriage, the spouses couldnot live together as man and wife and they started living separately.Thereafter the subject FIR came to be registered 08.01.2013

During the investigation of the subject FIR, settlement was arrivedat between the parties.Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement/settlement, itwas agreed upon that respondent No.2 would be paid Rs. 4.5 lakhs towardsall her matrimonial claims as against the petitioner No.1.It was furtheragreed that the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 shall obtain divorce bymutual consent. This court has been informed that divorce has been grantedby decree of competent court.The respondent No.2 has been paid anamount of Rs. 3 lakhs, uptil now. The balance amount of Rs. 1.5 lakhs hasbeen handed over to the respondent no.2, by way of cash, which has beenaccepted by respondent No.2 on her satisfaction. The parties are present andhave been identified by their respective counsels.

The petitioners have been identified by their counsel. The respondentNo.2 has been identified by her counsel and SI Gopal.

Taking into account the aforesaid facts, this Court feels inclined toquash the subject FIR as no useful purpose would be served in keeping theinvestigation in the aforesaid case pending.

In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303,

the Supreme Court has held that cases which are not compoundable underSection 320 of the Cr.P.C. could also be quashed, when continuation of anycriminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility and where justicedemands that the dispute between the parties should be put to an end and

peace is restored. But ending of such criminal proceedings could only beordered for securing the ends of justice.

The Supreme Court has further observed in Gian Singh vs. State ofPunjab & Another (Supra):

“58............................ No doubt, crimes are acts whichhave harmful effect on the public and consist inwrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens thewell-being of the society and it is not safe to leave thecrime-doer only because he and the victim have settledthe dispute amicably or that the victim has been paidcompensation, yet certain crimes have been madecompoundable in law, with or without the permission ofthe court. In respect of serious offences like murder,rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravityunder IPC or offences of moral turpitude under specialstatutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or theoffences committed by public servants while working inthat capacity, the settlement between the offender andthe victim can have no legal sanction at all. However,certainoffenceswhichoverwhelminglyandpredominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out ofcivil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership orsuch like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or thefamily dispute, where the wrong is basically to thevictim and the offender and the victim have settled alldisputes between them amicably, irrespective of the factthat such offences have not been made compoundable,the High Court may within the framework of its inherentpower, quash the criminal proceeding or criminalcomplaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of suchsettlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offenderbeing convicted and by not quashing the criminalproceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justiceshall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and notexhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and

no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”[RefertoB.S.Joshi, (2003)4SCC675;NikhilMerchant, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma, (2008)16 SCC 1.]

In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC

466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and laydown the following principles by which the High Courtwould be guided in giving adequate treatment to thesettlement between the parties and exercising its powerunder Section 482 of the Code while accepting thesettlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing toaccept the settlement with direction to continue with thecriminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is tobe distinguished from the power which lies in the Court tocompound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Nodoubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court hasinherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even inthose cases which are not compoundable, where the partieshave settled the matter between themselves. However, thispower is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and onthat basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings isfiled, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii)to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form anopinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in thoseprosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences ofmental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.Such offences are not private in nature and have seriousimpact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged tohave beencommitted under special statute like thePrevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by

public servants while working in that capacity are not to bequashed merely on the basis of compromise between thevictim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelminglyandpredominantlycivilcharacter,particularly those arising out of commercial transactionsor arising out of matrimonial relationship or familydisputes should be quashed when the parties have resolvedtheir entire disputes among themselves.29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is toexamine as to whether the possibility of conviction isremote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases wouldput the accused to great oppression and prejudice andextreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashingthe criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in thecategory of heinous and serious offences and therefore areto be generally treated as crime against the society and notagainst the individual alone. However, the High Courtwould not rest its decision merely because there is amention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision. It would be open to the HighCourt to examine as to whether incorporation of Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution hascollected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead toproving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For thispurpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by thenature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflictedon the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weaponsused, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered bythe victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basisof this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine asto whether there is strong possibility of conviction or thechances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the formercase it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash thecriminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would bepermissible for the High Court to accept the pleacompounding the offence based on complete settlement

between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also beswayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties isgoing to result in harmony between them which mayimprove their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power underSection 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play acrucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived atimmediately after the alleged commission of offence andthe matter is still under investigation, the High Court maybe liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminalproceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason thatat this stage the investigation is still on and even thecharge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those caseswhere the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to startor the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court canshow benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, butafter prima facie assessment of the circumstances/materialmentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecutionevidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of theevidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normallythe High Court should refrain from exercising its powerunder Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trialcourt would be in position to decide the case finally onmerits and to come to conclusion as to whether theoffence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is alreadyrecorded by the trial court and the matter is at theappellate stage before the High Court, mere compromisebetween the parties would not be ground to accept thesame resulting in acquittal of the offender who has alreadybeen convicted by the trial court. Here charge is provedunder Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recordedof heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question ofsparing convict found guilty of such crime.”

In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi

& Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58, wherein the Supreme Court in respect of the

matrimonial disputes has specifically held as follows:-

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encouragegenuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly,when the same are on considerable increase. Even if theoffencesarenon-compoundable,iftheyrelatetomatrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that theparties have settled the same amicably and without anypressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends ofjustice, Section 320 of the Code would not be bar to theexercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or thesubsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes inrecent times. They institution of marriage occupies animportant place and it has an important role to play in thesociety. Therefore, every effort should be made in theinterest of the individuals in order to enable them to settledown in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder overtheir defaults and terminate their disputes amicably bymutual agreement instead of fighting it out in court oflaw, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonialmatters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercisingtheir extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that thepower under Section 482 should be exercised sparinglyandwithcircumspectiononlywhentheCourtisconvinced, on the basis of material on record, thatallowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuseof process of court or that the ends of justice require thatthe proceedings ought to be quashed….”

For the reasons afore-recorded, the FIR No.06/2013 dated 08.01.2013(P.S Ranhola) instituted for offences under Sections 498A and 406 of theIPC and all the emanating proceedings therefrom are quashed.

NOVEMBER 17, 2017/ns

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J