W.P.(CRL)/2246/2017 of ATUL AGGARWAL & ORS Vs THE STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+W.P.(CRL) 2246/2017

ATUL AGGARWAL & ORS..... PetitionersThroughMr. Rajesh Vasisht, Adv.ThroughMr. Rajesh Vasisht, Adv.

versus

THE STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR..... RespondentsThroughMs. Richa Kapoor, ASC with Mr.Ashish Negi, Adv.SI Ravinder Kumar, P.S. PrashantVihar

Mr. R.S. Goswami with Mr. MukeshSharma, Advs. for R-2

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR

O R R%09.08.2017

CRL. M.A.12708/2017 (Exemption)

Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.

Application stands disposed of.

W.P.(CRL) 2246/2017

The petitioners have sought quashing of the FIR No.884/2016 dated31.12.2016 (PS Prashant Vihar) instituted for the offences under sections406 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

It appears that petitioner No.1 and daughter of respondent No.2 wereto be married and in preparation of the same, some preliminary rituals werealso performed. However, the marriage could not be performed because ofalleged demand of dowry which was not acceptable to the family of the

respondent No.2.Later, the subject FIR came to be lodged against thepetitioners.

The petitioners No.2 and 3 are the parents of petitioner No.1 whereastheotherpetitionersarerelatedtopetitionerNo.1.AcivilsuitNo.538492/2016 was also filed by the petitioners for the recovery of articlesbut the aforesaid civil suit has been withdrawn.

With the efforts and mediation of elder persons and family members,the dispute was amicably settled.

The respondent No.2 was compensated for the expenses which he hadincurred in preparation for marriage. As part of the agreement, it wasdecided that the respondent No.2 shall be paid an amount of Rs.11 lakh. Ithas been submitted that pay order No.507342 of Rs.11 lakh has already beenprepared and has been handed over to the learned counsel appearing forrespondent No.2 with the hope and trust that the same would be paid torespondent No.2 at the time of quashing of FIR.

The aforesaid pay order has been given to respondent No.2 in courtwhich he has accepted on his satisfaction.

Taking into account the aforesaid facts, namely, the settlement of alldisputes and the respondent No.2 having been compensated for the expenseswhich has been incurred, this court does not deem it appropriate that theinvestigation as against the petitioners should continue. This court is,therefore, inclined to quash the subject FIR.

In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303,the Supreme Court has held that cases which are not compoundable underSection 320 of the Cr.P.C. could also be quashed, when continuation of anycriminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility and where justice

demands that the dispute between the parties should be put to an end andpeace is restored. But ending of such criminal proceedings could only beordered for securing the ends of justice.

The Supreme Court has further observed in Gian Singh vs. State ofPunjab & Another (Supra):

“58............................ No doubt, crimes are acts whichhave harmful effect on the public and consist inwrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens thewell-being of the society and it is not safe to leave thecrime-doer only because he and the victim have settledthe dispute amicably or that the victim has been paidcompensation, yet certain crimes have been madecompoundable in law, with or without the permission ofthe court. In respect of serious offences like murder,rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravityunder IPC or offences of moral turpitude under specialstatutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or theoffences committed by public servants while working inthat capacity, the settlement between the offender andthe victim can have no legal sanction at all. However,certainoffenceswhichoverwhelminglyandpredominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out ofcivil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership orsuch like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or thefamily dispute, where the wrong is basically to thevictim and the offender and the victim have settled alldisputes between them amicably, irrespective of the factthat such offences have not been made compoundable,the High Court may within the framework of its inherentpower, quash the criminal proceeding or criminalcomplaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of suchsettlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offenderbeing convicted and by not quashing the criminalproceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justiceshall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not

exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts andno hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.”[Refer to B.S. Joshi, (2003) 4 SCC 675; NikhilMerchant, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma,(2008) 16 SCC 1.]

In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC

466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay

down the following principles by which the High Courtwould be guided in giving adequate treatment to thesettlement between the parties and exercising its powerunder Section 482 of the Code while accepting thesettlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing toaccept the settlement with direction to continue with thecriminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is tobe distinguished from the power which lies in the Court tocompound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Nodoubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court hasinherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even inthose cases which are not compoundable, where the partieshave settled the matter between themselves. However, thispower is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and onthat basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings isfiled, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:(iii)ends of justice, or(iv)to prevent abuse of the process of any court.While exercising the power the High Court is to form anopinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in thoseprosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences ofmental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.Such offences are not private in nature and have seriousimpact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged tohave beencommitted under special statute like the

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed bypublic servants while working in that capacity are not to bequashed merely on the basis of compromise between thevictim and the offender.29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelminglyandpredominantlycivilcharacter,particularly those arising out of commercial transactionsor arising out of matrimonial relationship or familydisputes should be quashed when the parties have resolvedtheir entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is toexamine as to whether the possibility of conviction isremote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases wouldput the accused to great oppression and prejudice andextreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashingthe criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in thecategory of heinous and serious offences and therefore areto be generally treated as crime against the society and notagainst the individual alone. However, the High Courtwould not rest its decision merely because there is amention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision. It would be open to the HighCourt to examine as to whether incorporation of Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution hascollected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead toproving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For thispurpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by thenature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflictedon the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weaponsused, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered bythe victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basisof this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine asto whether there is strong possibility of conviction or thechances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the formercase it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash thecriminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would bepermissible for the High Court to accept the plea

compounding the offence based on complete settlementbetween the parties. At this stage, the Court can also beswayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties isgoing to result in harmony between them which mayimprove their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power underSection 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play acrucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived atimmediately after the alleged commission of offence andthe matter is still under investigation, the High Court maybe liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminalproceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason thatat this stage the investigation is still on and even thecharge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those caseswhere the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to startor the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court canshow benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, butafter prima facie assessment of the circumstances/materialmentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecutionevidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of theevidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normallythe High Court should refrain from exercising its powerunder Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trialcourt would be in position to decide the case finally onmerits and to come to conclusion as to whether theoffence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is alreadyrecorded by the trial court and the matter is at theappellate stage before the High Court, mere compromisebetween the parties would not be ground to accept thesame resulting in acquittal of the offender who has alreadybeen convicted by the trial court. Here charge is provedunder Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recordedof heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question ofsparing convict found guilty of such crime.”

In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi

& Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58, wherein the Supreme Court in respect of the

matrimonial disputes has specifically held as follows:-

“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encouragegenuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly,when the same are on considerable increase. Even if theoffencesarenon-compoundable,iftheyrelatetomatrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that theparties have settled the same amicably and without anypressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends ofjustice, Section 320 of the Code would not be bar to theexercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or thesubsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes inrecent times. They institution of marriage occupies animportant place and it has an important role to play in thesociety. Therefore, every effort should be made in theinterest of the individuals in order to enable them to settledown in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder overtheir defaults and terminate their disputes amicably bymutual agreement instead of fighting it out in court oflaw, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonialmatters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercisingtheir extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that thepower under Section 482 should be exercised sparinglyandwithcircumspectiononlywhentheCourtisconvinced, on the basis of material on record, thatallowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuseof process of court or that the ends of justice require thatthe proceedings ought to be quashed….”

For the aforesaid facts, the FIR No. 884/2016 dated 31.12.2016 (PSPrashant Vihar) instituted for the offences under sections 406 of the IPC andSections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and all otherproceedings emanating therefrom are quashed.

The petition is disposed of in terms of the above.

AUGUST 09, 2017ns

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J