FAO(OS) (COMM)/133/2017 of STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED Vs M/S GREAT EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

IN THE HIGH COURTOF DELHIAT NEW DELHI

Decided on: 17.07.2017

+FAO(OS)(COMM)133/2017.CM.APPL.23390-23391/2017.CAV. 604/2017CAV. 604/2017

STEEL AUTHORITYOF INDIA LTD.AppellantThrough: Sh. Debal Banerjee, Sr. Advocate with Sh.Shaiwal Srivastava andSh. Gopal Singh Chauhan,Advocates.Through: Sh. Debal Banerjee, Sr. Advocate with Sh.Shaiwal Srivastava andSh. Gopal Singh Chauhan,Advocates.

Versus

M/S. GREAT EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY LIMITED

RespondentsThrough : Sh. Arvind Kumar Gupta with Ms. JyotikaJain, Advocates.

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHATHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.P. GARG

MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT (OPEN COURT)

CAV.604/2017

Learned counsel for the caveator has entered appearance.

Cav. 604/2017 accordingly stands discharged.

C.M. APPL.23390/2017

Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

FAO (OS) (COMM) 133/2017. C.M. APPL.23391/2017

1.The Steel Authority of India (hereafter "SAIL") appeals the judgmentand order of learnedsinglejudge of this court dated 28"" February,2017,

Signature Not Verified

dismissing its objections to an arbitral award, under Section 34 of theArbitrationand ConciliationAct, 1996 ("Act"). The Award was dated 30^'^June, 2015 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal ("AT"), constituted to decidedisputes between SAIL and the Great Eastern Shipping Company Limited("GE Shipping").

2.The facts necessary to decide this appeal are that GE Shipping, ashipping linewhich operatesinter alia, ocean-goingfreightvessels,owns thevessel MV Jag Riddhi. It entered into Charter Party contract with SAIL on19"^ December, 2007 in terms of which it undertook to transport 47,000metric tons ("MTs") (5% more or less at the option of GE Shipping) ofcoking coal in the said vessel from Haypoint Australia to 1/2 safe Berth(s)Visakhapatnam/Paradip/Haldiain India. MV Jag Riddhi was loaded with acargo of 47,102 MTs at Haypoint on IS''' January, 2008. It arrived atVisakhapatnam and issued notice of readiness ("NOR") at 0930 hours on5th February, 2008, for discharge of the cargo at Visakhapatnam. SAILalleged that all four hooks aboard the vessel were not ready for supplywhenthe NOR was issued. It alleged that cargo in Hatch-I and Hatch-II were notaccessible to it at the port of discharge at the relevant time. The NOR,according to it, could only be accepted at 1430 hours on 16th February,2008. Thereafter the vessel discharged 24,938 MTs of the cargo. It thenproceeded to Haldia where the balance cargo was discharged. The dischargewas completed on 20th February, 2008.

3.GE Shipping invoked the arbitration clause in the Charter Party whichenvisioned that disputes arising under it could be settled in accordance withthe provisions of the Act and under the Maritime Arbitration Rules of the

Indian Council for Arbitration ('ICA'). The Arbitrators were to be'commercialmen'. SAIL and GE Shippingnominatedone arbitratoreach andthe two arbitrators nominated third arbitrator; the three constituted thetribunal.GE Shippingclaimedf 1,23,28,252.20as dischargeport demurrageand 1,04,87,542.91as balance freight. By Award dated 7th/10th May,2010, thetribunalheld that SAIL shouldrefundto GE Shippingf 13,47,917being the sum in excess deducted by them from the freight. The tribunalrejected GE Shipping's claim for demurrage and balance freight. Thetribunal, inter alia, found that;

"(i)The statement of facts(SOF) indicated that 'fulldischarging equipment was not ready when notice wastendered. Nor was it available for use when required onberthing. Therefore, NOR tendered on 5.02.2008 was not avalid notice.

(ii)In the time sheet, GEShippinghad concededthepro ratadeductioneven before the berthingof the ship. Infact in thetime sheet there was an admissionby GE Shippingthat all thefour hooks were not ready 'in everyrespect' when the NOR wasgiven. The exceptionclause came into application onlyafter thecommencementof the lay time and not before that. The surveysarranged corroborate the deficiencywith regard to Cranes No.1 and 3.

(Hi)As far as Vizag was concerned, lay time would countfrom 0245 hours to 1430 hours on 12th February 2008. Afteraccounting for the breakdowns andfor the pro rata deductions,the charterers on 12thFebruary 2008 used an additionally timeofabout 5 hours 36 minutesafter commencementof discharge.The lay time used at Vizag was, therefore, 2 days 11 hours and43 minutes.

(iv)The calculation of the GE Shippingfor the lay time usedat Haldia as 1 day 2 hours and 45 minutes was correct.

(v)The claim ofthe GE Shippingfor demurrage and balancefreight did not survive. In terms of the lay time allowed andused and the dispatch amount deducted in excess, it was heldthat SAIL required to refund to the GE Shipping Rs. 13,47,917together with interest @ 8% per annum from 19th June 2008till the date ofthe Award. SAIL was also directed topay interestat 8% per annum on the balance of the 10%freight amountingto Rs. 72,22,959 that was withheld from 20th May 2008 to 4thMarch 2009."

4.GE Shipping challenged the above award before this Court underSection 34 (in OMP No. 582 of 2010). By judgment dated 9th May 2012{Great Eastern Shipping Company Limited v. Steel Authority of IndiaLimited2012 IV AD (Del) 655), the Court set aside the Award holding, interalia, that between the dates of issue of NOR and the date of berthing of thevessel, there was no inspection to show that vessel was not ready todischarge cargo when NOR was issued; in terms of the Statement of Facts(SOF), at the time of commencement of discharge, Grabs-I and II were underrepair as result of which Hatch-I could not be opened. Therefore, 50% ofthe cargo could be dischargedand apro rata discountwas given as regardslay time. The court also ruled that:

"The expression 'ready in all respects' in Clause 33 had to beinterpreted in the contextofreadiness to 'discharge' and not to'load'. It also had to be interpretedin the contextof thefact thatthe CP was port charter and not berth charter and thatClause 38 of the CPprovidedfor pro rata discountin lay timeto the extent any of the equipments were non-functionalFactually, there was pro rata reductiongiven in the lay timein thepresent caseas was evidentfrom the time statementitself

(vi) Yhe conclusion of the AT that when the NOR was issued,the ship was not ready in all respects was not based onevidence but on conjecture. The Awardsufferedfrom patent

illegality.It was on the basis of misreadingof the documentsplaced on record. Therefore,the AT's rejectionof the claim ofGE Shippingfor demurrage and balance freight cannot besustained on law. That portion of the impugned Award wasaccordingly set aside."

5.GE Shippingsenta letterdated20th July 2012 to the Secretaryof ICAinvoking the arbitration clause and stating that the disputes had arisenbetween it and SAIL. In terms of the Maritime Arbitration Rules of the ICA('MAR'), GE Shipping enclosed statement of claims. It also nominated itsArbitrator.ICA wroteto SAIL on 16thAugust2012 askingitto nominateanArbitrator from its Maritime Panel of Arbitratorswithin 30 days failingwhich SAIL's nominated Arbitratorwould be appointed by the MaritimeArbitrationCommitteeunder its rules. SAIL sought extensionof time till29th September2012, by its response,for submittingthe defencestatement,the name of the Arbitratorand the arbitrationfees. Later, by its letterdated20th September2012 to the ICA (by email) SAIL contendedthat de novoarbitration was not permissiblebecause GE Shipping had exhausted theprovision for reference of disputes to arbitration which had culminated in theaward, though it was set aside.

6.SAIL was granted final opportunity to nominate its arbitrator, whichit failed to avail. ICA wrote letter dated 9th April 2013 informingSAILaboutthe constitutionof the tribunal.It appointedShri GajendraSingh Sahnias an Arbitrator on behalf of SAIL. The two Arbitrators then appointed aPresiding Arbitrator of the tribunal. SAIL then filed Writ Petition (C) No.3013/ 2013 against ICA and GE Shipping before this Court under Article226 of the Constitution challenging the appointment of an Arbitrator on itsbehalf by ICA. GE Shipping questioned the maintainability of the writ

petition and also submitted that the principles of res judicata were notapphcable.Taking cue from McDermott Internationalv. Burn StandardCorporation Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 it was argued that while the Awarddated 7th May, 2010 passed by the tribunal was set aside by this Court by thejudgment dated 19thMay 2012, the disputes were not finally adjudicatedandthat once the Court set aside an Award under Section 34 of the Act it had nopower to pass further directions to remand the matter to the tribunal. Alearned Single Judge decided the writ petition against SAIL, holding it not tobe maintainable; he also ruled that res judicatadid not operate in thecircumstances of the case. SAIL's appeal (LPA No. 103 of 2016) before theDivisionBench of this Court was dismissed.The Division Bench followedIndian Oil Corporation Limited v. SPS Engineering Limited (2011) 3 SCC507 where it was held that question whether some claim is barred by theprinciples of res judicata has to be examined by the Arbitral Tribunal since adecision on res judicata requires consideration of the pleadings as also theclaims/issues/pointsand the award in the first round of arbitration,injuxtaposition with the pleadings and the issues/points/claims in the secondarbitration.

7.There was no stay of arbitration proceedings during pendency of writpetition and later, the appeal againstthe judgment of the singlejudge (in thewrit petition). The impugned Award was passed by the tribunal, afterconsideringthe pleas of the parties and the evidence led, unanimouslyon30"^ June, 2015. The tribunal held that Clause 33 of the CP (the TimeCounting Provision) meant that time started to count 24 hours after serviceof NOR, whether the vessel was in berth or not-as long as the vessel could

discharge, but not necessarily that it can discharge at the same rate asprovidedin the CharterParty. Clause38 (whichdeals with the consequenceof breakdown of cranes) comes into operation only after the lay timecommenced after the tender of NOR-it did not come into operation at thestageof tenderingthe NOR. No provisionin the CharterParty contemplatedavailability of minimum four functional cranes/grabs as conditionprecedentto the tenderor acceptanceof NOR. The contingencyenvisagedin Clause 38 and the guarantees in Clauses 41 and 42 did not invalidate theNOR nor did they stop the commencementof lay time. The consequenceprovided under the Charter Party is limited to pro rata exclusion of thebreakdown period for lay time. If the owners are unable to provide theequipmentsin workingorder as envisagedin the contract,the dischargerateis reduced proportionately. However, commencement of lay time wasentirely adifferent matteraltogether. Thequestion relating tocommencementof lay time was different from the time relating to reductionof rate of discharge. SAIL's contention, i.e. that for the NOR to be valid, notonly must all her cranes and grabs be ready when the NOR was tendered,they should also be ready to dischargecargo at the rate provided in the CP,was rejected.

8.On examinationof the evidence on record, it was concluded thatthejoint survey undertaken was in the context of the vessel efficiencywhich wasdischarged and not linked to the tender of NOR and/or to the commencementof lay time. The report which was signed only by the surveyors appointed bySAIL could not be accepted as joint survey report. There was no evidenceto show that GE Shipping was invited to attend the survey. SAIL also made

no attempt to prove the report by examining its officers. It was held that thereport could not have assessed the condition of the equipments at the timethe NOR was served. The possibility of the malfunctioning of the cranes andgrabs beyond the tender of the NOR on 5th February, 2008 and at the time ofsurvey on 14th February, 2008could not be ruled out. The tribunal ruledthat the burden of proof was primarily on SAIL; it never called upon GEShipping to produce its test certificates and other records pertaining to themaintenance and efficiency of the equipments. Consequently, SAIL failed toprove that the vessel cranes/grabs were malfunctioning or defective. Basedon the joint SOF presented by the parties, the tribunal drew up tabulatedlay time statement and found that the vessel was on demurrage for 5 days 14hours and 26 minutes and the agreed daily rate was of ? 20 lakhs per day andpro rated for part of day, the GE Shipping was entitled to receive the sumof? 1,12,02,780 towards demurrage before deducting 1% Chartering ServiceFee, as is provided in Clause 46. GE Shipping was also held entitled tointerest on the balance freight and demurrage from 17th July 2008 till 2ndMarch 2009 (both days included) and, therefore, the amount on whichinterest was due at 11% per annum stood reduced by ? 72,22,959. SAIL wasliable to pay GE Shipping ? 3,59,552 towards costs of arbitration. It was alsoheld entitled to get interest @ 10% per annum from the date of Award till thedate of payment if the sums due were not paid within 30 days.

9.Several grounds were urged by SAIL in this round of litigation, in itsobjections to the award, under Section 34. This included the submission thatthe impugned Award suffered from patent illegality and from an erroneousand contradictory construction of the clauses of the Charter Party which

vitiatedthe Award entirely.It was furtherarguedthat GE Shippingoughttohave led evidenceto provethat on the day of serviceof NOR, the vesselwas'ready in all respects'.SAIL argued that the SOF was plain in thatcranes/grabswere not working when the vessel berthed on 12th February,2008. The status of the vessel between 5th and 12th February,2008 beingwithin the exclusiveknowledgeof the GE Shipping, it ought to have beenprovedby it by leadingevidence.SAIL reliedonStateofRajasthanv. KashiRam 2006 (12) SCC 254, SushilKumar v. RakeshKumar 2003 (8) SCC 673and Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union ofIndia (2007) 1 SCC 174. Reliance wasplaced onGEShipping's admission about the defective/damagedcranes/grabs documented by the parties, which was binding on it. Theburden was wrongly shifted by the tribunalon to SAIL to prove that therewas anything amiss in the NOR. Thiru John v. Returning Officer(1977) 3SCC 540, Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 and DivisionalManager,United India InsuranceCompany Ltd.v.Samir ChandraChaudhary 2005 (5) SCC 784 were placed. The Tribunal's findings thatthere was no provisionin the CharterParty which envisionedavailabilityofminimumfour functionalcranes/grabsas conditionprecedentto the tenderor acceptance of NOR were challenged asperverse and contrary toClauses 10 and 42 of the Charter Party. SAIL submitted that the wholepurpose of having minimum 4 grabs/4 cranes was that they were to beftinctional and should have had the minimum prescribed capacity todischarge the cargo.

10.GE Shipping argued- besides objecting to SAIL's petition as notdisclosing any tenable ground for interference with the award- that the

survey report relied upon by SAIL was not in conformity with Clause 41 ofthe Charter party. Firstly it was not joint survey; and was conducted twodays after the discharge operations commenced; it did not bear the signatureof GE Shipping's surveyor. SAIL did not call upon GE Shipping to conductany joint survey. It was also argued that Clause 33 was standard clausedealing with commencement of lay time, which did not state that all thevessel cranes and grabs had to be ready in all respects when the NOR wastendered. It did insist that the vessel must be ready to discharge cargo at therateprovidedin the Charterparty.The partialunavailabilityof allequipments to discharge cargo did not disqualify readiness in all respectssince the vessel was still capable of discharging cargo. Further when thepartieshadagreedto clausethat providedhowtime had to beproportionatelyadjustedintheeventofpartialnon-availabilityindischarging cargo (i.e the rider Clause 43 of the Charter Party), SAIL'scontention was untenable. Clause 38 read with Clause 42 of the charter partyhad the effect of excluding lay time (proportionately if at all) only where thebreakdown of cranes and grabs actually affected the cargo or discharge. Inthe event of such breakdown only the actual discharge time would beproportionately reduced.

Impugnedjudgment

11.The learned single judge held that the expression 'ready in all respects'in Clause 33

"had to be interpreted in the context of readiness to 'discharge'and not to load. It also had to be interpreted in the context ofthefact that the CP was port charter and not berth chargerand that Clause 38 of the CP provided for pro rata discount in

lay time to the extent any of the equipments were nonfunctional. Merely becausesome of the equipmentswere nonfunctional atthe commencement of discharge did notnecessarily mean that they were non-functional even at the timethe NOR was served. This was questionoffact that had to beestablished by the party alleging it. It was not matterforsurmise or conjecture. Thereis nothingplaced on record beforethe Tribunalby the charterer to show that on the date of theissuance of the NOR by the master of the vessel, none of theequipments on board were working. Consequently it waserroneous on the part of the Tribunal to conclude that the NORissued in thepresent case was not valid. In port charter whensuch NOR is issuedit is normallysome days before the actualberthing. If some of the equipments were temporarily nonfunctional at the commencementof discharge, it did not meanthey were in that position even when the NOR was issued. Theportion of thepassage in Scrutton on Charter parties and Billsof Lading, 17th ed. (1964) highlightedin the extractfrom TresFlores supports the conclusion that the ship's gears did nothave to be shown to be functional at time when it was notphysicallypossiblefor her to commencedischarge. This viewwouldbe consistentwith harmoniousinterpretationof Clause33 and Clause38 which envisagespro rata reductionin the laytime. Factually, in the present case, there has been pro ratareduction given in the lay time, as can be seenfrom the timestatement itself.

37. Further the AT also has in the impugned Award oninterpretation of the clauses come to the conclusion that therewas no requirementunder Clause 33 that all the cranes andequipments on board ofthe vessel must be ready at all times.

38. GE Shipping is right in its contention that the requirementof all four cranes working is not conditionprecedent underClause 42for issuanceofa validNOR. In any event, thepartieshadagreedthatrateof dischargeshallbereducedproportionately in case of any breakdown or deficiency. Thekey aspect as far as Clause 33 is concerned is that it deals withcommencement of lay time and requires that the vessel must be

in position to discharge cargo and not that it must be ready todischarge at particulartime and at particularrate. TheCourt, therefore, rejects the interpretation sought to be placedby the SAIL on expression 'ready in all respects' occurring inClause 33 of the CP. The conclusion reached by the AT on thebasis of the above interpretation of the clauses suffers from noillegality. Re: shifting the burden ofproof

39. As regards the observation ofthe AT that SAIL hadfailed todischarge the burden of making good its case that the vesselwas not ready in all respects, it must be remembered that thiswas in the context ofSAILputting forth the Surveyor's report insupport of the above submission. As rightly pointed out by theAT, SAIL failed to examine the Surveyor who preparedthereport. SAIL was unable to counter the submission of GEShipping that the report was infact not 'joint survey' report.

40. The reliance placed on the aforementioned decisions underthe IEA by SAIL is misplaced for more than one reason. UnderSection 19 (1) of the Act, the AT is not bound by the CPC or thelEA. Section 19(3) ofthe Act states that where the parties fail toagreeon the procedureto be followedby the AT,theproceedingswould be conducted by the AT "in the manner itconsiders appropriate."None of the decisions cited by SAILbefore this Court pertain to applicability of lEA in arbitrationproceedings. In any event, it was SAIL which was seeking torely on the Surveyor report in order to show that the NOR wasnot valid. It was, therefore, incumbent on SAIL to prove suchSurveyor report to the satisfaction ofthe AT.

41. The Court finds nothing erroneous in the observation oftheAT as regards the failure of SAIL to prove the Survey report.The fact that some of the cranes/grabsmay not have beenfunctional at the time ofdischarge cannot be construed to be anadmission by GE Shipping that all the cranes and grabs werenon-functional. The earlier judgment dated 9th May 2012, ofthis Court reaching the same conclusion has attained finality,are is binding on SAIL. No ground made out under Section 3442. None of the grounds ofpatent illegality as explained by theSupreme Court in ONGC v. Western Geco International (supra)

or Associate Builders (supra) are attracted in the present case.On the other hand as held in National HighwaysAuthorityofIndia v. ITD CementationIndia Ltd. (supra), the interpretationof the clauses of the contract by the AT should be taken to befinal unless it is so perverse so as to shock the judicialconscience. Nothing in the impugnedAward goes to attract anyof the grounds under Section34 of the Act as explainedin theabove decisions. In other words, SAIL has failed to show thatthe impugnedAward is opposed to thefundamentalpolicy ofIndian law within the meaning of Section 34(2)(b)(ii)of theAct. "

12.Mr. Debal Kumar Banerjee, learned senior counsel appearing forSAIL, argued one ground, in support of SAIL's appeal, i.e. that the singlejudge fell into error in not appreciatingthat Section 106 of the EvidenceAct,or the principle underlyingthat provision, applied squarely to the facts ofthis case. Learned counsel submitted that in this case, SAIL did all that itcould to establish that the vessel was in fact not in readiness when the NORwas issuedby GE Shipping.Referringto the SOF, Mr. Banerjeepointedoutthat the representativesof the Chartereras well as SAIL were present. Thedocumentclearlyrecordedthat in two instances,on 12 February,2008, thevessel's grabs and craneswere inoperational.This automaticallyreversedtheonus of proving that the equipment was capable of use, in accordance withthe Charter Party, when NOR was issued(05.02.2008).GE Shipping,as thevessel owner had peculiarknowledgeabout its vessel and the equipmentonboard. It could have shown that the cranes and grabs were in order and notdefective. Its failure to place any material on record or lead any evidence inthis regard ought to have led the tribunal to concludethat what prevailedon12"^ February,2008 was whatexistedon 5"^ February,2008.13.Asmaybeseenfromtheabovefactualdiscussion,thatthecontroversyin this case relatesto laytime' calculation:a featurepeculiartomaritime law. Charter-parties (shipping agreement between the hirer and thevessel owner) involved in vessel hiring transactions contain typical (andstandard, time tested) conditions with respect to lay time calculation; theydefine when lay time commences; what supervening conditions can be takeninto account to stop (or put on hold) laytime calculation, once laytimecommences, what kind of delays are attributable to either party, etc. In thepresent case, concededly the vessel arrived after completing her journeyfrom Hayport at Visakhapatnam and issued notice of readmess ('NOR') at0930 hours on 5th February, 2008, for discharge of the cargo at port. Due tocertain port conditions, she could not berth; discharge operations started on16"^ February, 2008. SAIL alleged, on the basis of document, that thevessel's NOR was not binding, because all her hooks and grabs^ (i.eequipments used to scoop cargo, to be offloaded) were not functioning whichimpaired her capacity to fulfil charter-party condition that requireddischarge of cargo at 10,000 MT per hour. The tribunal, by unanimousaward, overruled this contention;it held that the NOR was effective; that theproportionate discount, for the recorded period (on 12 July 2008) when acrane and one grab were under repair, had been given; furthermore, on aninterpretation of the charter party, that the NOR was not ineffective becausethere was no condition that all cranes and equipment had to be ready for thatnotice to be issued by GE Shipping, the single judge upheld this award.

' laytimeis the amountoftime allowed(in hoursordays) in avoyagecharterfor loadingand unloadingcargo. If the laytime is exceeded, is incurred and payable by the charterer (i.e.) hirer of the vessel.^A"grab" isa set ofmechanicaljawsattachedto the end ofa cranecable.Itisused to loadoroffloadbulkcargo such as coal or wood.

14.In this court's opinion, the appeal has to fail. The argument made,which is that the onus of proof shifted the moment it became evident that notall equipment were operational, based on an application of Section 106 ofthe Evidence Act, is inconsequential. The single judge noted that theSurveyor's report was not conclusiveand that the provisions of the EvidenceAct were not applicable per se to arbitration. Such being the case, to extendtheir application,by an argumentthat their underlyingprinciplesare binding,too remote contention and unpersuasive. More substantially, once thetribunalheld that no conditioninthe charterparty dictatedthat all equipmenton board had to be fiinctional for NOR to be issued, the inference that thechartereris insistingcourtsto draw, i.e., that the vessel was not ready at all,to discharge the cargo for about 8 days, based on document prepared on 12February, 2008, cannot be accepted. Charter parties and their conditions inthis case, were within the exclusiveken of the arbitrators.The arbitratorshere were specialistsin maritimetrade and practice. They unanimouslyruledthat the NOR issued was in order. Lay time therefore commenced from theexpiry of designated time, under the Charter Party.

15.This court is mindfiil of its limitations while dealing with challengesto judgments that reject objections under Section 34 of the Act. Sans provenpatent and manifest illegality, findings contrary to contract, or contractualterms and in the absence of findings that are so unreasonable that noreasonable man placed in like situation would render, courts would refrainfrom interdicting awards rendered by tribunals set up for dispute resolutionthrough consensual, or agreed procedure. In this case, even if there was anerror, the interpretation of contract being within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the tribunal, it could not be termed as patent illegality (Ref. Kwality Mfg.Corporation v Central Warehousing Corporation (2009) 5 SCC 142, SteelAuthority ofIndia Ltd. Vs. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 63and Sumitomo Heavy IndustriesLtd. v ONGC Ltd. (2010) 11 SCC 296).There was no cause, therefore, for the single judge to interfere with theaward in this case.

16.The appeal, for the foregoing reasons, fails as unmerited; it is,therefore, dismissed without any order on costs.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT(JUDGE)

JULY 17,2017

KGARG(JUDGE)

FAO COS) (COMM) 133/2017