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W.P.(C)/1677/2017 of M/S MERINO REALTORS (P) LTD. Vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS

Court
Delhi High Court
Decision date
2019-07-16
Bench
S MURALIDHAR TALWANT SINGH
Case number
2236/2017

Parties

Cites (1 resolved of 5 detected)

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*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+W.P.(e) 1475/2017M/S MERINO REALTORS (P) Ltd. PetitionerThi-ough: Ms. Jyoti KatariaBajaj, AdvocateversusRespondentsUNION OF E4DIA & ORS.Through:Mr. Anil Dabas for TJOI.Ms. Akshay Chandra for DDAMr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr. SunilKumarTha, Mr. M.S. Akhtar forL&B/LAC"W-P-IC) 1520/2017SWAPNA SINGH , ••••• PetitionerThrough;, Ms. Jyoti Kataria Bajaj, AdvocateversusRespondentsUNION OF INDIA & ORS.Through:Mr. ArjunPant for DDAMr. Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counseland Ms. Jyoti Tyagi for L&B/LACW.P.(C) 2236/2017SUDHAPRASAD .A PetitionerThrough: Ms. Jyoti Kataria Bajaj, AdvocateversusUNION OF iNDIA & ORS...... RespondentsThrough:Mr; Brijesh Kumar for UOI.Ms. Shobhna Takiar with Ms. ShivaniJain for DDA

Signature Not Verified

W.P.(C) 1475/2017 and other connected matters

Mr. Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counseland Ms. Jyoti Tyagi for L&B/LAC

W.P.(C) 1677/2017

M/S MERINO REALTORS (P) Ltd. Petitioner

Through: Ms. Jyoti Kataria Bajaj, Advocate

versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.RespondentsThrough:Mr. Anil Dabas for UOI.Ms. Shobhna Takiar with Ms. ShwetaAnand for DDAMr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr. SunilKumar Jha, Mr. M.S. Akhtar forL&B/LACW.P.(C) 1685/2017M/S MERINO REALTORS (P) Ltd. PetitionerThrough: Ms. Jyoti Kataria Bajaj, AdvocateversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.RespondentsThrough:Mr. Anil Dabas for UOI.Ms. Shobhna Takiar with Ms. ShivaniJain for DDAMr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr. SunilKumar Jha, Mr. M.S. Akhtar forL&B/LACCORAM:JUSTICE S.MURALIDHARJUSTICE TALWANT SINGHORDER%16.07.2019

1. In all these petitions, the facts more or less are similar and the reliefs

sought are almost identical. They are accordingly being disposed of by thiscommon order. Nevertheless, each of the petitions was heard separately.

2. For the sake of convenience W.P.(C) 1475 of 2017 titled M/s MerinoRealtors (P) Ltd. v. UOI & Ors. is taken up as the lead case. The prayers inthe petition read as imder:

"(i) issue writ of certiorari and/or any other writ, order ordirection of the similar nature declaring the entire acquisitionwith respect to 1/5^ undivided share in agricultural landmeasuring 81 Bighas and 6 Biswas (Equal to 16 Bighas and 5Biswas), comprised in Khasra Nos. 600 (2-15), 629(44-9), 639(12-4), 647 (8-7), 649 (2-8), 651 (0-17) & 972/673/674/367 (10-6), situated in the revenue estate of Village Maidan Garhi, NCTof Delhi, having lapsed and further quashing the impugnednotification No. F.9(16)/80- L&B dated 25.11.1980 issued undersection 4, Notification No.F.9(28)/85-L&B dated 18.06.1985issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and theAward no.23/87-88 with respect to 1/5^^^ undivided share inagricultural land measuring 81 Bighas and 6 Biswas (Equal to 16Bighas and 5 Bisv/as), comprised in Khasra Nos, 600 (2-15),629(44-9), 639 (12-4), 647 (8-7), 649 (2-8), 651 (0-17) &972/673/674/367 (10-6), situated in the revenue estate of VillageMaidan Garhi, NCT of Delhi.

AND

(ii) issue writ of mandamus and/or any other writ, order anddirection of the similar nature issuing directions to theRespondents not to disturb or hinder the possession andenjoyment of the Petitioner over 1/5^*^ undivided share inagricultural land measuring 81 Bighas and 6 Biswas (Equal to 16Bighas and 5 Biswas), comprised-in Khasra Nos. 600 (2- 15\629(44-9), 639 (12-4), 647 (8-7), 649 (2-8), 651 (0-17) &972/673/674/367 (10-6), situated in the revenue estate of VillageMaidan Garhi, NCT of Delhi."

3. The narration in the petition reveals that the notification under Section 4of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LAA') was issued on 25^*^ November1980, followed by declaration under Section 6 of the LAA on 18 June1985. The impugned Award No. 23/1987-88 was passed way back in 1987-88. There is no explanation in the petition for the inordinate delay inapproaching the Court for relief.)

4. It is stated in the petition that "the Petitioner is the owner in, actualphysical possession of undivided share in agricultural land measuring 81Bighas and 6 Biswas (Eqiial to 16 Bighas and 5 Biswas), comprised inKhasraNos. 600 (2-15), 629(44-9), 639 (12-4), 647 (8-7), 649 (2-8), 651 (0-17) & 972/673/674/367 (10-6), situated iii the revenue Estate of VillageMaidan Garhi." It is stated that one Shri Hoshiyar Singh was the recordedowner of the land in question and after his demise, the land was inherited byhis two sons. It is stated that the Petitioner through his authorisedrepresentative purchased the subject land from the two sons by way of anAgreement to Sell (ATS) dated 10^*^ September 2005 and General Power ofAttorney (GPA) dated 2 April 2006.

5. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the LAC, it is submitted that thePetitioner is claiming ownership of the land based on an ATS arid GPAwhich are not valid instruments conferring title on the Petitioner. It is statedthat possession of KhasraNos. 600 (2-15), 629 (44-9), 639 (12-4), 647 (8-7),649 (2-8), 651 (0-17)972/673/674/367 (10-6) was-taken and handed over tothe DDA on 16^"^ July 1987. On the aspect of compensatiorl, it is submittedthat the compensation amount has been paid to the recorded owners. In the

present case, compensation amount of Rs. 5,09,237.84 was paid to each ofthe sons of the recorded owner.

6: In the counter-affidavit filed by the DDA, it is submitted that the petitionis barred by delay and laches. It is further submitted that the Petitioner haspurchased the property in question through GPAs and ATS which are notvalid instruments of sale. It is also submitted that the land in question hasbeen purchased by the Petitioner after the award has been passed which isbarred by Section 4 of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972.No rejoinder has been filed by the Petitioner to the counter affidavit of theLAC or the DDA.

7. In any event, the assertion of the Petitioner that it continues to remain inpossession of the land in question gives rise to disputed question of factwhich cannot be examined in this petition. Moreover, the documents on thebasis of which the Petitioner is claiming ownership are not valid. perusalof the said documents reveals that they do not confer any valid right, title orinterest in respect of the lands in question in favour of the Petitioner. In thistKcase, the Notification under Section 4 of LAA was issued on 25 November1980 and the Award was passed on 5^^ June 1987. The Petitioner having ful]knowledge about the status of the land in question and without takingpermission from the competent authority as required under Delhi Land(Restriction of Transfer) Act, 1972 has entered into the above transactions inrespect of the lands in question. The validity of the above documents are,therefore, extremely doubtful. In the circumstances, the Court is not satisfiedthat the Petitioner has been able to even prima facie demonstrate its, locus

standi to file this petition and claim any relief under Section 24 (2) of theRight to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('the 2013 Act').

8. On the aspect of laches, in Mahavir v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588

the Supreme Court has observed as under:

"23. In the instant case, the claim has beeri made not onlybelatedly, but neither the petitioners nor their previous threegenerations had ever approached any of the authorities in writingfor claiming compensation. No representation had ever beenfiled with any authority, none has been annexed and there is noaverment made in the petition that any such representation hadever been filed. The claim appears not only stale and dead butextremely clouded. This we are mentioning as additionalreasons, as such claims not only suffer from delay and laches butcourts are not supposed to entertain such claims. Besides suchclaims become doubtful, cannot be received for considerationbeing barred due to delay and laches.

24. the High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannotbe permitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicatedas they are barred. The High Court has rightly observed that suchclaims cannot be subject matter of inquiry after the lapse of areasonable period of time and beneficial provisions of Section 24of the 2013 Act are not available to such incumbents. In ouropinion. Section 24cannot revive those claims that are dead andstale."

9. The above decision has been reaffirmed by the judgment of the thi-eeJudges Bench of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v.Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412 where it was observed as under:-

"128, In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used torevive the dead or stale claims and the matters, v.Lich have been

contested up to this Court or even in the High Court having lostthe cases or where reference has been sought for enhancement ofthe compensation. Compensation obtained and still it is urgedthat physical possession has not been taken from them, suchclaims cannot be entertained under the guise of section 24(2).We have come across the cases in which findings have beenrecorded that by which of drawing Panchnama, possession hasbeen taken, now again under Section 24(2) it is asserted againthat physical possession is still with them. Such claims camiot beentertained in view of the previous decisions in which such pleaought to have been raised and such decisions would operate asres judicata or constmctive res judicata. As either the plea raisedis negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was notraised in the previous round of litigation. Section 24 of the Actof 2013 does not supersede or annul the court's decision and theprovisions cannot misused to reassert such claims once overagain. Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawingthe Panchnama physical possession has been taken, the casecannot be reopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013.

129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those whofirst deliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and thenindulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatoiytactics, for decades together. On the contrary, the section isintended to help those who have not been offered or paid thecompensation despite it being the legal obligation of theacquiring body so to do, and/or who have been illegally deprivedof their possession for five years or more; in both the scenarios,fault/cause not being attributable to the landowners/claimants.

130. We are of the view that stale or dead claims cannot be thesubject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Actof2013. The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate thosejudgment/orders of the courts where under rights/claims havebeen lost/negatived, neither do they revive those rights whichhave become barred, either, due to inaction or otherwise byoperation of law. Fraudulent and stale claims are not at all to beraised under the guise of section 24. Misuse of provisions of

section 24(2) cannot be permitted. Protection by the courts incases of such blatant misuse of the provisions of law could never 'have, been the intention behind enacting the provisions of section24 (2) of the 2013 Act; and, by the decision laid down in PuneMunicipal Corporation (supra), and this Court never, even for amoment, intended that such cases would be received orentertained by the courts."

10. It may be noted here that the reference made by Constitution Bench inIndore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2018) 4 SCC 405regarding the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Shailendra {supra) is as regards the extent to which it differsfrom the earlier view of the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal CorporationV. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki {supra) regarding the tendering ofcompensation, and on certain other issues but not on the question ofpetitions seeking declaration under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act- beingbarred by laches. This legal position was explained by this Court recently inMool Chand v. Union of India 2019 (173) DRJ 595 DB.

11. For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petitions are dismissed both onthe ground of laches as well as on merits, but in the circumstances, with noorders as to costs.

12. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated in all petitions.

S. MURALIDHAR, J.TALWANT SINGH, J.

JULY 16,2019/abc

W.P.(C) 1475/2017 and other connected matters