W.P.(C)/8967/2017 of M/S LONG VIEW DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. Vs DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS

$-3 & 36

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+W.P.(C) 8967/2017

M/S LONG VIEW DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. PetitionersThrough: Mr. M.P. Bhargava, Advocate

versus

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. RespondentsThrough: Mr. Rajesh Mahajan for DDAMr. Siddharth Panda for L&B/LAC

+W.P.(C) 8866/2017

M/S LONG VIEW DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. PetitionersThrough: Mr. M.P. Bhargava, Advocate

versus

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. RespondentsThrough: Mr. Arjun Pant for DDAMr. Siddharth Panda for L&B/LAC

CORAM:JUSTICE S.MURALIDHARJUSTICE LS. MEHTA

ORDER11.04.2019

1. These two petitions are by the same Petitioner and arise out of commonset of facts. In both petitions the relief prayed for is identical for differentpartsof land located in the same area being Village Satbari, Tehsil Hauzkhas.These petitions are accordingly being disposed of by this common order.

They were nevertheless heard separately.

2. For the sake of convenience the facts of W.P.(C) 8967/2017 titled M/sLong View Developers PvL Ltd, v. DDA & Ors. are being discussed.

3. The prayers in the petition read as under:

"In the facts and circumstances hereinabove stated, the Petitioner mosthumbly pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to;

(i) issue writ of certiorari and/or any other writ, order or direction ofthe similar nature declaring the entire acquisition with respect to 4Bigha 16 Bisws of comprised in Khasra No. 1025, situated in revenueEstate of Village Satbari, Tehsil Hauz Khas, New Delhi now knownas Farm No.H-1, Ansal Villa, Satbari, New Delhi, having lapsed andfurther quashing the impugned notification No. F.l(16)/80-L&B dated25.11.1980 issued under section 4, Notification No.F.9(26)/85-L&Bdated 27.05.1985 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 and the Award no. 14/87-88 with respect to 4 Bigha 16 Bisws ofcomprised in Khasra No. 1025, situated in revenue Estate of VillageSatbari, Tehsil Hauz Khas, New Delhi now known as Farm No.H-1,Ansal Villa, Satbari, New Delhi.

AND

(ii) issue writ of mandamus and/or any other writ, order anddirection of the similar nature issuing directions to the Respondentsnot to disturb or hinder the possession and enjoyment of the Petitionerover 4 Bigha 16 Bisws of comprised in Khasra No. 1025, situated inrevenue Estate of Village Satbari, Tehsil Hauz Khas, New Delhi nowknown as Farm No.H-1, Ansal Villa, Satbari, New Delhi.

(iii) pass any other or further order which this Hon'ble Court may

deem fit and proper in the interest of justice."

4. The narration in the petition reveals that notification under Section 4 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LAA') was issued on 25'^ November 1980,followed by declaration under Section 6 of the LAA on 2?"' May 1985. Theimpugned Award No. 14/87 was passed on 26^*^ May 1987. There is noexplanation in the petition for the inordinate delay in approaching the Courtfor relief.

5. It is stated in the petition that the Petitioner purchased the property fromthe legal heirs of the predecessor-in-interest through their constitutedattorney Mr. Tejinder Bhalla in 2006 through an Agreement to Sell (ATS)and General Power of Attorney (CPA) dated 8'^ May 2006. It is also statedthat the impugned notifications were challenged in Balak Ram Gupta v.Union of India (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB) whereby Division Bench (DB)of this Court quashed the acquisition proceedings. It is also stated that therecorded owner of the property also challenged the acquisition proceedingsin W.P.(C) No. 1043/1987 in which stay was granted by this court on 20'*'April 1987.

6. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the LAC, it is submitted that around of litigation took place regarding the current acquisition proceedings.It is stated that in the said award Khasra No. 1025(4-16) was not includedbecause of the interim stay granted in W.P.(C) No. 247/1986 titled

W.P.(C) 8967/2017 & W.P. (C) 8866/2017

Bhupender Kumar Modi & Ors. v. Union of India. Due to this fact, thepossession of Khasra No. 1025(4-16) could not be taken. It is also submittedthat the Petitioner is not the recorded owner. It is further submitted that thePetitioner purchased the subject land in 2006 which is almost 20 years afterthe Award was passed. The Petitioner is claiming title through GPA and anATS dated 8*^ May 2006 which are not valid title documents.

7. In the counter-affidavit filed by the DDA, it is submitted that physicalpossession of the Khasra No. 1025 has not been handed over to DDA by theLAC. It is submitted that the petition is barred by delay and laches. It isfurther submitted that the petitioners claim that their predecessors-in-interestwere the recorded owners of the subject land at the time of notification butneither any title documents nor copy from revenue records to prove theirtitle ownership in respect of the land have been attached.

8. No rejoinder has been filed by the Petitioner to the counter affidavit of theDDA or LAC. The facts in the companion writ petition are similar as is thatstand of the Respondents. Only the khasra numbers are different.

9. The unconverted counter affidavits of the LAC and the DDA give rise todisputed questions of fact regarding the assertion by the Petitioners that theyare entitled to compensation. The fact further remains that the Petitionershave no explanation to offer for the inordinate delay in approaching theCourt for the relief.

10. On the aspect of laches, in Mahavir v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588

the Supreme Court has observed as under:

"23. In the instant case, the claim has been made not only belatedly,but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations hadever approached any of the authorities in writing for claimingcompensation. No representation had ever been filed with anyauthority, none has been annexed and there is no averment made inthe petition that any such representation had ever been filed. Theclaim appears not only stale and dead but extremely clouded. This weare mentioning as additional reasons, as such claims not only sufferfrom delay and laches but courts are not supposed to entertain suchclaims. Besides such claims become doubtful, cannot be received forconsideration being barred due to delay and laches.

24. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot bepermitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicated as theyare barred. The High Court has rightly observed that such claimscannot be subject matter of inquiry after the lapse of reasonableperiod of time and beneficial provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Actare not available to such incumbents. In our opinion. Section 24cannotrevive those claims that are dead and stale."

11. The above decision was re-affirmed by the judgment of the three JudgeBench of the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v.Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412 where it was observed as under:

"128. In our considered opinion section 24 cannot be used to revivethe dead or stale claims and the matters, which have been contested upto this Court or even in the High Court having lost the cases or wherereference has been sought for enhancement of the compensation.Compensation obtained and still it is urged that physical possessionhas not been taken from them, such claims cannot be entertainedunder the guise of section 24(2). We have come across the cases in

which findings have been recorded that by which of drawing aPanchnama, possession has been taken, now again under Section24(2) it is asserted again that physical possession is still with them.Such claims cannot be entertained in view of the previous decisions inwhich such plea ought to have been raised and such decisions wouldoperate as res judicata or constructive res judicata. As either the plearaised is negatived or such plea ought to have been raised or was notraised in the previous round of litigation. Section 24 of the Act of2013 does not supersede or annul the court's decision and theprovisions cannot misused to reassert such claims once over again.Once Panchnama has been drawn and by way of drawing thePanchnama physical possession has been taken, the case cannot bereopened under the guise of section 24 of Act of 2013.

129. Section 24 is not intended to come to the aid of those who firstdeliberately refuse to accept the compensation, and then indulge in ill-advised litigation, and often ill-motivated dilatory tactics, for decadestogether. On the contrary, the section is intended to help those whohave not been offered or paid the compensation despite it being thelegal obligation of the acquiring body so to do, and/or who have beenillegally deprived of their possession for five years or more; in boththe scenarios, fault/cause not being attributable to thelandowners/claimants.

130. We are of the view that stale or dead claims cannot be thesubject-matter of judicial probing under section 24 of the Act of2013.The provisions of section 24 do not invalidate those judgment/ordersof the courts where under rights/claims have been lost/negatived,neither do they revive those rights which have become barred, eitherdue to inaction or otherwise by operation of law. Fraudulent and staleclaims are not at all to be raised under the guise of section 24. Misuseof provisions of section 24 (2) cannot be permitted. Protection by thecourts in cases of such blatant misuse of the provisions of law couldnever have been the intention behind enacting the provisions ofsection 24 (2) of the 2013 Act; and, by the decision laid down in Pune

Municipal Corporation {supra), and this Court never, even for amoment, intended that such cases would be received or entertained bythe courts."

12. It may be noted here that the reference made by Constitution Bench inIndore Development Authority v. Shyam Verma (2018) 4 SCC 405regarding the correctness of the aforesaid decision in Indore DevelopmentAuthority v. Shailendra {supra) is only as regards the extent to which itdiffers from the earlier view of the Supreme Court in Pune MunicipalCorporation v. Harakchand Misrimai Soianki {supra) regarding thetendering of compensation, and on certain other issues but not on thequestion of petitions seeking declaration under Section 24 (2) of the 2013Act being barred by laches. This legal position was explained by this Courtrecently in Mooi Chand v. Union of India 2019 (173) DRJ 595 DB.

13. For the aforementioned reasons, the writ petitions are dismissed both onthe ground of laches as well as on merits, but in the circumstances, with noorders as to costs. The interim order dated 2?"^ February 2018 is herebyvacated.

APRIL 11,2019

S. MURALIDHAR, J.I.S. MEHTA, J.