RC.REV./257/2022 of BHASKAR REFRACTORIES AND STONEWARE PIPES PVT. LTD. Vs ISHWAR INDUSTRIES LTD.

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CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA

J U M N T

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:

1.This petition has been filed assailing the eviction order dated01.12.2021, passed by the Rent Controller, South East District, SaketCourts, New Delhi (‘Trial Court’) in RC ARC No. 50 of 2019, as well asthe order dated 28.07.2022 passed by the Trial Court, dismissing the reviewapplication filed against the said eviction order dated 01.12.2021.

2.The Trial Court while allowing the eviction petition vide order dated01.12.2021, dismissed the application of the Petitioner seeking condonationof delay in filing the leave to defend application as the same had been filedafter delay of thirteen (13) days.

3.The eviction petition was instituted by the Respondent herein underSection 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (‘DRC Act’), seeking

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eviction of the Petitioner herein from tenanted premises i.e., ground floor,Block No. 6 in Khasra No. 264, Tribhuvan Complex, Ishwar Nagar, NewDelhi – 65 (‘tenanted premises’), ad-measuring 5000 sq. ft. approximately.4.The notice of the eviction petition was issued to the Petitioner hereinvide order dated 02.08.2019, under Section 25B(2) of the DRC Act, callingupon him to obtain the leave to contest within period of fifteen (15) daysof service. It is matter of record that the notice was served on thePetitioner on 20.08.2019. The Petitioner was thus, obliged to file theapplication seeking leave to defend within fifteen (15) days i.e., on orbefore 04.09.2019. However, the same was admittedly filed by thePetitioner herein on 17.09.2019 i.e., after delay of about thirteen (13)days.

5.The Petitioner, tenant, filed an application seeking condonation ofdelay in filing the application seeking leave to defend, explaining that thenon-filing was on account of the mistake of the clerk of the counsel. TheTrial Court relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in PrithipalSingh v. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs., (2010) 2 SCC 15 and OmPrakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, (2010) 9 SCC 183, held that the RentController does not have the power to condone even single day’s delayand accordingly, dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay infilling leave to defend application vide order dated 01.12.2021. The TrialCourt thereafter proceeded to examine the averments made in the evictionpetition and after satisfying itself that all the ingredient of Section 14(1)(e)of the DRC Act, are satisfied, it allowed the eviction petition filed onbehalf of the Respondent, vide order dated 01.12.2021.

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6.The Petitioner herein had originally approached this Court by way ofrevision petition bearing RC. REV. No. 178/2021, challenging the evictionorder dated 01.12.2021, however, the same was withdrawn by thePetitioner on 03.06.2022 with liberty to approach the Trial Court seeking areview of order dated 01.12.2021. As noted hereinbefore, the reviewapplication filed by the Petitioner herein stands dismissed vide impugnedjudgment and order dated 28.07.2022.

7.The Trial Court after perusing the averments made in the reviewapplication held that the grounds on which the review was sought were noteven raised in the application seeking leave to defend and had been raisedfor the first time in the review petition. The Trial Court observed that thegrounds raised were beyond the purview of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. TheTrial Court opined that it has no inherent power to condone the delay andaffirmed the view taken on 01.12.2021 while dismissing the reviewpetition.

8.Brief facts as stated by the Respondent in its eviction petition are asunder:

8.1.It is stated that the property wherein the tenanted premises aresituated was sold to the Respondent by Pandit Amarnath Bhaskar, vide anoral sale in the month of November, 1943. It is stated upon death of PanditAmarnath Bhaskar, his surviving legal heirs i.e., his wife and four sonsrelinquished their rights, title and claim in the property vide RegisteredDeed of Release dated 03.07.1962 (‘Release deed’).

8.2.It is stated that the Jamabandi and Revenue records reflect the nameof the Respondent as the owner of the property.

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8.3.It is also evident from the documents on record that the Respondententered into Development Agreement dated 08.01.1985 and 04.02.1986with Developer namely M/s Growth Techno Project Ltd., whichundertook development of the land and agreed to allot 50% of the superbuilt up area to the Respondent by way of ‘owner’s allocation’. TheDeveloper duly completed the construction of the building know as‘Tribhuvan Complex’ (‘building’) and handed over the possession to theRespondent towards the ‘owner’s allocation’. The tenanted premises arelocated in this building on the ground floor.

8.4.The first floor of the building is being used for residential purposesand is occupied by the Director of the Respondent, Sh. Bharat Bhaskar andhis family members.

8.5.It is stated in the eviction petition that the ground floor portion of thebuilding, ad-measures approximately 9092 sq. ft. out of which 5000 sq. ft.area is the tenanted premises, 2860 sq. ft. area has been sold by theRespondent to Mr. Sanjay Bhaskar and Mrs. Adita Bhaskar vide separatesale deed(s) dated 13.05.2003 and small portion is in possession of M/sTNB Investments Pvt. Ltd., sister concern of the Respondent.

8.6.It is stated that the Petitioner and Respondent being family runcompanies, no specific written agreement of tenancy was executed betweenthem. It is stated that vide Board Resolution dated 31.03.1977 and02.05.1980, the rent for the tenanted premises was fixed at Rs. 1,500/- permonth. It is stated that the monthly rent of the suit premises wassubsequently enhanced to Rs. 1750/- per month and the rent was being paiddirectly to Late Mr. Vinay Bhaskar, the then Director of Respondent

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Company. It is stated that however, after the demise of Mr. Vinay Bhaskaron 20.10.2006, the Petitioner failed to pay the rent for the tenantedpremises.

8.7.The eviction petition was filed on 01.08.2019 for the bona fide needof Respondent herein for office space for itself, for the business of itsDirector, Mr. Ashish Bhaskar, and for the business of Mr. Abhinav Bhaskari.e., the son of another Director, Sh. Bharat Bhaskar. It is stated in theeviction petition that the Respondent herein has no other alternate suitableaccommodation available with him and has affirmed that the tenantedpremises is ideally located in well-known commercial area and are moresuitable for the requirement of the Respondent and its Directors.

8.8.It is stated that the Petitioner (tenant) stopped carrying out anybusiness in these tenanted premises since about 7-8 years prior to filing ofthe eviction petition. It is stated that premises have been occupied by aDirector of the Petitioner (tenant) i.e., Sh. Vidur Bhaskar for short while;however, after the service of termination notice dated 01.04.2019, saidSh. Vidur Bhaskar also discontinued his use and the tenanted premises arecurrently lying locked and unused.

Arguments of the Petitioner

9.Mr. Neeraj Sharma, the learned counsel for the Petitioner made thefollowing submissions:

9.1.He stated that the Respondent has been denied consideration of themerits of the application seeking leave to defend by the Trial Court onaccount of the delay in filing the said application. He states that in view ofthe judgment of Tharia Ram v. Chitra Devi, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 94, the

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Petitioner herein cannot be made to suffer on account of the defaultcommitted by the counsel’s clerk. He states that the Director of thePetitioner had acted diligently and attested and affirmed on oath thecontents of the affidavit accompanying the application seeking leave todefend before the oath commission on 29.08.2019. He states that however,due to the mistake of the clerk of the counsel, the said application and theaffidavit was filed belatedly on 17.09.2019.

9.2.He states that applying the dual test laid down by the Division Benchof this Court in Director Directorate of Education & Anr. v. Mohd.Shamim & Ors., (2019) SCC OnLine Del 11490, this Court may take noteof the fact that the Petitioner herein is not at fault and therefore, this Courtmay exercise its power to condone the delay of thirteen (13) days in filingthe application seeking leave to defend and remand the matter back to TrialCourt for considering the application seeking leave to defend.

9.3.He states that the Petitioner herein relies upon its leave to defendapplication dated 29.08.2019 and is not relying upon the amended leave todefend application dated 16.09.2020 (‘amended leave to defend’); in viewof the settled law that no amendment can be made to the leave to defendapplication after fifteen (15) days to raise facts which were already knownto the tenant.

9.4.He states that the Petitioner herein has raised triable issues in theleave to defend application dated 29.08.2019. He states that an evictionpetition alleging bona fide need of the Director of the Respondent or theson of the Director of the Respondent, which is juristic entity, is notmaintainable in law. He states that the bona fide need can only be of the

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Respondent (i.e., the corporate entity) itself and not its Director’s or theirfamily members.

9.5.He states that the Respondent is corporate entity and the legal issuewith respect to the maintainability of an eviction petition under Section14(1)(e) of the DRC Act by juristic person is subject matter of referencevide order dated 22.12.2017 in RC. REV. 18/2016 titled as ‘K.S. Bhandariv. M/s International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd’.

9.6.In the leave to defend application, the Petitioner had alleged that thetitle of the tenanted premises vests in the Petitioner and has denied theownership of the Respondent. No documents were filed in support of thesaid plea of ownership.

However, during the course of arguments, learned counsel for thePetitioner fairly conceded that the Respondent herein is the recorded ownerof the tenanted premises.

9.7.He stated that there is dispute with respect to the existence of therelationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. He stated that thePetitioner herein admits making payment of Rs. 1,750 per month; however,he states that the said amount was paid towards ‘maintenance charges’ andnot towards rent.

9.8.He stated that the eviction petition itself refers to existence of afamily settlement agreement between the parties hereto and therefore, noeviction petition can be maintained. He fairly admitted that this contentionhas not been raised in the leave to defend application.

9.9.He stated that the eviction petition has been instituted by theRespondent through its Director, Sh. Bharat Bhaskar, however there was an

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injunction issued by the erstwhile Company Law Board restraining the saidperson from acting on behalf the Respondent. He, however, submitted thatthe injunction order has since been vacated on 29.09.2021 and the saidlegal proceedings have come to an end. He also fairly admitted that thisissue has not been raised in the leave to defend application dated29.08.2019. He also admitted that the Respondent has relied upon boardresolution dated 09.11.2022 authorising Sh. Bharat Bhaskar to filepleadings in this revision petition.

9.10. He states that as per the minutes of meeting dated 05.10.2011 filedon record by the Respondent with the eviction petition, the tenantedpremises or part thereof has been agreed to be transferred in favour ofMadhu Bhaskar Group in pursuance to family understanding. He statesthat thus, the Respondent is left with no right or title in the tenantedpremises and therefore, cannot maintain the eviction petition. He however,fairly admits that this issue as well has not been raised in the leave todefend application.

9.11. No objection as regards availability of alternate accommodation wasraised during the arguments.

Arguments of the Respondent

10.Ms. Ekta Mehta, learned counsel for the Respondent, has made thefollowing submissions:

10.1. She states that the explanation offered by the Petitioner for not filingthe leave to defend application within the statutory period of fifteen (15)days is mere pretext and the Trial Court has rightly applied and followedthe law laid down by the Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh (Supra). She

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states that the dual test laid down in Director Directorate of Education(Supra) is not fulfilled in the facts of this case.

10.2. She states that no triable issues have been raised by the Petitionerherein in its leave to defend application. She states that there is apresumption qua the bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Actin favour of the landlord. She states that the Respondent has sufficiently setout its bona fide need at paragraph 18(a) (1 to 6) of the eviction petition.She states that on the other hand, the Petitioner herein is not even using thetenanted premises, ad-measuring 5,000 sq. ft. and is keeping them lockedand unused.

10.3. She states that the pendency of the reference before the DivisionBench in K.S. Bhandari (Supra), cannot be consideration for notproceeding with these eviction proceedings. She states that during thependency of the reference, the Courts should continue to decide the casesand apply the law as it then prevails. She relies upon the judgment aCoordinate Bench of this Court in WhatsApp LLC. v. CompetitionCommission of India & Anr., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2308 in support ofthis proposition.

10.4. She states that the three (3) essential ingredients for maintaining anapplication under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act have been fulfilled bythe Respondent herein. She states that the title of the Respondent to thetenanted premises stands admitted and is also matter of record. She statesthat the bona fide need has been sufficiently set out in the eviction petition.She states that it is not denied by the Petitioner that the Respondent has noalternate suitable accommodation.

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10.5. She states that the contention of the Petitioner that there is referenceto family settlement between the Petitioner and the Respondent in theeviction petition at paragraph 18(a)(5) is ex-facie incorrect. She states thatthe family settlement/compromise referred to therein is with respect to Mrs.Madhu Bhaskar. She relies upon the contents of the settlement dated05.10.2011 filed with the eviction petition. She states that therefore, thesaid plea of the Petitioner alleging that there is family settlement betweenthe parties is incorrect and does not give rise to any triable issue.

10.6. She states that the conduct of the Petitioner merits award of costs infavour of the Respondent herein. She states that the first revision petitionchallenging the eviction order dated 01.12.2021, was withdrawn on03.06.2022, after exhausting its full time of statutory protection of six (6)months. She states that the Respondent herein filed an execution petitionafter the dismissal of the review application. She states that, warrants ofpossession were issued by the executing Court vide order dated 24.09.2022;however, the warrants could not be executed by the bailiff due to theresistance offered by the Petitioner which amounts to obstruction. Shestates that pursuant to the aforesaid, the execution petition was listed on03.11.2022, however, two days before the returnable date in the executionproceedings, the present revision petition was filed and listed on01.11.2022.

10.7. She states that the Petitioner herein is enjoying the tenanted premiseswithout making any payment of use and occupation charges, even thoughan eviction order was passed against the Petitioner on 01.12.2021.

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10.8. She states that the pleas raised in the amended leave to defend dated16.09.2020 and new pleas raised before this Court cannot be considered asit would be against the mandate of the law laid down by the Supreme Courtin Prithipal Singh (Supra).

Analysis and Finding

11.This Court has considered the submissions of the learned counsel forthe parties and perused the paper book.

12.In the first instance, this Court would like to examine the judgmentof the Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh (Supra) considering the argumentof the learned counsel for the Petitioner that in Prithipal Singh (Supra), noleave to defend application had been filed by the tenant before the RentController and therefore, the said judgment turned on the said peculiar fact.12.1. Firstly, the Supreme Court in the judgment of Prithipal Singh(Supra), authoritatively laid down that the Rent Controller has no powerunder Section 25B of the DRC Act to entertain an application for settingaside the order of eviction and/or entertain an application for condoning thedelay in filing leave to defend application.

12.2. Secondly, in the facts of the said case, the Rent Controller vide orderdated 28.02.2001 had dismissed the tenant’s application seeking leave todefend on the ground that it was filed 08 days beyond the date mentionedin the summons. The Rent Controller held that it had no power to condonethe delay in filing such an affidavit and as follow up action, passed aneviction order in favour of the landlord. The tenant, thereafter filed anapplication under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 and Section151 of CPC for setting aside the eviction order dated 28.02.2001. The said

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application was allowed by the Rent Controller vide order dated07.12.2001. The said order of the Rent Controller was upheld by this Courtvide judgment dated 30.10.2006. The Supreme Court in its judgment ofPrithipal Singh (Supra) set aside the High Court’s order dated 30.10.2006and Rent Controller order dated 07.12.2001; and restored the RentController’sevictionorderdated28.02.2001.TheSupremeCourtcategorically held that no application for condonation of delay can beentertained by the Rent Controller. The relevant extract of the saidjudgment reads as under:

“30. For the reasons aforesaid, we are therefore of the view that the HighCourt has acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of itsjurisdiction in affirming the order of the Additional Rent Controller wherebythe Additional Rent Controller had allowed the application for setting asidethe order of eviction and restored the application for leave to contest theeviction proceedings when such power, in our view, was not conferred onthe Rent Controller to entertain such an application filed by the respondenttenant.

31. There is another aspect of this matter. It is difficult to understand howan application for leave to contest having been rejected, may be on theground of delay, could be allowed when it is not disputed by the respondenttenant that no application for condonation of delay could be entertained bythe Rent Controller as the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 could notbe attracted. That apart, we have also carefully examined the special reasongiven by the respondent tenant in the original application for leave tocontest and the present application after order of eviction was passed. On areading of these two applications, we find that the same defence was takenby the tenant after the order of eviction was passed and therefore, we do notthink that such reason can be considered to be special reason within themeaning of Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code for allowing the tenant to defendthe proceedings if Order 3 7 Rule 4 of the Code applies to special Act.32. For all the reasons aforesaid, the order of eviction passed by theAdditional Rent Controller on 28-2-2001 stands restored, the impugnedorder of the High Court as well as the order of the Additional RentController, Delhi, are set aside and the application filed by the landlordunder Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act stands allowed.”

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12.3. perusal of the judgment therefore shows that leave to defendapplication was filed by the tenant therein however, the Supreme Courtheld that the delay of 08 days in filing the said leave to defend by the tenantcannot be condoned by the Trial Court and it therefore also set aside theorder of the High Court, which had the effect of condoning the delay.

12.4. The law settled by this judgment has been consistently applied bythis Court and therefore, no error has been committed by the Trial Court innot condoning the delay vide the impugned orders. In this regard, thejudgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in Shri Prabhudayal Batrav. M/s Shreyans Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7891 isapposite and reads as under:

“9. Thus the Supreme Court in Prithpal Singh (Supra) noted the dominantobject of the amending Act so as to provide speedy, expeditious andeffective remedy for class of landlords contemplated by Sections 14(1)(e)and 14A of the DRC Act and for avoiding unusual dilatory process. Section25-B(1) being special provision and every application on the ground ofSection 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act is required to be dealt with in accordancewith the procedure specified under Section 25-B(1) of the DRC Act. Sinceno power has been conferred on the Controller apart from Rule 23 which isa general rule, the Controller is required to be guided with the provisions ofSection 25-B DRC Act and thus there was no power with the Controller tocondone the delay in filing the leave to defend application. In view of thisdecision of the Supreme Court it cannot be said that this Court in itsinherent jurisdiction has power to condone the delay. This Court exercisingjurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, acts in supervisorycapacity to see whether any illegality has been committed by the learnedARC.Thus in view of the decision in Prithpal Singh (Supra) it cannot besaid that the learned ARC committed any illegality in not condoning thedelay or this Court has the power to condone the delay in filing the leave”to defend application.

(Emphasis Supplied)

12.5. The Petitioner in its application dated 17.09.2019 while seekingcondonation of delay of thirteen (13) days has foisted the lapse, in filing the

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application for leave to defend, on the clerk of the counsel entrusted withthe responsibility for filing the said application. In fact, the explanationoffered has been literally lifted from the facts of the judgment in ThariaRam (Supra) and fails to persuade this Court with respect to itstruthfulness. The judgment of Tharia Ram (Supra) was passed on28.03.1983 i.e., much prior to the law settled by the Supreme Court inPrithipal Singh (Supra). The explanation offered by the Petitioner in theapplication dated 17.09.2019 whilst seeking condonation of delay is merepretext and ruse, which if accepted would set at naught, the sanctity of themandate of filing the leave to defend within fifteen (15) days as upheld bythe Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh (Supra) and Om Prakash (Supra).This Court is therefore, of the opinion that the Petitioner has failed tosatisfy this Court that he was prevented by reason beyond its control fromapplying leave to defend within the prescribed time; and for this reason, thePetitioner cannot rely upon the judgment of the Division bench in DirectorDirectorate of Education (Supra).

13.The Petitioner herein filed his application for seeking leave to defendon 17.09.2019 and thereafter, filed an application dated 21.10.2020 seekingleave to amend the leave to defend. This Court has consistently held thatthe purpose and intent of the provision of Section 25(B)(4) of the DRC Act,would be defeated if leave to defend is permitted to be amended, unless thefacts which are sought to be pleaded have come into an existence after thefiling of the application seeking leave to defend. In this regard, it would beinstructive to refer the judgment of the Coordinate Bench in Ms. Madhu

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Gupta v. M/s Gardenia Estates (P) Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4500,

wherein the Para 11 reads as under:

“11. Contention of the petitioner before this Court is that the procedurecontained in Section 25B is silent as to whether an amendment ispermissible or not and in the absence of which Rule 23 of the Delhi RentControl Rules, 1959 can be adhered to. Reliance has also been placed uponthe judgment of Ved Prakash (supra). The said judgment had beenpronounced on 07.8.2009 which is admittedly prior in time to the judgmentof Prithipal Singh (supra) which was pronounced on 18.12.2009. Thejudgment of Prithipal Singh is clear and categorical on the point that theprocedure contained in Section 25B of the DRCA has to be strictly adheredto for dealing with petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA. This ratioof Prithipal Singh precludes the applicability of the provisions of the Codeof Civil Procedure; further the amendments sought for even otherwise wereof facts which were already known to the petitioner. The facts which weresought to be incorporated i.e. that the landlord company was part of ahuge Real Estate Group of companies having several properties in theirname were all facts known to the tenant; even otherwise they would nothave bearing on the bonafide requirement of the Director of the companynamely Amit Deep Singh who is seeking this eviction order for the personal-residence for his wife and two children. These facts were all preexisting i.e.existing at the time when the application for leave to defend was filed; ifsuch an application is permitted the whole purpose and intent of theprovisions of Section 25B(4) would be defeated as the specifically stipulatedperiod for filing an application for leave to defend within 15 days would begiven go by and by permitting the amendment there would be anautomatic extension of time for filing the application for leave to defend.This could not and was not the intent of the statute. In Ved Prakash (Supra)also the amendments sought for although being of subsequent events weredisallowed, as having been filed belatedly.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

13.1. In the facts of this case, the Petitioner herein in its amendment leaveto defend application has sought to raise contentions which were within inits knowledge at the time of filing the initial leave to defend application andtherefore, the said application is not maintainable. The said new pleasraised before the Trial Court at the time of the hearing in the review

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application were rightly rejected by the Trial Court vide order dated28.07.2022, for additionally being beyond the scope of review.

13.2. However, as noted above learned counsel for the Petitioner has dulyconceded during the course of arguments that the Petitioner cannotmaintain the application seeking amendment of the leave to defend in thefacts of this case. Therefore, the plea raised with respect to transfer ofownership of the tenanted premises in favour of the Madhu Bhaskar Group,relying upon the minutes of meeting dated 05.10.2011 is clearly notmaintainable. Even otherwise, this Court is not persuaded that there hasbeen any transfer of title in favour of Ms. Madhu Bhaskar on the basis ofthe minutes of meeting dated 05.10.2011. The Respondent herein continuesto remain the recorded owner of the tenanted premises.

14.Similarly, the plea raised challenging the authority of Sh. BharatBhaskar to institute and maintain the eviction petition having been raisedfor the first time in the amended leave to defend application, the same isnot maintainable. Even otherwise the Respondent has placed on record theboard resolution dated 09.11.2022 authorising Sh. Bharat Bhaskar andplaced on record the Master Data of the Respondent as available on thewebsite of Ministry of Corporate Affairs, which duly records, Sh. BharatBhaskar as the Director. In these circumstances, the challenge raised to theauthority of Sh. Bharat Bhaskar to maintain the eviction petition isuntenable and does not give rise to triable issue. The Petitioner does notdispute that Sh. Bharat Bhaskar is the Director of Respondent.

14.1. The plea raised by the Petitioner that there exists family settlementbetween the Petitioner and the Respondent which finds mention in the

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eviction petition at paragraph 18(a)(4) is ex facie incorrect. The contents ofparagraph 18(a)(4) refer to family settlement between Ms. MadhuBhaskar and the Respondent. It contains no reference to the Petitioner andtherefore, this plea is without any merit. Even otherwise as admitted by thelearned counsel for the Petitioner, no such plea has been raised in theoriginal leave to defend application.

15.The Petitioner’s contention that since the Respondent is corporateentity and the issue whether corporate entity can maintain an evictionpetition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, is subject matter ofreference in K.S. Bhandari (Supra) and therefore, the eviction proceedingsshould not be proceeded with is also without merit.

15.1. Firstly, this Court is in agreement with the contention of the learnedcounsel for the Respondent that pendency of similar matter in referenceto larger Bench, would not preclude the Court from dealing with the issueon merit. The observations made in the judgment of Coordinate bench inWhatsApp LLC (Supra) is clear on the said issue. The relevant extract of

the said judgment reads as under:

31. Similarly,in P.SudhakarRao v. U.GovindaRao [P.SudhakarRao v. U. Govinda Rao(2013) 8 SCC 693] , the Supreme Court observedthat the pendency of similar matter before larger Bench did not preventthe Supreme Court from dealing with the issue on merit.32. TheDivisionBenchofthisCourtin UnionofIndia v. V.K.Vashisht [Union of India v. V.K. Vashisht2012 SCC OnLine Del 6312] hasalso observed on the question of effect of reference to the larger Bench asunder:

“14. With regard to the contention that similar matter is pendingbefore larger Bench of the Supreme Court, it would be suffice tostate that reference to larger Bench does not lead to an inescapableconclusion that such matters be kept in abeyance. In recentcase AshokSadarangani v. UnionofIndia [Ashok

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Sadarangani v. Union of India(2012) 11 SCC 321 : AIR 2012 SC1563] , the Supreme Court has observed:

‘19.Aswasindicatedin HarbhajanSingh v. StateofPunjab [Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab(2009) 13 SCC 608] ,the pendency of reference to larger Bench, does not mean thatall other proceedings involving the same issue would remain stayedtill decision was rendered in the reference. The reference madein GianSingh v. StateofPunjab [GianSingh v. StateofPunjab(2010) 15 SCC 118] need not, therefore, detain us. Till suchtime as the decisions cited at the Bar are not modified or altered in

any way, they continue to hold the field’.”

33. Though the abovementioned judgments are in relation to issues pendingbefore the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, in my opinion, they show thateven during such pendency, the other courts may and should continue todecide the cases and applying the law as it then prevails. This is so, as merependency of reference before the larger bench does not denude the othercourts of their jurisdiction to decide on the lis before them. Similarly, merelybecause of the pendency of the above proceedings before the Supreme Courtand before this Court, Respondent 1 cannot be said to be bound tonecessarily hold its hands and not exercise the jurisdiction otherwise vestedin it under the statute. Maybe, it would have been prudent for Respondent 1to have awaited the outcome of the abovereferred petitions before theSupreme Court and before this Court, however, merely for its decision notto wait, the impugned order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction or soperverse so as to warrant to be quashed by this Court in exercise of itsextraordinary jurisdiction.

15.2. The law as it stands today recognises the right of corporate entity tomaintain petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, for its bona fideneed. In this regard, it would relevant to refer to the decision of theCoordinate Bench of this Court in Ravinder Kumar Verma v. LaxmiNarayan Mandir Nirman Sabha & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine 6024. The

relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under:

16. conjoint reading of two Sections i.e. Section 14(1)(e) and Section 22 ofthe DRC Act does not show that society registered under the SocietiesRegistration Act or public institution cannot apply for eviction underSection 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. Reference may be had to the judgment ofthis court in the case of Bhim Sen Batra v. Shreyans Buildwell Pvt. Ltd..That was case in which petition was filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the

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DRC Act by the landlord stating that the landlord Company was incurringlosses and is seeking to revamp its business and requires the place occupiedby the tenant for building proper infrastructure and office to be used by itsemployees. An objection was raised that if company or body corporaterequires the premises for the use of its employees, Section 22 of the DRC Actwould apply and not Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. This court rejectedthe contention. The court was of the view that the earlier judgmentsrendered prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the caseof Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC287 which made Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act applicable to commercialtenancies also would not help the tenant presently.

17. Similarly, in the case of Satnam Kaur v. Ashlar Stores P. Ltd., this courtheld as follows:-

“9.ThisCourtinthecaseof ChunniLal v. UniversityofDelhi reported in 1970 RCR 742 drew distinction between Sections14 and 22 of DRC Act in the following terms:

…The relationship of Sections 14 and 22, therefore, is that alllandlords are able to apply under Section 14 but only the landlordswho are corporate bodies or public Institution are entitled to applyunder Section 22. This necessarily means that such corporate andpublic institution landlords have been given the ordinary groundsunder Section 14 and additional grounds under Section 22. Thisaccords with their position of being primarily similar to naturalpersons and sometimes being different from them. I therefore, find thatthe corporate and public institution landlords are entitled to theordinary grounds of eviction under Section 14 like other landlordsand also to the special grounds of eviction under Section 22 which arepeculiar to the corporate and public institution landlords and thatSection 22 does not deprive the corporate and the public institutionlandlords form the benefit of Section 14.

10. Consequently, in my view, an eviction petition can be filed by aPrivate Limited Company under Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act forresidence of its Chairman and Directors.”

18. The above view was reiterated by this court in the case of CanaraBank v. T.T. Ltd. (2014) 214 DLT 526.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

16.The contention of the Petitioner that the Respondent has no bona fideneed for the tenanted premises and the pleading to the effect that thepremises are required for the personal use of the Director of the

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Respondent does not fall within the ambit of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCAct is contrary to the settled law.

16.1. Firstly, the dispute in pleadings raised by the Petitioner herein withrespect to the bona fide need of the Respondent, in the leave to defendapplication is devoid of any details and constitutes bare denial. Therelevant pleading in the leave to defend application reads as under:

“7. I say that apart from these substantial question in law there are variousissues in facts as well viz., the petitioner never needed that property anddoes not need it; that the petitioner can not make the need of family itsdirected as need of the petitioner etc. are also the matter that need to beadjudicated by this Ld. Tribunal before passing any order in favour of thepetitioner”

16.2. On the other hand, the Respondent in the eviction petition has set out

the bona fide in detail at paragraphs 18(a) (1 to 6) which reads as under:

“1.That the suit premises are bonafide required by the petitioner forits own use as also for the use of the sons of Shri Bharat Bhaskar, Directorof the petitioner company. One son of: Shri Bharat Bhaskar, Ashish Bhaskarwho is also Director of the petitioner company, is also engaged in the retailof ready-made-garments, children garments and in horticulture exoticplants. He is carrying on this retail from his residential premises in Noidabeing Sector, 39, Noida, for lack of commercial space available. Hisclientele is limited and he is unable to expand and increase the volume ofsale and attract more customers. The suit premises are required to augmentthe sale of the aforesaid garments as the same is presently not lucrativefrom the residential premises.

2.The second son of Shri Bharat Bhaskar, Shri Abhinav Bhaskar, isengaged in the import and sale of electronic and allied items in the name ofAVCDistributionsPvt.Ltd,andisalsoengagedinRealEstatedevelopment. He is presently carrying on his business from rented premisesin Okhla Industrial Area at monthly rent of Rs. 55,000/-. Besides, thepetitioner company does not have an office space for itself.

3.The petitioner company or the Directors thereof own no othersuitable property or accommodation. The suit premises being about 5000sq. ft. area in Ishwar Nagar, located on the ground floor, about 100 mts.from the main Mathura road, South Delhi with surrounding markets andseveral national and private banks in and around the premises and across

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the road, is popular commercial area fetching vast footfall of people. It isthe most suitable for the aforesaid purpose.

4.It is stated that, the premises are also required to give some areasof the premises to Smt. Madhu Bhaskar, sister-in-law of Shri BharatBhaskar, in terms of family settlement/compromise entered into betweenthe parties as full and final settlement of her claim for partition of theproperties of the family. The said partition suit being C.S (OS) No. 2090. of2008 is pending in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi where the saidsettlement is on record. As per the settlement 50% of the land and buildingof Block 6 is in the share of Smt. Madhu Bhaskar. She is in possession ofsome area as shown in yellow in Annexure-1. The additional area tocomplete her 50% portion is in possession of. the respondent tenant. copyof the settlement dated 05.10.2011 is filed herewith as Annexure-5.

5.It is stated that about 5,000 sq ft. area is in possession of therespondent tenant (shaded in green colour in Annexure-1). About 2860 sq.ft. is in possession of one Mr. Sanjay Bhaskar and- Mrs. Adita Bhaskar: byway of sale: on 13.05.2003 (shaded in blue colour in Annexure-1). copy ofthe sale deed in favour of Sanjay Bhaskar is annexed herewith asAnnexure-6. small portion (un-shaded area) is in possession of M/s TNBInvestments Pvt. Ltd, sister concern of the petitioner company. The firstfloor of the suit premises is residential, occupied by Shri Bharat Bhaskarand his family members.

6.The need of the suit premises is bonafide, honest, just and genuineand the respondent tenant ought to be evicted therefrom under section14(1)(e) or the Delhi Rent, Control Act 1958”

(Emphasis Supplied)

16.3. As is apparent, the Respondent has pleaded its personal requirementfor office space at paragraph 18(a)(2), which has not been controverted inthe leave to defend application. With respect to the bona fide need of theDirector(s) of Respondent, it is admitted that it is private family runcompany. It is settled law that in case of family run company, this Courthas held in Ram Saroop Gupta v. Major S.P. Marwah, 2012 SCC OnLineDel 2584, that the possession of the tenanted premises can be recovered byan individual for the bona fide need of the juristic entity, which is ownedand controlled by the said individual and his family members. The Courtrecognised that in case of family run company, the identity of juristic

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company and his directors and shareholders can be examined for thepurpose of bona fide need of the said persons. The ratio of the saidjudgment would also be attracted in the fact of this case in so far as theRespondent additionally seeks to recover the premises for the need of itsDirector(s). The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:

”6.In the instant case, there is no dispute to the factum that ‘A & TJewels Pvt. Ltd’ is private limited company comprising of the petitioner,his wife and his son; contention of the petitioner that the business which wasearlier being run by the petitioner and his wife on small scale from theirresidence could not be expanded and outside and unknown customers couldnot come to purchase their jewellery as they were running it on smallscale from the residence and this was because of the compulsion that theydid not have any other commercial establishment to carry out this business;in these circumstance, it can, in no manner, be said that the need of thepetitioner cannot be considered as his personal and bonafide need for thepremises. Even assuming that the need of the company (which is companyof no other persons but the petitioner, his wife and his son), the doctrine ofthe lifting of corporate veil in relation to this company would be fullyapplicable to reveal the true identity of the company; by lifting thecorporate veil, it is an undisputed factum that the company is no otherperson than the petitioner, his wife and his son; the registered office of thecompany is also the residence of the parties from where they had initiallystarted this business i.e. 297, Forest Land, Neb Sarai, New Delhi; theirbonafide need for requiring working space i.e. commercial establishmentto run the aforenoted business has been established.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

16.4. In view of the aforesaid judgment, applying the dicta laid down inparagraph 8, this Court is of the opinion that the need pleaded by theRespondent is bona fide. This is also for the reason that the Petitionerherein has not denied that the tenanted premises are lying unused andlocked for last many years. This Court therefore, of the opinion that thepleading of the Petitioner fails to place adequate and/or reasonable materialwhich may give rise to triable issue. The pleadings in the leave to defend

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application fail to rebut the strong presumption qua bona fide need raised infavour of the landlord, Respondent.

17.The Respondent herein has in the eviction petition duly set out atparagraph 19 (1 to 3) the facts pertaining to its title in the tenantedpremises. The documents filed in support of the pleadings i.e., the ReleaseDeed and the sale deeds dated 13.05.2003 duly trace the title of theRespondent. The Respondent has also averred that its title is duly recordedin the Jamabandi obtained on 09.04.2018.

17.1. In the application seeking leave to defend, no dispute has been raisedto the said title documents by the Petitioner herein. Pertinently, in fact, it isstated in the eviction petition that the Release deed was executed by LateBali Nath Bhaskar, who is the father of Sh. Vidur Bhaskar i.e., the directorof the Petitioner. The Petitioner therefore, has due notice of the saidRelease deed.

17.2. In light of the aforesaid registered documents and the public recordmaintained by statutory authorities, there is no dispute that the Respondentis the recorded owner of the tenanted premises.

17.3. As noted hereinabove, learned counsel for the Petitioner has fairlyconceded during the course of arguments that the Respondent herein is theowner of the tenanted premises.

17.4. In the leave to defend, the pleading raised by the Petitioner was tothe effect that the Petitioner herein has become the owner of the tenantedpremises by operation of law. The Petitioner was unable to substantiate thesaid plea during the course of the arguments and no document has beenplaced on record to substantiate the said plea. In fact, the plea is bald and

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there is no elaboration as regards the basis of making such claim.Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the Petitioner has failed to raise anytriable issue with respect to the said issue.

17.5. The Petitioner has sought to raise feeble plea, denying therelationship of landlord-tenant on the ground that no rent has been paid tothe Respondent.As noted hereinabove, the Respondent has placed onrecord its minutes of meeting dated 31.03.1977 and 02.03.1980, wherebythe Respondent had resolved to let out the premises to the Petitioner. In theleave to defend application, the Petitioner has not disputed the veracity ofthe said minutes. The Petitioner conceded that it was making payment ofRs. 1750/- per month to late Sh. Vinay Bhaskar till the year 2006, however,the same was towards the maintenance charges. No document has beenfiled on record to substantiate the said plea that the payment was towardsmaintenance charges. Thus, on an appraisal of the documents and thepleadings of the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the denial of therelationship of landlord and tenant is mere moonshine.

18.The Petitioner in its application seeking leave to defend sought toprimarily resist the eviction petition on the plea that the ownership of thetenanted premises vests in the Petitioner. On an examination of the record,this Court is of the opinion that the said plea raised by the Petitioner isfrivolous and without any basis. Similarly, the denial of the relationship oflandlord and tenant despite admitting to monthly payment of Rs. 1,750/- isagain made with an intent to protract the proceedings. The resistance to theeviction petition viewed from the fact that the Petitioner itself is not usingthe tenanted premises (for last 7-8 years) and is keeping them locked,

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evidence an abuse of the intent of the legal procedure permitting tenant toapply for leave to defend and finds merit in the submission of theRespondent that these proceedings are an abuse of process by thePetitioner.

19.In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is satisfied thatthe order dated 01.12.2021 and 28.07.2022 passed by the Trial Court do notsuffer from any infirmity and accordingly, the present revision petition isdismissed and the eviction order dated 01.12.2021 is upheld. TheRespondent is at liberty to forthwith execute the eviction order dated01.12.2021. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

20.The Petitioner is directed to pay costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- to theRespondent within two (2) weeks. In case the Petitioner fails to pay thecost, the Respondent will be entitled to recover the same in the executionproceedings.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J

JUNE 2, 2023/aa/asb