RC.REV./36/2023 of M/S RAM SWAROOP RADHEY SHYAM THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR Vs SH. AJAY SHUKLA

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CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORAJ U M N T

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J:

CAV. 78/2023

Learned counsel for the Respondent has entered appearance andaddressed arguments.

Accordingly, the Caveat stands discharged.

RC.REV. 36/2023, & CM APPL. 6147/2023

1.The present revision petition has been filed by the Petitioner(‘Tenant’), assailing the order dated 19.09.2022 passed by the Senior Civil

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Judge acting as Rent Controller, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts,Delhi (‘Trial Court’), in RC ARC No. 224/19, whereby the Petitioner’sapplication seeking leave to defend has been dismissed; and an evictionorder has been passed in favour of the Respondent (‘Landlord’) qua shop onthe ground floor of property bearing no. 236 E, Shukla Market, Anaj Mandi,Shahdara, Delhi – 32, admeasuring 444.31 sq. feet approx. (‘tenantedpremises’).

2.The Landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of theDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (‘DRC Act’), on the ground of bona fiderequirement for himself as well as his only son. The eviction petition wasfiled on 15.05.2019 stating that the Landlord, who was then employed withthe Punjab National Bank was scheduled to superannuate on 31.03.2020;and the tenanted premises were required for continuing the employment ofLandlord, who wishes to run departmental store. In addition, it was statedthat the only son of the Landlord had also completed his MBA and he aswell requires the tenanted premises for running and operating business.

2.1It was stated that the Landlord requires the tenanted premises forstarting his independent business of departmental store for selling grocery,which would require 350-450 sq. ft. area for the purpose of displaying andstocking of goods.

2.2It was stated that the tenanted premises is located in the propertybearing No. 235-238, Shukla Market, Anaj Mandi, Shahdara, Delhi-110032(‘Property No. 235-238’). It was stated that there are fourteen (14) shops inthe Property on the ground floor, which are marked as Point ‘A’ to ‘N’ inthe site plan. It is stated that the tenanted premises is marked in red colour inthe site plan, which is being reproduced hereinunder for ease of reference:

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2.3It is stated that the Property No. 235-238 was owned by the parents ofthe Respondent and the title has devolved upon the Respondent upon theirdemise. It is stated that except four (4) shops marked as Point K, L, M and Non the site plan, the remaining ten (10) shops stand sold. The date of sale ofthe said ten (10) shops has been duly disclosed in the eviction petition.

2.4With respect to shops marked as Point K, L and M, it has been statedthat the said shops are in occupation of old tenants, who have statutoryprotection under the DRC Act. With respect to shop marked as Point N, ithas been stated that the said shop, ad-measuring 64.583 sq. ft., was let out on06.12.2018 vide registered agreement. It has been stated in the evictionpetition that the said area of 64.583 sq. ft. is not suitable for the requirementof the Landlord, who requires an area of 350-450 sq. ft.

2.5The Landlord has also disclosed that he owns property bearing No.3/34, Gali Shuklan, Chotta Bazar, Shahdara, Delhi-110032 (‘Property No.3/34’). It is stated in the eviction petition that the said property is theresidence of the Landlord’s family and has been the residence of hisancestors as well. It is stated that in the said property there is one shop onthe ground floor, which is occupied by an old statutory tenant since the year1988. It is stated that except for the said one shop, the entire property No.3/34 is residential in nature and is not suitable for commercial activity.

3.The Tenant had filed his application for leave to defend on04.06.2019 and raised plea disputing the ownership of the Respondent,Landlord. The said plea was however abandoned and, in fact, the Tenantcategorically admits that the tenanted premises have devolved upon theRespondent, Landlord herein. The Tenant admits that the rent is paid to theRespondent herein. Accordingly, the existence of relationship of Landlord

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and Tenant stands admitted.

3.1The Tenant has however, raised dispute on the ground that theLandlord does not have any bona fide need for the tenanted premises eitherfor himself or for his sole son. It was stated that the Landlord is financiallywell off and does not require income from the business.

3.2The Tenant disputed the plea that the son of the Landlord is notgainfully employed. The Tenant along with his application dated 16.08.2022has sought to place on record the user profile of the Respondent’s son, Mr.Paras Shukla, as available on the professional social networking website i.e.,LinkedIn, to contend that the Mr. Paras Shukla is gainfully employed sinceFebruary, 2019. The said application was however, dismissed and the saiddocument has not been taken on record.

3.3The Tenant also raised plea with respect to availability of alternativesuitable accommodation in the Property No. 235-238 as well as Property No.

4.The Trial Court vide impugned eviction order dated 19.09.2022dismissed the application seeking leave to defend on the finding that theTenant has failed to substantiate the plea that the Landlord has alternativesuitable accommodation available with him. The Trial Court held that thereexists Landlord-Tenant relationship between the parties; and the Landlordherein has bona fide need for the tenanted premises to sustain himself. TheTrial Court thus concluded that no triable issue has been raised by theTenant.

Arguments of the Petitioner Tenant

5.The learned counsel for the Petitioner states that the arguments on theleave to defend were heard and the order was reserved on 17.11.2021;

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whereas, the impugned eviction order was passed on 19.09.2022 andtherefore, on account of the delay of ten (10) months, it raises presumptionthat the impugned eviction order suffers from errors.

5.1He states that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the first floor inProperty bearing No. 235-238, above shops marked as Point K, L and Mwas let out recently to one Mr. Shravan Kumar. The said first floor is beingused commercially and for this purpose, the Tenant relies upon theelectricity bill dated 31.05.2019, filed subsequently with the rejoinder to theleave to defend. He states that the said first floor is suitable for theLandlord’s alleged bona fide need. He states that the Landlord recently letout newly constructed hall at first floor to ‘Royal Kitchen Appliances’ inproperty No. 236-B, Shukla Market, Anaz Mandi, Shahdara, Delhi.

5.2He relies upon the summary filed as ‘Annexure A’ to the rejoinder tothe leave to defend to substantiate the plea that the Landlord has frequentlysold portions of several commercial premises owned by him, between theyear 2012-2019.

5.3He states that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the Landlord hasvacant accommodation available with him in Property bearing No. 3/34; asis evident from the site plan of the said property wherein, two vacant hallsare seen on the ground floor. He states that the said property is surroundedby commercial shops and is therefore, available for commercial use.

5.4He states that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that in view of thefact that the Landlord has in the past sold several shops in Property No. 235-238 itself and let out shops in the recent past, the said conduct of theLandlord belies his plea of bona fide need. In this regard, he refersspecifically to shop marked as Point ‘J’ on the site plan and states that said

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shop has been sold to one Mr. Surendar Pal and the shop marked as Point‘N’ on the site plan has been recently let out to one Mr. Naveen Pal on06.12.2018.

5.5He states that the Petitioner has sought to place on record the userprofile of Respondent’s son i.e., Mr. Paras Shukla, as available on theprofessional social networking website LinkedIn, which shows that Mr.Paras Shukla is gainfully employed since February, 2019. He states thatthus, there is no bona fide need of accommodation for the Respondent’s son.Arguments of the Respondent Landlord

6.In reply, learned counsel for the Respondent states that Property No.3/34 is used as residence by the Landlord and it is structurally built to beused as residence. He states that the said property has been used only forresidential purposes since decades. He states that the two halls on the rearside of the ground floor in this property are being used for residentialpurposes. He further states that the rear side does not abut any street and istherefore, not even viable for commercial use. He states that, therefore, thereis no alternate suitable accommodation available to the Landlord in thisproperty.

6.1He states with respect to Shop No. 236-J/B, situated on the first-floorof property No. 235-238, Shukla Market, Anaj Mandi, Delhi, the first flooris under the tenancy of Mr. Shravan Kumar since 20.09.2013. He states thatthe said floor is not used for sales/showroom by the said Tenant i.e., Mr.Shravan Kumar as there is no footfall of customers on the first floor.

6.2He states that the business under the name and style of ‘Royal KitchenAppliances’ is carried on from the shop marked as Point ‘D’ in Property No.235-238 on the ground floor. He states that the said shop was sold to Mr.

Shravan Kumar in the year 1966-1967 and this fact was duly disclosed in theeviction petition.

6.3He states that with respect to shop marked as Point ‘N’ on the siteplan, the same admeasures only 64.583 sq. ft. and is therefore, insufficientand not suitable for the requirement of the Landlord, who requires an area of350-450 sq. ft. for running his departmental store. He states this fact wasduly disclosed in the eviction petition and the measurement of 64.583 sq. ft.is not in dispute.

6.4He states that with respect to shop marked as Point ‘J’ on the siteplan; the said shop was sold to one Sh. Surender Pal on 20.06.2017 to meetthe financial needs of the Landlord. He states that the sale of the said shopwas duly disclosed in the eviction petition. He states that the said shop aswell admeasures 64.583 sq. ft. and is therefore, not suitable for the need ofthe Landlord.

6.5He states that the Landlord has disclosed all material facts pertainingto the shops, which exist in Property No. 235-238 and there is no otheralternate suitable accommodation admeasuring 350-450 sq. ft. available withthe Landlord for starting his departmental store for selling groceries.

6.6He states that the Petitioner herein had filed two applications dated26.11.2021 and 16.03.2022 for bringing on record alleged subsequent eventspertaining to alternative suitable accommodation as well as documents. Hestates that however, the said applications were dismissed by the Trial Courtvide order dated 16.07.2022, which order was assailed before this Court inCM(M) No. 702/2022. He states that the contentions raised before this Courtwith respect to availability of alternate accommodation has been consideredand rejected by Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgement dated

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21.07.2022 passed in CM(M) 702/2022 and therefore, the Petitioner hereinis precluded from raising the plea with respect to the first floor of thepremises located above shops marked as Point K, L and M as well as shopmarked as Point ‘N’. He states that the Petitioner is relitigating the sameissues.

Analysis and findings

7.This Court has heard the submissions of the parties and perused therecord as well as the written submissions filed by the parties in this petition.The facts set out in the eviction petition and leave to defend have been notedhereinabove.

Existence of Relationship of landlord and tenant

8.In the eviction petition, the Landlord had duly stated at paragraph18(a)(i) that his parents were the absolute owner of the tenanted premisesand the property has devolved on the Respondent after their death. TheRespondent also averred that the Petitioner herein has attorned in favour ofthe Respondent and was paying rent to the Respondent, Landlord.

8.1The Petitioner, Tenant, in his affidavit seeking leave to defend at para3(i)(a) specifically disputed that the Respondent is the owner of the tenantedpremises and in fact alleged that the Respondent is guilty of concealment.The relevant para reads as under: -

“a. The petitioner is not the owner of the suit property and is not entitled for anyrelief and his petition is liable to be dismissed with heavy cost for concealmentas he is not in need of tenanted shop for purpose as alleged.”

8.2The Petitioner, Tenant, reiterated the said stand at paragraph 2 in hisrejoinder to the reply to the leave to defend application. The Petitionerdisputed the relationship of the Landlord-Tenant as well. The relevant para

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reads as under: -

“2. That the Petitioner is neither the owner nor let-out the suit property to theRespondent.”

8.3The Petitioner thus sought leave to defend on the said specific plearaising dispute of ownership.

8.4However, in the revision petition, the Petitioner at paragraph 2 (a) and(i) while narrating the facts has categorically admitted that Mr. UmaShankar Shukla i.e., late father of the Respondent had let out the tenantedpremises to Mr. Radhey Shyam i.e., late father of the Petitioner herein. It isfurther admitted that the Petitioner herein attorned to the Respondent hereinand was tendering rent to him.

8.5In the aforesaid admitted facts, the Trial Court in the impugnedeviction order correctly held that since the Respondent is the Landlord of thetenanted premises, he is entitled to maintain the eviction petition. Therelevant portion of the order reads as under: -

“6. However, in leave to defend affidavit, the respondent has not raised anyissue which may require evidence. Respondent has stated that petitioner is notowner of the rented premises but he has not disclosed who is the actual ownerof the said property. The respondent has not denied that the petitioner is notthe landlord. In other words, the respondent has admitted that the rent is beingreceived by the petitioner in respect of the rented premises. Therefore, thepetitioner is entitled to seek eviction of the respondent from the tenantedpremises.

7. Otherwise also the term “owner” as used in the section 14(1)(e) of the DRCAct does not connote the same meaning as in the case of title suit forproperty. The petitioner need not prove the absolute ownership. He has only toshow that he has better title in respect of the property than the tenant. Thisinterpretation of the word “owner” has been accepted by Hon’ble SupremeCourt in Smt. Shanti Sharma and others Vs. Smt. Ved Prabha and others(1987) 4 SCC 193. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the word “owner”occurring in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) is not used in the senseof absolute owner. It is only used in contradistinction with landlord asdefined, who is not an owner but holds the property for the benefit of another

person. landlord as defined, who is holding the property for himself and forhis own benefit and not for the benefit of another person, is certainly theowner/landlord. The similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble DelhiHigh Court in Kanwal Kishore Chopra Vs. O.P. Dwivedi and others (AIR 1978Delhi 53).”

8.6In view of the said fact, this Court does not find any infirmity in thefinding of the Trial Court and, in fact, the plea raised by the Petitioner in hisleave to defend is false to his knowledge. The falsity of the said plea madeon sworn affidavit with respect to the fundamental relationship betweenthe parties, would necessarily require this Court to examine the remainingpleas raised by the Petitioner, Tenant, with great circumspection.

Bona fide need

9.The Respondent, Landlord, has with respect to his bona fide needaverred in the eviction petition that he was due for superannuation from hisjob at Punjab National Bank as on 31.03.2020. It was stated that he was keento continue to work post his retirement and remain gainfully employed. Itwas stated that since his monthly income is bound to reduce on retirement,he needed the premises to augment his income.

9.1In addition, it was stated that his sole son as well has completed hisMBA and requires the tenanted premises to join the business of theRespondent and thereafter, for carrying on his own business after thelifetime of the Respondent, Landlord.

9.2In the eviction petition, the Respondent narrated in detail at paragraph18 (a)(ii) to (xii) [except paragraph (viii)] his personal bona fide requirementfor the tenanted premises, the proposed user of the premises and thesuitability of the tenanted premise for the intended use.

9.3The Petitioner, Tenant in the leave to defend has not disputed the

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averments made in paragraphs 18(a)(ii) to (xii) [except paragraph (viii)]with respect to the personal bona fide requirement of the Landlord. In theleave to defend, the Petitioner raised dispute only with respect to therequirement of the Landlord’s son, which was pleaded at paragraph 18(a)(viii).

9.4The crux of the challenge laid by the Tenant in his leave to defendwas that the Landlord has suitable alternative accommodation available.

9.5Therefore, there was no dispute raised to the bona fide requirement ofthe Landlord for the tenanted premises to start departmental grocery storein view of his then imminent retirement on 31.03.2020 at the age of 60years. The Landlord’s requirement to continue to work at age of 60 years forhis own betterment as well as to augment his income give rise to strongpresumption in his favour and the Petitioner herein, Tenant has not evendisputed the said material facts.

9.6The Supreme Court in its recent authoritative judgement in Abid-ul-islam vs. Inder Sain Dua, 2022 6 SCC 30, while discussing the scope ofSection 14(1)(e) vis-à-vis Section 25-B (8) of DRC Act has held that theTenant’s contention regarding availability of alternative accommodation isonly an incidental one. The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 14(1)(e)of the DRC Act creates presumption qua bona fide need in favour of theLandlord and mere assertion by the Tenant in the leave to defend wouldnot be sufficient to give rise to triable issue. The relevant portion of thejudgement reads as under: -

18.For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25-B(5), amere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e) creates apresumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller qua bonafide need in favour of the landlord which is obviously rebuttable with somematerial of substance to the extent of raising triable issue. The satisfaction of

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the Rent Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend isobviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderanceforming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality ofadjudication is between mere moonshine and adequate material and evidencemeant for the rejection of normal application for eviction

28. The High Court, while ignoring the aforesaid conduct of the respondent, asnoted by the learned Rent Controller, proceeded to allow the revision bytreating it like an appeal. It did not even reverse the findings of the learnedRent Controller, but proceeded to hold that the denials of the appellant in hisreply to the application seeking leave to defend are vague, qua the plea ofalternative accommodation, notwithstanding the rejection of the contention ofthe respondent that he cannot question the title. This approach, in ourconsidered view, cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.

29. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of bona fide purpose.The contention regarding alternative accommodation can at best be only an

incidental one. Such requirement has not been found to be incorrect by theHigh Court, though it is not even open to it to do so, in view of the limitedjurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise. Therefore, the very basis uponwhich the revision was allowed is obviously wrong being contrary to the veryprovision contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25-B(8).”

(Emphasis Supplied)

9.7Thus, in the opinion of this Court in the absence of any specificdispute with respect to the need of the Landlord, the bona fide requirementof the Landlord stands admitted on record.

9.8The pleading in the eviction petition as regards the bona fiderequirement of the son was an additional plea and it was qualified with thestatement that the premises shall be used by the son after the lifetime of theLandlord. The relevant paragraph no. 18(a)(viii) of the eviction petitionreads as under: -

“(viii) That the sole son of the petitioner has also completed his MBA, who isdependent upon the petitioner, and he also wants to do aforesaid business inthe tenanted premises along with the petitioner, once the vacant possession ofthe tenanted premises is received by the petitioner. The son of the petitioneralso bonafidely requires the tenanted premises to do the aforesaid businesswith the petitioner, and also wants to continue the aforesaid business in thetenanted premises after the life of the petitioner.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

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No suitable alternate accommodation

10.As noted above, the crux of the defence raised by the Tenant is thatthe Landlord has alternate accommodation available with him in PropertyNo. 235-238 and at Property No. 3/34.

10.1With respect to Property No. 235-238, it was stated by the Tenant thatthe first floor above shops marked as Point K, L and M as shown in the siteplan can be used by the Landlord for commercial space. The Tenant admitsthat the said space on the first floor has been let out to third person namelyMr. Shravan Kumar.

10.2In this regard, the Landlord has already stated that the first floor is notsuitable for opening departmental store for selling groceries as it would notattract customer’s footfall.

10.3It is also stated that the said space on the first floor is not being usedeven by the current tenant for commercial sale purposes and he uses theground floor shop for sale purposes, which fact is not disputed by theTenant. The Petitioner has not brought on record any evidence to show thatthe first floor is being used for showroom/sales purposes by the existingtenant.

10.4It is trite law that shop located on ground floor has an enormousadvantage over the shops located on the first floor. In this view of the fact,the Landlord’s plea that he wants the tenanted premise for running andoperating departmental store cannot be faulted. Therefore, in the opinionof this Court, the first floor hall available above shop marked as Point K, Land M in Property No. 235-238 has been rightly held by the Trial Court tonot to be an alternate accommodation. In this regard, it would instructive torefer to judgment of this Court in M/s A.K. Woolen Industries & Ors. v.

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Shri Narain Gupta, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11363, wherein the Courtrelying on the dicta of the Supreme Court has held that the availability ofaccommodation on the upper floors cannot be said to be an alternateaccommodation as the same are generally not commercially viable and thecustomers are reluctant to walk into the same. The relevant portion of thesaid judgment reads as under:

“24. Supreme Court, in Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai (2002) 6 SCC 16 and inUday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503 held thatjudicial notice can be taken of the fact that the upper floors are generally notcommercially viable and consumers and patrons of the market are reluctant towalk into the same and are more prone to walk into shop on the ground floor.Thus availability of the upper floors above the shop Nos. 602 and 603 supra onthe ground floor cannot be said to be alternate suitable accommodation”

(Emphasis Supplied)

10.5The Tenant has next referred to two vacant halls on the rear side ofthe ground Floor in Property No. 3/34 to contend that the said vacant hallscan be converted and used as shops. The Landlord has explained thatProperty No. 3/34 is his residence and the said two halls located on the rearside are not vacant and are being used as part of the residentialaccommodation. The Tenant has not disputed that the said property is theresidence of the Landlord and his family. The Tenant has not brought onrecord any document to disprove the said contention of the Landlord asregards its existing use for residential purposes.

10.6This Court is unable to accept the contentions of the Tenant that sincethis property is located in the commercial hub, the Landlord has the optionto convert his existing residential accommodation on the ground floor forshops. The Landlord has sufficiently explained that the current use of thesaid property is residential and in the opinion of this Court, the saidexplanation is sufficient to hold that the said property cannot be considered

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as an alternate accommodation. The Tenant cannot compel the Landlord toconvert his existing residential premises for commercial purposes to meethis bona fide requirement.

10.7This Court therefore, finds that there is no error in the finding of theTrial Court holding that the Landlord’s need is bona fide and he has no otheralternative accommodation. The relevant portion of the eviction order readsas under: -

“8. Respondent has also taken the ground that petitioner is having big vacantshops at the ground floor of the property no. 3/34, Chhota Bazaar, Shahdara,Delhi and other four shops which are lying vacant. The respondent has alsoalleged that petitioner has not filed the correct site plan to depict the correctdimensions of the properties. However, the respondent has not cared to file thecorrect site plan and he has also failed to show that the shops which are lyingvacant are suitable for the purpose of the business which the petitioner alongwith his son wants to undertake. The plea taken by the respondent thatpetitioner has sold several properties is not relevant because petitioner isentitled to sell his property as and when he wishes and the respondent is notwithin his rights to challenge the same. In any case, those properties were soldin the past and have no bearing to the current need of the petitioner. Therespondent has also not placed on record any material to show that petitioner'sson who has completed his MBA is doing any job or is otherwise employed andis not dependent upon the petitioner. The respondent has not disclosed whenthe petitioner has let out the newly constructed shops. Similarly, the source ofearnings of the petitioner including the shares and rent are not relevant for thepurpose of deciding whether the need of the petitioner is bona fide or not.9. The respondent has not mentioned any property other than shop no. 3/34 asan alternative accommodation which may be available to the petitioner. Thepetitioner has categorically stated that shop no. 3/34 is in occupation tenant.Respondent has not brought on record any proof to show that shop no. 3/34 isbeing used by the petitioner for his business. Respondent has also failed toprovide any material to show that petitioner is having any other job to sustainhimself. Therefore, it is clear that no triable issue has been raised by therespondent in leave to defend affidavit. Leave to defend is declined.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

Time lapse between reserving the Judgement and pronouncement of orders

11.Lastly, the Petitioner has contended that arguments were heard and

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concluded before the Trial Court on 17.11.2021 and the judgement wasdelivered on 19.09.2022. It is contended that in this delay, there is apresumption that the Trial Court would have not remembered the argumentsof the Petitioner herein.

11.1This Court finds no merit in the aforesaid submission. The Trial Courtrecord shows that immediately on 26.11.2021, the Tenant filed anapplication (1[st]) for placing on record additional facts. This was followed byanother application (2[nd]) dated 16.03.2022, filed by the Tenant for placingon record additional documents. This issue of alternate accommodation wasspecifically agitated in these applications. However, the said applicationsdespite being contested and argued, were subsequently dismissed by theTrial Court by detailed order dated 16.07.2022. The said order wasimpugned before Coordinate Bench of this Court in CM (M) No. 702/2022and this Court vide judgment dated 21.07.2022 dismissed the petition andupheld the order dated 16.07.2022.

11.2The Tenant undeterred by the orders dated 16.07.2022 and 21.07.2022filed 3[rd]application on 08.08.2022 for appointment of local commissionerand 4[th]application on 23.08.2022 for amending to leave to defend andraising fresh pleas. The arguments on the said applications were addressedon 20.08.2022, 23.08.2022 and 19.09.2022. However, the said applicationsas well have also been dismissed by the Trial Court by separate orderdated 19.09.2022.

11.3The aforesaid facts with respect to filing of four (4) substantiveapplications after arguments were heard on Tenant’s leave to defendapplication on 17.11.2021 would show that the Tenant kept the Trial Court

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engaged and prevented the Court from passing the order with respect to theleave to defend application; and in fact, the Trial Court was engaged inhearing the successive applications filed by the Petitioner herein. In fact, theTrial Court has taken an adverse note in this regard in its order dated20.08.2022, which reads as under: -

“Ld. Counsel for petitioner states that he does not want to file anywritten reply to the application of the respondent filed w/o 26 Rule 9 CPCfor appointment of Local Commissioner and is ready to advance arguments.

The Ld. Counsel for respondent states that he cannot advanceargument in the absence of written reply from the side of the petitioner. Nojustifying round has been offered by the respondent's counsel and both thecounsels are directed to advance the arguments.

At this stage, Ld. Counsel for respondent has stated that he is notfeeling well and cannot argue the application.

Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that the application has beenmoved on frivolous ground in order to delay the matter.

The record shows that after the hearing of the arguments on leave todefend, the respondent has moved one application after the other. Two ofhis applications to bring on record subsequent events and certaindocuments have been dismissed vide order dated 16.07.2022.

The Hon'ble High Court in CM(M) 702/22 filed by the respondent hasup held the order. The record clearly shows that respondent is trying todelay the matter and Ld. Counsel for respondent is seeking adjournmentwithout any reasonable ground. Right of the respondent to argue theapplication is hereby closed. Arguments on the part of the petitioner heard.

Put up for order at 4:00 pm.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

11.4The fact pertaining to filing of four (4) substantive applications andthe passing of the orders dated 16.07.2022 and 19.09.2022, disposing of thesaid applications sufficiently evidences that the matter was consistentlyargued and reagitated before the Trial Court between 17.11.2021 and19.09.2022; and therefore, the Trial Court was aware of the rival pleas of the

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parties and consistently reminded by the Petitioner herein. In fact, thePetitioner herein has had three (3) attempts at arguing his leave to defenddue to the filing of the said applications.

11.5This Court therefore, finds no merit in the submission of the Petitionerthat presumably an error has crept in due to the passing of the order on19.09.2022 after ten (10) months. No alleged error has been argued beforethis Court.

11.6The said facts also show that the Trial Court was constantly apprisedof the Petitioner’s defence as raised in the leave to defend and there was nooccasion for the Trial Court to not remember the arguments of the Petitioner.

12.In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the order ofthe Trial Court suffers from no infirmity and merits no interference. In thisregard, the Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam (Supra) has held at paragraph 23that the scope of interference by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction isvery restrictive. The relevant para reads as under: -

“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power ofrevision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature ofsuperintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process,inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected tosubstitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising theappellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thescope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in caseswhere there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would onlymean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should notventure to disturb such decision. There is no need for holding rovinginquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the powerof superintendence into that of regular first appeal, an act, totally forbiddenby the legislature.”

13.In view of the aforesaid discussion, the revision petition along with

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pending application stands dismissed and eviction order dated 19.09.2022 isupheld.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J

APRIL 10, 2023/rhc/aa/ms