RC.REV./181/2020 of SHRI QUAZI MOHAMMED AHMED Vs MIOHAMMED SULTAN

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+RC.REV. 181/2020

SHRI QUAZI MOHAMMED AHMED

..... Petitioner

Through:Mr. Bahar U. Barqi, Advocate.versus

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA

J U M N T

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J (ORAL):

CM APPL. 11822/2023 (for restoration)

1.This is an application filed by the Petitioner, tenant, seeking recall ofthe order dated 22.02.2023, whereby the present eviction petition wasdismissed in default for non-prosecution and the interim order dated02.09.2020 was vacated.

2.In this application, the Petitioner seeks restoration of the revisionpetition as well as the interim order dated 02.09.2020.

3.For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and therevision petition is restored to its original number.

RC.REV. 181/2020 & CM APPL. 11823/2023 (for stay)

4.This petition has been filed by the tenant assailing the order dated17.02.2020 passed by the ACJ acting as Additional Rent Controller, SouthEast District, Saket Courts, Delhi (‘Trial Court’) in Eviction petition No.

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66/18, whereby the tenant’s application seeking leave to defend wasdismissed and an eviction order was passed in favour of the landlord in respectof Shop, admeasuring 8ft. x 10ft., built up in premises bearing property No.337-C/26, Batla House main Road, Okhla, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi-110025(‘tenanted premises’).

5.As per the site plan of the ground floor of property bearing no. 337-C/26, Batla House main Road, Okhla, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi-110025(‘subject property’) filed with the eviction petition, there are three (3) shopsincluding the tenanted premises, ad-measuring 8ft. x 10ft. each, facing themain road and hall, ad-measuring 33ft. x 26ft. 6 inches, in the rear portion(marked in green colour). For ease of reference the tenanted premises, markedin red colour is being referred to as ‘Shop No. 2’; the shop adjoining thetenanted premises is being referred to as ‘Shop No. 1’, and the shop, markedin blue colour, is being referred to as ‘Shop No. 3’.Arguments of the Petitioner

6.The learned counsel for the Petitioner states that the Respondent hereinhas suitable alternate accommodation available with him and this material facthas not been duly considered by the Trial court in its impugned order.

7.Firstly, he places reliance on the site plan of the ground floor of subjectproperty, wherein the tenanted premises are located, and states that on theground floor itself there is Shop No.3, ad-measuring 8 ft. x 10ft. (marked inblue colour) and hall ad-measuring 33 ft. x 26 ft. 6 inches (marked in greencolour), which were vacant and thus, available with the landlord at the timeof filing of the eviction petition and therefore, the plea of bona fide need forthe tenanted premises is not genuine.

7.1.He states that it has also come on record that during the pendency of

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the eviction petition, the said Shop No.3 along with the hall has been let outby the landlord. He states that, however, this material fact has not beenconsidered by the Trial Court in its impugned order.

7.2.He, however, fairly states that the assertion that in the subject property,the Shop No.3 delineated in blue colour and the hall in green colour areavailable to the landlord herein for his son’s need were not pleaded in theleave to defend application and the pleadings thereto.

8.Secondly, he states that in the application seeking leave to defend, thePetitioner herein had enlisted the following four (4) alternate propertiesavailable with the landlord:

i.Z-326/2, Okhla Main Road, Near Tikona Park, Jamia Nagar, NewDelhi. (‘Property No. Z-326/2 near Tikona Park’)Delhi. (‘Property No. Z-326/2 near Tikona Park’)

ii.259/2, Noor Nagar, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. (‘Property No. 259/2 atNoor Nagar’)Noor Nagar’)

iii.All Friends Apartment, Plot No. 32, Street No.11, West Zakir Nagar,New Delhi. (‘All Friends Apartment’)New Delhi. (‘All Friends Apartment’)

iv.Approx 100 Bigha Land on road in Ghosipur Village, Hapur Road,Meerut (UP). (‘Meerut’)Meerut (UP). (‘Meerut’)

8.1.1. He states that he is not pressing the availability of property at Meerutsince it is not within the territory of Delhi.since it is not within the territory of Delhi.

8.1.2. He states that he, however, specifically disputes that the Property No.259/2 at Noor Nagar, is unavailable for the use of the landlord. He states thatthe landlord has sought to explain the unsuitability of the said property bystating that there is dispute between the neighbours and therefore, he isunable to use the said property. He states that the said explanation offered bythe landlord is not admitted by the tenant and therefore, the same gives rise to

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triable issue.

9.He states that the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DelhiRent Control Act, 1958 (‘DRC Act’) has been filed by the Respondentpleading the bona fide requirement of his son, who was then 51 years old andis presently 58 years old. He states that the plea of the Respondent that his 54-year-old son is dependent on him for the commercial accommodation is notplausible.

9.1.He further states that in the eviction petition, the landlord has pleadedthat his son who was earlier employed with the India TV Group, has left thesaid employment and requires the tenanted premises for setting up photostudio. He states that the Petitioner herein has specifically disputed in hisapplication seeking leave to defend the assertion as regards the unemploymentof the Respondent’s son.

9.2.In this regard, he places reliance on screenshot of the informationavailable on India Today Media Institute wherein the Respondent’s son isshown as member of the guest faculty. He also relies upon the social mediaprofile of the Respondent’s son to allege that it continues to reflect his statusas an employee with the India TV Group (though the said document has notbeen filed on record in the revision petition).

9.3.He states that, however, despite specific objection raised disputingthe unemployment status, the Trial Court has erroneously observed in theimpugned eviction order that there is no challenge to the unemployment statusof the Respondent’s son. He states that the said finding of the Trial Court iscontrary to the pleadings of the Petitioner.

9.4.He states that the assertion of the landlord that his son is unemployedis an issue which requires proof and necessarily the matter must be set down

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for trial and the landlord must lead positive evidence of the erstwhileemployer of the son to prove that the son has left the previous employment(TV Today Network).

9.5.He relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Precision Steel& Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prema Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, (1982)3 SCC 270, and he also relies upon the order dated 11.04.2019, passed by theSupreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3880/2019 titled as ‘Mohd. Hannan &Anr. v. Abdul Basit’, to contend that the leave to defend should be allowedand time bound trial be directed in the matter.

Submissions of the Respondent

10.In reply, learned counsel for the Respondents states that theRespondent, landlord, was 85 years old at the time of the filing of the petition.He states that the landlord has three sons and one daughter, however, Mr.Rafay Sultan, the son for whose bona fide need the present eviction petitionhas been filed resides with the landlord. He states in the year 2017, on accountof the advanced age of the Respondent, Mr. Rafay Sultan started residing withthe Respondent as his caregiver to take care of his personal needs. He statesthat Mr. Rafay Sultan resigned from his employment with the TV TodayGroup in the year 2017.

10.1. He states that after an objection was raised in the leave to defenddisputingtheresignationbyMr.RafaySultanandhisstatusofunemployment, the Respondent to substantiate the said plea has placed onrecord before the Trial Court, certificate dated 16.04.2019 issued by theerstwhile employer (TV Today Network Ltd.) of Mr. Rafay Sultan, by way ofan application dated 04.05.2019. The said certificate confirm that Mr. RafaySultan resigned from the said organization in April, 2017. He states that the

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said application was allowed by the Trial court vide order dated 17.05.2019.He states that after the said certificate was taken on record, no further disputeto the veracity of the said certificate was raised by the Petitioner herein beforethe Trial Court. He states that the veracity of the said certificate has not beendisputed in the revision petition either. He states that therefore, the Trial Courtcorrectly observed that there is no dispute to the unemployment status of Mr.Rafay Sultan.

10.2. He states that the issue of the bona fide need has been duly deliberatedby the Trial Court in its impugned order and there is no infirmity in thefindings of the Trial Court.

10.3. With respect to the availability of the alternate accommodation, hestates that the Property No. Z-326/2 near tikona park, is residential propertyand the Respondent herein is the owner of first floor, second floor and thethird floor therein. He states that the said property is already let out to tenantsand being residential property is, therefore not an alternate or suitableaccommodation which could be used for opening the photo studio of the son.10.4. He states that with respect to the property at ‘All Friends Apartment’,the Respondents owns the ground floor and the first floor. He states that thesaid property is also residential and has already been let out; and therefore,not suitable for the requirement of commercial shop.

10.5. He states that with respect to the Property No. 259/2 at Noor Nagar, thesame is lying vacant due to the disputes between the neighbours. He statesthat the Respondent owns the ground floor and the first floor in the saidproperty, however, the said property as well is residential. He states that thefact that it is residential is evident from the photograph of the building placedby the Petitioner on record. He states that bare perusal of the photographs

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shows that the floors are apartments which shows that it can only be used forresidential purpose.

10.6. He states that therefore, none of the three (3) properties referred to bythe counsel for the Petitioner can constitute as suitable alternateaccommodation for opening commercial shop as required by theRespondent’s son.

10.7. He states that with respect to property in Meerut, the Respondent hereinhas no concern with the said property and therefore, the same is not material.10.8. With respect to Shop No.3 (marked in blue colour) and hall (marked ingreen colour) in the site plan filed by the Petitioner located in the same subjectproperty, he states that firstly the said vacant shop in the hall was let out bythe Respondent on 10.03.2019 during the pendency of the eviction petition onaccount of his economic condition, as he required additional finances for hispersonal financial expenses. The Respondent has in his reply dated30.09.2020, explained the circumstances in which he let out Shop No.3 andthe hall during the pendency of the eviction petition. The said explanationreads as under:

“14. That during pendency of eviction petition the petitioner filed anapplication u/s 151 CPC through which the petitioner claimed that oneanother shop at the ground floor had been let out by the respondent, which isbeing used to run restaurant in the name and style of Kicthies. The saidapplication was replied to by the respondent that there are three shops at thefront portion on the ground floor and it was submitted that the respondenthad filed two eviction petitions for two shops on the ground floor, third shopwas lying vacant, it was let out vide rent agreement dated 10.03.2019 uponthe condition that lease could be terminated even before expiry of lease periodby giving one month written notice. It was submitted by the respondent thatthe third shop was let out due to financial crises with the respondent and canbe vacated after he succeeds in the two eviction petitions, which were filedbefore the Ld. ARC, South East, Saket Court, New Delhi.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

10.8.1.He states that even otherwise the said Shop No.3 is not suitable

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alternate accommodation for the reason that the Respondent’s son herein hadright in the beginning sought advice from an architect who had prepared aplan for his studio wherein it was proposed that the shop would have 448 sq.ft. frontage. He states that the site plan prepared by the architect is duly placedon record along with the eviction petition.

10.8.2.He states that the Shop No.3 which is on one corner and isadjoining staircase, does not meet the said requirement of frontage. He reliesupon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014)15 SCC 610, to states that the landlord has the prerogative to select thepremises from where he proposes to carry out his business and tenant cannotdictate to the landlord that he must carry out business from new premises.10.9. He also relies upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in M/s A.K.

Woollen Industries v. Shri. Narayan Gupta, (2017) SCC OnLine Del 11363,to contend that the submissions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner thatthe Respondents must carry out business from upper floors is not tenable andjudicial notice should be taken of the fact that ground floor is morecommercially viable.

10.10.He states that the tenanted premises faces 60 feet wide main road andthat the tenanted premises are undoubtedly most suitable for opening photostudio. He also places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abid-

Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, and more specificallyparagraph No. 15, 18 and 20 therein).

10.11.He states that the Petitioner’s submissions that the Respondent’s son isgainfully employed is incorrect. He states that even otherwise the SupremeCourt has held that even if the son was gainfully employed it would notdisentitle the parent landlord from seeking recovery of possession to enable

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his son to set up an independent business. In this regard he relies upon thejudgment of Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi, (2016) 10 SCC 209.Analysis and findings

11.This Court has considered the submission of the parties and perused thepaper book.Bona fide requirement

12.The landlord is presently 89 years old and his son who is presently 58years old, is currently residing with him. In the opinion of this Court, the factthat the Respondent’s son is professional cameraman is not in dispute. TheRespondent has placed on record certificate issued by the Respondent’semployer (TV Today Network Ltd.) confirming that Mr. Rafay Sultanresigned from their company as the head of camera production as on10.04.2017.

13.This Court finds force in the submission of the learned counsel for theRespondent that the veracity of the said certificate, which was placed onrecord after the leave to defend was filed has not been disputed by thePetitioner before the Trial Court and this revision petition. In this background,the finding of the Trial Court that the unemployment status of theRespondent’s son is unchallenged by the Petitioner herein, cannot be faultedwith.

14.The submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that theunemployment status of the son of the Respondent is an issue which wouldnecessarily require trial and leading of evidence, does not persuade this Court.The Respondent herein has placed on record credible facts and documents tosubstantiate the unemployment status.

15.This Court also finds force in the submission of the learned counsel forthe Respondent that the social media profile on LinkedIn (which has not been

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shown to this Court) of the Respondent’s son may not have been updated afterhis resignation by oversight. He states that as on date, in fact, theRespondent’s son has no access to the said profile as he has lost the logincredentials and is unable to gain access. The findings of the Trial Court in thisregard are correct and reads as under:

“18. The petitioner in the present case is retired from Jamia Milia Universityand is staying with his wife, son and his family. Petitioner is aged about 85years and needs care and protection of the family. It is also not disputed thattwo sons of the petitioner are permanently staying in USA and he has only oneson (who is also his attorney in the present case) to look after him and his wifein this old age. The son of petitioner is stated to have left his previousemployment in April 2017 and letter in this regard issued by the employerhas also been placed on record by the petitioner. This aspect of presentunemployment of the son of petitioner has remained unchallenged by therespondent / tenant.

Besides the aforesaid, petitioner has sought eviction of the respondent/ tenant on the ground of requirement of the shop for his son to set up businessof video coverage of marriages, parties and setting up of photo studio. Theson of petitioner has admittedly worked as camera head with his previousemployer and as such, can reasonably and justifiably start such business.Petitioner has also clarified the size of premises required for such business.Petitioner is also justified in seeking eviction of the respondent from tenantedpremises for the aforesaid purpose as in the circumstance discussed above, theson can be considered to be dependent upon his father particularly when heleft his settled job to look after the ailing father and aged mother, and nowseeking support of his father to set up his own business.

It is observed that petitioner has averred before the Court that how hisson needs the tenanted premises to start new business. On the other hand, therespondent has failed to make any averment to show that there is no suchbonafide requirement or that the factual situation is such that no bonafiderequirement to start new business can be said exist. Therefore, there is noreason for this Court to doubt the bonafide need portrayed by the petitioner.The need to start new, separate business venture by grown-up son who wasso far employed outside, is natural, justified and bonafide. In the present facts,nothing has been shown to raise doubt on such bonafide need of thepetitioner / his son. It is observed that parents in this country still considerthemselves morally and socially obligated to provide maximum supportpossible for the growth and needs of their children and even grandchildren.

For this view support is also drawn from the observations made in

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"Kirshan Kumar Gupta Vs. Krishan Shushan Gupta" 152 (2008) DLT 556wherein it has been held that:

"In this country there is no social security system provided by Stateand the only social security is the security of the family. For gainingthis social security of the family by the aged parents, they have toprovide their sons and daughters the livingaccommodation, ifavailable with them. The requirement of the landlord's sons anddaughters and their families even if they are not financiallydependent on him cannot be said to be unjustified or mala fiderequirement. If daughter or son is taking care of the agedfather/grandfather and his wife, it would be bonafide necessityof the landlord, if he desires that his daughter or son shouldcontinue to live with him so that he continues to take care of him andhis wife. Similarly, when it become difficult, due to old age, to moveout, person may desire that his sons and daughters visit himfrequently and stay with him and the requirement of the landlord forthis purpose cannot be said to be malafide but is bonafiderequirement. "

In the opinion of the Court, respondent / tenant failed to make anyaverment raising any contradiction or shortcoming in the averments andclaims of the petitioner. In these circumstances, the ground of bonafiderequirement raised by petitioner appears justified and respondent tenant couldnot make case of triable issue on the basis of averments made in theapplication / affidavit seeking leave to defend.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

16.This Court has perused the finding of the Trial court; and the dicta ofthe judgment of Krishan Kumar Gupta (supra) cited by the Trial Court, whichis squarely attracted in the facts of this case. The Maintenance and Welfare ofParents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 statutorily recognises the fact that inIndia, children even after attaining the age of majority, continue to reside withtheir parents, take care of them in their old age and use the immovableproperties of the parents. In these circumstances, the bona fide need of theson/daughter, who continues to reside with the old parents, arises in normalcourse of things in Indian society. In the present case there is no dispute thatMr. Rafay Sultan is residing with his parents.

17.In this regard, this Court would also take note of the fact that in the city

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of Delhi, the cost of real estate is astronomical and many adults continue toremain dependent on their parents for residential and as well as commercialaccommodation.

18.In the facts and circumstances, there is no allegation that the son Mr.Rafay Sultan owns any other commercial property in the city of Delhi whichwas available with him for opening his photo studio. This Court is therefore,of the opinion that the Trial Court’s finding with respect to the existence ofthe bona fide need of the Respondent is correct and does not merit anyinterference.

Unavailability of the alternate suitable accommodation

19.With respect to the alternate accommodation, in the first instance, itwould be relevant to refer to the findings of the Trial court which reads asunder:

“19.Learned counsel for respondent has emphasized that the petitioner hasmany other properties available with him and can be utilized for starting thenew business of his son. He has referred to four such properties in hisapplication / affidavit seeking leave to defend. In reply thereto, petitioner hasexplained the status of all such properties.

As per the averments of respondent himself, the property of petitionerat Z-326/2, Okhla Main Road, Near Tikona Park, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi isalready on rent. Similarly, property at Plot No. 32, Street No. 11, All FriendsApartment (where petitioner admitted to have one flat each at ground andfourth floor) is also admittedly on rent. In fact, petitioner has clarified in hisreply that both these properties are residential in nature. As regards, propertyno. 259/2, Noor Nagar, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi, the same has been averredto be lying vacant. It has been clarified by the petitioner that the same is lyingvacant for last six years as during its construction, some neighbourers raisedobjection and the construction could not be completed.The property is averredto be situated in six feet gali and is residential in nature. These aspectsclarified by petitioner have not been controverted by the respondent / tenantby any written reply.

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21.In view of the aforesaid discussion and particularly the fact that therequirement of tenanted premises by the petitioner for use by his son forstarting new business has been found bonafide, and the fact that theproperties referred to by respondent can by no means be considered an

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alternative suitable accommodation, it is concludingly observed that therespondent / tenant has failed to make any such convincing averment in theapplication / affidavit seeking leave to defend which may create or raise a-triable issue thereby disentitling the landlord from seeking his eviction fromthe tenanted premises.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

20.From bare perusal of the aforesaid, it is evident that the Trial Courthas duly dealt with the alternate accommodation pleaded by the tenant in hisleave to defend and in the opinion of this Court, the Trial Court has correctlyappreciated the facts. The three (3) properties which were enlisted in the leaveto defend are all admittedly residential properties, whereas, the bona fide needpleaded by the Respondent is for opening (commercial) photo studio and forthat purpose the residential properties cannot be considered an alternative ora suitable accommodation.

21.Learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to contend that thepermissible user of the buildings in the Jamia Nagar area is not statutorilyprescribed as per the Master Plan since it is an unauthorised colony and he,therefore, sought to suggest that the commercial activity can also be carriedout from residential premises; and this Court can give seal of propriety tothe commercial use of the residential apartment.

21.1. The contention of the Petitioner that the property, which is admittedlybuilt for residential purposes should be used for commercial purpose iswithout any merit and is contrary to the municipal law, which directs thatproperty can be used only for the purpose for which it is built.

21.2. In the present case, the residential properties owned by the landlord asenlisted by the Petitioner are currently in occupation of tenants and for thisreason additionally, the same cannot be considered to be available.

21.3. In any event the judgment relied upon by the Respondent of AKWoollen Industries (supra) also applies to the facts of this case and negates

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the argument of the Petitioner, inasmuch as it is fact that ground floorpremises for opening new photo studio located on the main road is bound toattract more footfall than photo studio located in residential building on anupper floor.

21.4. Further, the Supreme Court in Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 4SCC (Civ) 469, has held that it is settled principle of law that it is not for thetenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to thelandlord should by utilised him for the purpose of his business. The relevantextract of the said judgment reads as under:

“6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant 1) iscarrying on his business from shop premise located in narrow lane, thetenant is in occupation of the premises located on the main road which thelandlord considers to be more suitable for his own business. The materials onrecord, in fact, disclose that the landlord had offered to the tenant thepremises located in the narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premiseswhich offer was declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant's case that thelandlord, Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenanted premises fromwhich eviction is sought for the purposes of his business. It is also not thetenant's case that the landlord proposes to rent out/keep vacant the tenantedpremises after obtaining possession thereof or to use the same is any wayinconsistent with the need of the landlord. What the tenant contends is thatthe landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying ondifferent businesses and further that the landlord has other premises fromwhere the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectivelycarried out.It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principleof law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how theproperty belonging to the landlord should be utilised by him for the purposeof his business. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from variousother premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenantedpremises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his ownbusiness."

(Emphasis Supplied)

22.With respect to the Shop No.3 (delineated in blue colour) along withthe hall (delineated in green colour) in the subject property, in the firstinstance this Court would like to take note that no such plea of the saidpremises being alternate or suitable was taken in the application seeking leave

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to defend.

22.1. In the eviction petition, the Respondent, landlord, at Annexure andmore specifically para (i) therein had made full disclosure of the said shopand the hall. The availability of the said area was also to the knowledge of thePetitioner, tenant, since the tenanted premises are in the same property.However, in the leave to defend application, there was no suggestion that thiswas an alternate suitable accommodation.

22.2. In the opinion of this Court, this itself shall be sufficient to preclude thePetitioner from now raising the said additional plea.

22.3. However, the Respondent has sufficiently explained that the said ShopNo.3 is unsuitable for the reason that he requires 448 square feet frontage,which is possible only if the two shops i.e., Shop No. 1 and Shop No.2 (i.e.,the tenanted premises), which are adjoining each other, in the left-hand cornerbecome available to the Respondent. It has also come on record that theRespondent has sought eviction of the tenant from Shop no.1 and an evictionorder has been passed in favour of the Respondent herein by the Trial court.22.4. The explanation given by the Respondent in his reply dated 30.09.2020with respect to the circumstances in which Shop No. 3 was let out during thependency of the eviction petition is also persuasive.

23.In these facts and circumstances, this Court finds no infirmity in thefindings of the Trial Court, which are duly deliberated and have taken intoconsideration all the evidence and the pleadings on record.

24.In this regard, the judgment of this Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam(supra) and more specifically paragraph 15 and 23 therein, as relied upon bythe Respondent is instructive and reads as under:

“15. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction.Thus, in case where landlord makes an application seeking possession of

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the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the learned RentController may dispense with the protection prescribed under the Act andthen grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fideneed, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation".Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) therequirement being bona fide, and (ii) the non-availability of reasonablysuitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along withsuitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant.When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists abona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonablysuitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated underSection 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.

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23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power ofrevision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the natureof superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process,inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected tosubstitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising theappellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. Thescope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in caseswhere there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would onlymean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court shouldnot venture to disturb such decision. There is no need for holding rovinginquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting thepower of superintendence into that of regular first appeal, an act, totallyforbidden by the legislature.”

25.In fact, with respect to the alternative accommodation also the saidjudgment in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) is instructive. The relevant para 25 andpara 26 reads as under.

“29. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of bona fide purpose.The contention regarding alternative accommodation can at best be only anincidental one. Such requirement has not been found to be incorrect by theHigh Court, though it is not even open to it to do so, in view of the limitedjurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise. Therefore, the very basis uponwhich the revision was allowed is obviously wrong being contrary to the veryprovision contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25-B(8).

30. We have already discussed the scope of Section 14(1)(e) vis-à-vis Section25-B (8) of the Act. Therefore, the mere existence of the other propertieswhich are, in fact, denied by the appellant would not enure to the benefit ofthe respondent in the absence of any pleadings and supporting materialbefore the learned Rent Controller to the effect that they are reasonablysuitable for accommodation.”

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26.This revision petition was heard on 29.04.2023 and while passing thejudgement, it was observed that arguments have not been heard on theRespondent’s application CM APPL. 35640/2022. In the said applications,the Respondent is seeking fixation of use and occupation charges at Rs.55,000/- per month. Accordingly, the matter was listed on 04.05.2023 and12.05.2023 for arguments on the said application. However, the counsel forthe Petitioner was not available to address arguments on 12.05.2023 andtherefore, the Respondent prayed that he is not pressing for the relief in thesaid application to avoid any further delay. Accordingly, the said applicationis disposed of as not pressed as recorded in separate order passed today.

27.In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present petition isdismissed and the eviction order dated 17.02.2020 is upheld. The pendingapplications, if any, are disposed of.

28.No order as to costs.

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J

May 12, 2023/msh/aa

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