RFA(COMM)/11/2025 of M/S RIDHA FASHIONS & ORS. Vs M/S NANDI FABRICS

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+RFA(COMM) 11/2025

M/S RIDHA FASHIONS & ORS......APPELLANTSThrough:Mr Raj Kumar, Advocate.versus

M/S NANDI FABRICS.....RESPONDENTThrough:None.

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRUHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIAO R R

12.03.2025

CM APPL. 1387/2025

1.Theappellantshavefiledtheabovecaptionedappealimpugning judgement and decree dated order dated 17.01.2023(hereafter the impugned judgement) in CS (Comm) no. 224/2020captioned M/s Nandi Fabrics vs M/s Ridhima Fashion and Ors.

2.This is an application filed by the appellants – who werearrayedasdefendantsinCS(Comm)no.224/2020–seekingcondonation of delay of 605 (six hundred and five) days in filing thepresent appeal. The appellants explanation for the inordinate delay infiling the appeal is as follows. They submit that they had engagedtheir counsel (Ms. Vandana Rani) who was looking after the presentcase, however, she was expecting and delivered child in the monthof March, 2023. They submit that she was suffering from post-

delivery complications and therefore, the appeal could not be filedwithin time.

3.The present appeal was listed on 10.01.2025 and the appellantshad sought further time to file an additional affidavit to explain thedelay in filing the appeal. The appellants have since filed the saidadditional affidavit. The explanation for the delay remains the same –the ill-health of Ms. Vandana Rani, Advocate who was engaged bythe appellants. The appellants have also filed certain medicaldocuments to establish that Ms. Vandana Rani has suffered certainmedical complications.

4.Copy of the impugned judgment indicates that the appellantswere the defendants in the suit and had stopped appearing despiterepeated opportunities. The parties were also referred to the DelhiHigh Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre to explore thepossibility of settlement but the parties could not settle their dispute.The learned Commercial Court had noted that the suit filed by therespondents was one of the 20 oldest cases on the court’s board andaccordingly, decided to take up the same on priority. The appellantswere granted opportunity to cure the defects in the written statementand also granted time for filing the statement of admission and denialof documents. However, despite repeated opportunities, the appellantshad failed to cure the defects and had stopped appearing in theproceedings. In view of the above, the learned Commercial Court hadpassed an order dated 29.11.2022 directing that the appellants beproceeded ex-parte.

5.The documents produced by the respondent (plaintiff) were

exhibited and the final arguments were also heard. The matter wasthereafter fixed by the learned Commercial Court on 17.12.2022 fororders. At that stage, on 17.12.2022, the appellants filed anapplication under Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908, once again stating that the appellants were willing to settle thedispute in Mediation. The appellants explanation for not curing thedefect in the written statement; not filing the affidavit of admissionand denial; and not appearing before the court was that Ms. VandanaRani, Advocate who was engaged by the appellants was facing seriousissues in her pregnancy and therefore, could not continue her practiceafter October, 2022. The appellants contended before the learnedCommercial Court that the non-appearance of the appellants wasneither intentional nor on account of any negligence but on account ofill-health of Ms. Vandana Rani, Advocate.

6.The learned Commercial Court did not accept the saidexplanation essentially for the reason that the written statement borethe name of Ms. Vandana Rani, Advocate as well as Sh. ManojChauhan, Advocate. It also did not bear the signatures of Ms.Vandana Rani, Advocate. There was no explanation as to why Sh.Manoj Chauhan, Advocate who was also counsel engaged by theappellants, had not appeared.

7.In the given facts, clearly the issue of ill-health of Ms. VandanaRani, Advocate for explaining the delay in filing the present appealcannot be accepted. The appellants were fully aware of her conditionand had in fact sought to explain the reason for their non-appearancebefore the learned Commercial Court as ill-health of Ms. Vandana

Rani, Advocate. This, therefore, cannot be accepted as ground fordelay in filing the present appeal.

8.In Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineersand Contractors Pvt. Ltd.: (2021) 6 SCC 460, the Supreme Court hadobserved as under:

58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the ArbitrationAct and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution ofdisputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough tocover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provisionitself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself loosepanacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court,in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] , hasheld : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could notbe blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient”is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary toanswer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient”embraces no more than that which provides platitude, whichwhen the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended inthe facts and circumstances existing in case, duly examinedfrom the viewpoint of reasonable standard of cautious man. Inthis context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should nothave acted in negligent manner or there was want of bonafide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of case orit cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances ofeach case must afford sufficient ground to enable the courtconcerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever thecourt exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. Theapplicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless asatisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allowthe application for condonation of delay. The court has toexamine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely deviceto cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & BuildingCorpn. v. BhutnathBanerjee [ManindraLand&BuildingCorpn. v. BhutnathBanerjee,AIR1964SC1336], MataDin v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC

770] , Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 :(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. MunicipalCorpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. MunicipalCorpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC(Civ) 24] .)

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra

Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the differencebetween “good cause” and “sufficient cause” and observedthat every “sufficient cause” is good cause and vice versa.However, if any difference exists it can only be that therequirement of good cause is complied with on lesser degree ofproof than that of “sufficient cause”.

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given liberalinterpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only[Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised inoriginal.] so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fidescannot be imputed to the party concerned [Ed. : The matterbetween two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] ,whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can bedecided on the facts of particular case and no straitjacketformulaispossible.(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal,(2002)1SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram NathSao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .

12. It is settled legal proposition that law of limitation may

harshly affect particular party but it has to be applied with allits rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no powerto extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A resultflowing from statutory provision is never an evil. court hasno power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers adistress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision maycause hardship or inconvenience to particular party but thecourt has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to thesame. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law ishard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such situation. It hasconsistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” decisivefactor to be considered while interpreting statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim

being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud andperjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeksto bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated

unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p.266:

‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts haveexpressed at least three differing reasons supporting theexistence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that longdormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them,(2) that defendant might have lost the evidence todisprove stale claim, and (3) that persons with goodcauses of actions should pursue them with reasonablediligence.’

An unlimited limitation would lead to sense ofinsecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitationprevents disturbance or deprivation of what may havebeen acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment orwhat may have been lost by party's own inaction,negligenceorlaches.(See Popat&KotechaProperty v. SBIStaffAssn. [Popat&KotechaProperty v. SBIStaffAssn.,(2005)7SCC510], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. SantaSingh,(1973)2SCC705]and PundlikJalamPatil v. JalgaonMediumProject [PundlikJalamPatil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 :(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14.In P.RamachandraRao v. StateofKarnataka [P.Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 :2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially engraftingprinciples of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in theface of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul RehmanAntulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] 15. The law on the issuecan be summarised to the effect that where case has beenpresented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has toexplain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” whichmeans an adequate and enough reason which prevented him toapproach the court within limitation. In case party is found to benegligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts andcircumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently orremained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condonethe delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an

inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. Theapplication is to be decided only within the parameters laid downby this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case therewas no sufficient cause to prevent litigant to approach the courton time condoning the delay without any justification, putting anycondition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation ofthe statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utterdisregard to the legislature.”

(emphasis supplied)

9.It is apparent from above that the question of condoning thedelay in commercial disputes cannot be considered liberally. Thecourt has to evaluate the reasons for the delay and the same can becondoned only where the court is satisfied that there is sufficientcause that prevented the appellant to file the appeal within thestipulated time. In the present case, there is no credible explanationfor the inordinate delay of six hundred and five days in filing thepresent appeal.

10.The application is accordingly dismissed.RFA(COMM) 11/2025 and CM APPL. 1386/2025

11.Consequently, the appeal and the pending application are alsodismissed.

VIBHU BAKHRU, J

MARCH 12, 2025/tr

TEJAS KARIA, J

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