CRL.REV.P.(MAT.)/207/2025 of AKASH SHRIVASTAVA Vs SWATI VERMA & ORS.

INTHEHIGHCOURTOFDELHIATNEWDELHI+CRL.REV.P.(MAT.) 207/2025 & CRL.M.A. 13842/2025AKASH SHRIVASTAVA.....PetitionerAKASH SHRIVASTAVA.....Petitioner

Through:Mr. Umang Tyagi and Mr. Zuber Ali,Advocates with Petitioner (throughVC).Advocates with Petitioner (throughVC).

versus

SWATI VERMA & ORS.

Through:

.....Respondents

Mr. Sudhanshu Tomar, Advocate.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

O R R11.09.2025

1.The present revision petition under Section 442 of the BharatiyaNagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023[1](formerly Section 401 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973[2]) assails the order dated 17[th]February, 2025passed by the Family Court, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhiin MT No. 498/2019 titled “Swati Verma & Ors. v. Akash Srivastava.” Bythe impugned order, the Family Court, in exercise of jurisdiction underSection 125 Cr.P.C., directed the Petitioner to pay sum of INR 20,000/-per month each to Respondents No. 2 and 3, the two minor children, alongwith their school fees.

2.Respondent No. 1 asserts she was married to the Petitioner on 14[th]September, 2010, with the marriage being formally registered at Kanpur on

1 “BNSS”

23[rd]October, 2018. The Petitioner disputes the validity and subsistence ofthe marriage, but unequivocally admits his paternity of Respondents No. 2and 3, who remain in the custody and care of Respondent No. 1. For presentpurposes,thatadmissionisdecisive.Theimpugnedordergrantsmaintenance only to the minor children, and their right to be maintainedflows directly from the undisputed father–child relationship. In that context,the Petitioner’s denial of marriage is collateral plea of no legalconsequence; once paternity is acknowledged, the statutory duty underSection 125 Cr.P.C. to provide for the children’s upkeep is engaged,irrespective of any controversy surrounding the marital tie.

3.Respondent No. 1 instituted proceedings under Section 125 of theCr.P.C. seeking maintenance both for herself and the two minor children.Upon consideration of the income affidavits and the evidence led by theparties, the Family Court declined maintenance to Respondent No. 1 butawarded maintenance in favour of Respondents No. 2 and 3. The relevantfindings of the Family Court to this effect are as follows:

11.Firstly, I am taking up issue of territorial jurisdiction raised bythe respondent in written statement / reply. L.d. Counsel for respondenthas argued that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain thispetition, as the Petitioners have never stayed within the territorialjurisdiction of this Court and even this fact has already been concludedby L..d. MM under DV Act that the Petitioner no. I never resided at thegiven address. It is further argued that the Petitioners have manipulateda rent agreement just to invoke territorial jurisdiction of this court andthis petition ought to be returned to the Petitioners to file afresh beforeGhaziabad Court where the Petitioners had been residing at the time offiling of this case. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners hasargued that the Petitioners have filed this petition on the basis of rentagreement and the Petitioners were residing at said address at the timeof filing of this case, due to this court has territorial jurisdiction to

2 “Cr.P.C.”

entertain this petition and same is liable to be disposed off on merit.12.Admittedly,Section126ofCrPCdealswithterritorialjurisdiction of court to deal with petition u/s 125 of CrPC. Anypetition may be filed where either the Petitioner or the respondent hasbeen residing. Petitioners have filed this petition on the basis of rentagreement and the respondent has nowhere disputed it. PWI hascategorically deposed that the respondent deserted him and the bankpressurized her to vacate the premises, whereas RWI has also admittedthat he defaulted in payment of EMIs and settled loan when thePetitioners left the premises. PW1 has further admitted that she had beenresiding at Indirapuram, Ghaziabad during the period from January,2019 to 31.03.2024 and earlier left her matrimonial home in bare clothesandeducationaldocumentsandstartedlivinginarentedaccommodation, which supported the version of the Petitioners. In fact,PW1 has duly proved that she along with her children shifted to rentedaccommodation and has also placed on record said rent agreementpertaining to address falling within the territorial jurisdiction of thisCourt. Rent agreement dated 25.06.2019 is on record and the respondenthas not led any evidence to prove that it is forged and fabricateddocument. In fact, testimony of PWI is slightly contradictory as, on theone hand, she has deposed that she had been residing at Indirapuram,Ghaziabad during the period from January, 2019 to 31.03.2024 and lefther matrimonial home on 01.04.2024, whereas she has also deposed thatshe stayed on rent within the jurisdiction of this court. In fact, testimonyof PW1 duly supported by rent agreement which has proved that thePetitioners stayed within the jurisdiction of this court at the time of filingof this case and this court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain thiscase and plea taken by the respondent has no substance.

..xx.. ..xx.. ..xx..

19.Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are minor sons and this fact is notdisputed by the respondent. PW1 has proved that both children wereborn out on 03.01.2012 and 15.08.2013 respectively. RWI has alsoproved that he used to reside with the Petitioner no.1 in live-inrelationship and both children were borne out of this relationship.Respondent has also filed child custody case against the Petitioner no.1 regarding custody of both children namely Divyansh and Aakansh.Even birth certificates of both children are Mark and F, which haveduly corroborated this relationship between the Petitioner no. 2 & 3 andthe respondent.

20.Both children are aged about 10 and 11 years and are studying ina reputed school at Greater Noida, UP. Respondent has filed his affidavitof income and assets and has acknowledged that both children are incustody of the Petitioner no.1 and studying in J.M. International School.

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Respondent has claimed that he is not earning, whereas earlier he wasearning substantial amount and has acknowledged his last drawnsalary Rs. 1,70,000/- pm in the year 2020, whereas he has not filed hisITR. However, the Petitioners have proved his I'I'R filed before the courtof MM under DV Act as Ex.PW1/19 (colly), as per which, he carried Rs.12,80,100/- during the financial year 2016-17, which reduced to Rs.2,05,700/- with refund of Rs. 15,960/- in next year. RWI has admittedthat he has paid housing loan of flat at Indirapuram, Ghaziabad in themonth of June, 2024 itself and now said flat stated to be in possession ofhis sister. It is further admitted that property remained in default of loanamount during the period from 2020-24 and probably just to turn out thePetitioners from said property. Respondent has claimed that he has notbeen earning and is dependent upon his pensioner mother and earningsister, which is not believable in any manner. Respondent has beenstaying in an expensive city like Pune and that too just as dependentupon his family members, whereas he had been working there and wasearning and drawing handsome salary.21.In fact, the respondent has been doing work but has concealedfrom this Court and his version that he has been earning merely Rs.15,000/- per month is not believable in any manner and herebydiscarded. It is further beyond explanation that the respondent has notbeen earning but still has borrowings of Rs. 24 Lacs. In fact, earning ofthe respondent ought to be considered according to his last drawnincome @ Rs. 1,70,000/- per month.

22.Respondent is father of both children and is liable to maintainthem.

No doubt mother of both children is also earning but her earning is muchlesser than respondent, due to the respondent is solely liable to maintainhis both children. Respondent has no other dependency except thechildren as he has already admitted that his mother is pensioner andsister is also earning.

23.Keeping in view of facts and circumstances of the case, I herebydirect the respondent to pay school fees of both children on monthlybasis directly to school and the Petitioner no.1 shall send copy of feesreceipt of both children to the respondent at least 7 days prior to duedate and the respondent shall pay foes directly to school. if he fails topay school fees, then the Petitioner no.1 shall pay said school fess andshall recover from the respondent as default maintenance. Besidesschool fess, the respondent shall also pay Rs. 20,000/- per month to eachchild, which shall be payable by the respondent from the date of filing ofthis petition till they attain age of majority or start earning, whichever isearlier. Monthly maintenance shall be payable on 10[th]of eachsucceeding calendar month.

24.Any ad-interim/ interim maintenance in this petition or any otherinterim / regular maintenance in any other petition, if any shall also be

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subject to adjustment. With these observations present petition isdisposed of.25. File be consigned to Record Room.”

4.The Petitioner who appears through video conferencing mechanismalong with his counsel, advances the following submissions against theimpugned order:

4.1.The Family Court has erred by misreading and misconstruing theincome affidavit of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is at present unemployedand does not have regular or fixed source of income. In the absence ofcogent evidence establishing gainful employment or steady income stream,the assumption of higher earning capacity, is entirely speculative.

4.2.The findings in the impugned order are not supported by anyreasoning or analysis of the material on record. The directions thereforerest on conjecture rather than substantiated financial assessment.

4.3.The Petitioner resides in flat situated in Pune which, belongs to hissister. He is financially dependent on his aged mother, who draws only amodest pension, and on his sister, who works as an insurance agent. Againstthis backdrop, the quantum of maintenance directed, INR 20,000/- permonth to each child along with school fees, is disproportionate, arbitrary,and beyond his means of compliance.

4.4.The Family Court failed to note that it lacked territorial jurisdictionsince Respondent No. 1 resides in Ghaziabad. Earlier, the proceedings underthe Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005,[3]the MahilaCourt, Shahdara were dismissed on 15[th]July 2022 for lack of territorialjurisdiction. Taking contrary view in the present case amounts to clear

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jurisdictional error.

4.5.RespondentNo.1iswithholdingthePetitioner’simportantdocuments and also does not allow the Petitioner to meet Respondents No. 2and 3.

5.The Court has considered the above-noted facts and contentions. Atthe outset, it bears repetition that the impugned order under Section 125 ofCr.P.C. concerns only the minor children (Respondents No. 2 and 3). TheFamily Court, on examining the income affidavits, bank records, and thePetitioner’s own admissions, found that he had understated his means.Although the Petitioner had claimed to be earning merely INR 15,000/- permonth, he had previously drawn salary of INR 1,70,000/- per month in2020, continued servicing home-loan EMIs until June 2024, and disclosedborrowingsofaboutINR24,00,000/-.Thesecircumstancesdrewinconsistencies with his plea of financial hardship. The Family Courtaccordingly assessed his capacity with reference to his last known earnings,makingareasonableestimationbasedonthepleadings,financialdisclosures, and overall status of the parties.

6.This approach of the Family Court is consistent with settled principlesgoverning the determination of maintenance, which permit degree ofguesswork where income is concealed, inadequately disclosed, or notverifiable. In such cases, courts may draw reasonable inferences fromfactors such as qualifications, work history, lifestyle, liabilities, and overallstandard of living, rather than rely solely on self-serving affidavits.[4]The useof the Petitioner’s last drawn salary as benchmark, given his prior earnings

4 Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324; Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 622. Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324; Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 622.

and credentials, is, therefore, fair and reasonable application of theseprinciples.

7.Further,thepaternalrelationshipbetweenthePetitionerandRespondents No. 2 and 3 is undisputed. The children are in Respondent No.1’s custody and are studying in reputed school. In law, father’s duty tomaintain his minor children is statutory and non-derogable once paternity isestablished; it does not hinge on the status of the marital relationship or oninter se disputes between the adults. The Supreme Court has consistentlyheld that healthy, able-bodied man cannot evade his responsibility tomaintain his children by pleading limited means or other excuses.[5]While themother’s income may affect the apportionment, it does not absolve thefather of his obligation.

8.The two minors (aged about 10 and 11 years) require steady supportfor nutrition, healthcare, clothing, transport, extracurriculars and schooling.Direct payment of school fees to the institution, with fallback mechanism,properly secures their education. The monthly maintenance of INR 20,000/-for each child is balanced amount, reasonably aligned with the Petitioner’slast-drawn income and the family’s social background. The Supreme Courthas elucidated in its judgement in Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai[6]that maintenancemust be “reasonable and realistic”: it should not be oppressive to the payer,yet cannot be so meagre as to drive dependents to penury. While there existsno straight-jacket formula for the same, the assessment of the Petitioner’sincome and the consequent award in the present case bears the stamp ofreasonableness and meets the essential needs of the dependents.

5 Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705; Anju Garg v. Deepak Kumar Garg (2022) 4SCC 443).SCC 443).

9.The jurisdictional objection is equally untenable. Section 126(1) ofCr.P.C. permits proceedings where either the husband or the wife has beenresiding. The Family Court recorded, on evidence, that Respondent No. 1and the children were residing within its territorial jurisdiction, supported bya rent agreement dated 25[th]June 2019. The said finding is mixed questionof fact and law. Relying on the previous dismissal of DV Act applicationfor lack of jurisdiction is not valid, especially as it pertained to differentperiod, address, and statute. Such dismissal neither acts as res judicata noraffects proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., which has its own rulesfor venue based on current residence. Besides, in revision, this Court doesnot re-examine such factual findings unless there is clear perversity, whichis not present here.

10.The remaining arguments do not help the Petitioner’s case either. Theclaimofunemploymentanddependenceonfamilymembersiscontradicted by his financial history, showing earning capacity beyondself-declared income. Second, the claim that the earlier order was vague iswithout merit. The impugned order properly evaluated the evidence,financial records, and children’s needs before providing clear andreasonable relief. Further, issues of child access or withheld documents arenot relevant with regards to the present matter and should be addressed inseparate guardianship or related proceedings. These do not affect thechildren’s entitlement to support under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.11.Lastly, the Court also has to take stock of the limited scope ofinterference at the stage of revision. Under Section 442 BNSS (formerlySection 401 of Cr.P.C.), interference lies only for jurisdictional error, patent

6 Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316.

perversity, or manifest miscarriage of justice, and not to substitute analternative view on quantum if the Family Court’s view is reasonably openon the record.[7]The impugned order applies the correct tests, marshals thematerial, and fashions relief proportionate to need and capacity. No groundfor revisional correction is made out.

12.For these reasons, the petition stands dismissed, along with allpending applications.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2025/as

SANJEEV NARULA, J

7 State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452.

CRL.REV.P.(MAT.) 207/2025