CRL.REV.P.(MAT.)/415/2025 of ANSHUMAN VERMAN Vs STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+CRL.REV.P.(MAT.) 415/2025, CRL.M.A. 26797-26799/2025ANSHUMAN VERMAN

.....Petitioner

Through:In person.

versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.....RespondentsThrough:Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for Statewith Mr. Sajid, SI, PS-Neb Sarai andMr. Raghuraj Singh, SI, PS-SangamVihar.

CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

O R R09.09.2025

1.The present revision petition under Section 442 of the BharatiyaNagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023[1](formerly Section 401 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973[2]) assails the order dated 13[th]March, 2024 passedby the Special Judge-NDPS/ASJ (South), Sake Courts, New Delhi. By theimpugned order, the Sessions Court upheld the order dated 31[st]May, 2023,passed by the MM-02 (Mahila Court), South, Saketh Courts, New Delhi onan application under Section 23 of Protection of Women from DomesticViolence Act, 2005[3]awarding interim maintenance of INR 12,000/- toRespondent No. 2 (wife) and INR 8,000/- to Respondent No. 3 (minordaughter).

2 “CrPC”

3 “DV Act”

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2.The Petitioner married Respondent No. 2 on 9[th]February, 2020 inaccordance with Hindu rites and customs. On 9[th]March, 2021, girl childwas born (Respondent No. 3) from this marriage. After Respondent No. 2’sdischarge from hospital on 13[th]March 2021, the Petitioner asked her to staywith her parents. Since then, the parties have been living separately. Theminor child has remained in the custody and care of Respondent No. 2.

3.In these circumstances, Respondent No. 2 instituted petition underSection 12 of the DV Act and sought interim maintenance under Section 23of the Act. After considering the pleadings and the income and expenditureaffidavits, the Trial Court awarded INR 20,000/- per month as maintenance(INR 12,000/- to Respondent No. 2 and INR 8,000/- to Respondent No. 3)having regard to their needs, the parties’ standard of living, and thePetitioner’s earning capacity. Relevant findings of the Sessions Courts orderto this effect are as follows:

14.Coming to the facts of the present case, as per Ld. MM's primafacie findings on the basis of affidavit and documents submitted by both thesides before her, Ld. MM came to conclusion that keeping in view theexpenses of the respondent, social status of the parties, sum of Rs.12,000/- was awarded to the respondent/wife and Rs. 8,000/- to the minorchild as monthly interim maintenance.

15.The appellant is not just an abled bodied man but is also apractising advocate It is not palatable that the appellant has no earningfrom his law practice and that he is totally dependent upon his aged father.Since the appellant did not come out clean as to his income before the Ld.MM, some amount of guesswork could not be ruled out on the part of Ld.MM in assessing the amount of interim maintenance. The evidence in thematter is yet to be recorded. Both the sides will have ample opportunity toproduce evidence in support of their rival contentions and that the amountof interim maintenance fixed by Ld. MM is in the nature of interim monetaryrelief provided to the wife and the minor child in order to prevent them fromthe state of vagrancy. The approach of Ld. MM in this regard cannot befaulted with.

16.The appellant has also sought paternity test upon the minor childclaiming that he is not the father of the child and as such, not liable to take

any maintenance to the child. It is not in dispute that the respondent is alawfully wedded wife of the appellant. Further, the child was also bornduring the subsistence of their marriage.

17.Section 112 of the Evidence Act is reproduced herein forconvenience:

“112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy- the factthat any person was born during the continuance of valld marriagebetween his mother or any man, or within 280 days (two hundredeighty days) after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried,shall be conclusive proof that he is the son of that man, unless it canbe shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each otherat any time when he could have been begotten.”

18.It is well settled that the presumption of legitimacy is apresumption of law. When child is born from wedlock, there is apresumption in favour of his legitimacy. The rule of evidence contained inSection 112 of the Evidence Act raises mandatory presumption that achild born during wedlock, no matter when the child could be begotten isthe legitimate issue of the husband of the mother.

19.In Lal Hari Bansha Vs. Nikunj Behari Ilr 1960 Cuttack 230 theHon'ble High Court reiterated the relevant principle of law as under:-

“Odiosa Et Inkonesta Non Sunt In Lege Praa Sunenda” whichmeans 'nothing odius or dishonourable will be presumed by law'. Sothe law presumes against vice and immorality. One of the strongestillustrations of the principle is the presumption in favour of legitimacyof children in civilised society.”

20.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goutam Kundu Vs. State of WestBengal and Anr AIR 1993 SC 2295, summarised the law on the subject asunder:-

“(i) That courts in India cannot order blood test as matter ofcourse;(ii) Wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to haverobing enquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained.

(iii) There must be strong prima-facie case in that the husband mustestablish non-access in order to dispell the presumption arising underSection 112 of the Evidence Act.

(iv) The court must carefully examine as to what would be theconsequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effectof branding child as bastard and the mother as an unchastewomen.

(v) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.”

21.Further in Bhabani Prasad Jena Vs. Convinor Secretary, OdishaState Commission for Women AIR 2010 SC 285, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt held that DNA test is matter relating to paternity of child and itshould not be directed by the court as matter of course or in routinemanner, whenever such request is made, the court has to consider diverse

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aspects including presumption u/s 112 of the Act, pros and cons of suchorder and the test of "imminent need" whether it is not possible for the courtto reach the truth without use of such test. The result of genuine DNA testmay not be enough to escape from the conclusiveness of Section 112 of theAct.

22.The law as enunciated in the aforecited decisions is abundantlyclear that once the validity of marriage is proved then there is strongpresumption about the legitimacy of child born out of that wedlock whichcannot be easily dislodged. Hence, no such direction is to be passed.23.The Ld. MM has passed well reasoned order which does notwarrant any interference. There is no merit in the present appeal. Same isaccordingly dismissed.

TCR be sent back with copy of the judgment.Appeal file be consigned to Record Room.Announced in open court on 13.03.2024.”

4.The Petitioner, appearing in person, assails the impugned order onmultiple grounds. His objections may be summarised as follows:

4.1.The Trial Court failed to consider that Respondent No. 2 was fullyaware, at the time of marriage, that the Petitioner had no fixed source ofincome and was still pursuing his three-year LL.B. course. Thus, herexpectations of financial support were unrealistic given the circumstancesthen prevailing.

4.2.Respondent No. 2 has been gainfully employed in private servicesince 2011 and has, from 23[rd]June, 2019, been drawing salary of aboutINR 25,000/- per month. She deliberately withheld this material fact fromthe Trial Court, though her professional credentials and employment detailsare publicly accessible on professional networking platforms such asLinkedIn.

4.3.Respondent No. 2 has concealed her true earnings and filed anincomplete and misleading income affidavit. The affidavit does not make afull disclosure of her financial position and seeks to create misleading

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impression that she is entirely without means to support herself.

4.4.The Trial Court also failed to consider the details supplied by thePetitioner, which indicate multiple significant monetary transactions inRespondent No. 2’s account between 1[st]April, 2020 and 26[th]March, 2023.These include transfers of approximately INR 51,000/- to her father viaonline platforms, suggesting undisclosed additional sources of income.

4.5.The above transactions are at variance with the income andexpenditure statement furnished by Respondent No. 2 before the Trial Court,thereby reflecting that she possesses sufficient means to maintain herself.Consequently, the award of interim maintenance is unwarranted andunjustified.

5.The Court has considered the aforenoted facts and contentions. Itbears emphasis that the impugned order concerns interim maintenance underSection 23 of the DV Act, provisional arrangement intended to securesustenance for the claimant during the pendency of proceedings. Such reliefis based on prima facie assessment of the material on record. It neitherdetermines the final rights of the parties with respect to maintenance, nordoes it prevent either party from leading further evidence during trial. Thestatutory scheme only ensures that the dependent spouse or child is not leftwithout financial support while the lis is pending.

6.The Trial Court drew its assessment of the maintenance based on theparties’ affidavits, qualifications, and standard of living, and the SessionsCourt found the assessment balanced: INR 12,000/- per month for the wifeand INR 8,000/- per month for the minor child. The Petitioner’s assertion ofzero income, despite being practising advocate with professional degrees,was rightly treated with circumspection.

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This is digitally signed order.

7.This approach is in line with the settled position of law onmaintenance. Where party withholds true financial particulars, adverseinference and fair estimation are legitimate tools to avoid reducingmaintenance to hollow formality. An element of reasonable guesswork ispermissible where income is concealed or not fully disclosed.[4]The rationaleis based on settled position that, in such cases, the Court must have regard tothe parties’ standard of living, social background, and overall circumstances,rather than rely solely on the self-serving statements of either party.

8.The Court is also unable to accept the Petitioner’s assertion thatRespondent No. 2 is independently earning and has sufficient means tomaintain herself. This contention rests largely on conjecture and material notsubstantiated in evidence. The Petitioner relies upon LinkedIn profile andcertain bank transfers to allege that Respondent No. 2 is gainfully employedand drawing monthly salary of INR 25,000/-. However, these are mattersof proof that cannot be conclusively determined at the interim stage, norwithin the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction.

9.More fundamentally, even if it were to be assumed that RespondentNo. 2 has some earning capacity, that does not, in law, absolve the Petitionerof his duty to provide for her sustenance and for the upkeep of the minorchild. Section 20(1)(d) of the Protection of Women from Domestic ViolenceAct, 2005, expressly empowers the Magistrate to grant monetary reliefs,including maintenance, notwithstanding the existence of an independentincome of the aggrieved person, where such income is found insufficient tomeet her needs. The test is not whether the wife has any income, but

4 Bharat Hegde v. Saroj Hegde, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 622; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another, (2021) 2 SCC324.

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whether she has adequate means to secure life of dignity, consistent withthe standard she was entitled to in her matrimonial home.

10.The Supreme Court has consistently held that an able-bodied husbandcannot avoid his duty of maintenance by pleading that the wife is employed,that she should contribute equally, or by relying on excuses of limitedmeans. This responsibility assumes even greater significance when minorchildren are in the custody of the wife, for their upkeep is inextricably linkedwith the mother’s sustenance.[5]The duty to maintain is statutory, moral, andsacrosanct, and only ceases on legally recognised grounds such asremarriage, proven misconduct disentitling maintenance, or decreeexpressly negativing the claim. Until then, the husband must ensure that hiswife and children are not reduced to penury.

11.On the facts of this case, Respondent No. 2, graduate who wasbriefly employed prior to her marriage, is now caring for minor child oftender years. The child’s daily needs, i.e., nutrition, healthcare, education,are inseparable from the mother’s upkeep. It is unrealistic to expect her tosimultaneously discharge the role of primary caregiver and generatesufficient income to match the Petitioner’s obligation. As underscored by theSupreme Court in Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai,[6]maintenance must be“reasonable and realistic”: adequate to prevent hardship to the wife, yet notso excessive as to become oppressive to the husband. In this backdrop, themaintenance fixed at INR 12,000/- for the wife and INR 8,000/- for the childis within the bounds of reasonableness and meets their essential needs.

12.At this stage, it is pertinent to note the limited scope of interference

5 Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705; Anju Garg v. Deepak Kumar Garg 2022 SCCOnLine SC 1314.

under Section 442 of BNSS at the stage of revision. Revisional jurisdictionexists to ensure the legality and propriety of subordinate court orders,correcting jurisdictional defects, manifest legal errors, or perverse findingscausing miscarriage of justice. It is not an appellate forum for re-assessingevidence or substituting another plausible view.[7]In light of the foregoingdiscussion, and bearing in mind the scope of revisional jurisdiction, thisCourt finds no perversity or legal infirmity in the concurrent findings of theTrial Court and the Sessions Court so as to warrant interference.

13.It must be reiterated that an order of interim maintenance is aprovisional measure aimed at ensuring the subsistence and basic financialsecurity of the claimant during the pendency of proceedings. Such anarrangement neither crystallises the ultimate rights and obligations of theparties nor forecloses fresh determination upon full appraisal of evidenceat the final stage.

14.For these reasons, the petition stands dismissed, along with allpending applications.

SEPTEMBER 9, 2025

SANJEEV NARULA, J

6 (2008) 2 SCC 316.

7 State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452.

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