T. C. BASAPPA versus T. NAGAPPA AND ANOTHER.

.May5.

T. C. BASAPPA

T. NAGAPPA AND ANOTHER.

[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MUKHERJEA, V1v1AN BosE, BHAGWATI and

VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.J

Constitution of India-Article 226-Certiorari, writ of-General principles governing the issue thereof-Manifest and patent error apparent on the face of proceedings-Clear ignorance or dis-regard of provision of law-Absence or excess of jurisdiction. The issue of prerogative writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo 'warranto, prohib£tion and certiorari had their origin in England in the King's prerogative power of superintendenCe over the due observance of law by his officials and Tribunals.

The powers of the Supren1e Court as well as of all the High Courts in India under articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution res-pectively are very wide.

The Supreme Court as well as the High .Courts in India can make an order or issue writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner so long as the broad and fundamental principles of English law regulating the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs are adhered to. writ of certiorari can be availed of only to remove or adjµ-dicate upon the validity of judicial acts, which expression includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions bv administrative .bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions but does not include purely ministerial acts. . In granting writ of certiorari the superior Court does not exercise the power of an appellate Tribunal. the control exercised through it being merely in supervisory and not appellate capacity. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon. which the determination of the inferior Court is based nor docs it substitute its own views for those of the inferior Tribunal.

or >--.,.--

writ of certio1·ari is generally granted whei:i ·a CoUrt has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of juris-"",.J.., diction may arise from the natu.re of the subiect-matter of the pro-ceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the Court itself may not be legally constituted or may suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. If the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the existence of some colla-teral fact the. Court cannot by wrong decision of the fact assume jurisdiction which it would. not. otherwise possess. writ of certiorari is available in those cases where Tribtl-nal though competent to enter upon an enquiry acts in flagrant disre·gard of the rules of procedure or violates the principles of · .( natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed.

"",.J.., 'o

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

mere wrong decision cannot be corrected by writ of .certi-orari as that would be using it as the cloak of an appeal in disguise but manifest error apparent on the face of the proceeding based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so corrected. ·

Held, that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was not right in holding that sufficient and proper grounds existed for the issue of certiorari in the present case.

Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (70 I.A. 129, 140); Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao ([1953] S.C.R. 1144, 1150); Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ([1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205) ; Walshall's Overseers v. London and Northern Western Railway Co. ( 4 A.C. 30, 39) ; King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited ([1922] 2 A.C. 128, 156); Banbury v. Fuller, (9 Exch. 111); Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax (21 Q.B.D. 313) ; Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal ([1952] 1 K.B. 338, 357); Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., ([1952] S.C.R. 583, 594); and Halsbury, Vol. IX, 2nd edition, page , 880, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1954.

Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 11th January, 1954, of the High Court of Judicature of Mysore in Civil Petition No. 29 of 1953, quashing the Order of the Election Tribunal, Shimoga dated the 15th January, 1953, in Shimoga No. 1 of 1952-53. K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar (K. S. Venkataranga Iyengar and M. S. K. Iyengar, with him) for the appellant.

Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand (R. Ganapathy Iyer and M. S. K. Sastri, with him) for respondent No. 1. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General fior India (Jindra Lal, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for r-., respondent No. 3. ·

1954. May 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MuKHERJEA J.-This appeal is directed against judgment of Division Bench of the Mysore High Court, dated the 11th January, 1954, by which the learned Judges granted an application, presented by the res-pondent No. 1 under article 226 of the Constitution, ). -. and - directed writ of certiorari to issue quashing the proceedings and order of the Election Tribunal, 17-86 S. C. India/59 ·

T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another.

1954 T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa · and Another. MukherJea J, t

Shimoga, dated the 15th January, 1953, m Shimoga Election Case No. I of 1952-53. The facts material for purposes of this appeal may be briefly narrated as follows : The appellant and res-pondent No. 1, as well as eight other persons, who figu-red as respondents Nos. 2 to 9 in the proceeding before the High Court, were duly nominated candidates for election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly from Tarikere Constituency at the general election of that State held in January, 1952. Five of these nominated candidates withdrew their candidature within the pres-,cribed period and the actual contest at the election was between the remaining five candidates including the appellant and respondent No. 1. The polling took place on the 4th January, 1952, and the votes were counted on the 26th of January following. As result '> of the counting the respondent No. 1 was found to have r secured 8,093 votes which was the largest in number and the appellant followed him closely having obtained 8,059 votes. The remaining three candidates, who were respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 before the High Court, · got !respectively 6,239, 1,644 and 1,142 votes. The Returning Officer declared the respondent No. 1 to be the successful candidate and this declaration was pub- --.-, lished in the Mysore Gazette on the 11th February, · 1952. The respondent No. 1 lodged his return of elec-tion expenses with the necessary declaration sometime after that and notice of this return was published on the 31st March, 1952. The appellant thereafter filed a. petition before the Election Commission, challenging the validity of the election, inter alia, on the grounds · that there was violation of the election rules in regard r'. to certain matters and that the respondent No. 1 by ' himself or through his agents were guilty of number of major corrupt practices which materially affected the result of the election. The petitioner prayed for declaration that the election of respondent No. 1 was void and that he himself was duly elected. This peti-. tion, which bears date, 10th of April, 1952, was sent by registered post to the Election Commission and was , actually received by the, latter cin the 14th of April,- ;:, , following. The Election Commission referred the matter for determination by the Election Tribunal at

Shimoga and it came up for hearing before it on the 25th of October, 1952. On that date the appellant filed an application for amendment of the petition, heading it as one under Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code, and the only amendment sought for was modification of the prayer clause by adding prayer: for declaring the entire election to be void. It was stated at the same time that in case this relief could not be granted, the petitioner would, in the alter-native pray for the relief originally claimed by him, namely, that the election of respondent No. 1 should be declared to be void and the petitioner himself be held to be the elected candidate at the election. Des-pite the objection of respondent No. 1, the Tribunal granted this prayer for amendment. The hearing of the case then proceeded and on the averments made by the respective parties, as many as 27 issues were framed. Of them, issues Nos. 1, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 14 are material for our present purpose and they stand as follows :

(1) Has there been infringement of the rules relat-ing to the time of commencement of poll by reason of the fact that the polling at Booth No. 1 for Ajjampur fixed at Ajjampur to take place at 8 A.M. did not really commence until about half an hour later as alleged in paragraph 4 of the petition ?

(5) Did the 1st respondent hire and procure motor bus which was service bus running between Tarikere and Hiriyur, belonging to one Ahmed Jan, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the particulars and thereby commit the corrupt practice referred to in it ?

f--, ( 6)b Didf tGhe 1st respondent take thf hassishtance of num er o overnment servants to urt er t pros-pects of his election as alleged in paragraph 2 of the list of particulars ? (11) Is the return of election expenses lodged by the 1st respondent false in material particulars and has the ·1st respondent omitted to include in the return of election · expenses, expenses incurred by him in connec-tion with the election which would easily exceed the j, -· sanctioned limit of Rs. 5,000 as per particulars stated ' in . paragr:aph 7 of the list of particulars ' . ~ ? .

T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another. Mukherjea J,

·r. C. Basapp• .v. •T.Nagappa .and Amith"· .Mukher:fea J.

(12) Has , the election ·of the 1st respondent been procured and induced by the said corrupt practices with the result that · the ··election has been materially affected ? ( 14) Would the petitioner have obtained majority of votes had 1t not been for the aforesaid ·corrupt and illegal practices on the part of the first res-pondent? The Tribunal by majority of 2 to 1 found all these ·issues in favour of the petitioner and against the res-pondent No. 1 and on the strength of their findings on these issues, declared the election of ·respondent No. 1 to , be void and the petitioner to have been duly elected . . The judgment ·of the Tribunal is dated the 15th of January, 1953. On the 5th February, 1953, the res-\.. pondent No. 1 presented an application before the • Mysore High Court under article 226 of the Constitution praying for writ or direction in the nature of certio-rari calling for the records of the proceeding of the Election Tribunal in Election Petition No. 1 of 1952-53 and quashing the same including the order pro-nounced by the · Tribunal · as mentioned above. This application was heard by Division Bench consisting 'Y of Medappa C.J. and Balakrishnaiya J. and by their judgment dated the 11th January, 1954, the learned Judges allowed the petition of respondent No. 1 and directed the issue of writ of certiorari as prayed for. It is against this judgment that the appellant has come up to this Court on the strength of certificate grant-ed by the High Court under articles 132(1) and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. ,The substantial contention raised by Mr. Ayyangar, ,-' who appeared in support of the appeal, is, that the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected them-selves both on facts and law, in granting certiorari in the present case to quash the determination of the .Election Tribunal. It is urged; that the · Tribunal in deCiding the matter in the way it did did 'not act either wit4out jurisdiction or· in ·excess of its authority, nor ;Was there . any error apparent on the face of the pro- . A.I cee'dings which 'could, justify the issuing of writ to quash the same. · It is argued by the learned · counsel

SUPREME• COURTi REPORTS

that, what the High Court · has chosen to describe as errors of jurisdiction are· really not · matters which affect the competericy of the · Tribunal to enter or ad-judicate upon the matter in controversy between the parties and the reasons assigned by the learned Judges in support of their decision proceed· upon misreading and misconception of the findings of fact which the Tribunal arrived at. Two points really · ai:ise for our consideration . upon the ,contentions raised in this appeal. ·The first is, on what grounds could the High Court, in exercise of its powers under article 226. of 'the Constitution, grant writ of· . certiorari to quash the adjudication of the Election Tribunal ? The second is, whether such grounds did actually exist· in the present case and are the High Court's findings on that point J proper findings which should not be disturbed in ' appeal ? The . principles upon. which the. superior Cqurts in England interfere by issuing writs of : certiorari are fairly well known and they have genera1ly formed the basis of decisions in our Indian Courts. It is true that there is lack of uniformity even in the pronouncements of English Judges, with regard to the grounds upon which Y-a wtit, or, as it is now said, an order of certiorari, could issue, but such differences of opinion are unavoidable in judge"made faw which has developed through long course cif years. As is ·well· known, the issue of the prerogative writs, within which· certiorari is include•i. had their origin in England in the King's prerogative power of superintendence over the due · observance of law by his officials and Tribunals. The writ of certiofari ;.... ) is so named because in its origina:1 · form it' required that the King should be "certified' of"·· the proceedings to be' investigated' and the object ' was to secure by 'the authority of superior Court, ·that · the jurisdiction . of the inferiOr Tribunal should be· properly exercised(1) These principles were traiisplanted ,to other. parts · of the King's dominion:s; Ill India, during' the British days, the three chartered High · Courts · of Calcutta, Bombay · and Madras ·were· al6ne ·competent to· issue (1) Vide Ryots ·of Garabandhov. Zemikd~rof Pdrlaldmeili, ·70 I.A;· r29 ~t page 140.

T:c. Basappa' T. Nagappa v~ .. and Another. Muk/iedea J·

1954. T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa 0:.nd Ano~her ~ MuJcherjea J.

256. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

writs and that too within specified limits ·and the power was not exercisable by the other High Courts at all. "In that situation" as this Court observed in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao('), "the makers of the Constitution having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards fat the people in the new set up, which they called fundamental rights, evidently thought it necessary to provide also quick and in-expensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs, which the Courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposi-tion, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they con-ferred, in the States' sphere, new and wide powers on the High . Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enfor.cement of fundamen;tal rights, the power to issue such directions "for any other purpose" being also included with view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in some-what the same position · as the Court of King's Bench i.n England." The language used in articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of ,orders, writs or directions .including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo war-ranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our Consti-tution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of ' qpinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an. order or issue a. writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and· in appropriate manner, so lorig · as we keep to the broad and funda-mental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdic-tion in the mauer of granting such writs iµ English law. One of. the. fundamental principles in regard to the . issuing of writ of certiorari is, that the writ can be · (1) [1953] S.C.R. I144 at I150.

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

availed of only to remove or. adjudicate on the validity of judicial · acts. The expression "judicial acts" in-cludes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in con-trast with what are purely ministerial acts. Atkin L. J. thus summed up the law on this point in Rex v. Electri-city Commissioners(1) : "Whenever any body or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exer.cised in these writs." The second essential feature of writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting writ of certiorari the superior Court does not exercise the powers of an appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Tribunal purports to be based. It demo-lishes the order which it considers to be without juris-diction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior Tribunal. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detri-ment of any person(2).

The supervision of the superior Court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited(3). One is the area of inferior jurisdic-tion and the qualifications and conditions of its exer-cise ; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which writ of certiorari could be demand-ed. In fact there is little difficulty in the enunciation of the principles; the difficulty really arises in applying the principles to the facts of particular case.

(1) [1924] I K.B. 171 at 205.

(2) Vide Per Lord Cairns in Walshall's Overseers v. London and North

.Pl, · Western Railway Co. 4 A.C. 30, 39.

(3) [1922] 2 A.C. 128, 156.

T. C. Basappa v. T.Nagappa and Another. Mtikherjea J.

T. C. Basil.pp. v. T.Nagappa and Another. Mukherjea ]:

Certiorari may .lie and is generally granted when Court has acted without or .in , excess . ·of its jurisdic-tion. The. want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or· the Court itself may not be legally constituted· or suffer from certain disability . by reason of extraneous circum-stances('). When the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is well settled that the Court ,cannot by , wrong decision .. of the fact give it jurisdiction which it would not other-wise possess(').

Tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may· violate the principles of natural justice. writ of certiormri . may be available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to writ of certiorari but it must be manifest error apparent . on the face of the proceedings, ,e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. Iri other words, it is patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision. The essential features of the remedy by way of certiorari have been stated with remarkable brevity · and clearness by Morris L. J. in the recent case of Rex v. North-umberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal('). The Lord Justice says :

'It is plain that certiorari will not issue as sthe • cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does ·not 1ie in order to bring up an order or decision ·for re-hearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists 'to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order or decision or irregularity . or absence of or excess of juris-diction when shown." In dealing with the powers of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution' this ·Court . has express-ed itself in almost similar terins([4 ]) and .said : . ·

(1) Vide Hals bury, 2nd edition, Vol. IX, page 880. · · (2)"Vide "Banbury v. Fuller, ExCh:. 111; R.v. In.corm Tax Sptcial P11r: Al poses Commissioners, 21 Q.B.D. 313. • . ' : 1 (3) [1952] 1 K.B. 338 at 357. . (4) Vide Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman· Ltd., [1952] S.C.R. 583 at 594·

£.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

"Such writs as are referred to in article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordiriate Tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in exceils' of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not -so wide or large as to enable the High Court to .convert itself into Court' of appeal and examine ·for itself the correctness. of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made."z954

T. C. Basappa

T. Nagappa and Another.

Mukherjea ].

These passages indicate with sufficient fullness the general principles that govern the exercise of jurisdic-tion in the matter of granting writs of certiorari under article 226 of the Constitution .

We will now proceed to examine the judgment of

the High Court and see whether the learned Judges were right in holding "that sufficient and proper grounds existed for the issue of certiorari in the present case •

. The grounds upon which the High Court has granted

the writ have been placed in the judgment itself under three heads. The first head points out in what matters the Election Tribunal acted without jurisdiction. It is said, in this connection, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation for the presentation of the election petition and it had no authority also to allow the petitioner's prayer for · amendment and to hear and dispose of the case on the basis of the amended petition. The second head relates to acts in excess of jurisdiction. The Tribunal, it is said, acted in excess' of jurisdiction in so far as it went into and decided questions not definitely pleaded and put in issue, and not only did it set aside the election of respondent No. I but declared the petitioner to have been duly elected, although there was no definite finding and no proper materials for arriving at

:T. c. Basappa v. T. Nagappti and Another. Mukhi1jtii J.

finding, that the petitioner could secure more votes than respondent No. 1 but for the corrupt practices of' the latter.

The third head purports to deal with errors apparent on · the face of the record: These apparent errors, according to the High Court, vitiated three of the material findings upon which. the Tribunal based its decision. These findings relate to the commencement_ of polling at one of the polling booths much later than the scheduled time, the respondent No. l's obtaining the services of Government servant to £urt1f er his prospects of election and also . to his lodging. la false return of expenses. We will take up these points for consideration one after another.

As regards absence of jurisdiction the High i Court is of opinion that the Tribunal acted without jurisdic-tion, first in extending the period of limitatiOn in presentation of the election petition and secondly in allowing the _petitioner's prayer for amendmenj: and dealing with the case on the basis: of the amended petition. The view taken by the High Court seems to be that under the Reprdentation of the People Act (hereinafter called "the Act"), no power is given to the Election Tribunal to condone the delay, if an elec-tion petition is presented after the period prescribed by the rules, nor is it competent to allow an amend-ment of the petition after it is presented, except in the matter of supplying further and better particulars of the illegal and corrupt practices set out in the list annexed to the petition, as contemplated by section 83(3) of the Act.

Assuming, though not admitting, that the proposi-tions of law enunciated by the learned Judges are correct, we do not think that they at all arise for con-sideration on the actual facts of the present case. As regards the first matter, the election ·petition, as stated above, was despatched by the petitioner by registered post to the Election Commission on the 11th of April, 1952, · and it reached the Commission on the . 14th of April following. · . We may take it therefore that 14th of Aptil was the date when the election petition

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

could be deemed to have been presented to the Elec-tion Commission under section 81(2) (b) of the Act. Under rule 119 of the Election Rules framed under the Act, an election petition against returned candidate is to be presented at any time after the publication of the name of such candidate under section 67 of the Act, but not later than 14 days from the date of publication of the notice in the official gazette under rule 113, that the return of election expenses of such candidate and the declaration made in respect thereof have been lodged with the· Returning Officer. It 1s not disputed that this notice of the return of election expenses was published in the Mysore Gazette on the 31st of March, 1952, and the petition therefore was just in time as it was presented within and not later than 14 days from that date. The High Court seems to think that in computing the period of 14 days the date of publication is to be included. This seems to us to be . an unwarrantable view to take which 1s opposed to the ordinary canons of construction. Dr. Tek Chand appeanng for the respondent No. 1 plainly confessed his inability to support this view and we must hold therefore that there 1s no question of the Tribunal's entertaining the election petition after the prescribed period in the present case.

Coming now to the question of amendment, the High Court, after an elaborate dis.cussion of the various ·provisions of the Act, came to the conclusion that the Election Tribunal which is special Court endowed with special jurisdiction has no general power of allowing amendment of the pleadings, and that the express provision of section 83(3) of the Act, which empowers the Tribunal to allow amendments with respect to certain specified matters, impliedly excludes the power of allowing general amendment as is con-templated by Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code. Here agam the discussion embarked. upon by the High Court seems to us to be unnecessary and uncalled for. The only amendment applied for by the petitioner was modification in the prayer clause by insertion of an alternative prayer to the original prayer in the petition. No change whatsoever was sought to

T. C. Basappa v. T.Nagappa and Another. Mukherjea J.

rg_5+' T. c. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another; MukherjeaJ.·

be introduced in the ··-actual' averments' in the pettt10n and the original prayer . which .. was kept. intact was repeated ·in · the application ' for amendment. The alternative prayer introduced by the ·amendment was not eventually allowed. 'by the Tribunal · which granted the- prayer of the petitioner as it originally stood. In these circumstances the mere fact that the Tribunal granted the . petitioner's application. for amendment becomes altogether immaterial and; has absolutely no bearing on the actual decision in . the case. We are unable to hold therefore that the Tribunal acted with-out jurisdiction in respect · to either · · of · these · two matters.

The High Court has held that the Tribimai' acted Ill excess of ,its jurisdictio~ . in entering into certain questions which · are not covered by the pleadi11gs of the parties and not specifically put iri issue. The other act in excess of its authority committed by the .Tribu-nal, according to the High Court; is that it declared the petitioner to be duly elected · candidate, on mere speculation although it did · riot find and had no materials to find that the' petitioner 'could secure , more votes ·than the respondent No. l. . Qn the fiist point the learned Judges have referred only to the allegation of corrupt practice made by 'the' appellant, regarding the hiring and procuring by the respondent Nb. 1 of motor bus belonging to Ahmed Jan for transporting his voters to the polling · booth~. The· issue framed on this point is issue No. 5 which is wbrded as follows : ·"Did the first respond~nt hire ~nd procure )notor bus which was service. bus. rurming betwee·n ·Tarikere and Hiriyur, belonging to one; .Ali~~d' Jan, a·s al,leged in paragraph 1. of the list o~ r".articulars and thereby commit the corr~pt practicer~ferr~d io in it '?" ..

. The .Tribunal. found that· the. hiring of the bus . by respondent . No. 1 was,. not.· proyed, . bu~ it .was proved that . the first respondent did procure ~e servicec bus of Ahmed Jan, .wh9 ,was. acring a~. his .agent,· for conveying his 'IOters, , . Th,e ·Tribuna.l . ..further. ,found., that .. e,v~n if Ahmed Jan. ·Was npt . an _agept. qf the. first respon_dent; as he, , was .. actually , .carryffi.g .. the .:voters . of. the l~tt~r

froin Gowrapur to Sollapur in bus, which bore the .first respondent's election symbol, with his knowledge and connivance, the ·first respondent must be held guilty of the corrupt practice in question. The High Court 'says that as it was nowhere alleged in the petition that Ahmed Jan was an agent of respondent No. I or that he was carrying the voters with his connivance, the Tribunal must be held to have acted in excess of its jurisdiction in going into matters which were not defi-nitely pleaded. We do not think that this view of the High Court can be supported. In paragraph 8 of the petition the appellant definitely stated that the first respondent by himself and through his agent commit-ted major corrupt practices, one of which was the hiring or procuring of Ahmed Jan's motor bus. The Tribunal found, on consideration of the evidence adduced in the case, that the motor bus was procured by the first respondent and his conduct in this respect, as disclosed by the evidence, showed that his . voters were being carried by Ahmed Jan with his knowledge and .connivance. It may be pointed out that in para-graph 9 of the petition the petitioner clearly stated that the corrupt practices were committed by respond-ent No. 1, or his agents, or by several persons with his knowledge and connivance. The finding of the Tri-bunal arrived at on this point is finding of fact based on evidence adduced by the parties and it is not in any way outside the pleadings or inconsistent therewith .

The other ground put forward by the High Court that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the appellant to be the duly elected candidate, although it had no materials to come to the conclusion that he could have secured more votes than respondent No. I but for the corrupt practices committed by the latter, seems to us to be without substance. It appears that the learned . Judges did not properly advert to. the findings arrived at on this point by the Election Tribunal. The peti-tioner, it may be noted, got only 34 votes less than the respondent No. 1. The Tribunal has found that the bus of Ahmed Jan, which was procured by respondent No. 1, 'did carry to the polling booths about 60 voters in two trips and in the circumstances of the· case it could

T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another. Mukherjea J.

T. C. BasaPfta v. T.Nagappa and Another. • Mukhei}ea 'j,

be legitimately presumed that the majority of them did vote for respondent No. 1. If the votes of at least 40 or 50 of these persons be left out of account as be-ing procured by corrupt practice of the first respond-ent, the latter's majority by 34 votes would be com-pletely wiped out and the petitioner would gain an undisputed majority. In paragraph 33 of its judg-ment the Tribunal states as follows :

"Hence on the 14th issue we hold that the peti-tioner would have obtained majority of votes had it not been for the aforesaid corrupt practices on the part of the first respondent."

Thus the finding is there and there is evidence in support of it. Whether it is right or wrong 1s another matter and it may be that the view taken by the dis-senting member of the Tribunal was the more proper ; but it cannot be said that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in dealing with this matter.

We now come to what the High Court has described as errors apparent on the face of the record. These errors, according to the High Court, appear in respect of three of the finding arrived at by the Tribunal. The first of these findings relates to the time when the polling at Booth No. 1 at Ajjampur commenced on the date of election. The Tribunal has held that the time fixed by notification was 8 A.M. in the morning but the polling did not commence till 25 minutes after that and the result was that number of voters went away. It is said that some of these voters would in all proba-bility have voted for the appellant and as there was difference of only 34 votes between him and the res-pondent No. 1 the results of the election have been materially affected by this· irregularity or violation of the election rules. There was evidence undoubtedly to show that some of the voters went away as the polling did · not commence at the · scheduled time ; · but the exact number of these persons is not known and there could not be any positive evidence to show as to how many of them would have voted for the appeJlant. If the Tribunal had on the basis- of these facts alone declared ' the appellant to be the duly elected candidate -holding

that he could have secured more votes than respond-ent No. 1, obviously this would have been an error apparent on the face of the record, as such conclusion would rest merely on surmise and nothing else. The Tribunal however discussed this matter only in connec-tion with the question as to whether the violation of any statutory rule or order in the holding of election did materially affect the result of the election which would entitle the Tribunal to declare the election of the returned candidate to be void under section 100(2) ( c) of the Act. This, the Tribunal was competent to do under the provisions of the Act and in doing so it could take into consideration the circumstances and probabilities of the case. But as we have stated already, the Tribunal declared the appellant to be duly elected upon the specific finding that, but for the cor-rupt practice of respondent No. 1 in the matter of procuring the service bus of Ahmed Jan, the appellant would have got majority of the votes. We cannot say that this is an error apparent on the face of the record which would entitle the High Court to interfere by writ of certiorari.

As regards the other two findings, one relates to the receiving of assistance from Paramesshwarappa, who is Patel, by respondent No. 1, in furtherance of his prospects of election. The High Court does not dispute the facts alleged by the appellant that Paramesshwa-rappa accompanied the first respondent and actually canvassed at several places and that he openly canvas-sed at one polling booth on the polling day. The lear-ned Judges say that even if these facts are believed, they only establish that Paramesshwarappa canvassed for the petitioner but that would not amount to res-pondent No. l's taking assistance from him. This does not seem to us to be proper view to take. There was allegation by the appellant of the respondent No. l's taking assistance from Government servant within the meaning of section 123(8) of the Act. In proof of the allegation evidence was given of the facts men-tioned above. If from these facts, which were found to be true, the Tribunal drew the conclusion that there had been an assistance taken from Government

T. C. Basappa

v • . T. Nagappa and An at her.

· Mukherjea J.

T. C. Bgsappa v. T. Nagappa and Another. . Mukhedea J.

servant which would come within . the purview of sec-tion 123(8) of the Act, it is impossible to say that this is an error apparent on the face of the record.

The remaining finding relates to the allegation of the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 in his return of election expenses omitted to include several items and if they had been taken into account the election expenses would have exceeded the sanctioned limit .. The Tribunal has held that the respondent No. 1 omitted to include, in his return of expenses; the petrol charges, the hiring charges in respect of some cars and vans hired by him and also the dinner expenses incur-red in the hotels. The High Court has observed that as regards the first item the finding of the Tribunal is based on no evidence and rests on mere speculation. We do not think that we can accept this view as cor-rect. The first respondent stated that he had used two cars which were his own and incurred petrol expenses to the extent of Rs. 1,083-3-0. The Tribunal has found in paragraph 29 of its order on the basis of both docu-mentary and oral evidence that the re·spondent No. 1 had used six other cars and had purchased petrol for them for the purpose of his election campaign. The Tribunal held that the first respondent must have spent not less than the sum of Rs. 1,250 on this account which was not included in the list of expenses. We are unable to say that this finding rests on no evidence.

As regards the omission to include hiring charges the High Court has observed that the Tribunal did not record any finding that such hiring was ·proved. The Tribunal has in fact found that as regards some cars they were hired, while other' had been taken on loan, the money value for their use having been paid by the first respondent which is tantamount to saying that· he had to pay the hiring charges. The matter has been dealt with in paragraph 29( d) of the Tribunal's order and the entire evidence has been gone through. We are unable to say that the finding of . the Tribunal that the respondent No. 1 had omitted to include in_ his return of election expenses· the dinner and hotel charges is finding unsupported by any 'evidence. Reference may be made in this connection to paragraph 29(f) of the

S.C.R. S,UPREME COURT REPQRT~

Tribunal's order which deals with the matter in deiaH. On the whole our opinion , is that the so-called appar-ent errors pointed out by the High Court are neither ' errors of law nor do they appear on the face of the record. 'An appellate Court might have on review of this evidence come to different conclusion but these are not matters which would justify the issue of writ of certiorari.. In our opinion the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported and this appeal must be allowed. The writ issued by the High Court will there-fore be vacated. We make no order as to costs of this appeal.

Appeal allowed.

DURGA SHANKAR MEHTA

THAKUR RAGHURAJ SINGH AND OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., MuKHERJEA, VIVIAN BosE, BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]

._ Constitution of India, articles 136, 173, 329-Supreme Court .,.,--Power to grant special leave to appeal-Decision of Election Tri-bunal-Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), ss. 36, 100(1) (c) and (2) (c), 105-Non-compliance with the provisions of , article 17 3-C onstitutional disability-Election void-Whether under s. 100(1) (c) or s. 100(2) (c) of the Act-Non-compliance with the provisions of Constitution in s. 100(2) (c)-Scope of.

Article 136 of the Constitution is worded in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme Court plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appeals by granting special leave against any kind of judgment or order made by Court or ~ Tribunal in any cause or matter and the powers can be exercised in spite of the specific provisions for appeal contained in the Consti-tution or other laws. The powers given by the· article are, however, in the nature of special or residuary powers which are exercisable outside th.e purview of ordinary law, in cases where the needs of justice demand interference by the Supreme Court.

The non obstante clause in article 329 of the Constitution which debars the Supreme Court as well as any other Court in India from entertaining suit or proceeding calling in question ~ . any election to Parliament or the State Legislature and sec-tion 105 of the Representation of. the l'eopk Act which. gives fina-lity to the decision of the Election· ·Tribunal so far as that Act is 18-86 S.C, India/59

T., C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another.

May 19.