STATE OF PUNJAB versus MOHAR SINGH

. [MuKHERJEA, . VIVIAN. BosE, and . JAGA~ADHAnAS JJ.]

General .Clauses Act (X of 1897), .s. 6(c)(d)(e)-Repeal of law-Repeal and simultaneous . enactment-Temporary Law running out by efflux of time-Such /all! repealed before running out,. Effect of~ East Punjab Refugees (Registration ·of Land ·Claims) · Ordinance Vil of 1948, 's. 7-0ffence committed under exisiing /awe-Prosecu-tion started after repeal-Validity-East Punjab Refugees (Registra-tion of Land Claims) Act, 1948 (Punjab Act XII of 1948), s. 11-'Anything done', Meaning of. · ·

The provisions 'of s. 6( c) ( d) and. ( e) .of the. General 'clauses Act, 1897 '(same as s. 4 of the .Punjab General Clauses Act; 1898) rel~t­ing to the consequences of the repeal of law are. applicable · not only when an Act or Regulation is repealed simpliciter but also to case of repeal and simultaneous enactment · re.:eriacting · all the provisions of the repealed law.

On the repeal of law the consequences mentioned in: s. 6(c)(d) and ( e) of the Act follow unless different or contrary intention app~ars from the repealing statute. · · · · ·

For ascertaining. the -above contrary · intention one has to look to the provisions of the new enactment iri order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been· put an end to by the new enactment. It is an erroneous and incorrect approach to enquire if the new enactment has by its provisions positively kept alive . the . rights and liabilities under. the . repealed l~w. The absence of saving clause in the new enactment preserv-ing the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive on the question. ·

· .. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, has no application to temporary law . which automatically expires by effiux of time but the section would apply if the temporary law is repealed before it' so expires. The .Punjab Ordinance VII of 1948 . was :i temporary law and· the same having been repealed before it expired by efflux of time prosecution for an offence committed under s. 7 of the Ordinance prior to its · repeal could be validly started even after the repeal. · ·

The term "anyt.hing done" occurring :in s. 11 of. .the Punjab Act XII of 1948 does not mean any act done by person in con-travention of the provisions of the. East Punjab Refugees (Regist-ration· of Land Claims) Ordinance VII of 1948. The term "anything done" refers to official acts ·· done in the exercise . of the · powers conferred. by or under the Ordinance .

. : Danmal, Parsh,otamdas v •. Babura'm ( ,(1935) I.L.R. 58 All. 495), ~,~~ing17_is~e~.,,·_; ..... -·.· ... ~·:<..: .... .-_:-·: (·> ·;.,_:. :·.:. _·l' __ r ·~1-~,_; · :~t.. i~---~:-:

S.C.R. SUPREME: COURT REPORTS

Act; which makes ·it ail'" offence for· any · ·person to submit, with regard· fo his. · claim under 1the. Act, any information which is false. The accused•: was' tried . by S. J aspal Singh, Magistrate, First Class, . Jullundur, before whom he confessed· his guilt and: ' pleaded for mercy. · The trying Magistrate by his order dated the 20th of July, 1951, convicted" the respondent · under section 7 of the Act' and sentenced him to. imprison-ment till the rising of the ·Court and fine . of Rs. 120, in default of which he .was to suffer rigorous· imprison-ment for one month.The District Magistrate of Jullundur considered the sentence to be inadequate .and referred the case. to the High Court at Simla under section 438 . of . the Criminal Procedure Code with recommendation that'. deter-rent sentence might be imposed upon the accused. · The matter first came up before single Judge of that Court and preliminary point was raised on behalf of . the respondent that it was not within the competence of the trying Magistrate to convict him at all under the . pro-visions of the Act, as . the offence was committed against the Ordinance before the Act came into force and the prosecution was started long after the Ordiµance had come to an end. Having. regard to the . di v.ersity of judicial opinion on the point, the single. Jud,ge referred the case for. decision by Division Bench: TJie. learned Judges constituting the Division Bench accepted the contention rais~d on behalf of th.e respondent;. and by their judgment, . date.cl .the 7th of August, i952, set aside the convic;ti@ of the respondent and ~he sentence imposed upon him under section .7 of the Act. It is against this judgment that the present appeal has ~een taken to this ,Court by the. State of Punj.ab. . · It is not disputed that the respondent dia submit, with regard to the claim filed by him uridei: the provi-sons of the Ordinance; an information' which .'was ·false and that such act' was . punishable'' a~ an offence. under section 7 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance however was repealed soon after the 'filing of the claim and was substituted ·by the Act which incorporated · all · the pro-Vtsions of the ·ordinance: · The High Court 'in' decidii'ig the case in . favour of the respondent proceeded oti, the

1954 Tht State of Punjab . v. Mohar Singh. Mukherjea J.

19M Statl'Of Pu•jab v. -Mohar ·.·Singh. Mukh•dea J.

8% SW'REME C01)R'f REPORTS

ground .that as Act . XII of 1948 was not in existence at the date when·.the·· claim. was. filed ·bt the. ·tespondent, he could not possibly be _.convicted of all offence under ktw . which was not in force at the time of the commi.!7 sion of .the offence. The 'State Government attempted t0 meet this argument by invoking ·the provisions of sec-tion 6 of the General .Clauses Act which is in the sam~ term.s as ·section 4 of the Punjab.- General · Clauses Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act lays down the effect of .the repeal of an enactment. . .The section . :runs thus:

"6 .. Where this Act or any Central Act or regula-tion made after the commencement of . this Act, repeals any enactment. hitherto .made or hereafter to be mad.e; then, unless different intention appears, the. repeal shall not-,

••• i ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

· ( c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or 'iiabi' lily a'cquired, accrued · or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or · ( d) affect -any · penalty, forfeiture ·or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed · against any enactment so repealed ; or ( e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in . respect of any such right, privilege, obliga: tion, ·liability, ' penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid."

On the strength of this provision in the General Clauses Act it was contended on behalf of the State that the . repeal . of the· Ordi:nante could not in any way affect the liability· already incurred by the respondent, in respect of an offence; committed ' against the provi• sions of the Ordinance and any penalty or punishment consequent' thereon. . .

'!'h~Jearne,d Judges .;£the High ·.Court negativ~d thi~ contention by holding thai section. · 6 0f the Gene.ral Clauses. Act could. be attracted _only ,. wlien an Act or regulation is.repealed _ simp#citer but not . when, as iri the present. case, -.the repeal is 'followed . by re-enactment. The , R,epep.ling Act, it is poin~ed qut,. reproduces the provis1ons 9£ tht;, . Qrdi,J:iance .in their ent:frery, but it

s.~.}l:; sµ:pREME COURT REPORTS

nowhere .proyides· that offence!;. committed, ·when.: the Ordinance was in force, could be punished after· its repeal. The language of section . 11 of the Act, which contains its saving provisions, does not, it is said, indi-cate that criminal liability incurred when the Ordin~ ance was in force would . continue after it came to an end. It is the propriety of this view that · has · been challenged. before . us in this appeal. . · · It is not disputed that in i:he present case the prose-cution was started against the respondent under section 7 of the Act and not under the · corresponding· provision of the Ordinance. The offence was committed at time when the Act was not in force and obviously no man could be prosecuted or punished under law which came into existence subsequent . to the commission of the offence. But this by itself might. not . raise any serious difficulty, for the · Court would have, ample authority to alter the conviction of the· accused,. under the Act, to one under the Ordinance which contained the identical provision, provided he could be prosecuted and punished . under the Ordinance ·after . it was repealed, and this is the material point that requites consideration in this case. · Under th<; law of England, as it stood prior to the Interpretation Act of 1889, · the effect of repealing statute was said to be to obliterate it as completely · from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed, except for the purpose of those actions, which were· commenced, prosecuted and concluded while it. was an existing law(1 ). repeal therefore without any saving cla1Jse would destroy . any . proceeding · whe.ther not yet begun or whether pending at the time of the eflactment of the ·Repealing · Act and not ·already prose.:. c11ted to final· .judgment so. as to create a. vested. right(2). Tei .obviate such results .a practice came into existence in · England to insert saving clause in · the". n::pealing statute . with . view to . presei-Ve rights and liabilities already accrued or incurred~ under the repealed, ·. ehactment. . Later on, to dispense with the . necessity:. of having to insert saving clause. on each · occasion,., '.: .(1j Vide Crai'es on -Statute Law, 5t!) edn.,· page ~s,-: · ,; (2) Vide Crawford on Statutory Constructic>n,_page 599:.600.· .•,

r954 Stal• ·of Punja;,.. v·r ·Mohar Singh_ Mukherjea j.o

Stak offU11jab v.

SUP:REME C:OUR'P REPO&TS [1955]

sei:tion . .38(2).:was .inserted,;n the 'Interpretari0n Att of 1889 which .provic\es th;rt' .a repeal,.: unless .. the ' conrrary intention appears, . d©es .not affect; the•· previous opera-tion. of. tile repealed., enactment ' or •anytliing duly· done or .suffered under.•it" and• any investigation;··, legal·• pro-ceeding or .remedy may · •be instituted, continued or enforced ·in respect of ·any right, liability· and penalty under the repealed Act as ihhe Repealing •Att' had" 'not been ,passed.. Sec,tion. ,6 .of the General .. Clauses Act, as is well k.nown, .is. on .the same lines as.section 38(2) of the Interpretation A~t of England. . . . Under section .. 30 of the General Clauses ·Act, which corresponds to section.-27 of thei Punjab. Act, the provi-sions· of the. Act are applicable to Ordinances as' well. Of course, · the . consequences laid down· in ·section 6 of the Act will·apply.only when a.statutecYor regulation having . the• force of statute is actually repealed.. It has .no application when .a statute, - which is-·of tern· porary. nature,.. ·automatically expires by effiux of. ·time. The Ordinance in the present case. was ·undoubtedly· temporary statute but· it is admittecl that ·the· period during which it was to .continue had ·not expired when the Repealing Act was passed. The repeal · · therefore w.as an effectiYe one whiCh would normally attract · the operatiofl of section. 6 .of the General Clauses Act. . The contro-.:ersy thus . narrows down. to the short point a~ to whether the fact' of the repeal of the Ordinance· being followed by re-enactment would make the provisions . of section 6 of the General Clauses . Act inapplicable •to >the present case. · .

The High · Court, in support of the view that .. it .took, placed great rdiance ·•upon· certain , observations• of Sulain;ian C.J. in D,_anmal •Parshotamdas v. Baburam{' ). The question raised in .. .that· case· was· whether suit·· by an unregistered· firm against third party; after .coming into force. of· .section 69 ·of .the: Partnership Act, ··would be. barred :by that section in· spite of· the .saving I' clause contained .in section 74.(b} 0£ the •Act.· The•Chief Justice felt .some doubts on the point and was inclined • 'tO• hold that . ,section 74.(b). would · operate to save ·the · · suit although the right . sought to .be enforced· by it had

(I) (1935) I.L.R.. 58 All.:495,

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accrued prior to the commencement of the Act; but eventually he agreed with his colleague and held that section 69 would bar the suit. While discussing the provision of section 74(2) of the Partnership Act, in course of his judgment, the learned Chief Justice refer-red by way of analogy to section 6( e) of the General Clauses Act and observed as follows at page 504: "It seems that section 6(e) would apply to those cases only where previous law has been simply repealed and there is no fresh legislation to take its place. Where an old law has been merely repealed, then the repeal would not affect any previous right acquired nor would it even affect suit instituted subsequently m respect of right, previously so acquired. But where there is new law which not only repeals the old law, but is substituted in place of the old law, section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act is not applicable, and we would have to fall back on the provisions of the new Act itself." These observations could not undoubtedly rank higher than mere obiter dictum for they were not at all necessary for purposes of the case, though undoubtedly they are entitled to great respect. In agreement with this dictum of Sulaiman C.J. the High Court of Punjab, in its judgment in the present case, has observed that where there is simple repeal and the Legislature has either not given its thought to the matter of prosecut-ing old offenders, or prov1S1on dealing with that question has been inadvertently omitted, section 6 of the General Clauses Act will undoubtedly be attracted. But no such inadvertence can be presumed where there has been fresh legislation on the subject and if the new Act does not deal with the matter, it may be presumed that the Legislature did not deem it fit to keep alive the liability incurred under the old Act. In our opinion the approach of the High Court to the question is not quite correct. Whenever there 1s repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, different intention appears. In the case of simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of contrary opinion. But when the

Stau of Punjab v. _ Mohdr Singh. Afuk!zerjea J.

!!95"4 ·\.State OJ Piinjah ·V. Mohar Singh. .Mukiie;jea j.

'900 'SUPREME '-COURT REPORTS

:repeal is followed .. by fresfr•legislatiorr·on the.: same· 'stib-:ject we· would undoubtedly have.to look' tothe ·provisions :of the riew Act, buf;'"only'for the purpose of determining whether they indicate : different -intention:•: Tlie " line -of enquiry would be, not· whether the -new Act expressly 'keeps alive old rights· ·and liabilities but whether it manifests · an in~ention ·to destroy thein. · We· ·cannot :therefore . subscribe to :·the · broad · proposition that :settionc-6:of the··· General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment. followed by fresh 'legislation. Section 6 would be applicable ·in such' cases also unless the new legislation ·manifests a_n -intention incompatible with _or contrary ·to · the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from · consideration of all' the relevant ·provisions of the new" law and the. mere absence of 'a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case. The offence cornrniued by the respondent consisted ·in filing false claim. The claim was filed in accord-ance with the provision of section 4 of the · Ordinance and under section 7 of the Ordinance, any false infor-mation in regard to claim was punishable offence. The High Court is certainly right in holding that section 11 of the Act does not make the claim filed under the Ordinance claim under the Act so · as .. to .attract the operation of section 7. Section 11 of the Act is in the following terms : "The East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Ordinance No. VII of 1948 is hereby repealed .and any rules made, notifications issued, anything done, any action taken in exercise of the powers con-ferred by or under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been made, issued, done or taken in exercise of ·the powers conferred by, or under this Act as .if this Act had come into force on 3rd day of March, 1948." We agree with the High Court that expression ·"anything done" occurring in the section does not mean -or include an act done by person in contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance. What the section -eonternplates and keeps alive are rules, notifications · or

s:c.it: SUPREME 'COURT "REPORTS

other official acts ·done ·in exercise · of the · powers • con-ferred 'by or under the · Ordinance •and these powers are mentioned in several sections of ·the· Act. But. although the lodging of the, claim doe~· not corne :within the pur-view of section 11 of the Act, we are of .opinion that the proviso to section· 4 of the Act clearly shows that claim filed under the . Ordinance would . be .. treated as one filed under the Act with ·all the · consequences attached thereto. Section 4 of the Act provides for the registration of land -claims. The first sub-section lays down how the claim is to be filed. The proviso attached to it then says that. "a refugee who· has .previously submitted claim under Ordinance VII of 1948 to any other authority competent to register such claim shall not submit another claim in respect of the same land to the Registering Officer." Such claim · would be reckoned and registered as claim under the Act and once it is so treated the incidents and corollaries '.attached to the filing of claim, as laid down in the Act, must necessarily follow. The truth or falsity of the claim has to be investigated in the usual way and ·if it is found that the information given by the claimant is false, he can certainly be punished in the manner laid down in· sections 7 and 8 of the Act. If we are to hold that the penal provisions contained in the Act cannot be attracted in case of claim filed under the ·Ordinance, the results will be anomalous and even if -on the· strength of false claim refugee has succeeded in getting an allotment in his favour, such allotment could not be cancelled under section 8 of the Act. We think that the provisions of sections 4, 7 and 8 make it apparent that it was not the intention of the Legis-lature that the rights and liabilities in respect of claims filed under the Ordinance shall be extinguished on the passing of the Act, and this is sufficient for holding that the present case would attract the operation of section 6 -0£ the General Clauses Act. It may be pointed out that section 11 of the Act is somewhat clumsily worded and it does not make use of expressions which are _generally used in saving clauses appended to repealing :Statutes ; but as has been said above the point for our

:siate of Punjab •V, . Mohar Singh MukherjedJ ..

1954 Slate of Punjab v. Moh"' Singh. M•id1etfea ].

consideration is whether the Act evinces an intentiol\ which is inconsistent with the continuance of rights and liabilities accrued or incurred under the Ordinance and in our opinion this question has to be answered in the negative.

The Advocate-General of Punjab has drawn our attention to certain American authorities which hold that in case of simultaneous repeal and re-enactment, the re-enactment is to be considered as reaffirmation of the old law and the provisions of the repealed Act which are thus re-enacted continue in force uninterruptedly. It appears that judicial opinion in America on this point is not quite uniform and we do not consider it necessary to express any opinion upon it. The provi-sions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act will, in our opinion, apply to case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court set aside. The Advocate-General does not press for enhancement of sentence passed on the respondent. Consequently it is unnecessary for the High Court to hear the reference made to it by the District Magistrate, Jullundur any further.. The sentence already passed upon the respondent by the trying Magistrate shall stand and if the fine of Rs. 120 has not· already been paid, it shall be paid now. In default, the respondent shall suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month.

Appeal allowed.