STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS versus THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER

1959 November z6.

Supreme Court, Appellate Jurisdiction of-Special leave to appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution-M eam:ng of-Constitution of India, Art. I32(2).

The respondents filed petition in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir cha)lenging the vires of r. 4-47 of the Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the said rule was Hltra vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The appellants filed an application in the High Court for certific-ate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution which was rejected on the ground that no substantial question of law as to. the inter-pretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution, which was granted with liberty to the respondents to raise the question of maintainability of the appeal. There was no controversy between the parties in regard to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, and the dispute centered round the question whether the impugned rule stood the test of reasonable classification. The respondents raised preliminary objection that special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution could be granted by this court only if it was satisfied that the case involved substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and that since, in the present case, the interpretation of Art. I4 of the Constitution was not in dispute by reason of series of decisions of this Court and no question of law, much less substantial question of law, could arise for consideration, no special leave could be granted under the said Article.

It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever question of classification was raised that by itself involved the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the impugned classification was concerned,

Held, that the principle underlying Art. 132(2} of the Consti-tution is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court. With that object that Article is freed from other limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134 and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in case involving only substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

The interpretation of provision means the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. Where

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

rg.sg Stale of of . 6- Kaslmm v. TltaAu, Ganga Singh

the parties agree as to t~e true interpretation or provision or rg.sg do not raise any question in respect thereof, the case does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Stale of of . Constitution. substantial question of law cannot arise where Jammu 6- Kaslmm that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this v. Court. TltaAu, Ganga

In the instant case, the question raised does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

T. IM. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor Gc?teral in Cosmcil (1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) I, Blmdan Clzotedhry v. The State of Bihar• [1955) I S.C.R. 1045. Chiranjit Lal Cltowdhuri v. U11io" of b1dia, Lrgsol S.C.R. 869, Ram Kr~shna Dalmia v. Jt~slice. Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279 and Mohammad Haneef Quareshs v. State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629, relied on.

CIVJL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1959.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 20~ 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in Writ Petition No. 108 of 1958.

H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, N. S .. Bindra, R. H. Dhehar and T. 1J1. Sen, for the appellants. R. K. Garg and M. K . Ramamurthy, 8. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rame.shwar Nath and P. L. Volwa, for the respondents.

1959. November 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SunBA RAo J.-This appeal by· special leave raises the question of the scope of Art. 132(2) of tho Consti- • tution.

subba nao J.

The first respondent is one of the shareholders of the second respondent, M/s. Jammu Kashmir Mechanics And Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited Jammu {hereiua.fter called the Society). The Society was registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi). They put in number of applications before the third appellant for the grant of stage carriage and public carrier permits to them for various routes in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, but no permits were granted to thom on the ground tha.t under r. 4-47 of the ,Ja.mm~

z9s9 and Kashmir Motor Vehicle Rules (hereinafter called the state of Rules), service lic~nce could only be issued t? person Jamm14 &-Kashmir or company registered under the Partnership Act and v. that, as the Society was neither person nor partner-Thak11r Ganga ship, it was not entitled to licence under the Rules. Singh The respondents filed petition in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir under s. 103 of the Constitution of Snbba Rao ]. Jammu & Kashm.ir challenging the vires of r. 4-4 7 of the Rules. To that petition the appellants herein, viz., the Government of Jammu & Kashmir State, the Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and the Traffic Superintendent, were made party-respondents. The High Court held that the said rule was ultra vires _as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, and, on that finding directed writ of mandamus to issue against the appellants herein from enforcing the provisions of the said rule. The appellants filed an application in the High Court for certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, but the High Court rejected it on the ground that no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Therefter the appellants applied for special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution and this Court granted the same. The order giving the special leave expressly granted liberty to the respondents herein to raise the question of the maintainability of the appeal at its final hearing.

Learned Counsel for the respondents raises preli-• _minary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. Shortly stated his objection is that under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution special leave can be given only if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution that in the present case the inter-pretation Art. 14 of the Constitution has been well-settled and put beyond di~pute by series of decisions of this court, that, therefore, no question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, much less substantial question of law in regard to that mattter, arises for consideration and that, therefore, no special leave can be granted undel· the said Article,

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

This argument is sought to be met by the learned Additional Solicitor-General in the-following manner: Whenever question of classification. is raised, it involves the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Consti-tution with reference to the classification impugned. To state it differently, the argument is that the question in each case is whether the classification offends the principle of equality enshr-ined in Art. 14. Therefore, whether registered firm, limited company and person have equal attributes is' question of interpret-..4 • ation of Art 14 of the Constitution. • Before considering the validity of the rival conten-tions it would be convenient to ascertain precisely what was the question raised in the High Court and what was the decision given thereon by it. The argu-ment advanced before the High Court on behalf of the Society was that under r. 4-47 licence can be issued only to person or firm registered under the Partner-ship Act and· not to ~orporation registered under the Co-operative Societies Act or othenvise, and, therefore, · the said rule, being discriminatory in nature, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the appellants contended that under Art. 14 of the Constitution rational classification is permissible and the legistature has framed tbe impugned rule on such basis, the object of which is to safeguard the interest of the public. The High Court, after considering the rival arguments, expressed the opinion that the said rule did not proceed· 011 any -rational basis of classification and that, as corpora-tion had been arbitrarily singled out for discrimin-atory, treatment, the impugned rule offended the equality clause of the Constitution. The appellants in their petition for special leave filed in this Court questioned the correctness of the conclusion ofthe High Court. They asserted that the said role was based upon reasonable classification and therefore could not· be struck down a.s repugnant to Art. 14 of the Consti-tution. In other grounds they elaborated the same point in an attempt to bring out the different a.ttribntes of the two classes affording an intellisible differentia for -

Z959 5':e;~~;;:~u v. Thakur Ganga Singh Subba Rao ].

classification. They clearly posed the question pro-posed to be raised by them in the appeal as under : Ground iv: "The aforesaid rule 4-4 7 (of the Motor Vehicle8 Rules) is based upon reasonable classification and is and was perfectly intra vires and valid and could not be struck down as repugn-ant to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India."

State of Jammu &Kashmir v. Thakur Ganga Singh Subba Rao.

Ground vi: "There is marked difference between corporate body and partnership registered under the provi~ions of the P-artnership Act and these points of difference provide an intelligible differentia for classification. The Hon'ble High Court has only referred to one point of difference and has overlooked other points of distinction and has erred in striking down the aforesaid rule 4-4 7."

Ground viii : " Rule 4-4 7 was framed in the light of local conditions prevailing. Co-operative Societies and Corporations in the matter of transport were not considered to be proper objects for the grant of licence or permit. The classification is rational and reasonable. The exclusion of artificial persons from the ambit of the Rule is natural and not discrimin-atory."

The other grounds are only further clarification of the said grounds. In part II of their statement of case the appellants stated as follows;

"It is now well-established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation."

The respondents, in their statement of case, accepted the said legal position but contested the position that there was reasonable classification. It is therefore manifest that throughout there has never been con-troversy between the parties in regard to the interpret-ation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but their dispute ·centered only on the question whether the impugned rule stood the test of reasonable classification.

In' the premises, can special leave be granted to the appellants under Art 132(2) of the Constitution ? Article 132(2) reads:

"Where the High Court has refused to give such certificate, the Supreme Court may, if it is

within the meaning of the equality clause, and, there-fore, the case involves question of interpretation of the Constitution. This argument, if we may say so, involves the same contention in different garb. If analysed, the argument only comes to this : as an artificial person and natural person have different attributes, the classification made between them is valid. This argument does not suggest new inter-pretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but only attempts to bring the rule within the doctrine of classification. We, therefore, hold that the question raised in this case does not involve any question oflaw as to the interpretation of the Constitution. -Assuming that the case raif'les question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, can it be said that the question raised is substantial question of law within the meanintz of cl. (2) of Art 14. This aspect was considered b:v the :Federal Court in T. 11!. K rishnaswamy Pillai v. Governor General In Council (1 ). That decision turned upon the provisions of s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The material part of that section says : S. 205: "{l) An appeal shall lie to the Federal Court from any judgment, decree or final order of High Court if the High Court certifies that the case involv-es substantial question of law as to the interpre-tation of this Act or any Order in Council made thereunder . ''

State of T ammt~ & Kashmir v. Thakur Ganga Singh Subba Rao ].

The Madras High Court gave certificate to the effect that the case involved substantial question of law as to the interpretation of s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under s. 240(3) of the said Act, no person who was member of civil service of the Crown in India or held any civil post under the Crown in India could be dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The High Court, on the facts found, held that the appellant therein had been offered reason-able opportunity of showing cause within the meanin_ (I} (1947).5~ C.W.N. \F.R.) I,

I959 This in only restatement of the law that has been State of Jammu enunciated by this Court in Ohir.anjit Lal Olwwdhuri e;. Kashmir v. The Union of India ([1]) and in other subsequent v. decisions. The said principles were reaffirmed in the Thakur Ga11ga recent decisions of this Court in Rama Krishna Singh Dalmia v. J'ustice Tendolkar ([2]) and in Mohammed S1ebba Rao ]. Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar ([3]). In view of the said decision there is no further scope for putting new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution vis-a-vis the doctrine of classification. The interpretation of Art. 14 in the context of classifi-cation has been finally settled by the highest Court of this land and under Art. 141 of the Constitution that interpretation is binding on all the Courts within the territory of India. What remained to be done by the High Court was only to apply that_ interpretation to the facts before it. substantial question of law, •therefore, cannot arise where that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court.

In the result we accept the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal with costs.

, Appeal dismissed.

(1) [195e] S.C.R. 869.

(2) [1959] S.C.R. 279.

(3) [1959) S.C.R. 629.