THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL MILLS LTD. versus KUSHAL BHAN

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

cancel. the decree in regard to the properties covered x960 by t at the w en certificate. Section it . s 11 appear to t 10 provides, inter alia, " o ector t JI o ector t JI at y at y y y at y at y y y ShankargoudaPatil , appagou 11 virtue of, or in execution of, decree or order of any v. court any watan or any part thereof, or any of the Basangouda · profits thereof, recorded as such in the revenue records Shiddangouda Patil or registered under this Act, and assigned under s. 23 . -as remuneration of an officiator has or have, after the aJendragadkar . . date of this Act coming into force, passed or may pass without the sanction of the State Government into the ownership or beneficial possession of any person other than the officiator for the time being, the court shall, on receipt of certificate under the hand and seal of the Collector, stating the particulars mentioned in the section, cancel the decree or order complained of so far as it concerns the said watan or any part thereof. The only objection against the validity of the certificate is that it has been addressed to wrong court. Since we have overruled that objection it follows that that portion of the decree which concerns the watan properties must be cancelled.

JI , appagou 11 o ector t JI o ector t JI at y at y y y ShankargoudaPatil

In the result the petition is allowed and the decree in question in so far as it purports to operate on or include any right to the office of Patilki and watan lands attached thereto at Kirtgeri as enumerated in the certificate is cancelled. Under the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.

Petition allowed.

THE DELHI CLOTH AND GENERAL

MILLS LTD.

KUSHAL BHAN

March xo.

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)

Industrial, Dispute-Dismissal of employees by enquiry com-mittee pending trial in Criminal Court-Subsequent acquittal of the employee-Jurisdiction of Tribunal, to refuse approval of dismissal-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (XIV of r947), s. 33(2), proviso.

The appellant company served charge-sheet on the res-pondent who was one of its employees alleging that he had stolen the cycle of the company's Head Clerk, criminal case relating

the stolen cycle from among 50/60 cycles standing z960 there. This matter was apparently brought to the lh' cz notice of the company in October 1957 and thereupon Gene:a/.u;~;s 'i.'ta. charge-sheet was served on the respondent to the v. effect that he had stolen the cycle of Ram Chandra, Kushal Bhan Head Clerk, that it had been recovered at his instance and that criminal case was pending against him with Wanchoo J. the police. He was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed for misconduct. The respon-dent submitted his explanation on October 13, 1957. As his explanation was unsatisfactory, November 14, 1957, was fixed for enquiry. The respondent appeared before the enquiry committee but stated that as the case was pending against him, he did not want to produce any defence till the matter was decided by the court. He further stated that he did not want to take part in the enquiry and was not prepared to give any answers to questions put to him. When questions were put to him at the enquiry he refused to answer them and eventually he left the place. The company, however, completed the enquiry and directed the dismissal of the respondent on the ground that the misconduct had been proved against him. Thereafter ·an application was made under s. 33(2) of the Indus-trial Disputes Act, No. 14 of 1947, by the company to t.he tribunal for approval of the action taken against the respondent. The matter came before the tribunal on May 6, 1958. In the meantime, the respondent had been acquitted by the criminal court on April 8, 1958, on the ground that the case against him was not free from doubt. The copy of the judgme_nt of the criminal court was produced before the tribunal and it refused to approve the order of dismissal. The company thereupon applied for special leave to this Court resulting in the present appeal.

The main contention on behalf of the appellant-company is that the company was not bound to wait for the result of the trial in the criminal court and that it could, and did, hold fair enquiry against the respondent, and if the respondent refused to partici· pate in it and left the place where the enquiry was being held, the company could do no more th~n to complete it and come to such conclusion as was

z960 possible on the evidence before it. Learned counsel Dell" -. Cfo;h -'f: for principles the respondent, on of natural justice require the other that hand, an urges employer that General Mil' ' • should wait at least for the decision of the criminal v. Ku,hal Bhan trial court before taking disciplinary action, and that inasmuch as the employer did not do so in this case Wanchoo J. the employee was justified in not taking part in the disciplinary proceedings which dealt with the very same matter which was the subject-matter of trial in the criminal court.It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. In Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Messrs. Newsman's Print-ing Works('), this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advis-able for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. The present, however, is case of very simple nature and so the employer cannot be blamed for the course adopted by him. In the circumstances, there was in our opinion no failure of natural justice. in this case and if the respondent did not choose to take part in the enquiry no fault can be found with that enquiry. We are of opinion that this was case in which the tribunal patently erred in not granting approval under s. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Besides it is apparent that in making the order under appeal, the tribunal has completely lost sight of the limits of its jurisdic-tion under s. 33(2). We therefore allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the tribunal grant approval to the order of the appellant dismissing the respondent. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.

\1) \1956) L.A.C. 188.