TATA IRON AND STEEL CO., LIMITED, BOMBAY versus S. R. SARKAR AND OTHERS.

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

TATA IRON AND STEEL CO., LIMITED, BOMBAY

S. R. SARKAR AND OTHERS.

(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)

Sales Tax-Inter-State sales-Sale effected by transfer of documents of title to goods during their movement from one State to another-Appropriate State to tax such sale-Place where sale effected-Central Sales Tax Act, I956 (74 of I956), ss. 2(a), 3, 4-Constitution of India, Art. 286.

The petitioner, limited company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling fron and steel goods, with its factory at Jamshedpur in Bihar and its head Sales Office in Calcutta in west Bengal, was served with notice on August 12, 1959, by the Commercial Tax Officer of West Bengal directing it to submit statement of sales from Jamshedpur for the period of assessment July l, 1957, to March 31, 1958, "the documents relating to which were transferred in West Bengal or of any other sales that may have taken place in West Bengal under s. 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956." For the same period, i.e., July 1, 1957 to March 31, 1958, of assessment the petitioner had on December 15, 1958, filed with the Sales Tax Officer, Jamshed-pur, return of inter-State sales made from Jamshedpur, in which were included all sales in which movement of the goods had taken place from the State of Bihar to destinations outside the State, and had paid advance tax nnder the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The petitioner contended before the Taxing Officer of West Bengal, inter alia, that in so far as its inter-State sales from Jamshedpur were concerned the situs of snch sales, as determined nnder s. 4(2) of the Act, would always be in the State of Bihar as the goods were in Bihar and that the State of West Bengal could not tax sale where goods were under the contract of sale moved from Bihar to Bengal even though the documents of title to the goods sold were transferred in Bengal, such sales being taxable only by the State of Bihar. The Taxing Officer, however, taxed all the sales effected by the company under s. 3(b) on the view that the sales in which the documents of title were handed over in Calcutta were taxable in the State of West Bengal because (1) all the sales effected in favour of West Bengal parties satisfied the conditions prescribed by s. 3(b), and (2) the place where the documents were delivered by the company to the purchaser was the place where the sale was effected.

Held, (per Sinha, C. J.,- Imam and Shah, JJ., Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ., dissenting): (1) that within cl. (b) of s. 3 of the 49

August ag.

'fttftt Iron ls. Strei Cn., l.td. v.

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are included sales in which property in the goods pa.ssPs during the rnovernent of the goods from one State to another by transfer of documents of title thereto clause (a) of s. 3 covers sales, other than those included in cl. (h). in which the movement of goods from one State to another is the result of covenant or inci<hnt of the contract of sale, and pro-perty in !:le goods passes in either State.

(2) that sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act defines what sales or purchases shall be deemed to take place inside State and, thereby, locates the place wl1ere sale is effected. The terms of the sub-scctiori-heing quite general provide also for cases where sales are effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce under s. 3 of the Act. ·

Cll that the Taxing authorities in West Bengal had to ascer-tain, before they could order payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, whether on t1e materials they were satisfied (a) that the goods at the time of transfer of documents of title were in movement from the State of Bihar to the State of West Bengal, and (b) that the pJa.:e where the sale was effected was, under s,4, cl. (2). withi1i the State of West Ilengal.

Per Sarkar and Das Gupta. Jj.--A sale contemplated by s. 3(b) ul the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is one where the trans-fer of property in the goods sold takes place hy the transfer of documents of title to them during their movement from one State to another and is effected within the State in which the documents of title are transferred, that State is the "appropriate State" in respect of such sale (2) The purpose of s. 4(2) of the Act is to formulate principles .'or determining when sale. takes place "outside State", and not to fix the place where sale under s. 3(b) can be said to have taken effect. The place of that sale is fixed by cl. (ii) of the Explanation in s. 2(a).

Petition No. 199of1959.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:

Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, N. A. Palkhfrala, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner.

B. Sen, K. C. Mukherjee and P. K. Bose, for res-pondents X os. l and 2.

Lal Narriyan Sinha and S. P. Varma, for re~pondent No. 3.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Gana-pathy Iyer, R. H. Dhebar and T. JI. Sen for respondent No. 4.

1960. August 29. delivered by

The judgment of the Court was

SHAH J.--By this petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the company, challenges the authority of the Commercial Tax Officer, t.yons Range, Calcutta, to demand payment of Rs. 41,14,718·12 nP. to the West Bengal Government as tax leviable under the Central Sales Tax Act No. 74 of 1956 in· respect of certain sales of steel goods.

The company has its registered office in Bombay, its Head Sales office in Calcutta in the State of West Bengal and its factories in Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar. The company is registered as "dealer" under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, and is also registered as " dealer " in the State of West Bengal under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. For the period of assess-ment July 1, 1957, to March 31, 1958, the company submitted its return of taxable sales to the Commer-cial Tax Officer, Lyons Range, Calcutta, disclosing gross taxable turnover of Rs. 9,561-71 nP. in respect of sales liable to Central sales tax in the State of West Bengal. By his memorandum dated August 12, 1959, the Commercial Tax Officer directed the com-pany to submit statement of sales from Jamshedpur for the period under assessment, "documents relating to which were transferred in West Bengal or of any other sales that may have taken place in West Bengal under s. 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 ". The company, by its letter dated September 30, 1959, informed the Tax Officer that the requisition for pro-duction of statement of sales made from Jamshedpur in the course of inter-State trade or commerce was without jurisdiction. The company contended that " all the sales from J amshed pur were of the type mentioned in s. 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and at the same time, some of them also fell within the category mentioned in s. 3(b) of the Act ", that even if the sales were "of the type mentioned in s. 3(b) of the Act, the appropriate State of the place where the sales take place or are effected alone had jurisdiction

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.

Sarkar

Shah ].

Tata Iron lS· Steel Co , Ltd. v. Sarkar Shah ].

to assess such sales to Central sales tax ", a1 that in respect of inter-Sta.to s.1les from Jamshedpur, the situs of the sale was always the State of Biha.r as the goods were in Bihar either at the time of the contract of sale or at the time of appropriation to the contract. By his order dated October 21, 1959, the Commercial Tax Officer made " best judgment assessment" on gross turnover of Rs. 9,00,09,56I·iJ nP. of inter-State sales and called upon tho company to pay Rs. 41,14,718·12 nP. as tax under the Central Sales Tax Act.

The company had, on December 15, 1958, filed with the Sales Tax Officer, Jamshcdpur, return of int€r-State sales made from Jamshedpur for the period July 1, 1957, to .March 31, 1958, and return for the same period for the sales made from Dhanbad with the Sales Tax Officer, Dhanbad. Jn these returns, the company included all sales in which movement of the goods had taken place from tho State of llihar to destinations outside that State. The total turnO\·or in respect of such inter-Stat~ sales as shown in the return exceeded Rs. 26 crores and the company pa.id as required by the Biha.r Sales Tax Act Rs. 71 lakhs odd as advance tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. By this petition the company impugns the validity of the order of the Commercial Tax Officer and claims writ of certiorari quashing and setting aside the assess-ment order dat~d October 21, 1959, and writ of mandamus directing the Commercial Tax Officer t-0 refrain from ta.king steps in enforcement or implemen-ta.t.ion of the order.

Counsel for the respondents contends that the peti-

tion under Art. 32 of tho Constitution is not ma.inta.in-a.blo because no fundamental right of the company is infringed by the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer and the remedy of the company, if it feels aggrieved by the order, is to seek relief by resorting to the ma.chi'!ery provided by the West Bengal Sales Tax Act. Counsel relics in support of his contention upon the judgments of this court in Ramjilal v. In-come Tax Officer, Mohinilargarh (') and Laxmanappa (1) (19l1) S.C.R. n7.

Hanumantappa Jamkhandi v. The Union of India and another ([1]). In Ramjilal's case('), this Court held that the protection against imposition and collection of tax save by authority of law directly arises from Art. 265 and is not secured by cl. 1 of Art. 31 ; and Art. 265 not being in Ch. III of the Constitution, its protection is not fundamental right which can be enforced by an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It was observed in Ramjilal's case(') that the right secur-ed by Art. 265 may be enforced by adopting appro-priate proceedings under the Act authorising levy of tax but petition founded on Art. 32 read with Art. 31(1) was misconceived and must fail. That view was reiterated in Laxmanappa's case (1). But it has been held that threat by the State to realize without authority of law tax from citizen by using ·coercive machinery of an impugned Act is an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed to him under Art. 19(l)(g) and gives to the aggrieved citizen right to seek relief by petition under the Constitution (see Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others('), The Bengal Immunity Com-pany Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and others(') and The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and others('). In these cases, in appeals from orders passed by the High Courts in petitions under Art. 226, this Court held that an attempt to levy tax under statute which was ultra vires infringed the funda-mental right of the citizens and recourse to the High Court for protection of the fundamental right was not prohibited because of the provisions contained in Art. 265. In the case before us, the vires of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not challenged; but in Kailash Nath and another v. The State of U ttar Pradesh and oth.ers ([5]) petition challenging the levy of tax was entertained by this Court even though the Act under the authority of which the tax was sought to be recovered was not challenged as ultra vires. It is not necessary for purposes of this case to decide whether the principle of Kailash Nath's case ([6]) is inconsistent

(l) [1955] l S.C.R. 769 (3) [1954] S.C.R. uu. (5) [1953] S.C.R. Io69.

(2) [1951] s.c.R. 127. (4) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603. (6) A.I.R. 1957 s. c. 790.

Tata Iron &. Steel Co., Ltd.

Sarkar

Shah ].

Tata Tron 0. St~rl Co .. Lid. v.

Shah }.

with the view expressed by this Court in Ramjilal's case('). Evidently, ihe company has paid t.o the Sales Tax Officer, Rihar, tax due under the Central Sales Tax Act on its turnover including sales on which the tax is sought to be le\·ied by the Commercial Tax Officer, West Bengal. Under the Central Sales Tax Act, there is single liabilit.y to pay t.ax on inter.State sales. The company having paid tht• tax tot.he Bihar State for and on beho.lf of the Central Go\·ernment, the threat to recover again sales tax on belrnlf of the Central Government in respect of the same sales, i. e., sales which are included in the aP.sessment proceedingR before the Bihar Sales Tax authoritieR prima facie infringes the fundamontal right of the company to hold its property and the company is entitled to approach this Court under Art. 32 of the Co11stitution. The preliminary objection raised by counsel for the respondents must therefore fail.

To appreciate the arguments ad\•anced 011 the merits of the claim made by the company, it is necessary to set out tho rele\·ant legislative history and the course of judicial decisions.

Cnder the Government of India Act, 1935, po11·er to make laws in respect '.>f" taxes on sale of goods and advertisements" waE conferred bys. 100(1) read with entry 48 of List II in Schedule VII upon the Pro\'in-eial Legislatures. This power was !'X~rciscd by all the Provinces and by picking out one or more ingredients constiluting Rale, as determinative of the place where the sale took place, they brought within the taxing laws transactions substantially outside the territorial limits of their authority. Statutes so enact-ed led to multiplo tax1itio11 of the same tra.nRa.c:tion by several Provinces, each Province seeking to rely upon some ingredient of the sale \\ ithin its jurisdiction as establishing territorial nexus.

This burden lay ho,al"ily upo11 the conRumer. The

Constituent Assembly was seriously exercioed over this situation and tried to meet the problem by placi11g restrictions upon the taxing power of the 8tates in respect of sales and purchases having inter-State elements. Article 2813 of the Constitution was one of (1) [t951] S.C.R. 127.

the Articles enacted for that purpose. That Article before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, stood as follows:

(l) No law of State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place-

(a) outside the State; or

(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or

export of the goods out of, the territory of India.

Explanation :-For the purposes of sub-clause (.a), sale or purchase shall be deemed to .have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.

(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law

otherwise provide, no law of State shall impose, or autho1ise the imposition of, tax on the sale or pur-chase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce-

Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, shall, notwithstanding that the imposi-tion of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thity-first day of March, 1951. .

(3) No law made by the Legislature of State

imposing, or authorising the imposition of, tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.

As framed, the Article attempted to enunciate restraints upon the legislative power of the States: but the somewhat inartistic form in which the Article and particularly the Explanation was couched, obscur-ed instead of clarifying the meaning of the Constituent

Tata Iron & Sltel Co., Lid.

v. Sarkar

Shah ].

Tata Iron S. Sl1tl Co., ltd. v. Sar/tor Sita~ ].

Assembly. The scope of Art.. 286 fell tCJ be determin-ed in The State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. (')in a.n appeal to this court in which the validity of the provisions of the Bombay Sa.Jes Tax Act, 1952 was challenged. By the BombA.y Act; liability to pay tax was imposed on sales of goods which had been actually delivered in the State of Bombay as a. direct result of sales for th" purpose of consumption in that State even if property in the goods bad, by reason of such sales, passed in another State. The High Court of Born bay in a. petitiCJn under Art. 226 held that the definition of ea.le in the Act included certain sales which were by Art. 286 of the Constitution exempt from liability to tax by the State and the tax imposed was therefore wholly void. majority of Judges hearing a.n appeal from that judgment to this Court held that Art. 286(l)(a) prohibited taxation CJf sales or purchases involving inter-State ele"ments by a.11 St>i.tes except the State in which the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption therein, and · the effect of t.he Explanation thereto was to convert inter-State transactions into intra-State transactions and lo remove them from the operation of cl. 2. On this view, the majority of the Judges held th>i.t the Bombay Sales Tax Act did not contravene Art. 286. This jnterpreta.tion of Art. 286 did not meet with the approval of larger Bench of this Court which heard and decided the Bengal Immunity Co.'s case('). In that case four out of the seven judges constituting the Bench held that the operative provisions of the several parts of Art. 286, namely cl. l(a), cl. l(b) and els. 2 and 3 were intended to deal with different topics and one "could not be projecl{!d or read into another". According to the minority view, Art. 286{l)(a.) located the situs of the sales with view to a.void multiple taxation and for that purpose, it divided the sa.le8 into two categories-" inside sales" and "outside sales", and that Art. 286(2) applied to the sales in the course of inter-State trade and the sales which fell within the Explanation were intra-State sales. In M fa. Ram Narain Sona L/.d. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales (1) [1953) s.c.R 1o6g. (3) [1955] l S.C.R. 6o3.

Tax and others(') which was decided after the Bengal Immunity Oo.'s case('), this Court held:

"The bans imposed by Art. 286 of the Constitu-tion on the taxing powers of the States are indepen-dent and separate and each one of them has to be got over before State Legislature can impose tax on transactions of sale or purchase of goods. The Expla-nation to Art. 286(l)(a) determines by the legal fiction created therein the. situs of the sale in the case of transactions coming within that category and once it is' determined by the application of the Explanation that transaction is outside the State, it follows as matter of course that the State, with reference to which the transaction can thus be predicated to be outside it, can never tax the transaction."

The Constitution was thereafter amended, Explana-tion 1 of Art. 286 was deleted and els. 2 and 3 thereto were altered by the amendment. As amended, Art. 286 stands as follows :

Art 286 :-1. No law of State shall impose, or authorise the im-position of, tax on the sale or pur-chase of goods, where such sale or purchase takes place-

( a) outside the State; or

(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.

2. Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in cl. 1.

3. Any law of State shall, in so far as it imposes, or authorises the impositio!l of,. tax on the sale or purchase of goods ·declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or com-merce, be subject to such restrictions and conditions iri regard to the system of levy, rates and other inci-dents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify.

Simultaneously, the Parliament was authorised by the incorporation of item 92A in List I of the seventh schedule, to legislate for levying tax on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such

(t) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483: (2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603.

Tata Iron 6' Steel )., Ltd.

v Sa· ar .•"tiah T

Tata Iron & Slttl Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar Shah ].

sale or purchaBc takes place in the course of inter. State tra<le or rommerce, and by the amendm!'nt of item 54 of List 11 oxdu<led that ncld of taxation from the competence of the State LegislatureB. Art. 269, cl. l(g), which was aho amended by cl. 3 to that Arti-cle read after the amendment as follows:

"Parliament may by law formulate principles for

determining when sale or purchase of goo<ls takes place in tho course of inter-State trade or commerce". Tho effect of these diverse amendments made by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, was to invest the Parliament with exclusive aut.hority to enact laws imposing tax on sale or purchase of goods where such sa.le or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and the tax collected by the States was to be assigned in the manner pro-vided by cl. 2 of Art. 269 to the State within which the tax was leviahle.

In exercise of authority conferred upon the Parlia. ment by Art. 286 and Art. 269, cl. 3, the Parliament enacted the Central S11les Tax Act (74 of 1956). The Act was enacted as the preamble recites:

"to formulate principles for determining when sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or outside State or in the course of import into or export from India, to pro-vide for the levy, collection and distribution of taxes on sales of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and to declure certain goods to be of special importance in inter-Sta.Le trade or commorco and specify the restrictions and conditions to which State laws impo8ing taxes on the sale or purchase of such goods of special importance shall be subject".

By chapter 2 of the Act., ss. 3, 4 and 5, those prin-ciples were formulated and by chapter 3, detailed pro-visions were made for imposing liability to pay tax ou inter-St,ate sales, for registration of dealers, fixing rates of tax and for lovy and collection of tax and for imposing penalties for breach of the provisions of the Act relating to levy and collection of inter-State ·sales tax. By s. 6, every dealer was made liable to pay tax on all sales effected by him in the course of inter-State

trade or commerce. By sub-s. 2 of s. 8, the rates of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade or com-merce were directed to be calculated at the same rates and in the same manner as would have been done if the sale had in fact taken place inside the appropriate State. By s. 9, the machinery for levy and collection of tax was prescribed. The tax payable by any dealer under the Act was to be levied and collected by the appropriate State in the manner provided by sub-s. 2 which enacts that the authority for the time being empowered to assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the General Sales Tax Law of the appropriate State shall on behalf of the _Government of Ind.ia assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax payable by any dealer under the Act in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the General Sales Tax Law of the State is assessed, paid and collected. It is manifest that by s. 6 which is the charging section, liability to pay tax on inter-State sales is imposed upon all sales effected by any dealer in the course of inter-State trade or. commerce. The liability to pay tax under the Central Sales Tax Act arises as an inter.State sale. The tax though collected by the State in which the sale takes place is due to the Central Government and is pay-able at the rates prescribed in respect of intra.State sales by the State in which it is collected.

Sale is defined ip s. 2(g) as meaning any transfer of property in goods by one person to another for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable con-sideration and includes transfer of goods on the hire-purchase or other system of payment by instalments, but does not include mortgage or hypothecation of or charge or pledge on goods. By s. 3, sale or purchase of goods is deemed to ta.ke place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase (a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another, or (b) is effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another. transaction of sale is subject to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on the completion of the sale, and mere contract of sale· is

Tata Iron ~ · Steel Co., Ltd.

Sarkar

Shah ].

Tata Tron 6-Sf1el Co., I.Id

v. sa,kar

Shah ].

not. sale within ihe definition of sale in s. 2(g). sale being by the definition, transfer of property, becomes taxable under s. 3(a) if the movement of goods from one State to another is under a. covenant or inci-dent oft.he contract of 8alc, and the property in the goods passes to t.he purchaser otherwise than by trans-fer of documents of title when the goods are in move-ment from one State to another. In respect of an inter-State sale, the tax is leviable only once and that indicates that the two clauses of s. 3 are mut.ua.lly exclusive. sale taxable a.s falling within cl. (a) of s. 3, will be excluded from the purview of cl. (b) of s. 3 ; otherwise certain sales may, be liable to tax under both the clauses and two States may, in respect of a. single sale, claim to levy the tax contrary to the plain intend ment of ss. 6 and 9 of the Act.The sale contemplated by cl. (b) is one which is effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement. from one State to another . . Where the property in the goods has passed before t.he movement has commenced, tho sa.lo will evidentlv not fall within cl. (b); nor will the sale in which the. pro-perty in the goods passes after the movement from one State to another has ceased be covered by the clause. Accordingly sale effected by transfer of . documents of title after the commencement of move-ment and before its conclugion as defined by the two terminii set out in Explanation (l) and no other sale will he regarded a.s a.n inter-State sale under s. 3(b). The definition (lf the expression "salo" um.loubtedly includes transfer of goods on hire-purchase or other systems of payment by instalments, but thereby, a. more contra.ct of sale which does not result in transfor of property occasioning movement of goods from one State to another does not fall within tho terms of s. 3(a.). That transact.ion alone in which there is "transfer of goods " on the hire-purchase or other systems of payment by instalments is included in the definition of" sale". Tho question whether a. mere contra.ct in which goods a.re delivered under a. hire-purcha.se agreement is sale within the meaning of s. 2, cl. (g) and therefore, covered by cl. (a.) of s. 3 does

not fall to be determined in this case : nor are we called upon to express our opinion on the question whether the clause authorising imposition of sales tax on what may be merely contract of sale is unconsti-tutional. We are in this case concerned to decide the competing claims of the States of West Bengal and Bihar to levy sales tax from the company in respect of transactions of completed sales and not in respect of any hire-purchase transactions.

Tai• Iron ,s. 5 lee 1 [c ]o., LI' •· v. SOrkar

Shah ].

Cases of this Court, viz., State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. The Bombay Co., Ltd. (1) and State of Travancore - Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory and others(') relied upon by coun-sel for the State of West Bengal have no bearing on the interpretation of s. 3, els. (a) and (b). In those cases, the meaning of the expressions, " in the course of import and export " and "in the course of inter-State trade or commerce "-used in Art. 286 fell to be determined. The Constitution does not define these expressions. The Parliament has in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, sought to define by s. 3 when sale or purchase of goods is said to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and by s. 4(1) to define when sale or purchase of goods is said to take · pla.qe outside State and by s. 5, when sale or pur-chase is said to take place in the course of import or export. In interpreting these definition clauses, it would be inappropriate to requisition in aid the obser-vations ma,de in ascertaining the true nature and inci-dents without the .assistance of any definition clause of " sales ontside the State " and " sales in the course of import or export" and" sales in the course of intet-S,tate trade or commerce" used in Art. 286.

In our view, therefore, within cl. (b) of s. 3 are included sales in which property in the goods passes during the movement of the goods from one State to another by transfer of documents of title thereto: cl. (a) of s. 3 covers sales, other than those included in-c:: cl. (b), in which .the movement of goods from one State to another is the result of covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and property in the goods passes in either State. (1) [19.50] S.C.R. 1112. (2) [195+] S.C.R. 53• 53•

(2) [195+] S.C.R. 53• 53•

Fala !roil 6-Stetl Co., I.Id. v

Sarknr

Shah ].

The question to which attention must then be directed is, which out of the two or more States con-cerned with the goods sold under an inter State sa.le is entitled to collect the tax under Act 74 of 19fi6. By s. 9, the tax payable by any dealer under the Act is to be levied and c·1llected in the "appropriate State". The expression "appropriate State" was at the mate-rial time defined by s. 2(a) as follows:

"Appropriate Stato" means:-

(i) in relation to dealer who has otH' or more

places of business situate in the same St ate, that State;

(ii) in relation to dealer who has one or moro

places of business situate in different States, every such State with respect to the place or places of busi-ness situate within its territory;

Explanation:-" Placo of business" means,

(i) in the case of sale of goods in the course of

inter-State trade or commerce falling within cl. (a) of s. 3, the place fr:im which the goods have been moved by rea.8on of such s:tle ;

(ii) in the case of any such sale falling within

cl. (b) of s. 3, the place where the sale is <'ffccted.

Thio definition mado the State in which tlw place of business is situate, the appropriate State; and by the Explanation, the expression "place of business" wa.H dP.fined in relation to the two classes of sales in s. 3 as snles in the course of inter-State trade or com-merce. By the first part. oft ho definit.ion, in case of sale of goods falling within cl. (a), the place from which the goods have been moved is tho placo of busi-ness and by cl. 2, in the case of sales falling within cl. (b) of s. 3, the place where the sale is effected is the place of buoincBs. This evidently is highly artificial definition. By fiction, the place from which goods have been moved by reason of the sale falling within cl. (a) of s. 3, that is, that place from which the goods have been moved under the contract of sale for the purpose of deliver.I' LO the purchaser in not her State was dedarwJ the place of business. By another fic-tion, the place where the sale is dfocted in inter-State transactious falling within s. 3(b) was declared the

place of business. In ascertaining the place of busi-ness as defined by the Explanation, for cases falling within cl. (a) of s. 3, little practical difficulty arises. But in cases of sales falling within cl. (b), the location of the place where " the sale is effected " for ascer-tainment of the place of business within the meaning of the Explanation raises difficult problems. As observed by Das, Acting Chief Justice, in Bengal Immunity Company's case ([1]) at p. 649:

" The situs of an intangible concept like sale can only be fixed notionally by the application of artificial rules invented either by Judges as part of the judge-made law of the land or by some legislative authority. But so far as we know, no fixed rule of universal application has yet been evolved for deter-mining this for all purposes. There are many con-flicting theories: One, which is more popular and frequently put forward and is referred to and may indeed be urged to have been adopted by the Consti-tution ............ favours the place where. the property in the goods passes, another which is said to be the American view ......... fixes upon the place where the contract is concluded, third which prevails in the continental countries of Europe prefers the place where the goods sold are actually delivered, fourth points to the place where ·the essential ingredients which go to make up sale are most densely grouped".Ex facie, cl. 2 of the Explanation to J>. 2(a) does not seek to locate the place where the sale is effected in cases falling within cl. (b) of s. 3 at the place where the transfer of documents of title to the goods was effected. Parliament has classified the sales " in the course of inter-State trade or commerce" in els. (a) and (b) of s. 3 and by the first clause of the Explana-tion to s. 2(a), in cases of sales falling within s. 3(a) the place of business is the place from which move-ment has commenced and in the case of sales falling within s. 3(b), it is the place where the sale is effected. But there is in the Explanation no material for ascer-taining the place where the sale is effected.

(t) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 603.

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.

Sarkar

Shah ].

Tata ]r0'1 6-Steel Co .. Ltd.

.~:iarAar

Shah j.

There wa.s sh<i.rp conflict of opinion as to the true meaning of Art. 286, els. l(a) and (b) and the Expla-nation as they st.ood before the amendment by the Constitution (Sixth Arnendme.nt) Act, 1956. In the United Motors' cas.i (') it was opined by majority of tho judges of this Court that Art. 286(l)(a) prohibited taxation of sales or purchases involving inter.State elements by a.ll States except the State in which the goods were delivered for the purpose of cons um pt ion therein, a.nd the latter State wa.s left frro to ta.x such sales or purchase> a.nd that power was not derived from the ExplH.nation to Art. 286(1) but under Art. 246(3) read with entry 54 in List II. Mr. Justice Bose who disagreed with the majority held that the basic idea underlying Art. 286 was to prohibit taxH.tion in the course of inter-State trade and commerce until the ban under cl. 2 of the said Article was lifted by Parliament and always in the case of imports nnd ex-ports, and when the ba.n wa.s lift~d. the Explaua.tion to ol. l of Art. 286 came into play to determine the situs of the sale, the explanation not governing cl. 2 a.s it a.ppl\ed to transactions which in truth and in fact took place in the course of inter-State t re.de a.nd commerce. Mr. Justice Bhagwati who a.greed with tht• conclusion of the majority a.s to the vires of the impugned Act, opined that the Explanation to Art. 286(1) did not take a.way the right which the Sta.to in which the property in the goods passed had to tax the sale or purchase, but only deemed such purchase or sale by legal fiction to have ta.ken place in the State in which the delivery of the goods had been made for consumption so as to enable the latter State also to tax tho sale or purchase in quest.ion. In 'l'he Bengal Immunity Go.'s case('), Das, Acting Chief Justice, in delivering the judgment of the majority observed that the several parts of Art. 286, viz., els. l(a), l(b), (2) and (3) were intended to deal with different topics; that the Explanation to cl. l{a) to Art. 286 should not lt1gitima.tely be extended to cl. (b) either as an excep-tion or as proviso theret-0 or read as curtailing or limiting the ambit of cl. 2; that Art. 286(1Xa) fixed (1) [1953] S.C.R. 100g.

the situs of the sales with view to avoid multiple taxation and for that purpose classified the sales into two categories, inside sales and outside sales and enacted that the State cannot tax outside sales and the purpose of the Explanation which declared sale in the course of inter-State trade must be deemed to have taken place inside the State in which the goods are deliver~d for consumption was clearly to take it out of the inter-State trade and impress it with the character of an intra-State .sale. This view was follow~d in M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax & others ([1 ]).

Tata Iron &> Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar

Shah ].

Evidently, by the interpretation placed by this Court on the scope and meaning of Art. 286 as origi-nally enacted, Parliament was faced with difficult problerii. The Parliament had to examine the pro-blem of taxing inter-State trade and commerce in the · light of three principal factors, namely, (1) the consti-tutfonal freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Art. 301, (2) the inadvisability of .allowing the States unrestricted freedom to levy or impose taxes on sales or purchases of goods with inter-State content, and (3) the necessity to impose restric-tions on multiple taxation of the same sale by different States. The Parliament deleted the Explanation to cl. 1 of Art. 286 which had given rise to this serious conflict of views and recast els. 2 and 3. By cL 2 as amended, the Parliament was authorised to formulate principles for determining when sale or pnrchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in cl. 1 ; and by the addition of item 92A in List I of the seventh schedule, the Central Government alone could tax sales or purchases of goods which take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. By in-corporating cl. 3 to Art. 269, the Parliament assumed to itself the power to formulate principles for deter-mining when sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is after this .amendment was made that the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, was enacted with view to pro-vide for collectio1l of tax on sales or purchases in (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 483. 51

Tata lro11 ,-;.. Strei C()., Lr-I. "· Sa1har

SJ:ah .f.

(1961 J

the course of int.er.State trado or commerce. Tho Par!i:urnmt had to define sales in the course of inter. Stale trade or commc-.rc<',.Ralcs in the course of import or export, and intra-Sl!•tc sales. The Parliament set out by s. 3 to define sales of goods which ca.n be SH.id to take place in th~ course of inter-State trado or commerce, by R. 4(1) t.o define wlwn sa.le is said to tBke place outside Stttte, and by s. ii when a. sa.le is said to take place in the course of import and in the course of export. By s. 9, authority to tax was conferred upon the appropriate State, and that expres-sion was defined hv s. 2 as the State where the dealer had hi~ placo o( business, and in respect of salt's which fall within cl. (h) of s. 3, the: place of business of the dt>aler was dedared to be the place where the salo i~ ptfected. B1· f;, 3, it was intended to define the class of sales whicli' s:iall b(I deemed to bo sales in the course of intcr-Stato trade or commerct>, but the con-ditions which go to make such transaction~. sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce as sot. out by els. (a.) and (b) were not intended to locate the place where the salt> takes placo.

Th1i legal position as to taxability of sales in the cours·~ of inter-State t.ra.de or commrrce was unsatis-factory and the Parliv.ment radically amended Art. ~86 and the a.Hied Articles. It also enacted Hpecial Act authorising levy and collection of Cent.ral Sales Ta.x with a. viow to prevent. rivalry a.nrl competition between different 8t.i<tcs. Is it then to be assumed that the Parliament still left the law in so far as it related to class of sales covered by the description of sa.lcs in the course of intor-State trade or commerce in the same unsatiAfactory condition without enacting whore the sales in cases falling within cl. (b) of s. 3 wore cffccwd? Before proceeding to answer that <Jliery, attention may be directed to s. 4 of Act 74 of H.156. It is as follows :

"(I) Subject to the provisions contained ins. 3

when sa.lo or purchaso of goods is detnmim.'C! in accordance with sub-s. (2) to !.a.kc place inside State, such Mle or purchase sh1tll be deemed to have taken pla.oe out.qide a.II other States.

(2) sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside State if the goods are within the State-

( a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made ; and

(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods,

at the time of their ·appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appro-priation.

Explanation :-Where there is single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at more places than one, the provisions of this sub.section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each of such places."

Sub-section 2 defines what sales or purc.hases shall

be deemed to take place inside State. The terms of sub-s. 2 are quite general, and the Parliament has thereby attempted to locate the place where sale takes place. The clause does not deal with the condi-tions which" effect" sale: nor is there any warrant for the view that sub-s. 2 of s. 4 only seeks to locate the place of sale which are not in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. By enacting ch. II, the Parliament sought as evidenced by the title of the chap-ter to exercise its power under Art. 269(3) and 286(2). By s. 3, the Parliament formulated principles for deter-mining when sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and in so doing, it exercised authority conferred upon it by Art. 269(3). In enacting s. 4, cl. (1), the Parliament sought to formulate principles for determining when sale takes place outside State and in enacting that section, it legislated in exercise of authority under Art. 286(2) read with cl. l(a) of that Article; and in enacting s. 5, sub-ss. 1 and 2, it exercised authority under Art. 286(2) read with cl. l(b) of the Article to formulate principles for determining the sale which takes place in th6 cou.rse of import or export. The Parliament by sub-s. 2 of s. 4 attempted to define when sale shall be deemed to take place inside State, and by sub-s. 1 of s. 4 provided that when sale or

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.

v. Sarkar Shah ].

Tata lrn11 6-Strtl Co., Ltd v. Sar!:ar

Shah ].

[ 1961]

purchase of goods was determined in accordance with sub-s. 2 to take place insidn State, such sale or pur-chase shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States. But sub-s. I having been made subject to the provisions contained in s. 3, it is evident that only those sales which were not in the course of inter-State trade or commeree should be determined under sub-s. I of s. 4 as having taken place outside State. We are unable to hold that any weight can be attach-ed to the argument that if it was the object of the Legislature by enacting su b-s. (2) of s. 4 to explain the expression, " where the salo is effected " as used in cl. (ii) of the Explanation to s. 2(1.1), the Legislature would have expressly fltated so. Nor are we able to agree with the contenti·)n that s. 4 only seeks to define "out;iide sales" and is not. intended to locate the place where sale is effect(ld. The argument that by the application of s. 4, sub-s. 2, in cases where the goods sold are unasccrtained or future goods, there will be diffieulty in ascertaining the place where the sale ,is effected, has also no force. In any event, s. 4(:.!) may not be denied its foll operation, merely because difficulty may be encountered in some cases in ascer-taining the place wh·3re it is effected by the applica-tion of the rnles set out therein.

The Commercial Tax Officer has observed in his order that:

"In this case, it should be remembered that sec-

tion 3(b) refers to transfer of documents and not only to transfer of documents by endorsement. Thus, even if the documents are in the name of the buyer as con-signee but these are physically transferred to the buyer in Wrst Bengal then that sale is taxable in \\'est Bengl\l. In cl\se of goods consigned to " Self " there is no question that deli1·ery to the railways cannot be constituted as delivery to tbe buyer".

But under the Sa.le of Goods Act, if document of title to goods is used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of guocls, endorse-ment or delivery thereof according tu mercantile practice will amount to delivery oft.he goods thereby represented. The transfer of documents contemplated

by s. 3(b) is therefore such transfer as in law amounts to delivery of the goods. Transfer of documents either by endorsement or delivery does complete transfer of title, but in the absence of an indication to that effect in the statute, the place where the documents are transferred is not the place of sale. If the view which appealed to the. Commercial Tax Officer is accepted, there is possibility of large scale evasion of tax. For instance, the documents may be handed over outside Iudia. If documents of title to goods are handed over by the vendor either directly or through his agent to the purchaser or his agent outside India, on the view taken by the Commercial Tax Officer, even though the sale has taken place in India and the goods are in India, the sale would not be taxable. This result could not have been contemplated by the Legis-lature. We are therefore unable to agree with the view taken by the Commercial Tax Officer.

It was urged by counsel for the State of Bihar that iron and steel are commodities of which the storage, sale and purchase are controlled by the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, 1956, and all the sales which are made subject to tax under the impugned order are those covered by s. 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In para. 3 of the petition, the company has set out the practice w.hich is followed in supplying steel pursuant to the orders passed by the Controller. It is stated that an intending purchaser has to obtain permit from the Iron and Steel Ccintroller of the region where he carries on business and the permit is sent by the Provincial Controller to the Controller at Calcutta. The latter Officer plans the indent on the company and sends it to the Head Sales Office at Calcutta for compliance, and the planning of the indent in effect is directive by ~he Controller to supply steel to the intending purchaser subject to the company's terms and conditions. In paras. 4, 5 and 6 of the petition, the specimen forms of quotation letters and the prac-tice followed in supplying goods to the Government and Railways, to the·" engineering firms and the bazaar parties" are set out, In the light of els. 4, 5, 10 and 15 of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, it was

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.

Sarkar

Shah ].

Ta.ta lrnu <"'>-Stc1; Co., Lttf. v. Sarkar

urged that a.II tho sales effected by the company under the direction of the C'ontrnllor fall within s. 3, cl. (a). But we do not think it necessary to express any opinion 011 this argument at t.his stag1>, without more complete pict.urc of the modus operandi f.,IJowed.

The Commercial Tax Officer has taxed all the sales effoc1.ccl by the company under s. 3, cl. (b), 011 the view t.hat sales in which the documontR of title \\'ere handed over in Calcutta were taxable in the 8tatc of \Yest Bengal. The assessment is ma.de on twu 1ts.•;umptions, (!)that all the sales effected in favour of West Bengal parties satisfied thn conditions prescribed by s. 3(b}, and (2) that the place whE·re the documents are deli-vered by the company through its Head Sales Offic(J to the purchaser is tho place where the sale jg effocted. Neither of thrse assumptions is correct. The Commer-cial Tax Officor had, in our judgmPnt, tn ascertain before he could order payment of tax under the Central Sales Tax Aet, whether on the materials he was satisfied, (a) that the goods at. the time of tmnsfer of documents of title wcro in movement from the State nf Bihar to the State of West Bengal, (b) that the pla.cc where t.he sale was effected was 111:der s. 4, cl. (2.1, within the State of West Bengal. Thi• Com-mercial Tax Officer has, in our view, failed to apply the correct tests and has made ass11mptions which are not watTant.c•d and on true interpretation of the prnvisions of the Central Sales 'l'<ix Act, t.ho order of assessment di.,doscs a.n Prror appa-rent 011 its f,v:e and writ of certiorari must issue quashing tho assessment. It will be for the Commer-cial Tax Officer of WeAt Bengal to re-assess the com-pa11y iu respect of tr;rnsactious of sale which aro properly taxable within the State uf West Bengal by the application of the test which we have already set out.

On this view, th<i ru]., is made absolute and it is directed that writ of certiorari will issue quashing the order of assessment ma.de by tho Comml'rcial Tax Officer, Lyons ]{auge, Calcutta, \Vt>st Bengal. The company will be entitled to its costs of this petition.

SARKAR J.-The petitioner. was assessed to sales tax on some of its sales by the Government of West Bengal under the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It contends that the Government of West Bengal had no power to assess tax on those sales, for, under the Act, they could be brol,lght to tax only by the Government of Bihar. It has filed this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for writ to quash the order of assessment made by the Government of West Bengal on the ground that it violates the peti-tioner's rights under sub-els. (f) & (g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 to hold property and carry on business.

The petitioner is limited company carryin·g on business of manufacturing and selling iron and steel goods. It has its factory at Jamshedpur in Bihar and its head sales office in Calcutta in West Bengal.

On August 12, 1959, the Taxing Officer of the Government of West 'Bengal served notice on the petitioner to produce " statement of sales from Jamshedpur ..................... the documents relating to which; were transferred in West Bengal or of any other sales that have taken.place under s. 3 (b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 ". The petitioner refused to submit the return for reasons which we shall state later and took the stand that the tax on the sales was assessable by the Government of Bihar and not by the Government of West Bengal.. The Taxing Officer of the Government of West Bengal did not accept the con-tention of the petitioner and in the absence of return by it, made best judgment assessment on Octo-ber 21, 1959, assessing the petitioner to tax of Rs. 41,14, 718-12 nP. The petitioner seeks to have this order quashed. ·The respondents to this petition are the Government of West Bengal, its officer who made the assessment, the Government of Bihar and the Union of India. No relief is however claimed against the last two respon-dents.

The questions raised by this petition depend on the ccnstruction of certain provisions of the Central Sa.Jes Tax Act, 1956. The Act was amended with effect from October 1, 1958 •.. This ca.se however b&s to be decided

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar --·, Sarkar ].

Tata Iron &. Stet/ Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar

Sarkar ].

on the Act a.s it stood prior to the amendment, for the period covered by tho impugned order of assessment wa.s from July I, 1957 to :\larch 31, 1958. It may be stated here tha.t the validity of the Act bas not been challenged by the petitioner.

preliminary objection to thiR petition is ta.ken on

behalf of the Government of West Bengal. It is sa.id that a.s the legality of the Act is not challenged, the · imposition of the ta.x doefl nut result in a.ny violation of the funda.menta.l right guaranteed by Art. 31(1) of the Constitution and this petition based on such alleg-ed violation is, therefore, not competent. Such a. view was indeed ta.ken by tl:.is Court in Ramji Lal v. In-come.tax Officer, Mohindargarh ('). This case was followed in Laxmanappa J/anumantappa Jamkhandi v. Union of India('). The present case however does not complain of a. violation of any fundamental right under Art. 31. Tho fundamental right the infringe-ment of which is alleged by the assessment order, is the right to hold property <tnd carry on businef:s under Art. 19 (l)(f) a.nd (g). In Kailash Nath v. The State of" U. P. ('),this Court held t.hat an illegal levy of sales tax on trader under an Act the legality of which was not challenged violates his fundamental rights under 'Art. l9(l)(g) a.nd a. petition under Art. 32 with respect to such violation lies. Tho earlier case of Ramji Lal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh (') does not appear to have been considered. lt is con-tended that the decision in Kai/ash Nath's case(') requires reconsideration. We do not think however that the present is fit ~ase to go into the question whether tho two cases a.re not roconcila.ble and to decide the preliminary question raised. Tho point was taken at late Htage of the proceedings after much costs had been incurred. The question a.rising on this petition is further of general importance, a. decision of which is desirable in the interest of a.II concerned. As there is at lea.st one case supporting the competence of tho petition, we think it fit to decide this petition on its merits, on the footing that it is competent.

(1) (1951] S.C.R. 127. (2) [19,5] 1 S.C.R. 76<}.

(3) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 790.

Now, the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is an Act of the Union Legislature. It authorises the levy of tax on sales made in the course of inter-State trade. It is only with such sales that the present case is concerned .. Sales in the course of inter-State trade are defined in s. 3 of the Act and this section will be set out later. Section 6 of the Act provides that every dealer shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on a.II sales made by him in the course of inter-State trade. That the petitioner is dealer is not in dispute. Section 9(1) provides that the tax payable by any dealer under the Act shall be levied and collected in the" appropriate State" by the Government of India. Section 9(2) provides that the authorities empowered to assess and collect tax under the general sales tax law of the "appropriate State" shall on behalf of the Government of India, assess and collect the tax pay-able under the Act and for such purpose, exercise all powers under its general sales tax law. Under the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. Q, the State collecting the tax be6omes entitled to retain it substantially. It is therefore clear that the tax is payable to the Union and is collected by a. State for the Union.The contention of the petitioner before the taxing officer of the Government of West Bengal may be reproduced in its own words :

"We contend that all our sales from Jamshedpur are of the type mentioned in Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and at the same time some of them also fall within the category mentioned in Section 3(b) of the Act. Even if the sales are of the type mentioned in Section 3(b) of the Act, the Appropriate State of the place where the sales take place or are effected, has jurisdiction to assess such sales to Central Sales Tax. Section 4(2) lays down the principles for ascer-taining where the sale takes place, or in other words, the situs of the sale. This section creates legal fiction for ascertaining the situs of the sale.

· So far as our inter-State sales from J amshedpur are concerned the situs of such sales will always be in the State of Bihar as the goods will be in Bihar either ,.

Tata Iron t$-Steel Co., Ltd.

v. Sarkar

Sarkar ].

19fin

1'ata lro11 {.,.. _c..·1rrl Co., Ltd v. Satkar Sar~ar ].

at the time of contract of sale (ascertained goods) or at t.he time <1f thPir appropriation to the contract (unascertainerl goods). \Vo have accordingly filed our returns of sales made in the course of inter-State trado or commerce from Jamshedpur with the Bihar Sales tax Authorities under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and have paicl to them the Tax on the basis of these ret.urns ".

The Taxing Officer of the Government of West Bengal did not accept ,_he petitioner's contention. He held:

" l n the casft of s;Lle 11/s 3(b) no property in the goods passes unless the documents of title to goods are in the hands of the buyer. ln such caso the " Appropriate State" to levy the tax should be that State in which the sale has be~n effected; or, in other words, that State in which the documents of title to goods have been transferred to tlie buyer .

.................................................................. In the above circumstances, it is clear that West Bengal is the "Appropriate State" to levy tax on intPr-St.ate sales of the dealer effected by transfer of documents of title to goods in West Bengal. In this case, it should be remembered that section 3(b) refers to transfer of documents and not only to transfer of documents by endorsement. Thus, even if the docu-ments are in the name of the buyer as consignee but these are physically transforred to the buyer in West Bengal then that sale iH taxable in West Bengal. In case of goods consigned to" Self" there is no question that delivery t-0 the railways cannot be constituted as delivery to the buyer".

He also held that ;

"The dealer has said that section 4(2) lays down

the principles for ascert.aining where the sale in tho course of inter-State trade takes place. In other words, the "Appropriate State" (to levy the tax on the sales) u/s 9 of the Central Act (prior to its amend-ment with effect from 1-10-58) should be determined by section 4(2). In my opinion, this is an incorrect reading of the law. E1\ch of section 3 and section 4

deals with quite independent sphere of commercial transactions ".

Finally, he made the best judgment assessment, earlier mentioned, remarking that:

"The dealer has himself admit.ted that he has some sales u/s 3(b). From my experience of examining the books of accounts of the dealer for some earlier years I am of the opinion that very substantial portion of the total sales are effected by transfer of documents in West Bengal. The dealer has refused to comply with my direction to submit statement of such sales. I have, therefore, to make an estimate.

On examining the records of the dealer under the State law and keeping in view the fact that there had been considerable expansion of sales of iron and steel in recent years I estimate the turnover during the period of assessment to be Rs. 9 crores; i.e., an aver-age of Rs. l crore per month ''.

Now in this case the petitioner's complaint is not that there should not have been best judgment assessment. It does not say that that assessment is arbi-trary or, for any other reason, unfair. Its pofot is that the Government of West Bengal could not tax sale where goods were· under the contract of sale moved from Bihar to Bengal even though the docu-ments of title to the goods sold were transferred in Bengal, such sales being taxable only by the Govern-ment of Bihar.

It is clear from what we have said that the Govern-ment of West Bengal purported to tax sales under s. 3(b); it taxed sales where during their movement from Bihar to Bengal, the property in the goods sold passed, by transfer in West Bengal of the documents of title to them. Two questions arise, namely, what is sale under s. 3(b) and which is the" appropriate State " to tax such sales ?

\,Ye take up the first question now. In order to decide it, we have to considers. 3 as whole. The section, so far as material, is in these terms:

Section 3 :-A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase-

Tata Iro>i 6' Steel Co., Ltd.

Sarkar ].

TattJ Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sar Cir

Sarkar ].

(a) occasions the movement of goods from one

State to another; or

(b) is effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods during t.heir movement from one State to another.

The first thing that strikes us is that the section has to be so construed that the two clauses in it are made mutually exelu~ive. It seems clear that it was not contemplated that sale can fall with'n both tho clauses. If that were not so, there might be two " appropriate States" in respect of it, one being the State from which the goods were moved by reason of the sale and the other being another State within which the sale was effected by the transfer of docu· men ts of title during the movement of the goods sold from one State to another. In such case, each of the two" appropriate States" would be entitled to collect tho tax with the result that the same sale would be taxed twice over. The learned counsel for the State of Bihar was inclined to contend, no doubt as an alternative argument, that that could be dona. We do not think that the Act intended such result. We proceed now to state our reasons for this view.

The Act imposes tax on sales in the course of intcr-State trade. It is an Act of the Union legislature. Under the Constitution the State legislatures have no power to tax such sales and only the Union Legis-lature can do so. It is well-recognised that the power to, tax sales made in the course of inter-State trade has been denied to the State Legislatures with the object of preventing multiple taxation of the same sale by different StMes resulting in hardship to the ultimate consumer: see St,ate of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.(') and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd . . v. The State of Bihar ('). Since these cases were decid-ed, tho Constitution has no doubt been amended, but the observations made in them still apply. This being so, the Aot could not have intended to tax the same sale twice.

But apart from this consideration of somewhat general nature, the provisions of the Act plainly make .(t) (19'3] S.C.R. 1Cl09. (2) [ 1955] • S.C.R. bo3,

it impossible to levy two taxes on the same. sale. Under s. 8(1), the tax is certain percentage of the dealer's " turnover". Section 2(j) defines "turnover " as meaning the aggregate of the sale .prices in respe~t of the dealer's sales. So the tax is percentage of the sale price and as each sale produces one price, it follows that it can be taxed only once. Again, s. 9 by providing that the tax shall be collected in the "appro-priate State" by the Government of India, plainly indicates that there is one tax payable to the Govern-ment of India which is collected by one State only. Section 3 by the use of the word "or" between els. (a) and (b) in it also suggests that the clauses are exclu-sive of each other.

One sale then cannot be taxed twice. sale cannot fall under both cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 3, for then it would be liable to tax twice. Clauses (a) and (b) are hence mutually exclusive. Keeping this basic con-sideration in mind, we proceed to construe s. 3.

We take cl. (a) of s. 3 first. That clause contem-plates sale which occasions the movement of goods from one State to another. The words ' sale occasions the movement' should create no difficulty. It is apparent from the explanation in s. 2(a) which will be set out later, that they mean •moved by reason of the sale'. The question then arises, when does sale occasion the movement of goods sold ? It seems clear to us that saie can occasion the movement of the goods sold only when the terms of the sale provide that the goods would be moved ; in other words, sale . occasions movement of goods when the contract of sale so provides.

We turn now to the sale contemplated by cl. (b) of s. 3. That is sale effected by tr\\nsfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another. What then is sale effected by transfer of documents of title? In our view, it can only be sale where the property in the goods sold is . passed by transfer of documents of title. It is well known that in many cases of sale, property in the goods sold is transferred by transfer of documents of title to them. It has been said that sale has several

Tata Iron 6-Steel Co., Lta.

Sarkar ].

Tata Iron 6-Sltel Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar

Sarkar J.

elements, namely, agreement to soil, transfer of pro-p1Jrty in tho goods sold, payment of price, delivery of the goods and so forth: see St.ate of Bombay ,., United .Motors (India) Ltd.('). It seems to us to be inappro-priate to talk of any of these elements of sale being effected by f.ransfer of documents of title, other than the element of tra.nsfor of property. Thus, fur exam-ple, the contra.ct of sale cannot be pffected by the transfer of documents of title, neither the paym~nt of prfoe. transfer of docum~nts of title m"y perhaps effect delivery of the goods if tho parties HO ag1:ee. But. it seems to us that in defining a. sale in the course of inter.State trarfo in statute purporting to tax a. sale, that is transaction in which property in the goods passed, tho legislature was not thinking only of delivery of goods. It does not appear lo us to br, a. reasonable construction of the words 'sale is cffecterl ' to hold that they mean delivrry of tlie thing sold. Therefore, we thi1Jk that cl. (b) refers only to sales where transfer of property in the goods sold takes place by the transfer of documents of title t.o them during their movement from one State to another.

We have then come to this that cl. (a) of s. 3 con-templates sale where the cont.re.ct of sale occasions the movement of the goods sold and cl. (b), 1;ale where transfor of property inf.ho goods sold is r·ffec:ted by a. transfer of documents of title to them. Of course, in the first case, the movement of tlw goods must be from one State to another a11d in tho second, the docu- · ments of title must be transferred during such move-ment.

Now it will be apparent that if this was the foll co11strucf.ion of the two clause~, then they would often overlap. This, as earlier stated, was not intended. We have to narrow down tho construction so as to make the clauses mutually exclusive. There may he sales under the terms of which the goods havo to be moved from one State to another. All such Rales would come within cl. (a). But it may so happen that in some of these sales, the property in the goods passes by a. transfer of documPnt of title to them during their (1) (1953] S.C.R. 1c(,g.

movement. Such sales would fall within cl. (b) also.

To avoid this result we have to exclude from cl. (a) such of the sales coming under it in which the pro-perty in the goods passes by transfer of documents of title to them during their movement. In other· words, where sale comes under both the clauses, it has to be held to fall under cl. (b).

\Ve, therefore, think that the two clauses should be construed in the following way : Clause (a) contem-plates sale where· under the contract of sale the goods sold are moved from one State to another, pro-vided however that such sale will not come under cl. (a) but foll under cl. (b) if the property in the goods sold is passed by transfer of the documents of title to them during their movement from one State to another. Clause (b), on the other hand, contemplates sale where the property in the goods sold is passed by transfer of documents of title to them during their movement from one State to another.

The next question is which State can collect the tax on sale falling under cl. (b) of s. 3, construing that clause in the sense that we have done earlier. In other words, the question in this case is: Would West Bengal be the" appropriate State·" to tax sale where the property in the goods sold passed from the seller to the buyer by transfer in Wes~ Bengal of the docu-ments of title to them during their movement from Bihar to West Bengal ? Again, to put it shortly, in the case of sale under cl. (b) of s. 3, is the State where the transfer of documents of title takes place, the "appropriate State" to tax the sale? The West Bengal Government thought it was. We think that this is the correct view to take.

Now the" appropriate State" which alone can under s. 9 levy and collect the tax under the Act has been defined in s. 2(a) which is in these terms: Section 2.-In this Act, unless the context other-wise requires,-

(a) "appropriate State" means-

(i) in relation to a. dealer who has one or more places of business situate in the same State, that Sta.te;

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar

Sarkar ].

Tafa Iron 6-Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar Sarkar f.

(ii) in relation to dealer who has one or more places of business situate in different Statt>s, every such State with respect to the place or places of business siwato within its territory;

Explanation.-" Place of business" meanR-

(i) in the case of sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce falling within .clause (a) of section 3, the place from whioh the goods have been moved by reason of such sale, .

(ii) in the case of any such sale falling within

clause (b) of s. 3, the place where the sale is effected ;.

So the" appropriate State" iR that within whose territories t.ho dealer bas bis place of business. The pince of business has however to be decided in each case by reference to the kind of ~ale. The effect of a. 2(a) appears to be this: If the sale is of the kind mentioned in cl. (a) of s. 3, the "appropriate State" is that from which the goo<ls have been moved by reason of the contract of sale, while if the sale is of the kind mentioned in cl. (b) of s. 3, the "appropriate State" is that" where the sale is effoctod ".

We aro in this case concerned only with sales under

cl. (b) of s. 3, and the "appropriate State" in respect of such sale has to be decided from cl. (ii) of the Explanation ins. 2(a). Under that clause the" appro-priate State" in respect of such sale is the 8tate "where the sale is effected". The question is, does this definition by itself give sufficient guidance to ascertain the" appropriate St.ate"?

Tho learned counsel for the State of Bihar contends

that the words "where the sale is effected" do not indicate any place of ~a.lo and are not intended to indicate the" appropriate State". The" appropriate State", according to him, has to be decided by resort to s. 4(2) which was intended to be explanatory of Explanation (ii) iu s. 2(a). We will consider s. 4(2) little later. But before we do that, let us examine the argument that the words "where the sale is effected" in cl. (ii) of the explanation in s. 2(a) do not indicate any pla.ce or the" appropriate State".

The learned counsel gave several reasons why the words "where the sale is effected" in cl. (ii) of the

Explanation in s. 2(a) cannot indicate any place. First, he referred to certain observations in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.{') indicating that it was difficut to localise, that is, to fix the place where, sale in the course of inter-State trade takes place. He also said that transfer of property is the creation of jural relation and it is not possible to say where jural rPlation is created. Lastly, he referred to the observations of Lord Lore burn, L. C., in Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v. Hickson(') that, ''if you must decide in what country an appropriation of goods by consent takes place, it takes place not where the consent is given, but where the goods are at the time situate ". Therefore he contended that the words "where the sale is effected" do not point to any parti-cular place of sale. . '

Tata Iron & Steel Co., L_td. v.

Sarkar Sarkar J.

In our opinion, these reasons have no application to case, where statute fixes the place of sale. The difficulty in the cases mentioned above was not that there was no place of sale at all, sale being jnral con-cept, but which of the several places in which sale coulrl be said to have taken place, was the correct one to select. No such difficulty arises where the statute fixes the place of sale. That is what the Act before us admittedly purports to do, in one view by cl. (ii) of the Explanation in s. 2(a) and in the other view by s. 4(2). Clause (ii) of that Explanatfon says in effect that in the case of any sale falling within cL (b) of s. 3 the appropriate State shall be the State where the sale is effected. Now, sale under s. 3(b) is sale " effected " by transfer of documents of title. The "effect" is the sale; the mode in which the" effect"· is produced is by the "transfer of documents of title". As soon as this mode has 'Completed itself the "effect " has been produced. It is simple syllogism that the place where the mode is completed, that is, the transfer of docu- · ments of title takes place, is the place where the effect is produced, that is, the sale is effected. The act con-stituting the mode of effecting the sale being prescribed, the sale must be taken to have been effected where (t) [1953] s.cx 1069 (2) [19o6] A.C. 419, 4"· 53

Tata Iron 6' Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sarha-r

Sarkar j.

that act is performed. Clause (ii) of the Explanation in s. 2(a), therefore, itself fixes the place of sale and no question of any difficulty in fixing it arises. In our view, sale contemplated by s. 3(b) is effected within the State in which the documents of title to the goods sold are transferred resulting in transfer of the pro-perty in them; that State is the "appropriate State" in respect of such sale.

In this view of the matter no question of resorting

to s. 4(2) for fixing the place where sale under s. 3(b)

is effected, arises. The place of that sale is fixed by

cl. (ii) of the explanation in s. 2(a) itself.

It also appears to us to be absolutely clear that the purpose of s. 4(2) was not to fix the place where sale under s. 3(b) can be said to have taken effect. That section is in these terms :

Section 4. When is sale or purchase of goods said to take place outside State.-

(1) Subject to the provisions contained in section

3, when sale or purchase-of goods is determined in accordance with sub-section (2) to take place inside State, such sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States.

(2) sale·or purchase of goods shall be deemed to

take place inside Sta~e if the goods are within the State-

( a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time the contract of sale is made ; and

(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods,

at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appro-priation.

First, what the learned counsel for the petitioner and

the State of Bihar say is that s. 4(2) is really an explanation to cl. (ii) of the. Explanation in s. 2(a); cl. (ii) of the Explanation ins .. 2(a) does not say where sale is effected and the "place" is explained by sub-sec. (2) of s. 4. Now, sub-sec. (2) of s. 4 does not pur-port to be an explanation to clause (ii) oft.he explana-tion in s. 2(a); it does not refer to s. 2(a) at all. It would be strange mode of enacting statute to have

an explanation to another explanation and that too in another part of the statute dealing, as we shall pre-1lently show, with different matter. Further sub-cl. (ii) of the Explanation in s. 2(a) specifies the place of lrnsiness and s. 4(2) specifies State; so the latter cannot be an explanation of the former.

Secondly s. 4(2) states when sale shall be deemed, to take place "inside State". In order however to say where sale takes place in the course of intei:-State trade it is inappropriate to talk of it as taking place " inside State ". sale in the course of inter-State trade from its very uature, has nothing to do with sales inside or outside State. It contemplates commercial activities which take place in more than one State.

Thirdly, s. 4 is not really defining when sale shall ba deemed to take place inside State. It is only defining when sale shall be deemed to take place outside State. It does so by saying that when sale is to be deemed to be inside any State under sub-sec. (2), it shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States. Sub-section (2) provides when sale shall be deemed to take place inside State only for the purpose of showing that it shall then be deemed to have then taken place outside all other States, and for no other purpose. This is clear from the section itself and is made further clear by the heading to the sec-tion. It seems to us that the heading is really pre-amble to the sectitm giving key to its interpretation as was found to be the case in Martins v. Fowler ([1]).

Fourthly, s. 4 is expressly made subject to s. 3. This can only mean that in case any conflict between the two sections appears, s. 3 would prevail. Now these two sections define two kinds of sale, namely, sale in the course of inter-State trade and sale taking place outside State. If sale happens to oome under both definitions, it would have to be taken as sale in the course of inter-State trade for s. 4 has been rnade subject to s. 3. That being so, it would be impossible to hold thats. 4(2) indicates where a· sale falling under s. 3(b) is to be held to have been effected. Lastly it seems clear to us that s. 4 was enacted

(1) [1926] A. C. 746, 750.

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd,

Sarkar .f.

Tata /'1>11 ,: .... Ster/ C0., /.td.

uncfor t.ho power conferred on the Parliament by Art. 286(2) to formulate principles for determining when sale takt'S place "out::;idc State", the State ll'gisla-turcs having been prevented by cl. (I) of that Article from pa"Hing any law imposing tax on such sale. Thi~ iH clear from consideration of ss. 3, 4 aud 5 which together constitute Chapter II uf the Act. Sec-tion 5 stales whrn AalP is said to take placo in the course of export or import. The puwer t-0 enact this section is also derived from Art. 286(2) .. Section 3 formulates the principles for determining when sale is said to take place in the course of inter-State trade and it i8 enacted under thP power for that purpose contained in Art. 269(3). The enactment~ in that Chapter, as it8 hl'ading shows, \\ere for "formulation of principles for determining when sale or purchase .. of goods takes place in the course of inter.St ate tradt>, or uutsiJ1, State or in the course of export or import" irnd werP made under Arts. 269(3) and 286(2), 11s already stated. We think that it is legitimate to refer to the h('ading of Chapter II for ascerta.iuing the intention of the lPgislature on the principlee stateci by tho .Judicial Committee in Toronto Cor7ioration v. 'J'(jronto Railu·uy (')in the~e words:"This clause is the la~t of fasciculus, of which thP heading· is "Track, &c., and Hail ways", and, as was held i11 Hananernmith Ry. Cu. v. Brand, such ht·adi11g is tu be regarded ~s giving the key to the interpretation of the dauses ranged under it, unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation". The interpretation that we put on s. 4 in the light of the heading, is clearly not incun~istent with the word-ing of tb11t section. It is admitted that s. 5 has no connection with the other pro\'isionR iu the Act and is clearly only laying down principles for d_ctermining when sale can be said to have taken place in the course of import of goods into or export of goods out of, r ndia.. It would be kgitimato to hold that simi-larly s. 4 was enacted only for the purpose of formula-ting· principles for d~termining when sale is said to take place outside Stale and nut for any other pur-pose. For all these reasons, we hold that sub-s. (2) of (1) [1g.>7J A. C. 315, 324

s. 4 was not enacted for determining w hic_h is an "appropriate State" to collect the tax in the case of sale falling under cl. (b) of s. 3.

It was argued on behalf of the Government of Bihar that in any case the sales of the petitioner from Jams-hedpur do not come under cl. (b) of s. 3 because all such sales were made ,pursuant to the permit granted under the provisions of Iron & Steel (Control) Order, 1956, issued under the Essential Supplies Act, 1955, the directions in which permit the petitioner was bound to carry out. - It appears that iron and steel being controlled commodities, they could not under the provisions of the Act and Order aforesaid, be sold without the permission of the Iron &'Steel Controller. It was contended that when on cont,ract made pur-suant to such permission, the petitioner loaded the goods into the railway wagons at Jamshedpur, the property in them passed under s. 23(1) of the Sale of Goods Act to the purchaser, because, in view· of the Iron & Steel (Control) Order, 1956, the goods became _ unconditionally appropriated to the contract by the seller with the assent of the buyer. The case of Com-missioner of Sales '/'ax, Bihar v. New India Sugar Mills(') was cited as authority for this view. This case was decided under different Order. We do not pro-pose to go into the question whether in any pa.rticular sale property was transferred from the seller to the buyer or how and when. -That point can be taken before the appropriate taxing authorities. ·

It appears to.us that the Taxing Officer of the West Bengal Government took the same view o~ s. 3(b) a.s we have done. He said that in the case of sale under s. 3(b) " no property in the goods passes unless the documents of title to the goods are in the hands of the buyer". This, of course, means that in the case of sale under cl. (b) of s. 3 the property in the goods . sold passes by the transfer of documents of title to them. The Taxing Officer was further clearly con-templating the transfer of documents of title ta.king place during the movement of the goods from J amshedpur to places in West Bengal. So far, it seems to us, his view is correct and unexceptionable. He (r) 10 Sales Tax: Cases 74.

Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Sarkar

Sarkar ].

Te1t~1 fr,.i1 :,, Sttd Co., /.t4 v. Sarke1r _{

however proceeded to statP. that "<'\'ell if tho docu-ments are in the na.me of the buyer as consignee but these <>re physic1\lly trnusforred to the buyer in \VeRt Bengal, then that sale is taxable in West Bengal''. We think that. this was not correct view to take. Tho transfer of documents of title to the g0<Jds sold can pass the property in them only if the parties agree tlrnt I.hat would l>e t.he rcHult. Therefore, the: Taxing O/lic••r of the \Vest 8eng1\I e.;ovcrnmcnt hiid further to bear in mind the question whether the parties had :..greed that. phy~ical delh·ery of the documents of title to the goorls would pass thP propnrty in them. Ht' dotis not seem to ha\'e done this. In the other case also where the documents of title are transferred to the buyer 1tfter endorsement, the same lest has to be kept i11 mind, namely, that such transfer would pass the 1•roperly iu the goods only if the parties agreed that tha.l would ha.pp•in. It., therefore, seoms lo us that tho West Beng1d Go,·ernmeut's Taxing Officers order may not ha.rn been completely in consonance with s. 3(b). l u w> far as it purported to levy tax on sales whero the doc:uments of title aro already in the nam~ of the lrnyer simply h•Jcauso such documents had been trans-forrcd in West. Bo)nga.1, it ma.y have g[0]1ne outside the limits of s. 3(b). The order of a.ssessmont mado by tho T1uing Officer of the Government of West Bengal in this case is benee liable to be set aside.

We a('cordingly set aside the order made by the

Taxing Olficer of thn Government of West Bengal on October 21, 1950, assessing the petitioner to tax of gs, 4l,14,718-l2nP. The Government of Wost Bengal will be at liberty to proceed to assess the tax afresh in terms of the interpretation put on s. 3 by us in this judgment.

\Ye do not think it tit to ma.kc any ordor a.s to the costs of this petition.

BY COURT: In view of the majority judgment of

the Court, the petition is allowed with costs, and it ic directed that writ of certiorari will issue quash in~. the order of a8sessment made by the Commercial Ta>. Oliicn, LyonH Hange, Calcutta.

Petition allowed.