MAHARAJA PRAVIR CHANDRA BHANJ DEO KAKATIYA versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

MAHARAJA PRAVIR CHANDRA BHANJ DEO KAKATIYA v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (J AFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. c. DAS GUPTA, RAGHUBAR DAYAL a.nd N. RAJAGOPALA AY7ANGAR, JJ.)

"Ruler"-Recognition by President-Whether ex-Ruler for purposes outside the Constitution-Maufidar, Meaning of-Constitu-tion of India, Art. 366(22)-Madliya Pradesh Abolition of Proprie-tary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, z950 (M. P. I of z95z), s. 2(m).

The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster which was later integrated with the State of Madhya Pradesh. He was recognised by the President as Ruler under Art. 366(22) of the Constitution. The respondent resumed certain lands belonging .to the appellant under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Pro-prietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950. The appellant contended that he was still Ruler and not an ex-Ruler and as such did not come within the definition of "pro-prietor" given in the Act.

Held, that the appellant was an ex-Ruler for the purposes of the Act and was within the class of persons who were by name included in the definition of 'proprietor' and was within the scope of the Act. Factually the appellant was an ex-Ruler. He was Ruler for the purposes of the privy purse guaranteed to him. There was nothing .in Art. 366(22) which required court to treat such person as Ruler for purposes outside the Constitution. Further, the appellant was also maufidar in respect of the lands acquired which were exempt from the pay-ment of rent or tax. The expression "maufidar" was not neces-sarily confined to grantee from State or Ruler of State; he could be the holder of land which was exempted from pay-ment of rent or tax.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 198 of 1954.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 16, 1952, of the former Nagpur High Court in Misc. Petn. No. 1231 of 1951.

M. S. K. Sastri, for the a.ppella.nt.

H. L. KhasMam, B. K. B. Naidu a.nd I. N. Shroff, for the respondent. -

I9[60 ]

November rB.

1960. November 18.

The Judgment of the Court

Maha..aja Pravir was delivered by

IMAM, J.-This is an appeal from the judgment of

Chandra Bhan)

Deo Kakatiya the Nagpur High Court dismissing the appellant's Th ;· petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of Mad:ya'~'.:a:esh 1 India. The High Court certified under Art. 132(1) of · _ the Constitution that the case involved substantial Imam J. question of law as to the interpretation of the Consti-tution. Hence the present appeal.

The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster.

After the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the appellant executed an Instrument of Accession to the Dominion of India on August 14, 1947. There-after, he entered into an agreement with the Domi-nion of India popularly known as "The Stand Still Agreement". On December 15, 1947, he entered into an agreement with the Government of India whereby he ceded the State of Baster to the Government of India to be integrated with the Central Provinces and Berar (now the State of Madhya Pradesh) in such manner as the Government of India thought fit. Con-sequently the Governments in India came to have exclusive and plenary authority, jurisdiction and pow-ers over the Baster State with effect from January 1, 1948.

The Legislature of the State of Madhya Pradesh

passed the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the Act, which received the assent of the Presi-dent of India on January 22, 1951. The preamble of the Act stated that it was one to provide for the acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, ma-hals, alienated villages and alienated lands in Madhya Pradesh and to make provisions for other matters connected therewith. Under s. 3 of the Act, vesting of proprietary rights in the State Government takes place on certain conditions, mentioned in that section, being complied with. The definition of 'proprietor' is stated in s. 2 cl. (m) and it is

"in relation to-

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(i) the Central Provinces, includes an inferior

1960 -.-.

proprietor, protected thekailar or other thekai1ar, or protected headman;

Mahara1a Prav~r

t •t . ,£.3-• err1 ones, means mauJ"™"r in-

t •t . ,£.3-• Chandra BhanJ ( u t merge [.. ][) ]err1 ones, means mauJ"™"r in-Dea Kakatiya eluding an ex-Ruler of an Indian State merged with v. 1 Madhya Pradesh, Zamindar, Ilaq_uedar, Khorposhdar 1"he stats of or Jagirilar within the meaning of wajib-ul-arz, or any Madhya Pradesh sana.d, deed or other instrument, and gaontia or Imam]. thekadar of village in respect of which by or under the provisions contained in the wajib-ul-arz appli-cable to such village the maufiilar, the gaontia, or the thekadar, as the case may be, has right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such village;".

The definition of 'mahal' is stated in s. 2(j) and it is

" "ma.ha.I", in relation to merged territories, means any area other than land in possession of raiyat which has been separately assessed to land revenue, whether such land revenue be payable or has been released, compounded for or redeemed in whole or in part;". ·

Before the High Court the appellant contended that he was still Sovereign Ruler and absolute owner of the villages specified in Schedules and of his peti-tion under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. He urged that his rights had been recognized and guaran-teed under the agreements entered into by him with the Government of India. The provisions of the Act, therefore, did not apply to him. It was further con-tended that the provisions of the Act did not apply to Ruler or to the private property of Ruler which was not assessed to land revenue. He relied on Art. 6 of the Instrument of Accession and the first para-graph of Art. 3 of the Merger Agreement. The High Court held that if the petitioner's rights under Art. 6 of the Instrument of Accession and Art. 3 of the Merger Agreement had been infringed it was clear from the provisions ·9£ Art. 363 of the Constitution that interference by the courts was barred in disputes arising out of these two instruments. The High Court was also of the opinion that Art. 362 of the Constitu-tion wa.s of no assistance to the a"{lpellant.

After referring to the definition of the word 'pro-

M ahara1a -. Prav" . prietor' in the , Act, fid the High . Court was of the opinion Chandra Bhan· t at t wor man ar' ms. 2(m) of the Act had not Deo Kal•atiy~ been used in any narrow or technical sense. 'maufi-v. dar' was not only person to whom grant of maufi Th• s1a1e of lands had been made but was also one who held land Madhya Prad,sh which was exempt from the payment of "rent or tax". Im-;;;;;.f. It accordingly rejected the contention on behalf of the appellant that the word 'maufidar' is necessarily con-fined to grantee from the State or Ruler and there-fore Ruler could not conceiva.bly be maujidar. The High Court also rejected the contention on behalf of the appellant that as he was "Ruler" within the meaning of that expression in Art. 366(22) of the Con-stitution he did not come within the expression 'ex-Ruler' as contained in the definition of the word 'pro-prietor' in the Act. The expression 'Ruler' as defined in Art. 366(22) of the Constitution applied only for interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. The expression 'ex-Ruler' given in the Act must therefore be given the ordinary dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 'Ruler' means "one who, or that which, exercises rule, especially of supreme or sovereign kind. One who has control, management, or headship within some limited sphere". The High Court accordingly took the view that '"1-though the appellant did exercise such rule in the past he ceased to exercise it in his former Domain after the agreements of accession and merger had come into operation. Accordingly the appellant must be regarded as an ex-Ruler and as he was also maujidar he fell within the definition of the word 'pro-prietor' in the Act.

The question whether the villages mentioned in

Schedules and of the petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution fell in any of the categories, "Estates, Maha.ls, Alienated lands", was also consider-ed by the High Court. In its opinion they did not fall within the category of Estates or Alienated lands but they did fall within the category of Mahals. According to the definition of 'Mahal' in s. 2(j) of the Act the same must be separately assessed to land

2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

revenue. .According to the appellant they had not

been assessed to land revenue but this was denied on -.-P . behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The High 111 c~a:~;; B;::;r Court was of the opinion that in these circumstances it Deo Kakatiya was for the appellant to establish that the villages in v. question had never been assessed to lan,d revenue but The State of no evidence ·had been led to this effect. On the con-Madhya Pradesh trary, according to -the High Court, it would appear Ima"' ]. from the documents on the re.cord that the villages known as 'Bhandar villages' had been assessed to land revenue. .As the rest of the villages in Schedule and the villages in Schedule B, upto the date of the High Court iudgment, had not been recognized as the pri-vate property of the appellant by the Government of India as required by the second and third paragraphs of the Merger Agreement, the appellant could not assert his ownership over them. The High Court, accordingly, dismissed his petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution;Two questions in the main were urged before us (1) whether the appellant is proprietor within the mean-ing of that expression in the Act and (2) whether the villages in question came within the definitiop. of the word 'mahal' contained in the .Act. On behalf of the appellant it had also been urged that the Act could not defeat the rights of the appellant guaranteed under .Art. 3 of the Merger .Agreement. It seems clear to us, however, that in view of the provisions of .Art. 363(1) of the Constitution any dispute arising out of the Merger .Agreement or the Instrument of .Accession is beyond the competence of the courts to enquire into. The High Court rightly decided this point against the appellant.

With reference to the first point we would first con-

sider whether the appellant is an ex-Ruler for the purposes of the Act. That he is so factually cannot be denied, since he ceded his State to the Government of India to be integrated with the Cel)tral Provinces and Berar (now the State of Madhya Pradesh)' in such manner as the Government of India thought fit. He further ceded to the Government of India full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers in relation

<96o to the governance of his State when he agreed that . the administration of that State would be transferred M Chand•• ara;a [-:-P ]Bhanj ravir to t overnment o I n d" ia as rom J anuary 1, 1 9 48. Deo Kakatiya The question is whether bis recognition for the pur-v. poses of the Constitution as Ruler by virtue of the The State of provisions of Art. 366(22) of the Constitution of India Madhya PYOdesh continues his status as Ruler for purposes other than Im-;;;;; J. the Constitution. Art. 366(22) states:

The State of Im-;;;;; J.

" "Ruler" in relation/to an Indian State means the

Prince, Chief or other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in clause (1) of article 291 was entered into and who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler".

Article 291 refers to the privy purse payable to Rulers.

It states:

"Where under any covenant or agreement entered

into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the com-menc~ment of this Constitution, the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India to any Ruler of such State as privy purse-

(a) such sums shall be charged on, and paid out

of, the Consolidated Fund of India; and

(b) the sums so paid to any Rulei: shall be exempt

from all taxes on income."

Article 291 refers to any covenant or agreement enter-

ed into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of the Constitution. The covenant or agreement referred to in this Article certainly includes the Instrument of Accession and the Merger Agree-ment. The effect of the Merger Agreement is clearly one by which factually Ruler of an Indian State ceases to be Ruler but for the purposes of the Con-stitution and for the purposes of the privy purse guaranteed, he is Ruler as defined in Art. 366(22) of the Constitution. There is nothing in the provisions of Art. 366(22) which requires court to recognise such person as Ruler for purposes outside the Constitu. tion. In our opinion, the High Court rightly held that

the appellant was an ex-Ruler and that Art. 366(22)

of the Constitution did not make him Ruler for the Maharaja Pravir purposes of the Act. As the appellant was an 'ex-Chandra Bhanj Ruler', he was within the class of persons who were Deo Kaka"ya by name specifically included in the definition of 'pro-T ;· prietor' and therefore cleai'ly within the scop~ of the Ma!~ya'~;a~esh 1 Act.

That the appellant was not only an ex-Ruler but maufidar appears to us to be clear. The ordinary dictionary meaning of maufi is "Released, . exempted, exempt from the payment of rent or tax, rent free" and maufidar is "A holder of rent-free land, gran-tee". It was common ground in the High Court that the villages in question were exempt from the pay-ment of rent or tax. In our opinion, the High Court rightly took the view that the expression• 'maufidar' was not necessarily confined to grantee from State or Ruler of State. A.maufidar could be· perso1.1 who was the holder of land which was exempted from the payment of rent or tax. In our opinion, the appellant certainly came within the expression 'maufi-dar' besides being an 'ex-Ruler' of an Indian State merged with Madhya Pradesh.

Imam].

It is, however,. contended on behalf of the appel-lant that the most important part of the definition was the conclu~ing portion where it was stated that in the case of maufidar he must be .a person who by or under the provisions contained in the wajib-ul-arz applicable to his village, had the right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such village. It was contended that even if the appellant was maufidar, there was nothing to show that with refer-ence to any village held by him it was entered in the wajib-ul-arz, that he had right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such vmage. In the petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitu-tion, filed by the appellant in the High Court, it was nowhere asserted that even· if he was regarded as maufidar it was not entered in the wajib-ul-arz with respect to any of his maufi villages that he had. right to recover rent or revenue from persons holding land in such villages. From the judgment of the High

'9[[6]]° Court it would appear that no such argument was M Chand.a araJa . Bhanj P ravir . advanced before it. un e~ . rt. 13~(1) o In the the Const1tut10n we can find no application for certificate . . Dea Kakatiya ment10n of this. In the statement of the case filed in v. this Court also there is no mentfon of this fact. There The State oJ is thus no material on the record to establish that the Madhya Pradesh appellant as maufidar had no right to recover rent Im:;: J. or revenue from persons holding land in his villages. The burden was on the appellant to prove this fact which he never attempted to discharge. It is impos-sible therefore to accept this contention on behalf of the appellant raised for the first time 'before us in the course of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.Regarding the second point arising oµt of the defi-nition of 'Mahal', the High Court definitely found that the petitioner had given no evidence to establish that the villages in question were not assessed to land revenue. On the contrary, at least with reference to the Bhandar villages documents on the record showed that these villages had been assessed to land revenue. Since it was question of fact whether the villages had been assessed to land revenue, which was denied on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh, the High Court rightly held that the contention of the appel-lant in this respect could not. be accepted. As for the other villages, in Schedules and of the petition of the appellant under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitu-tion the High Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the petition was not maintainable as these villages had not yet been recognised by the Government of India as the private property of the appellant. In our opinion, the appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dism.issed.