DALIP SINGH versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB

this view, because in our judgment, the contention of The State of the a.ssessee that for setting a.side an adverse order Ulla• P•adesh inconsistent with the provi8ions of the amending Act 6- Othm of 1956, a. proceeding for review under s. II isthe only v. remedy which is open to an aggrieved party, is with-;·~· Sye~ out force. court of appeal, in an appeal properly Saad•~ ·;~·Khan before it, must give effect to the law a.sit stands if the law ha.a at some stage anterior to the hearing of Shah ]. the appeal been a.mended retrospectivelJ;. with the object of conferring upon the authority or tribunal of first instance from the order whereof the appeal is filed jurisdiction which it originally la.eked : and a. provision for review like the one contained in s. 11 of the a.mending Act does not affect the power of the appellate court to deal with the appeal iu the light of the a.mended law.

In the view expreBSed by us, this appeal must be allowed. As the appellant succeeds relying on a. statute which was enacted after the date of the judg-ment of the High Court, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.

DALIP SlNGH

July a8. ·

THE STATE OF PUNJAB.

(P. B. GAJENDBAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. c. DAS GUPTA

and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)

service Sardar Dalip Singh, Inspector General of Police, Pepsu (on leave) for administrative reasons with effect from the 18th August, 1950."

No charges were framed against him and it was on his insist-ence that certain charges were communicated to him. Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations, 193r, which was then in force, provided as follows:-

" 278. For all classes of pensions of person who desires to obtain the pension is required to submit his application before any pension is granted to him.

The State reserves to itself the right to retire any of its employees on pension on political or on other reasons."

The question for determination in the appeal was whether the compulsory retirement of the appellant amounted to removal or dismissal from service within the meaning of Art. 3r r(2) of the Constitution. The trial Court held in favour of the appellant and the High Court ag~inst him, ,

Held, that the two tests laid down by this Court for deter-mining whether an order of compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal from service were (r) whether it was by way of punishment, charge or imputation against the officer, being made the basis of the exercise of the power, and (2) whe-ther the officer was deprived of any benefit already earned as in case of dismissal or removal.

Shyamlal v. State of U. P., [1955] l S.C.R. 26 and State of Bombay v. Subhagchand Doshi, [1958] S.C.R. 571, referred to.

So judged, the order passed against the appellant could not amount to dismissal or removal from service \Vi thin the meaning of Art. 3rr(2) of the Constitution.

The order was not one purported to have been made on any charge of misconduct or inefficieny and the fact that any such considerations might have weigh:ed with the Government in passing the order under Rule 278 did not amount to any imputation or charge against the officer, and there could be no question of losing any benefit earned since the Rule itself pro-vided for retirement on pension and the officer had in fact been allowed full pension.

It would not be correct to say that since the Rule did not fix any age for compulsory retirement, an order of compulsory retirement passed under it must necessarily be regarded as dis-missal or removal within the meaning of Art. 3rr(2) of the Constitution.

State of Bombay v. Subhagchand Doshi, [1958] S.C.R. 571, ex-plained.

C1v1L APPELtATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1958.

Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab

Dalip Singh '" Tiu State ~f l'unjab

Das Gupta J.

Appeal from tho judgment and decree dated Octo-ber 18, 1956, of the former PEPSU High Court in Reguhtr First Appeal Ko. 11 of 1954, arising out of the judgment aud decree dated Kovember 21, 1953, of the Additioual District ,Judge, Patiala.

Gopal Singh and K. R. Krishnaswamy, for the appellant.

N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondent.

1960. July 28. delivered by

The Judgment of the Court was

DAS GUPTA J.-The appellant Dalip Singh l'lltered

the service of the Patiala State in 1916 and rose to the rank of Inspector General of .Police of the State in June 1946. After the formation of the State of Pepsu he was absorbed in the Police Service of the newly formed State and was appointed and confirmed as Inspector General of Police thereof. While holding that post he proceeded on leave from October 18, 1949, till August 17, 1950. Ou August 18, 1950, an order was made by the Hajpramukh of the State in these words:-

" His Highness the ltajpramukh is pleased to retire from service Sardar Dalip Singh, Inspector General of Police, Pcpsu (on lea.ve) for administrative reasons with effect from the 18th August, 1950."

copy oft.his order was forwarded to the appellant.

Thereupon on August 19, 1950, the appellant wrote to the Chief Secretary of the State stating that by his retirement he would be put to heavy loss, i.i>., about Rs. 50,000 which he would ha\·e earner! as his pay and allowances etc., during this period and that his pension was also being affected and that this decision of the Government tanLamounts to his removal from service. He requested that the Government should let him know the grounds which bad impelled the Go,·ernment to take this decision about his removal. Ultimately on March 30, 1951, the Government mentioned the charges against him on the basis of which the Government had decided to retire him on administrative grounds. After service of notice under

s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant brought suit in the Court of the District Judge, Patiala, against the State of Pepsu asking for decla-ration that the orders of August 16, 1950, and August 18, 1950, whereby "the plaintiff has been removed from the post of Inspector-General of Police, Pepsu, are unconstitutional, illegal, void, ultra vires and inoperative and that the plaintiff still continues to be in the service of the defendant as Inspector General of Police and is entitled to the arrears of his pay and allowances from August 18, 1950, and is also entitled to continue to draw his pay and allowances till his retirement at the age of superannuation ; and decree for the recovery of Hs. 26,699-13.0 and full· costs of this suit and future interest."The main plea on which the suit was based was that the order of August 18, 1950, amounted to his removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution and the provisions of that article not having been complied with the termination of his service was void and inoperative in law. The respon-dent State contended that the plaintiff had been retired from service and had not been removed from service and so Art. 311 of the Constitution had no application. On this question the trial Court came to the conclusion that the order compulsorily retiring the plaintiff amounted to his removal within the meaning of Art. 311 of the· Constitution and as the requirement of that Article had not been com-plied with it held that the termination of service effected by that order was void in law. The Court accordingly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff declaring that the orders of the Government dated August 18, 1950, whereby the plaintiff had been remo. vcd from the post of Inspector General of Police, Pepsu, are unconsitutional, illegal, void and ultra vires and inoperative and that the plaintiff still continued to be in the service of the defendant as Inspector Gene-ral of Police and he his entitled to the arrears of his pay and allowances from August 18, 1950 and is also entitled to continue to draw his pay and allowance

Ig6o Dalip Singh

v. The State of Punjab

Das Gupta ].

Dalip Singh v. The Stale of Punjab Das Gupta ].

till his retirement at the age of superannuation and decree for the recovery of Rs. 26,699-13 0.

On appeal by the State the Pepsu High Court disagreeing with the Trial Court held that the order of compulsory retirement did not amount to removal from service within the meaning of Art. 3ll of the Constitution and accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

The main contention of the plaintiff before us was that the order of retirement did amount to his remov-al from service within t.he meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The learned counsel also wanted to argue that Rule 278 oft.he Patiala State Regulations under which the Government apparently ma.de the order of compulsory retirement was no longer opera-tive. Jt appears that the Patiala State Regulations which continued to govern the members of the services of that State after they became integrated into the Pepsu State Services were revised from time to time. It was suggested by the learned counsel that the revised rules do not contain any rules similar to Ruic 278. Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations was in the following words:-

" 278. For all classes of pensions the person who

desires to obtain the pension is required to submit his application before any pension is granted to him.

The State reserves to itself the right to retire any of its employees on pension on political or on OLher reasons.''

The learned counsel though wanting to persuade us that the Ruic about the State reserving lo itself the right to retire any of its employees on pension on poli-tical or on other reasonA was not present in the new rules was unable to show us however that before AuguHt 18, 1950, there. had been any r~vision of Rule 278. It appears that revised rules for Travelling Allowanee were published in 1946 as Vol. II of the new rules; and Rules relating to pa.y and a.llowances were published as Vol. l in 1947. Thereafter in 1952 we find that the first volume of the Pepsu Service ltegula- · tions as rrgards pay and leave rules wa.s published. In the same yea.r t.he third volume of the Pepsu State

Regulations containing rules relating to pensions was published. In the preface to this volume we find this statement :-

Dalip Singh

v. The_ State of Punjab

"The Revised Edition of the Patiala State Regu-lations relating to pay, allowances, leave, pension and travelling allowance was published in the year 1931. Subsequently the travelling allowance rules were revised and issued as Patiala Service Regulations, Vol. II, in the year 1946. Similarly the pay, allow-ances and leave rules were taken out from the Revised Edition (1931) and printed as Patiala Services Regula-tions, Voll,lme 1, in the year 1947. The other rules relating to pensions continued to remain in the Revis-ed Edition (1931) and kept upto date by the issue of correction slips. On the formation of the Patiala & East Punjab States Union on 20-8-48, these rules were made applicable to the entire territories of the Union by Ordinance No. I of 2005. The number of copies of this publication available for official use had run out of stock and great difficulty has been experienced in Government "offices for want of it for reference. It was therefore found necessary to revise and reprint · this publication to make it available to all offices." This makes it clear that ilpto the publication in 1952 of Volume III of the Pepsu Service Regulations the pension rules. appearing in the 1931 edition of the Patiala State Regulations continued to be applicable to Pepsu. On August 18, 1950, therefore it is reason-able to hold that Rule 278 in its entirety remained in force and was applicable to Pepsu. It is interesting to mention that in this 1952 edition also this reservation by the Government of the "right to retire any of its employees on pension on political or on other reasons" has been maintained (Vide Chapter V, Rule 10). The contention of the learned counsel that Rule 278 was not applicable to the case of the appellant on· August 18, 1950, is therefore totally without foundation.

Das Gupta ].

This brings us to the main contention in the case. viz., that the compulsory retirement of the appellant under Rule 278 of the Patiala State Regulations was removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The question whether the

Dal1p SingA v. Tlic .<..,·talc of Pioijab Das Gupta }.

termination of service by compulsory retirement in accordance with Service gu]es amount to removal from service was considered by this Court in Shyamlal v. The State of U. P. and the Union of India(') arid again recently in State of Bombay v. Subhagchand Doshi ('). The Court decided in Shyom lal's Case(') that two tests had to be applied for ascertaining whether tcrmina. tion of servico by compulsory retirement amounted to removal or dismissal so as to attract the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The first is whcth<>r the action is by way of punishment and to find that out the Court said that it was necessary that charge or imputation against the ofiicer is made tho condition of the exercise of the power ; the second is whether by compulsory retirement the officer is losing the benefit he has already earned as he does by dismissal or removal. In that case in fact charge.sheet was drawn up against the officer and an enquiry held but ultimately the order of compulsory rel.irement was not based on the result of the t>nquiry. Tho Court pointed out that the enquiry was merely to lrnlp ·the Govern. ment to make up its mind as to whether it was in the public interest to dispense with hi8 services so that thP imputation made in thu chargc.8hect was not being made the condition of the exercise of the power.These test~ were applied in Doshi'.~ Case(') and it was held that the provisions of compulsory retirement under H,ule 165.:\ of the Saurashtra Civil Service Rules under which the order of retirement was made there was not violative of Art. 3ll(2). It was pointed out t.hat "while misconduct and inefficienc\· are fac-tors that enter into the account where the O'rder is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that whilo in the cas(' of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if held-and there is no duty to hold an enquiry-is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of cli8missal or removal, they form the verv basis on which tho order is made and the enquiry thereon must be formal, and must satisfy

(2) [1958] S.C.R 571

(1) [1955]1S.C.R26.

the ru'!es of natural justice and the requirements of Art. 311(2) ". ,

, In the case l]efore us the order of the Rajpramukh does not purport to be passed on any charge of mis-conduct or inefficiency. All it states is that the com-pulsory retirement is for "administrative reasons.!!. It was only after the appellant's own insistence to be supplied with the grounds w bi ch led to the decision that certaip charges were communicated to him·. There is therefore no basis for saying that the order of retire-ment contained any inputation or charge against the officer. The fact that considerations of misconduct or inefficiency weighed with the Government in coming to its conclusion whether any action should be taken under Rule 278 does not amount to any imputation or charge against the officer.

Applying the other test, viz., whether the officer has lost the benefit he has earned, we find that the officer has been allowed full pension. There ls no ques-tion of his having lost benefit earned. It may be pointed out that Rule 278 itself provides for retire-ment on pension. If the provision had been for retire- · ment without pension in a,ccordance with the rules there might have been some reason to hold that the retirement was by way of'punishmen·t. As however the retirement can only be on pensi()n in accordance with the rules-in the present case full pension has been granted to the officer-the order of retirement is clearly not by way of punishment.

In Doshi's Case(') there is at p. 579 an obs'ervation ·which might at first sight ·seem to suggest that in the op.inion of tbis Court compulsory retirement not - amounting to dismissal or removal couW' only take place under rule fixing an age for compulsory retire-ment. \Ve do not think that was what the Court in-tended to say in Doshi's Gase('). In Doshi's Case(') there was in fa.ct rule fixing an age for compulsory retirement, at the age of 55, and in addition another rule for compulsory i:etirement after. an officer had completed the age of 50 or 25 years of service. It was in that context that the· Court made the above (1) [x958] S.C.R. 57'·

Dalip Singh v. The State of Punjab

Das Gupla ].

Dalip Singh v. The Slale of Punjab

Das Gupta f•

observation. It·had.not in that case to deal with a·rule w.liich did provide for compulsory retirement, at any age w·hatsoever irrespective of the length of. service put in. It will not be' pr'oper to read the observation~ in Doshi's" Gase referred to above as laying down the law that retirement undar the..rule we are considering must necessarily be regarded as dismissal cir removal within the meaning of Art. 311. .

}Ve are therefore oI opinion that the High Court was right in holding that the order of compulsory retire-ment made against the appellant was not removal from service so as to attract the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution and that the suit was rightly dis-missed. 'The appeal Is accqrdingly dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

August I.

PANDIT M. S. M. SHARMA .-v.

DR. SHREE KRISHNA -SINHA AND OTHERS. (:!} •. P. SINHA; c. J., JAFER IMAM, P. B. GAJENDRA-GADKll.R, A. K. SARKAR, K.- SUBBA RAO, -K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA and J. 0. SHAH, JJ.)

State Legislature-Breach of Privilege-Decision of Court, if res-judicata betw.en parties-Constitution of India, Arts. I94(3), Ig(I)(a).

The petitioner, the Editor of the Searchlight, an English daily newspaper published from Patna, was called upon to show cause before .the Committee of Privileges of the Bihar Legisla-tive .A:ssembly why. he should not be proceeded against for the breach of privilege of the Speaker and the Assembly for publish-ing 1tn)naccurate .account of the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. He moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitu-tioµ for quashing the said proceediqg and the question for deci-sion in ~ubstance was whetjier the said ·privilege conferred ·by Art. 194(3) of the Constitution was subject to the fundamental