ALL INDIA BANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION versus NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & OTHERS

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'.l'S

should do something in the discharge of his own duty and thereby obtain valuable thing or pecu-niary advantage.

These observations dispose of the present appeal and it must be held that there is no merit in the contentions raised in support of the appeal. As the only point raised in support of the appeal fails, it is accordingly dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

ALL INDIA BANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & OTHERS (And Connected Petitions)

(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and

J. R. MunHOLKAR, JJ.)

Fundamental Right-Right to form association or union-Scope of-Stature protecting Banks from disclosure of information regarding secret reserves etc.-Oonstitutionality of-Bankinll Companies Act, 1949 (X of 1949), s. 34-A-Oonstitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(c).

Section 34-A of the Banking Companies Act, I 949, intro-duced in 1960, provides that no banking company shall be compelled to produce or give inspection of its books of account or other document or furnish or disclose any statement or in-formation which the company claims to be of confidential 4 nature and the production etc., of which would involve di•-closure of information relating to any reserves not sho\crn as suc_h in its published balance sheet or any particulars not shown therein in respect of provisions made for bad and doubtful debts and other usual or necessary provisions. Sub-section (2) of '· 34-A provides that any authority, before whom the question as to whether any amount out of such reserves or provisions should be taken into account, may refer the question to the Reserve Bank and the Reserve Bank shall furni•h to the autho-rity certificate stating that the authority shall or shall not take -~ •-into account the amount specified therein. Sub-section (3) makes s. 34-A applicable to only such banking companies whose operations extend beyond one State. The Appellant contended

Dhane81twar Na rain Saxen• v. The Delhi ~4dminiatratio11 Sinha C. J.

All India Bank Employets' AsDociation v •• Naiional Industrial ~ V'ibunal

270 ~UP~~ COPRJ REPOR~S [1962J

that s. 34-A c.;mtravened the fundamental tight guaranteed to trade unions.by Art. 19( l')(c)' of the Constitution as it prevented them .from effectively lxefcising the concomitent fight of collective bargaining in respect of \vages, bonus etc. befOre Industria,l Trjbunals by shutting out important a11d re~ levant evidence and that thC Section violated Art. 14 of the Constitution as it' was n6t mad.er applicable to all the banking· co~panies.

r· Held, thats. 34-A of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, was constitutionally valid and did not'offend eitl)tr Art. 19( 1)( c) or Art. 14 of the Constitution.

The right guarant~ed by Art. !9(l)(c) of the Constitution does not carry \Vith· it concomitant right that unions fC?rmed for protecting the interests of labour shall achieve their object such that any interference to such achievement by any law wotild ,])e.uncl\rlstitution'af i.11\less' it could k>e 'justified ,under Art. 1\1(4) as being in the interests of Public order or morality. '.The right under Art, 19(l)(cJ extends only to the. formation of an a's~9~i.afipn Of \lnion ap~ i~Ef:Jf¥ ,as ,the f\Ctixities 0( the jlS~O­ciation or union a.re con,csrl).i;d or ,as regards ~qe steps which the union might take to acl{i.eve its otiject, they are subjec~ to such laws as may be ffamed !and: suCh .la\\'S cannot be: tested under Art. ll)(+) .. i;;e~pon 31-A was i;nacted to effect re-conciliation bet,veen lhf. confli~~n~ interest .of labour to obtain p1opcr relief in. !nc!usir1a1 arLiLi'ation, a'Ila the beed to prc~ervc and maintain the delicate fabrit of the credit structure of the country by strengthening the t1eal as well as the appatent credit w,orthiness of banks 'op'erating in •the country.· It preserved industiial adjudication in' respect 'cf'disputes between the banks and their employees by entrusting the duty of determining the surplus res,rve :-rhich, <:ould be tal\~\1 iP~.o l''<;ount as part of the asse~s for determining t!'i~ir cap~city to pay to t4e l\.cservc Bank, ·

Rome•h-fI'hdpparN.>State of .Madras (1950) S.C.R". 594 Ezpreas Newspapers (P.) Ltd: v. Unio1'oj lndid, ( 1959JS.C.R. 12, Re. The f(erala Education Bill, ·(·1959) S.C.R. 995, National A'8ociationjor the advan,,.ment of colcuredpeople v. Alabama, 2 Law. Ed. Second 1488; BatM·v. Little Rdck, 4 Law Ed. Seconsl 480, h'ational Labour Relation• Board ,v. Jones &> Lauqhlin Steel Oorpofation, 81. Law: Ed. 893· and AmalgamalP.d Utility WorHra v. Oonsolidatea.·1 Edi§cm Oo,,.pany of ·'New York, 84 Law. Ed. 738, referred io. ' • '•

• ()+ I•' 0 If ).; 1 ., TP,ougjt t}iere wi;re ccriail}, Ip,anks whic~ were not entitled to~he pro(\'.9~~on.of s. 34.,.,. ~hat,'\'~·no ground for holding that the. se9tii;m offenped. Ar,t. \ t· Tre co"1p,1,aint was not.made by the b'!11ks w\J.o Vfere,no! g1ven,~he p~oteptmn. A'.lmi)t;:!)ly, 95,%. of¢he .. b,anking };>}ljif\es~. in t!/e; .cgµntry; v.:as· iJ:t t\ie ·h#,?-,s pf

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT HEPORTS

banks to whom s. 34-A applied and they employed 80,000 out of the 90,000 bank employees. The injury to the credit struc-ture will only be by the disclosure of the reserve etc. of the banks of this class and there is sufficient rational connection and basis for the classification to justify the differenciation. The exclusion of the Reserve Bank from the operation of s. 34-A (2) also does not amount to discrimination; in the very nature of things and on the scherne of the provision the reserve Bank could not but be excluded.

CIVIL APrELLAT~ JumsnrcTION: Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1961.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 31, 1960, of the National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, in Reference No. 1 of 1960.

WITH

Petitions Nos. 70, 80 and 82 of 1961.

Petitions Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

A. S R. Chari, V. G. Raw, D. P. Singh, Jr[. K. Ramamurthi. R. K. Gm·g and S. C. Agaru·al, for the appellant and the petition (in Petn. No. 80 of 61).

JI[. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, N. V. Phadke, K. H. Bhabha, J. B. Dadachanj-i, * S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for respondents Nos. 2-17 and 19-34 (In appeal and Petn. No. 80 of 61).

J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, R1imeshwarNath and P. L. Vohra, for respondents Nos. 41-49 (In appeal and Petn. 80 of 1961).

Anand Prakash, for Respdts. Nos. 35-40 (In

' Petn. No. 80 of 61).

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, D. P. Singh, Jlf. I(. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agaru·al, for Intervener No. 2.

D.S. Nargolkar and K. R. Choudhri, for Peti-tioners Nos. 70 and 82 of 61).

1rf. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.N. San11ol,

"- Additional Solicitor-General of Indio, J.B. Dadachanji,

All India Bank Employees' Association v. Natio11al Industrial Tribunal

All /nt.Jia 1Ja1~k Employet~' As"ociat,'011 v. National in'ftu;trial Triliunal

~yya11gar J.

[HJ6;.; J

272 SUPREME COVRT REPORTS

S. N. Andley, Rameshu:ar Sath and P. /,. Vohm, for Rcspdt No. 2 (In Pctns. Xos. 70 and 82 of GI). Naunit Lul, for intcn·pner 1\o. :l.

JI. C. Set<ilrnd, Attomey-Geneml of lndi<i awl 1'. JI. Sen, for Intervener Xo. I.

1961. August :!8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered hy

AYYA::\GAH, J.-Civil ApJoeal No. l:;.1 of 1061

has been filed on special le•l\'c obtai11ed from thi~ Court against an order of K. T. l>cs<Li, J., funetion-ing as the Xational lndustriJ.l Tribunal (Hanks Disputes) Bombay dated October :11, IOtlO. Tho point arising for decision in the appeal i,; as reg11rds the constitutional validity of s.34A of the B1inking Companies Act, 194~) which was enacted un August 26, 1960 as an amendment to the 11<1.rcnt Act (Aet X of 1949). The appellant before this Court is the All India Bank Employees' Assot'iation whit'h is ;1 trade union urganization of Hank Employees of several banks operating in India. The Punjab Xational Bank Employees' Union, which is trade union with similar objecte has been permitted to inter-vene in this apveal in support of the appellant union. _ The three other_ \Vrit Petitions are hy other Bank Employees' Unions whose description woul<l be apparent from the cause title and all these cases have been heard together because in the writ petitions also the point raised is identical, r-iz., the validity of s.34A of the Banking Com. panics Act, which will be referred to hereafter as the impugned provision.

Section 34A whcse validity is tho matter in dispute in these proceedings runs in tho following terms:-

"34A. (1)

Kotwitl1stan<ling anything

containecl in section 11 of the lndustria l Disputes Act, 1947, or any other law for tho time being in force, no hanking company

3S.C.R. SUPREllfE COURT REPORTS

shall, in any proceeding under the said Act or in any appeal or other proceeding arising thArefrom or connected therewith, be Com -pelled by any authority before which such proceeding is pending to producr, or give inspection of, any of its books of account or other document or furnish or disclose any statement or information, when the banking company claims ·that such document, state-ment or information is of confidential nature and that the production or inspection of such document or the furnishing or dis-clousure of such statement or information would involve disclosure of information rela-ting to:

(a) any reserves not shown as such in

its published balance sheet ; or

(bl any particulars not shown therein in

respect of provisions made for bad and doubtful debts and other usual or necessary provisions. (2) If, in any such proceeding in relation to any banking company other than the Reserve Bank of India, any question arises as to whether any amount out of the reserves or provisions referred to in sub-section (1) should be taken into account by the authority before which such proceeding is pending, the authority may, if it so thinks fit, refer the question to the Reserve Bank and the Reserve Bank shall after taking into accont principles of sound banking and all relevant circumstances concerning the banking com-pany, furnish to the authrity certificate stating that the authority shall not take into account any amount as such reserves and provisions of the banking company or may take them into account only to the extent of the amonnt specified by it in the certificate, and the certificate of the Reserve Bank on

Alt India Bank. EmployeeH' Associntion v.

, · alinnal I ndustriat Tribunal Ay?}anqar J.

.. StJPRE:iIE COURT REPORTS (1962]

,.<-··-~· ;. _, ..

. · ' . such question shall be final and shall not be .' i.' call!jd in question in any such proceeding.

AU ltwia Bank · .f.:!c'.~r;:~

· .f.:!c'.~r;:~ > . · ': (3) For. the ·purpos~s .of this section, NaJJ,nal"jnau.irial.: '";·''.?~liking 'co~1i1;any'; ·shall.have the meaning Tribunal assigned to 1t in the Industrial Disputes Act, ---. l9!i". . . . A.yya11[J'lrJ •.. •.. ,, .... , .... , , .. ,, ,, _,, ,_ .

A.yya11[J'lrJ •.. •..

,, .... , .... , , .. ,, ,, _,, ,_ ··;Before commencing the examination of the 1ioints in controversy and the grounds on which the legality . 'oLthe: above provisio1Lis impugned .• It would be i, 'helDful for lietter. apvreciatioil of the: problem if ·'we set 'out, in very•biief· ciutlme,'the history of the :steps which led to the enactment in dispute. .There , ... was Jong standing : practice. in England of· Banking - · Companies, ·as distinguishcd~·from companies carry-. ing ·on other commercial etc. activities/ not to · disclose, . in their balance sheets and Profit & Loss aiicouiits;· bad and doubtfol ;debts and the provision . made therefore, · as w:ell as the secret reserves crcat-' '.cd. and held midervariotis'items.,..:a practice which '·received 'judicial"recognition·'by Buckley; L., J. in '.'Newton v; Binrii1ig!ia'm Small AT1ns Co .. Ltd.' ([1]) This practice was followed by, several banks in India and ,-. questions arose from:time to time as'to how far the ":'.practice was-consistent with the' statutory provisions · ···as to disclosure contained in the several Companies· ' Acts. enacted from tiinc. to time.· ··,Ve shall, how-.'· l ,ever,' add 'that the desirability and even the legality -,.,··of this practice• has not• gone· without· challenge, .. :;:though there has been co'nsideralJle body of opinion ·;.,"which· has held: this' to .b_o salutary: and necessary •1 i fcir the preservation _and pr.ogress· 'of .credit institu; tation like bank. We are' not now concerned with the · ndeairability or ethics 'ofnthe ·practice which is . ·r1 matter;:.for the.:consideration of the; legisfature but r<! as·.to the steps'bywhich'accord was established bet-""·Weeri the'practice and the lll.w: · , .·; • · . _- · -b·-"· ""'C?"' ,r . .,_~',. .•"')f>-_• • '' ,,,..•,, 'i ;:;, ·; I~dfo.n,~,()ompa'uies Act' of: ISQ6-;drew no . :pie. . '..distinction between, the contents. of.balance· sheets -";,· '""' of·bariking-eompanies . , __ ~ . .. .. --. --' as ~ distmguished from those " . ' . . -. of l!(I (l):·;(l906]2Ch.378 • ._,. "" •>; •. · :1: ... '::.'; I·;;.

3 S.C.R. SUPREJ\ffi COURT REPORTS.

other companies and both were required to disclose list of debts owing to the concern which were con-sidered barl or doubtful. Provisions on the same lines, ·i. e., without any distinction between Banking and other companies, were copied and continued by the Indian Companies Act of 1882. When, how-ever, the Companies Act of 1913 was enacted, Form •F' to the 3r<l.'lchedule to the Act contained note in respect of the sub-heading 'book debts' under the head 'I'roperty & Assets' in the balance sheet, readi .1g :

"distinguishing in the case of bank bet- · ween those considered good and in respect of which the bank is fully secured and those . considered good for which the bank holds no security other than the debtor's personal secu-rity; and distinguishing in all cases between debts considered good and debts considered doubtful or bad. Debts due by directors or other officers of the company or any of them either severally or jointly with any other per-sons to be separately stated in all cases."

It would be seen that by reason of this note the obligations imposed upon banks as regards the classi-fication of their assets and the information to be disclosed became slightly more detailed than in the case of other companies. The practice, however, of bankers to which we adverted earlier not to dis· close or not to disclose to the full extent, bad and · doubtful debts but to make provision for thetn by setting aside under other heads, sufficient moneys which would operate as secret reserves, so that the credit of the institution would not be affected while its financial stability would remain unimpaired, was continued notwithstanding this change in the form. The Central Bank of India Limited in its published balance-sheets of the year 1925 adopted the above practice which, however, was not obviously in strict conformity with the requirements of Form 'F' to the third schedule read with the note. The

1961 ll!!'i .

All lndia ]Jank Emplo1Jee/$' Association

1Yatiorml lnduBtrial, Tribunal

.·lyya11gar ,T.

All J nrl ia 8111,k J;mployr.ro' Aasla~latio11 v • • \"aiiuMI lndu.~iriul Tribunal Ayya11!}ar J.

SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS

[l 91l21

m:maging·clircetor of the bank was pnmecutcd bv one Shamdasani wbo was shareholuPr of tho ban·k for "filing anu publishing Statements which ll'Crl' false in material p1;rticulars"', an offence punishable under 8. 282 of the Indian Companies Act. The ~fa"istratc acquitted the accused on the ground tlmt ti~· Lala. ncc·shect "·as i11 accoruancc with tl11• u;ual practice of bankPrS and that the resCr\"CS of tlW Cum pam· which were shown UIJ(ler various head,; thou"h m;t aR ;i specific provision fo1· bad and douLtful '\Iebts l"OVered the possible luHses several times. An appli-cation for revision was filpcJ beforu the High Court of Born hay and Fawcett, ,J. allowed it holding that. "a declared pro1·ision or the form cannot be allowed to he whit.tlecl down by vencra.l c01rnidorntions as tu the object of b.'\hmcc-shcct." This jud!,.'Il!ent was rendered on February 28, 192i (vide Shamdc1srwi v. Pocltkamc·dr1 (') and very soon thereafter tho Government of fnnia intnvcned hr notification dated !llnrch :W, l!J27 under R. Iii! oi" the companies Act HJI:I amending form 'F' and as amended bank:; were excluded from the requirement of disclo-sing the reservo for had and doubtful debts under the heading 'Capital and Liabilities' in the left-hand sido of the halance·sheet, and in the right-hand column "hook debts which wcro hau and doubtful for which prol'ision had been made to the satiHfac~ ti on of the auditors", were not required tu be shown as part of the property and assets of n Ba11k.The provisionR of the Companies Act of l!l 13 underwent numerous changes by the amending Act of 1936 which included 1:nter alia one whcrPby tho change effected by the Xotifica.tion, di~terl ~farch 2!J, 1927, in Form 'F' were omitted and Form 'F' was ma.de to retain tho note which aecompanicd it under the Act of 1913 without the exception in favour of banks effedcd hy tho Notification. This was poi;si-bly unintended, because on the day after the amcnu-ing Act came into operation, the Central Go1·crn-me11t published Notification on January Hi, 1937 \I) A.l.R. 1927 Bom. 414: 29 llom. LR. 722.

.... ,.

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

again under s.151 of the Companies Act restoring the alterations in the balancf'.sheet Form 'F' as hf~d been effected by the prior Notification of March 1927. The validity of this Notification w.as ques-tioned as being beyond the powers of the Central Government by Sha!lldasani who filed complaint against the Central Bank of India Limited and its directors charging them with having issued false balance-sheet for the year ending December 31,1939, balance-sheet which was in conformity with the form as modified by the Notification. The Magistrate upheld the validity of the Notification and aquitted the accused. Shamdasani preferred revision to the High Court and full Bench of the Bombay Hi!i:h Court held that the Notification was beyond the powers of the Central Government, though the order of acquittal was affirmed upholding the plea of the accused that their act was bona fide in that they believed the alteration in the form to be valid (Vide Shamdasani v. The Central Bank of India Ltd.([1]) Immediately after this judgment the Central legis-lature passed Act XXX of 1943 with retrospective effect validating the Notification and amendinQ'. the relevant sections of the Companies Act. (ss. 132,151, Art. 107) so as to empqwer the Government to effect changes in the form of the balance-sheet in the manner in which they had done in January 1937.

The next event in order of date relevant to to the present cotext is the report of the Company Law Amendment Commitee of the United Kingdom presided over by Mr. Justice Cohen where the entire question of undisclosed reserves was fully discussed. The pros and cons of the question were elaborately considered by the Committee and it is sufficient to refer in this connection to short passage in the report. In paragraph IOI the problem is thus set out:

"The chief matter which has aroused con-troversy is the question of undisclosed or, as (i)l.L. R.1944Bom. 302.

All Indi'.a Bank Employees• Association v. 1'.tational Induatrial 1 ribunal Ayyangar J.

. \ \ . ' '·' , ------' ·, 27€( '.. .. SUPRE?rIE: COURT REPORTS'< (1962] 1961 ''1 ;• [7])heyare frequently called,"secret orimierreser" . All Iodia Ba,k · :· 'ves .. · An u;idisclosed reserVe iS commonly crea- · !_':1::,;;:r:: ,: ' ,_ ted by using profits to write. aown more' than v ' . ' ' • • ; is riecessarj such' assets as investments, freehold r xai:on;,~fi::ff',ia[1 ]·-i- .'iindle~sehold ·property for plant and ·machi- • · ., ."-nery; by ~reiiting. excessiVe p:fovisfons for bad.·· Ayy•nlf;ii'J: ; . ~debts 'of"~th11!°: co.nt!~gencies by charging ca pi- . . · tal ··expenditure: to -revenue; ·or by. under-' ; [1]v;i)uing :stock'in .trade; .. ·NorinalTy the object -~of.creating all undisclosed reserve is to enable · ; ,, :i ci:rmpany to avoid: violent fluctuations in its •. ; ·-·'published profits ·or its dividends.'~ . :' .· •. · The ' Committee made· ,.-'. ',. _ ·• i 1 , -'; number· '., • __ of r , recommendations •• ,-, ! _ · severarcifwhich were:.adopted'jn the u, K. Compa•·' nies·, Act of 1!148; _and· those relevant Jo the point · undet,"discussiori _served to.brin·g:· the 'law as .to the' contents of ri. oalarice-sheet of'iL Banking Company . intidine with tho practice of sou'~d and well managed, 1 banks., Tri.India; 'special legislation· in relation to ·Bankini . Ocimp:mies .·embodying . several of these.,. recominendatioris ·was .'enacted 'in the shape of the· Bankin~·.companies~Act ,1949'JAct:Xfof 1949). Section 29 cif .the Act,'lri.id-.do\vn ''.tile. lmv in "reg3rd · to requfrements' of the contents :of the balance-sheets. of.: banks: · The balance-sheet,, arid Profit· & Loss account w~re to' be in the'fcirtn set out in' the 3rd schedule to that and sub-s: (3) of that section' exem ... pted .. Banking Companies fro~ the requirements of ' conform fog_ to the forni of balance-sheet and Profit & Loss · ·apcount 9f cq~panfos · 'registered · under the . Irid\an Companies Act; and t!ie·Central G<ivernment. · were empowered by'sub'.s. (4) to-amend the form set . out. in' the schedule by Notifications published in the . offiCial '.Gazette: '"In Form 'A' which provided thee.· morJel' of balancii-sheet · ai:id Pr'ofit & Loss account ., in tlie':c:\se .of banks_,' t~1~re·was: not much c~angll' ,s compared to•the reCjmrements :·of tho prc:v10us law except. that in tlif/ Pro~it & Loss account (Form :'B' of the. tl\ird _schedulA) the prtl"7ision for bad and rloubfful ·debts was permittild to:-be exchlded from the

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

income so that the am1unt of bad and doubtful debts did not figure separately on the income side of the profit & loss account. The income as required to be shown was "income (!es" provision made during the year for bad and doubtful debts)". This last item was modified by Notification issued under the power conferred by s.29(4) of\he Act in December 1951, so that after amendment the heading "Income" in the Profit & Loss Account ran: "Income (less provision made during the year for bad and doubtful debts and other usual and necessary provi-sions''). Thus so far as sh'lreholders of Banks and the general public inclurling tho customers of the bank were concerned, hanks were relie,-cd from the obligation of disclosing the entirety of their reserves as s•1ch and also of the extent of had or doubtful debts and the provision made therefor.Whil~ th~ law wns in thh stat" dkp11t0s aro~"' between the employees of banks ali over India and the respective banks with regarrl to wages, condi-tions of work etc. which were referred by the Cen-tral Government in June 1949 to an ad hoc Tribu-n'l.I with Shri K. C. Sen, retired Judge of the Bombay High Court as Chairmnn. The Tribunal passed an award but its validity was Huccessfully challenged in this Court in April l!J51 on the ground that all the members of the Tribunal who passed th" award were not those who had all inquired into the dispute. Thereafter fresh Tribunal was appointed in January 1952 with Shri S. Pancha-pagesa Sastri, retired ,Judge of the High Court of Madras as Chairman. The award of this Tribunal was published in April, Hlfi:i, but it is not necessary to state its terms. Appeals against the award were preferr"cl to the Labour Appellate 'l'ribunal bQth by th" banks as woll as hy worknwn The Appel-late Tribunal which heard the appeal consisted• of three members with Shri J eejeehhoy as president.

The claim of the workers in the appeal bdore the Appellate Tribunal in great part related to

All India Bank 1nployee8'. ARsociation

.Yil.!ional JnduJ?frial '1'1il.Ju11al

All I11din /Jarik J.:tnpfoyttG' .1s~OC{Qliun v. 1'.'ahorml lrululifri(Jl Tribute al

280 SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (1962]

dcmaml for increased wages and salaries and the main clcff'nce of thn banks was that they had not the capil.r:ity to pay anything he~·on<l what. the Sastry 'l ribunal had granted. The Jcejecbhoy Tribunal set out their difficulties in assessing tlic pleri of incapncit.y raised by the banks in the co11-text of the provisions of the Banking Companies Act an<l the form of balance·shcet prescribed there-under in the follo\l·ing terms :-

"At the verv outset there is an initial difficulty in arrh;ing at correct e~timate of the financial position of banks. There are two circ·umstanccs which militate against our secur-ing prop<'r insight into the finandal stato of banks. ·w., rcfor in particular to (a} the un<lisrloscd or HCC'l"et reserves and (b} to the mamwr in which it is permissible in law for bankiiig •·ompany to exhibit its balance sheet. It is not in dispute that hank do hM·c undiFclosecl or sc·cret r<'sen·C's which they aequire i11 11 number t•f ways, and such umlis-closed rescrvC's can11ot be ascertained from the

balance sheet ............................... : ......... .

The other difficulty with which we are confronted at the out~et is the manner in which bank is permitted to present its profit &. loss account. On the income side ~he form originally prescribed by the Rankmg Companies Aet required the hanks to declnre "Income Jpgs provision macle during thl· year for bad an<! <loubtfnl d~bt~)"" ; this has now heen altered bv an aml·ndment made by the Cl'n:ral Govcrnm~nt in <'Xercise of the powers eonforred under suh-Rection 4 of section 29 of the Banking Companies Act to read "Income (less provigion made during the yt•ar fur bad and doubtful debts and other usual or neces-sary provisions)". The effect of this altera· tion is that the profits as shown for any

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

particular year are first shown not only of bad and doubtful debts but also of 'other usual or necessary provisions' before being shown in the balance sheet ....................... .

All India Ban' Employeea• Association v. Nation •l Indmtrial Tribunal Ayyangar J.

It mav be that these 'other usual or neces-sary "provisions' have been passed by the Board of Directors, and by the auditors of the concern and may even have been scrutinized 0by the Reserve Bank of India ; but it is our duty and function to decide the question of the capacity of bank to pay, and in the absence of important information of this character our estimate of the capacity of & concern to pay must necessarily be incom-plete ........................ Banks feel that they now have the form of the Banking Companies Act to shield themselves against an enquiry on the subject; but insofar as we are concerned we consider these undisclosed reserves and these appropriations relevant for the purposes of our investigation and in their absence we would have to decide as best as we could from the other materials before us and draw such inferences as justified."

It was the contention of the workmen that an Industrial Tribunal had the right in law to compel hanks to disclose their secret reserves as well as the amount of "the bad and doubtful debts and other necessary provisions" which had been excluded under the h'ead "income" in tho Profit & Loss Account of banks. This matter was agitated by them before this Court in Stite Bank of India and others v. Their Workmen ([1]) being an appeal against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In view, however, of the conclusion reached by this Court on other parts of the case it refrained from pronoun-cing upon the correctness or otherwise of this claim by the workmen.

The diputes between the employees of banks (I) (1959), 2 L.~L. J. 205.

i!ICJ

All Indirs Bank Employtt•' .Auocialion v . • ./'lati-OMJ Inctustrial 1"ribunal

[1962] ...

11.nd the managements, however, continued with the result thR,t on March 21, 1960 the Central Govern-ment in exorcise of the powors conferred on it by sub-a. (I A) of s. I 0 of the Industrial Disputes Act referred the dispute which related to several matters to the NR,timml Tribunal constituted bv & Xotification of Govrrnment or the snm" c1:1te, K. T. Desai, J. was the Tribunid so nppointnd. :.'\Inst of the rnnjor banks in tho country were nrnd" parties to the reft>rence including tho Reserve Bank and State Rank of Imlia. ft.er the Tribunal started functioninir and after the parties formulated their respeotivo contentions, applications were filed by the Bank Employees Association on June 9, 1960, for directing the respondent-banks to produoe before the Tribunal for the purpoHcs of adjudication several documents listc<l in the applications. Among the items in reHpe<'t 0f which production was thus sought were (I) st.atements ~howing "the s1•cret reserves in any fonn" of each bank from 19.'i~ right upto December 31, 195!l ; and ( 2) statements show-ing the provision made "for bad and doubtful debts and other usual and necessary provisions" during • tho years 195c! to 195() and tho total amounts outstanding in such items in each bank in tho said years. The banks filed their reply on July Hi, l!l60. The production of the. doeumonts and tho informa-tion called for on se\·era\ of the matt .. rs including the above two was resisted hy the Indian BankR Association {being an aHsoriation of employers) on the ground that th{'Y were by Jaw exempted from disclosure in th" interest. of the in<lnHtry aml the public and claimed abHoluto privil<'ge from making the disclosure.It was at this stage that the impugned provi-sion was enacted by Parliament as an aml'mlment to tho Ranking Comvanics Act. A~ several of the • banks relied upon th;i impugned provisions in.support..,.. of their plea that they could not he compelled to disclose either the quantum of their secret reserves or their naturo, or as regards the provision made in

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

the several years for "bad and doubtful debts and for other reasonable and necessary provision", the bank employees association challenged the constitu-tional validity of s. 34A of the Banking Companies Act, whieh, if' valid, could have afforded 2ufficient answer to the demand for production of the docu-)- ments in relation to these matters. This objection was argued before the National Tribunal which upheld the validity of the section. As we have stated earlier, Civil Appeal No . .154 is directed against and challenges the correctness of this deci-sion. The Writ Petitions have been filed by Bank Employees Associations which were not parties to the application for production before the National -> Tribunal and are intended to support the plea of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1961.

The foregoing narrative would show that the Banking Companies Act, as it stood before t,he amendment now challenged, had brought the law as to the disclosure of secret reserves and the provi-sion for bad and doubtful debts etc. Into accord • with the usual practice of Bankers, and harl protect-ed these items from being compulsorily disclosed to the shareholders of the respective companies and to the general public. There had been controversy as to whether the workmen of these establishments were or were not entitled to be placed on different position from the shareholders because of the bear-.. ing of these undisclosed items on the determination · ' of the quantum of their wage etc. and on their conditions of work having financial implications. Parliament had, by the impugned legislation, extended the protection from eornpulsory diRclosure to the workmen as well, but with safeguard in their case that the Reserve Bank would cletermine the amount of reserves etc. which cou Id be taken ,. into account in the course of industrial adjudication. ""The question before us is, is this attempt iit some approximation of the position of tbe workmen to that of shareholders etc. unconstitutional ?

All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal Ayyangar J.

1981 All India Bank r;mployte•' Aa8ocial j 011 v. Nalior111l lndu.rlrial ·rrJJunril Ayyungur J.

. . ~fr. Chari, foarnerl Counsel for the appellant,.. m Civil Appeal No. 154 arlclressed to us the main arguments in the case and these were supple-mented by learned Counsel appearing for the peti-tioners in the several writ petitions and also by learned Counsel on behalf of the Tntervencrs both in the appeal as well as in the potitiom. Though tho arguments before us ranged O\•er vPr>· wicle .; fiel<l, the attack on the validitv of the )Pgislation was rested on two main gro'iinds : (I) that th(' impugned legislation contravened the fun<lamcntal right guarant.cc<I to "trade unions" h>• tl1C' proYi-sion contained in sub-cl. (c) of cl. (I) of Art. HI; an<! (2)"that it violated the freedom of rguality guaran-teed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.

We shall consider these two points in that order : First as to the impugned provision being obnoxious~to, or in·~,·.ontravention of sub-cl.(c) of cl. (!)'of Art.•19·of the~ Constitution. This Article runs, to quote only t.ho relevant words :

"Article 19. (l) All citizens shall have thl'I ri"bt:._ 0 •

(a) ........................................... ..

(h) ............................................ .

(c) to form association:-; or 11nions.; "

The right is subject to tlw gualifiPation Pontaim·d in cl.(4), reading: ..

"( 4 ). Nothing in sub-clause ( c) of th<;

said clause shall affect the operation of a.n.v existing law insofar as it imposes, or prPvm1t. the Stat~ from making any law imposinµ-, in the interests of public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on tho excrciRe of the right conferred by the said sub-clauRP."'

It is not the contention of any of the learned Conljjo- • sel that the right of workm(m to form 1mionB or associations which is the right guaranteed· by sub-cl. (c) of cl. (l) of Art. 19 on its literal reading has

3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

.peen denied by the impugned legislation. The argument, however, was that it would not be pro-per construction of the content of this guaranteed freedom to read the text literally but that the free-dom should be so understood as to cover not merely right to form an union in the sense of getting their union registered so as to function as an union,

All India Bank Employees' Association v .

.National Industrial Tribunal Ayyangar J.

i.e., of placing no impediments or restrictions on >their formation which could not be justified as dictated by pablic order or morality but that it extended to confer upon unions so formed right to effectively function as an instrument for agita-ting and negotiating and by collective bargaining secure, uphold or enforce the demands of workmen in respect of their wages, prospects or conditions of work. It was further submitted that unless the -"' guaranteed right comprehended these, the right to foim an union would be most illusory. To under-stand the implications of learned Counsel's submis-sion in their proper perspective the several steps in the reasoning might be set out as follows :

(l) 'fhe Constitution guarantees, by sub cl.(c) •of cl. ( l) of Art. 19, to citizens in general and to workers in particular the right to form unions. In this context it was pointed out that the expression 'union' in addition to the word 'association' found • in the Article refers to associations formed by work-men for "trade union" purposes ; the word 'union' being specially chosen to designate labour or Trade "'unions . •

(2) The right to "form an union" in the sense

of forming body carries with it as concomitant right guarantee that such unions shall achieve ·the object for which they were formed. If this conco-mitant right were not conceded, the right guaranteed to form an union would be an idle right, an empty shadow lacking all substance.

The object for which labour unions are

brought into being and exist is to ensure collective

All India Bank F.mplo;JtC$' A3aoC•at!·on v.

Nativnal lndu1/rial Tribunal

l(>yangar J.

286 SUPREME COURT f:.EPOHTS (1062)

bargaining by labour with the employers. The necessity for this has arisen from an ineapaciti~ stemming from tho handicap of poverty and come: qucnt lack of bargaining power in workmen a.~ compared with employers which is the reason d'etre for the existence of labour organizations. Collective bargaining in order to bo effective must bo enforce-able labour withdrawing its co-operation from the omploycr am! there is consequently fumlamcntal .; right to strike right which is thus natural deduc-tion from tho right to form unions guaranteed by sub-cl. (o) of cl.( I) of Art. 19. As strikes, ho\1'c\·cr, produce economic dislocation of varying intensity or magnitude, system has been devised by which compulsory industrial adjudication is substituted for the right to strike. This is the ratio underlying tho provisions of tho Industrial Disputes Act l !J.1 i undor"-which Governmont is empowered in tho event of an industrial tlisputo which may ultimately lead to strike or lock-out or when such strikes or lock-outs occur, to refer the dispute to an imparti;\I 'l'riuuiw.l for adjudication with provision banning arnl nm.k-ing illegal strikes or lock-outs during the pcndcucy of the adjudication proceedings. The pro\·ision o'9 a.n alternative to strike in the shape uf industrial adjudication is restriction on the fundamental right to strike and it would be ron~onable and vs.lid only if it were an effective Bubstitute.

(4) For an adjudication to snti8fy the tests of rea.sona.blenoss and effectiveness two conditions arc necessary : (a) that the ndjudicator should u: enabled to have before hint all the materials which a.ro necessary for pronouncing upon tho matt-0r in controversy before him; and (b) that tho adjudica-tor by whom tho controversy between the parties should be decided should be an impartial person or body who would render the decision or award after fully hearing the parties, and that no rnatt-0r in controversy should be the subject of ex patle ~ decision by an interested party or without tho disputants having an opportunity to know the

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

materials on which the decision is reached, as also >, an opportunity to place their case with reference to such material.

( 5) In regard to the right of la hour unions to function effectively and to achieve the object of their existence as set out earlier, by negotiated settle-ment or by compulsory adjudication, the only limita-tio,ns permitted to be imposed by law are those set out in cl.(4) of Art. 19 and unless, therefore, either the objects of tho association or the manner of achieving them are contrary to, or transgress public order or morality, for which reason alone reasonable restrictions might be imposed upon the guaranteed right, the freedom gnarar,teed is absolute.

(6) The lcgislat~on now impugned withdraws as it were vital issue in dispute between the par-ties before the adjudicator, viz., the capacity of the industry to pay, from his cognisance and vests the power of deciding that issue in the Reserve Bank which is biased and interested party, the decision itself being rnndered ex parte, the trade unions being deprived even of the knowledge of facts which lead to the decision .

It was on this line of reasoning that learned Counsel submitted that the impugned enactment violated the freedom guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 .

We shall now proceed to consider the sound-ness and tenability of the steps in the reasoning. It is not necessary to discuss in any detail the first step as sub-cl. (c) of cl. (l) of Art. 1!1 does guarantee to all citizens the right "to from associations". It matters little whether or not learned Counsel is right in his submission that the expression 'union' in the clause has reference particularly to Trade Unions or whether the term is used in generic sense to designate any association formed for any legitimate purpose and merely as variant of the expression "Association" for comprehending every body of persons so formed. It is not controverted

AU India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal

Ayyangar J.

AU lndi.a Ba11k J:mployttJ' :lsJocialiori v. Nalio1tal Industrial 'Tribunal

288 SUPREME COURT REPOHTl:i

that workmen have right to form "associations or unions" aud that any Jogal impediment in the way ?ft.he format.ion of such unions imposed directly or ~directly which does not satisfy the tests laid down m ~I. (4) would be unconstitutional as contravening right guaranteed by Pa.rt III of the Constitution.

It is the second step in the argument of the learned Counsel, viz., that the right guaranteed ·to form "an union" carries with it concomitant right that the achievement of the object for which the union is formed shall not be restricted by legislation unless such restriction were imposed in the intcr<>st of public order or morality, that calls for critical examination. We shall be referring little Inter to the authorities on which learned Counsel rested his arguments under this htad, but before doing so we consider it would be proper to discuss the matter on principle and on the construction of the constitu-tional provision and then examine how far tho authorities support or contradict the conclusion reached.

The point for discussion could u" funuulated

thus : When sub-cl. ( c) of cl. (I) of rt. l!J guaran-tees the right to form associations, is n guarantee also implied that the fulfilment of cv<'ry object of an association so formed is also prokcte<l right, with the result that there is constitutional guaran-tee that ovcry association shall effectively achieve tho purpose for which it was formed without intc-r-ference by law except on grounds relevant to the presel"l'ation of public order or morality set out in cl. (4) of Art. 19? Putting aside for the moment the case of Labour Unions to which wo shall refer le.ter, if an &SBociation were formed, let us say for carrying on lawful business such a8 joint.stock company or partnership, does the guarant-00 by sub-ol.(o) of the freedom to form tho association, carry with it a. further guaranteed right to tho company or the partnership to pursue its trade and achieve its profit-making object 1md that the only limitations

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

which the law could impose on the activity of the a5sociation or in the way of regulating its business activity would be those based on public order and morality under ol. (4) of Art. 19? We are clearly of the opinion that this has to be answered in the negative. An affirmative answer would be contradictory of the scheme underlying the text and the frame of the several fundamental rights which are guaranteed by Part III and particularly by the scheme of the seven freedoms or groups of freedoms guaranteed by sub-els. (a) to (g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19. The acceptance of any such argument would mean that while in the case of an individual citizen to whom right to carry on trade or busincsa or pursue an occupation is guaranteed by sub-cl. (g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19, the validity of law which imposes any restriction on this guaranteed right would have to be tested by the criteria laid down by cl. (6) of Art. 19., if however he associated with another and carried on the same activity-say as partnership, or as company etc., he obtains larger rights of diffe-rent content and with different characteristics which include the right to have the validity of legislation · restricting his activities tested by different stan-dards, viz., those laid down in cl. (4) of Art. 19. This would itself be sufficient to demonstrate that the construction which the learned Counsel for the appellant contends is incorrect, but this position is rendered clearer by the fact that Art. 19-as contras-ted with certain other Articles like Arts. 26, 29 and 30-grants rights to the citizen as such, and assocfa-tions can lay claim to the fundamental rights guaranteed by that Article solely on the basis of their being an aggregation of citizens, i.e., in right of the citizens composing the body. As the stream can rise no higher than the source, associations of citizens cannot lay claim to rights not open to citizens, or claim freedom from restrictions to which the citizens composing it are subject.

All India Bank Employees• As8ociation v. Nat-ional Industrial Tribunal Ayyangar .7.

The resulting position may be illustrated thus : Ir an association were formed for the purpose of

All India Ba11k · Ernployee.s' Association, v. ~·at ional Indutilrial Tribunal JJ:J'OllQ1T J ...

.---- -

!WO SUPHfillE COURT REl'OltTS·

'[Hl62J

carrying on business, the right to form it w.ould be guaranteed by sub-cl. (o) of cl. (I) of Art.19 subject to' any law reRtricting that right conforming to cl: ( !) of Art. 19. · As regards it& business activities, however; and the. achievement of the objects for Twhich it was brought into existence, its rights ~ould be· those. t,'llaranteed by sub-cl. (g) -of cLll} of_ Art; 19 subject to any relevant :Jaw on· the· matter conforming to cl. (6) of Art. 19 ; while the property which the associatioil acquires or·possesses would be protected by sub-cl. (f) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 subj6ct to legislation within the limits laid down by. cl. (5}. of · Art.il9. .:; . . ~. -. . .. ' . ·• •.. . I -. '-' ' .:' · ,'\Ve.consider it unnecessary to multiply. ·exam-ples· to further·illustrate the1ioint. · Applying w~t \ve have stated earlier to the case of Jabour union Uie positiori,would be, this: while_ the right: to form an union is guaranteed by sub-cl. (c}, the right of the. mew hers of the associatioir to meet ,foul<l be i,riiaranteed_by sub-cl. (b), their right to uiove from place to'place within India by sub-c!.(d), their ,right to discuss their 'problems' and to propagate ·their vi<.l\vs by~ sub-cl; (a), "their right' to hold property -would be that guaranteed by sub-CJ. (f) and so on-, each;of these'freediims beillg subject to such restri-ctions as might properly he imposed by' C!s: (2) to .(6) of Art. 19 as might be appropriate in the: con-text. · It is cine thing to interpret each of the free: ' doms guaranteed by the several Articles in°Part III in 'fair and liberal sense, it is quite another to read ·eaclr guaranteed right. as involving or including . eonoomitant rights nece6Sitry to achieve the. object 'which might be supposed ,to under lie the grant: of ·. ·each' of those rights; for that construction would, . . by' series of ever . expanding concentric circles in · '·the shape '--of· rights· .. concomitant to concomitant -·rights· and so on, lead. to _au almost grotesque. result, iL;·~i::· ·;~.;_:-'.;,-··,1·,"··,,: ...• ' .. : · '"'· · There is no doubt. that Ill the context of the . . -. principles .underlying .• the Constitution arid the . m'anner in which its Part III has been framed the !_\_l'1)_,.,:;•:;l;__;;,:.._,· ,.,·.-"';,. , .. ----••r·.,:. ·• _,; ... ,

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B,EPOH,TS

guarantees embodied in it are to be interpreted in liberal way so as to subserve the purpose for which the constitution-makers intended them and not in any pedantic or narrow sense, but this however does not imply that the Court is at liberty to give an unnatural and artificial meaning to the expres-sions used based on ideological considerations. Be-sides it may bo pointed out that both under the Trade Unions act as well as under the Industrial Disputes Act the e:iqiression 'union' signifies not merely union of workers but includes also unions of employers. If the fulfilment of every object for which an union of workmen was formed were held to be guaranteed right, it would logically follow that similar content ought to be given to the same freedom when applied to an union of employers which would result in an absurdity. We are point-ing this out not as any conclusive answer, but to indicate that the theory of learned Counsel that right to form unions guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of cl.(l) of Art.19 carries with it fundamental right in the union so formed to achieve every object for which it was formed with tne legal consequence that any legislation not falling within cl. (4) of Art. 19 which might in any way hamper the fulfilment of those objects, should be declared unconstitutional and void under Art, 13 of the Constitution, is not proposition which could be acoepted as correct.

Besides the qualification subject to whiuh the right under sub-cl. ( c) is guaranteed, viz., the coi1-tents of cl. (4) of Art. 19 throw considerable light upon the scope of -the freedom, for the significance ·and contents of the grants of the Constitution are best understood and read in the light of the restric-tions imposed. If the right guaranteed included not merely that which would flow on literal reading of the Article, but every right which is necessary in order that the association brought into existence fulfils every object for which it is formed, the quali-fications therefor would be not merely those in ol.(4) of Art. 19, but would be more numerous and

All India Bank b'mployees' Associatio11 v. l\'alional lndustri-al 1-ribu11al

Ayyangar J.

2!12 · \ SUPREME COURT REPORTS .

[l!l62[

very different, restrictions - which bore u11on and took into account the several fields in which associa-tions or unions of citizens might leiritimately engage themselves. l\Icrely by way of illustration we inight ·point out that learned Counsel admitted that though the freedom guaranteed. to workmen to forrn )aliour unions carried with it the concomitant right to collective . bargaining together with the right to strike, still.the.provision in the Industri'll Disputes • .\ct forbidding strikes in the protected industries as well as in the event of reference of the dispute to adjudication under s. 10 'of the Industrial Disputes -Act was conceded to be reasonable restriction on the ri;jht guaranteed by sub-cl.(c) of c!.(l) of Art. I!!. It· would -be seen - that ·if the -right to strike were by implication right guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art.· l!l;thcn the restriction-mi tliat right in t]ie interests of the-general· public, i·iz.,-of national economy while perfectly legitiniate if tes-ted by the criteria in cl. (6) of Art. l!I, might not be capable. of being sustained as : reasonable restic-tion ,iniposed for ·reasons of morality or public order; ·On' the construction of the Article, there-.. fore; apart from the authorities to which we shall refer presently, we have reached the conclusion that everi very liberal interpretation . of sub-cl. ( c) of cl.' (1) of'Art. l!I cannot lead to the conclusion that ,the trade· unions have· 'guaranteed right to. an ~effective collective_ bargaining or to strike, either as ' •part of collective bargaining or .. otherwise. . The ---" i right to strike_ or the right to declare lock-out may t be-controlled or restricted by appropriate industrial legislation, and the validity of such legislation would have to be'tested not with reference to the criteria laid down, in cl.(4) o,f Art. l!I b1,1t by totally different · consid!,lrations. · -, . . ' i , ,\Ve shall rio\v·proceed to consider the authori-·ties relied on by . the lea~ed Counsel in support of this, theory of "concomitant right'' to collective ba.rgairiing . guaranteed to labour unions. First as regards the decisions of this Court on which learned

..1tl India Ban~ Empl-Oyees' Association v. ;.YtJl ional Ind us! rial Tribunal .rl!Jyangar J.

3 S.C.R. SUPRE!VIE COURT REPORTS

Counsel relied, Ramesh Thappar v. The State of ivfadras('} was the earliest case referred to and learned counsel placed reliance in particular on the following pass,tge in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice :

"Turning now to the merits, there can be no doubt that freedom of speech and expres-sion includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. 'Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication. Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value' : Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727".

Based on this, learned Counsel submitted that if the phrase 'freedom of speeoh and expression' in sub-cl. (a) of ol. (l) of Art. 19 were given this liberal construction so as to effectuate the object for which the freedom was conferred, similar construction ought to be adopted of the content of the freedom guaranteed by sub-cl. (cl of cl. (1) of Art. 19. We are, however, unable to discern any analogy bet-ween tlie two cases. It is obvious th<it "freedom of speech" mea"ns freedom to speak so as to be heard by others, and therefore to conve~, one's ideas to others. Similarly the very idea of freedom of expression necessarily connotes that what one has right to express may be communicated to others. Unless therefore the freedom.guaranteed by sub-cl.( a) of ol. (1) of Art. l9 were read as confined to the right to speak to oneself or to express his idPas to himself, which obviously they could not mean, the guaranteed freedom would mean freedom to addres5 others, and of conveying to others one's ideas by printed word, viz., freedom of circulation. We do · not see, t,herefore, any analogy between the case which was considered by this Court in Homesh Thappar's (') case and the one before us.

(ll 1950 s:c.R. 594 In A.

All India Bank Employees' .Issociat-ion v. National Industrial Tribunal

Ayyangar J.

All Tnclii Ba11k F.rnplo~ttll' Asaoci(ltion .. ,\"utio11af [11dtutriol Trilitoml A;yungar J.

The obRervations in t,he jurlgment ofBhagwati, J. in Express Neu·.•papers (Prirntc) ltd. v. Ur>ion nf ln1f.ia.([1]) on which Conmcl relier!, in regard to the content of tho 'fru<'rlom of speech and expression' that. th<>y "inclurlc within its ~cope the freedom of the press", for tho press with the nrintc<l word is merely the mechanism hy which the freedom is P.Xl'rr·ised do not really cnrr~· the matter any further.

We were next referrer1 to the observations of Das .• T. in thfl arlvisorv ciriinion Re the Kerala Ednrati'on Bill('). Thf' que~t ion, which Wlls hPing considered in the passage r<'lied on, rl'latcd tci the scope anrl content of cl. (l) of Art. 30 which guaran-teca to ll!l minorities right to est:thliRh anrl ad-minister e<lucational institutions of their choice. The question dchated lwforo this Court was, whetlwr the nroYision in tho Kerala Education Bill which rlenieil recognition h~· Government to edu-cational institutions run by minoritif's contr:n-ened thi.'l frrPrlom gnarantcc<l ·to them ? DC'aling with thiR Das .. J. s.iirl :

''Without recognition, therC'forc, the cdu-cntionnl inRtitution8 csta~ishcd or to bo establi•hcrl hy the minorit;v communities can-not fulfil the real objects of their choicn and the rightsurnlnr Art. 30(1) cannot be effectively exerciserl. The right to establish c<lurational inBt.itutions of t.Jieir choico must, therefore, menn the ril!ht to establish real institutions whioh woul<l cffectiv!'IV ~Prvc the nerd~ of their communit.v and th'e srholars who r!'sort t0 thl'ir educational institutions. There is, no doubt, no ~uch thin!:! as fundamental right to recognition by the Stato but to deny rccogni-1 ion to the cilucationa.1 institutions excep~ upon terms tantamount to tlw Hllrr1>n<ler of their constit11tion:1l rirht. of ndministrat ion <'f th" <'<l•ll':>tinn:tl institntions of thrir rhoirr iR

'I l !9595.C.R. 12.

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

in truth and in effect to deprive them of their rights under Art. 30 (l)."

All India, Bank Eniployees' Association v. J.l afional Industrial Tribunal

We do not consider that these observations and ·this construction of cl. (I) of Art. 30 a,ssist learned Counsel in his submisdon as regards the theory of concomitant rights flowing from the free· dom guaranteed by sub.cl. (cl of cl. (1) of Art. 19. The observations of the learned Chief Justice and the conclusions drawn are in relation to the con· struction of Art. 30 and cannot be divorced from the context. They do not purport to lay down any general rule of construction for the freedoms guaran· teed under the several sub-heads of cl. {l) of Art. 19, and, indeed, what we have pointed out earlier should suffice to indicate the impossibility of upholding any such construction of the freedoms guaranteed by the Ia.tter Article.

Axranqar J.

· L8arned CounsP l also referred us to certain passages in two judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States : N at-ional Association for the advancement of c~lored people v. Alabama,([1])and B1ife8 v. L'ittle Rock([2])in which'the~Court held that freedom of speech and assembly which wPre fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution would be abrogated or improperly encroached upon by legis-lation which compelled the disclosure to public authorities of the membership rolls. In the two decisions the facts were that the associations in question were for the P-rotection of coloured persons and the requirement of disclosure"of the names of members was inserted in the law for the purpose of putting pressure upon these associations so as to dissuade people from joining them. The aq:(ument of learned Counsel before us was based on the dicta in these two decisions that the right to form an association which followe<l by reason of the 'clue process' clause in the 14th amendment carried with it the right to ensure that the associations were able to maintain themselves as associations. In the two (I) 2 Law. Ed. Second 1488. (21 4 Law. Ed. Second 480.

Alf !nd!a Bank },'mpln1•,u' . -t.~.voc :·,lfi 911 v . .\"nlinmil lmlustrial 'Tril>11>mf

291i SUPREME COURT REPORTS

decisions referred to, the leamod Judges of the Supreme Court of the Uniterl States were not constrnini? the eontent of n proviRion on the lines of Art. 19(1)1e), for in America, the right of associa-tion is not anv specificallv guaranteerl right, hut has been derived hy jurlirial interpret:i.tion of the due nrocess cl.1use of tho 14th Amendment. But apart from this tho ]('gislation thne impugned was on<' which direct.Iv affected the formation of the associa-tion nnd in that sens" mav he hit by the terms of sub-cl.(c) of cJ.(l) of Art. i9 if st1itutes with similar purpose were 1macted in Tnrlia. The rlecisions cited are no authoritv for the second step in the arg-ument for \vhich thev wne cited.Leam11d Counsel also referred us to two other dicisions of the i'iuprnme Court of the UnitPd Stat<•s in which the right of emolovees to self-organization, to form, join anrl assist labour organisatinns and to bargain collectively throu!!h representatives of their own choice anrl to engage in concerted activities for the purrose of collective bargaininf or oth"cr mutual aid has lll•en"reforr<>d to -ns "a fundamental right" (videNatiomu Labor R11lation.,- Board \' . .Tones anrl La1tqMin Sit.eel Corporatinn and ors.,([1]) and Amalga-mated Utilil 11 W orkn.• v. Con.~olidated Edi8on Company of Sew York) ('). We rlo not consirlor the inference sought t.o bc> drawn well-founded. What. the )(',arn. ed .Turlgcs of tho Sunreme Court wore refrrring to ns fundam<'ntal ri~ht was not with reference to a. fnndament.a.I right 11s reeou-nit.cd or guaranteed hy the Constitution, but in the m>nse of right of the unions which cnaclorl law recognizer! or rrspec•ecl, a.ml as nthor decision"' of the United St<ites' Supreme Court Rhow, waR suhiect to regulation by tho l<'gis-laturc('). Wo have, t.hcr!'fore, reach<'d th.e'conclusion that t.he righr.·~11mranteNI hv ~Rub-cl.(c) of cl.(1' of Art. 19 rloPs not <'arry with it concomitant right

(I) RI Law. Fd. RQ1, QnQ_

t~) R.J LAu•. Erl 7~R. 7-'J.

'."; Vide \Ve1ver (',)n~titl1li "''l:tl L:i.w !101 its Adniinis[1]ra1ion ! 19!t\l p. 505, r··ferring rn n(1rchy i:. Kan<:as 272 L'. S. 306: 71 I.. Ed. 2J8 "Neither -~c c0mmon law nor 1he I ·~th :\rrendmtnt confers the absolute right 10 -,rr;lcc."

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

"- that the unions formed for protecting the interests of labour shall achieve the purpose for which they were brought into existence, such that any interfere-nce, to such achivement by the law of the land would be unconstitutional unless the same could be justified as in the interests of public order or moral-ity. Tn our opinion, the right guaranteed under sub-cl. ( c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 extends to the forma-tion of an association and insofar as the activities of the association are concerned or as regards the steps which the union might take to achieve the purpose of its creation, they are subject to such laws as might be framed and that the validity of such laws is not to be tested by reference to the criteria to be found in cl. (4) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.

In this view it is not necessary to consider the other steps in the argument of learned Counsel all of which proceed upon the correctness of the sten which we have just now dispos'·d of. Neverthe-less we consider it proper to deal with thf1 sub-mission that the impugned legislation (a) withdraws an essential part of the dispute between the pa1 ties from the jurisdiction of ·an impartial adjudicator and vests the same in the Reserve Bank of India which is biased body ; and (b) that the adjudiP~tor is left without proper materials to discharge his duties by withdrawing the proper materials from his cognizance. •

complaint that the impugned provision withdraws the dispute from the adjudication of an impartial arbitrator and leaves it to the decision of another body is an obvious over-statement of the position. The dispute between the parties in relation either to wages, bonus or other amenities or perquisites which involve financial obligations on the part of the employer remain even after the impugned provision was enacted, with the adjudi-cator and he alone determines the rights of the parties subject to the provisions of the Industrial law or other relevant legislation, and the relief which he could award to the employees remains

1961 All India Bank Emplayees' Association v. Nat-ional Industrial Tribunal Ayyangar J.

From what we have statecl carli<>r as the genesis of tho legislation now impugned, it would be apparent that Govorrum•nt h1icl to effect reconci-liation between two conflicting interrst~ : one was the need to preserve and maintain the clelicate fabric of the credit structure of the country by Rtrengthening the real ae wtJI! as the apparent. credit worthiness of banks operating in tho country. It was really this principlo which iM vit~•l to the economic life of the COl)1mUnity that has been reHponsible for the changes that have been made from 1927 onwards as regards tho form of balance-~heet and of the Pro.fit & Loss accounts of banking companies as distinguished fro1n other trading and industrial organit:ations. There was urgent need to prot<>ct from disclosur!' cntain of the itt•ms of appropriation by banks in order to pres<'rve th<'m ao creclit. institutions. On the other hand, there was the need-an equally urgent need fur enabling the workers in these iusti tut ions not to be <lf'niecl propN wage and other emolumellts and proper conditions of service. The question was how far information which in the interests uf national eeonomv the banks were entitkd to withhold from their ~h~reholders and tho general public, was to b<' made vaila.ble for determining thn capacity of th b:rnks to pay their employees. was in these ~ircumstances that the impugned legislation was

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1"' enacted which while preserving industrial adjudi-cation in respect of disputes between the banks and their employees, entrusted the duty of determi-ning the surplus reserve which could be taken into account as part of the assets for determining capacity to pay, to the Reserve Bank. Thus unrler-stood there doe> not appear to be anything unrea-sonable in the solution which the impugned legis-lation has effected.

We do not also consider that thPre is any substance in the complaint that the R~serve Bank of India is biased body. If it was not the Reserve Bank of India, the only other authority that could be entrusted with the function would be the Finance Ministry of the Government of India and that department would necessarily be guided by the Reserve Bank having regard to the intimate know-ledge which the Reserve Bank has of the banking structure of the countrv as whole and of the affairs of each bank in particular. In the circum-stance therefore it matters little from the point of view of the present argument whether it is ~he Finance Ministry that was vested with the power to determine the matters set up ins. 34-A or whe-ther it is the Reserve Bank that does so, as under the impugned enactment. .Learned Counsel made further submisRion that the impui;ned enactment was piece of colourable b~islathn, and th'tt thf'l purported objective of securing secrecy from disclosure was really device adopted for deprpssing wageB and for denying to workmen employed in banks th,,ir legitimate rights. It was urged that the preanihle to the amending Act sought to make out that the real purpose behind the legislation WAS the ensuring of s~crecy from disclosure of the resPrves held by the banks and of the bad and doubtful. debts wR.ich arose in the course. of business and the provision made for these losses and proceeded on the ratio th at such disdosure would hurt the credit of the

All India Bank Employees• Assoeiation v.

NatifJnal Ind 1slr1al Trilunal Ayyanga'f', J.

AU India Bank .F.mpfo)tts' .1.fsOr i4t ion

v. ,,Vatirmal lwlusfrir.l Tribunal

banks which would have repercussions not morely on the individual bank but also on the banking structure of the country as whole. This, it was submittP<i, was not tho.real but onlv the colourable object and purposo underlying the legislation. In this connection it was stressed that s. 21 of the Industrial Disputes Act and r. 30 of the Industrial Disputes Rules had made ample provision for securing secrecy to the affairs of ev<>ry concern in regard to which disclosure would not bo in public interest. We are satisfied that this submisi;i\Jn has no basis in fact and besides even if made out does not affect the validity of tho legislation. As wo han~ pointed out already, the impugnod legislation merely carries out to its logir,al eonelusion the effc"t of the changes in the form of the balance-sheet and Profit and Loss accounts of Ranks which starting in I !l2i culminated in the notification datecl December 2:!, l\l;il under s. 29 (.i) of the Hanking Companies Act :i.me11ding the Forms :i ppendrd to that Al't. If the constmction of the "right to form union:;" under sub-cl. (c) of el.(!) of Art. l!J put forward b~· learned ('ounsel for impugning the -;alidity of the enactmrnt i;; negatived, then subject to the point ahout A1t. I! which we shall examine presently, lt·gislatil'O eom pct <'nc:e being conceded there could he no l<'gal objection to it.s validity. Objections based on colourahle legislation have relevance only in situa· tioa8 when the power of the legislature is restricted to particular topics, and au attempt iR made to csmpe legal fetters imposed on its powers hy r<•sorting to forms of legislation ca lculat.!'cl to mask the real subject-matter. Xo such problem <'XiRtH in the present eaAe and it is common ground that once tht• lcgi.,]ation passes the t-0Rt of the fundameut:i.I rights gua.nnteed by Part JII, legislatiYe compe-tence not being in dispute, its vafidity is beyon<l cadl. The question whether the secrecy assmed by s. 21 of Industrial DiRputes Act is or is not sullirient to protect the interests of the Banks, is matt.er of legislative policy-and is for Parliament

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT8

:.lOl

alone-and even the fact that the Court coulu be .... persuaded that the existing law is sufficient would be no ground for invalidating the impugned legis-lation. When the end which the legislature seeks to achieve, viz ., secrecv is competent, the enquiry as to ultra vires stops. Whether less th;m what was done might have been enough, whether more drastic provision was made than occasion demanued, whether the same purposes could have been achieved by provisions differently framed or by other means, these are wholly irrelevant consi-derations for testing the validity of the Jaw. They do not touch or concern the ambit of the power but only the manner . of its exercise, and once the provisions of Part III of the Constitution are out , of the way, the validity of the legislation is not open to challenge.The next point urged was that the impugned provision was in violation of Art. 14; though the several learned Counsel who appeared in support of the case of the workers were not all agreed as to the precise grounds upon which it could.be held that the impugned provision violated Art. 14 .

It was first submi~ted that the provision was rendered invalid because it vested an arbitrary power in banks which were parties to dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, to claim or not to claim the privilege of not producing the docu-ments and that no criterion had been indicated as to the circumstances in which Banks could decide to ma.ke the claim. But this, however, is answered by the provision itself which runs :

"When the banking company claims that such document, statement or information is of confidential nature and that the produc-tion or inspection of such document ...... would involve disclosure of information relating to the matters set not-the matters set out in sub·clauses (a) and (b)."

Aft India Bank E1nployus' Assoc6ati'.on

v. National Industrial Tribunal Ayyfi.ngar J.

AU India Bank Employu.•' AsMJciation v. National lndr.utrial Ttihunal "-yyangar J.

30~ SUPREME COUHT REPORTS

It was also submitted that ~ub-el. (b) of ,;.

sub-s. (I) was vague, in that rl•forcncc was made to "provision marlc for bacl and doubtful debtR aud ot.her usual or necessary prrn·isions". We do not soc any sub,;umcc in this point eith<'r, IH'causc these words arc taken from the form under the Bauking Compunies Act and their meaning is dl':tr in banking circles. In fact, in the application which the employee asRoeiations made before tho adjudicnte>r to direct the production of information and (]ocu-ments from the banks this phrase was UA(•d am! it is apparent that (Wen the Bank Employees' Associations understood it aA haviug definit.c connotation.

It was next submitl<:d on behalf of some of the

inten·cners thats. 34A(l) and (2) violatecl Art. 14 in that the classification contained in it waH impermissible as not being basod on rational grounds. It was said ( 1) that the protection acrainst 0 disclosure applied only to adjudicationsun-der the industrial Disputes Act. and not to olhor adjudications ; (2) that it ppliod only to certain banking companies and not to all banking companies; and (3) that by reason of ~. 34A (2) tho provisions of the impugned C'llactment were applied in discriminatory manner to all banks other than the Reservo Bank. The first two points cover the same ground and arise out of the fact that tho impugned provision by its 3rd sub-soction defines "banking company" reforrod to in it and to which its provisions apply, as meaning "Banking Company" wider the Industria.I DisputC'H Act, 1947. The Indmtrial Disputes Act. ddinC's "Banking Company" in s. 2(b) as follows:

"Banking Company means banki11g com-

pany as defined in s. 5 of the Banking Compa-nies Act, 1949, having branches or other estab-lishments in more than one State and include• the State Bank of India and tho Reserve Bank of India."

Reserve

'~ It would thus be seen that though the Bank· ing Companies Act applied to every banking com-pany, it is only those banks whose operations ex· tended beyond one State were brought within the scope of the definitions of "banking company" under the Industrial Disputes Act. The result of that was that Banking Companies not having bran-ches in more than one State would be an industry so as to be within the Industrial . Disputes Act but not "a banking company" within its definition. In the circumstances learned Counsel is right in . his submission that such banking companies as are not within the definition of "a banking company" undior the Industrial Disputes Act would not be entitled to claim the protection from disclosure con-ferred on "banking companies" by the impugned provision. This, however, is no ground for hold-ing the legislation invalid. In the first place, the complaint of discrimination is not by the banks who are not on the terms of s. 34A entitled to the protection from disclosure of their reserves etc. Secondly it is common ground that 95% of the banking business in this country is in the hands of Banks which at\J within the definition of "bank· ing companies" under s. 2(b) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Besides, these banks employ over 80,0JO out of the 90,000 bank-employees. In the circumstances and seeing that the injury to the ere· dit structure will only be by the disclosure of the reserves etc., of the banks of this class, there is sufficient rational connection and basis for classifi. cation to justify the differentiation. The fact that the legislation does not cover every banking· com-pany is therefore no ground for holding the pro· vision to be discriminatory within Art. 14.

All India Bank Employei&' Assoeiation

Nat,ional Industrial Tribunal

Ayyangar J.

1'he last point about the exclusion of the !~eserve has also· no ·substancBank ofindia 0e. from In the the very operation nature of of s. 34A things (2) and 011 the scheme of the provision the Reserve Bank could not but be excluded from sub-s. (3) of the impugned provision. In determining

All lndia Bank Emplo!JU8 A81t0Ciatiot1, v. J.Vational lntluatr~ul Tribunal Ayyatagar J.

[106:.>j

304 SUPREME COURT REPOilTS

what reson·es could properly be t1Lkcn into account, ti'<

the Reserve Rank would be discharging not any quasi judicial but only an administrative function, determining this matter with rcfor<'nce to uniform business principles and it therefore appears to us that there is no ·impropriety in its findings being final even in regard to itself. submissio:i on similar lines about biaR was also made in relation to the impact of tho impugned pro\·isiou insofar as it related to the industrial <lioputc between the State Bank of India and· its "mplo~•ccs. It "·as pointed out to us tliat the Hcson·o Bank of India owned practically the entirety of the sh:1rccapital of the State Bank of India, with the result that the Reserve Bank was peeun.iarily and vitally interested in supporting the State Bank as against the latter's employees in any industrial dispute and that the element of bias which the situation involved would invalidate the impugned provision. We consider this argument without force. If, as we have held, the impugned provision is ,·alid and does not violate any of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution in regard to the employees of the Reserve Bank, the challenge to the impugned pro-vision cannot obviously be successful in the case of the employees of the State Bank.

As we have stated earlier, though the argu-

ments before us ranged on very wide ground, we have not thought it necessary to deal with all of them because in view of our conclusions on the crucial points in the case the others whioh wore subject of debate before us did not arise for consi-deration.

Tho appeal foils and is dismissed with costs.

The petitions also fail and are dismissed with costs. (one hearing fee)

Appeal and Petitions dismissed . .. ..