THE SENIOR ELECTRIC INSPECTOR AND OTHERS versus LAX.MI NARAYAN CHOPRA AND OTHERS

·.,t,,,,...t, 16

146 St1PR~ME COURT REPORTS

.. [i9~j

'.l'HE SENIOR ELECTRIC INSPEC'fOit A~D OTHEHS

LAX.MI XARA YAK CHOPRA AND OTHERS

<P. B. GAJE~DRAGADRAR, K. SunJJA RAo, -1\1. liIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)

TtleU'flPhy-W ire/,,,.-SIJU.icm-Expmaion "Telegraph line", MIJSfling of-If includes electric lines u&ed for ~he purpo&e of wirel<88 tele~raph-Indian Electricit,~ Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), &a.2,3'(2) (b) Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 ( 13 of 1885), 8.3(1), 3(4)-E/edrir.ity (Supply) Act (Mo/ 1948). Slatute-Co11atruction--Maxim Contemporanea Expo81IW est optima etforlis•ima in lege-If.npplicab le t~ Acts comparatir<ly modern-Mode nf Interpretation. Severe electrical interference was obser\'ed jn J>ost and Telegraphs Wireless Station which was traced to the respondent No. 1 's factory where number of motors were ope~ated for .the purpose .or working _electric 4rills. The Senior Electric Inspector JSSued nbt1ce to the first res-pondent to show cause as to why an ord.r under s.84(2)(b) of the Indian Electricity Act requiring discontinuance of the operation of the electric motors in the said factorr should not be made. The first respondent challenged the said order by-a \vrit petition contending inte1· alia that there \\•as no "Telep graph Line" in the Posts and Telegraphs Wirekss Station within the meaning of >.34(2}(b) of the Act. ·

The High Courr held, firstly, that the woi·d. 'line' in the expression 'telegraph JiHc' connotes th~ c.xistencc of defined channel of communication which has got a·physical existence and that wireless tclegraphy 1s dependent upon transmission through space c,f electric \\'aves and that is not defined r,hysical channel. Secondly, thr expression "tekgraph line', as used ins. 34(2)(1..>) of the Indian Elcc· tricity Act, has, in the absence of any ncv.· definition in that Act, to be 11:h:cn the sa.me sense as the Legislature had intended in 1885 by the definition of that expression in the ear-lier Act. 1'his reason is based upon the maxim r..ontemporanta r.zpositio £81 optima et fortiMi111a i1l. [,1Je (contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in fa, .. •).

The appellants contended that the definirion of "teJc. graph line" in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, was wide enough to take in electric lines usrd for the purpose of

3S.C.R. SUPREME COURT-REPORTS

wireless telegraph and the High Court went wrong in invoking the old maxim Mnlemporanea expositio est optima et fortisaima ~n lege. in construing the provisions of n1odern statute.

Held, that the combined reading of the relevant provisions of the Iridian Electricity Act, 1910, and the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, "Telegraph line" is comprehensive enough and means wire or wires used for the purpose of an appliance or apparatus for receiving telegraphic or other com· munications by means of electricity, and it need not be continuous physical channel from the point of transmission to the point of reception.

wireless transmitter transmits sound as electro-mag-netic waves and the said waves are detected by the aerial and fed into the receiving apparatus by wires. So the wires of the aerial as well as of the apparatus are used for the purpose of the apparatus receiving communications. Thus, the receiving apparatus employs "telegraph lines" within the meaning ofs.3 (4) of the Telegraph Act, 1885.

Held, further, that the maxim contemporanea expositio as laid down by Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes, but not to interpreting Acts which were comparatively modern;

The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether the court is asked to construe provision of an ancient statute or that of modern one, namely, what is the expressed intention of the Legislature. In modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of Legis-lature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, and unless contrary intention appeared, an interpretation should be given to the words used·. to take in new- facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them .

. The maxim "contemporanea exposiiio" could not be invoked in cons truing the word "telegraph line" in the Indian mectricity Act, 19!0.

Assheton Smith v. Owen, (1906)1 Ch. 179, Atl.-Orney-General v. Edison Telephone Go. of London, (I 880)6 Q. B. D. 244, In re Regulalion and Control of Radio Comm1inication in Canada, (1932) A: C. 304, The· Ki111J v. Brislan, Ex prlrle WillilllTIUI, (1935) 54 C.L.R. 262 and James v. Commonwealth of Australia, (1936) A.C. 578, refr.tred to.

Stal~ of Madras v. Gannon Dunk1Nley & Go. (Madras) :i.:.. !Jd. . (1959} S.C.R. -379, relied O!J•

TheS1n ... ·/ill4Ck'W

-I~r .v. L011mi·Nll•"ll'Jn ·.~

·1961 CrnL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal ' '7'ht Bmt.r ·Electric No. :128 of 1958. ·1...,.w ·V. . Appeals from tho judgment and order dated ·La.TM\ J\'ar411an 11/Jopro September 12, l!l5G, of tho Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 15 of 1955.

B. Set1, P. K. Ghatte1jee and P.K. Bo.1e, for tho ·appellants. Dipak Datta Ch0'11dhri and P. D. llfenon, for rrspondcnt No. 2. HHil. August 16. The .Tudgnwnt of the Court waH delivered by SuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal raises the ·'fjnostion of eonstruction of the expression "tel~grap11 line'' in s. 34(2)(b) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Act 9 of 1910), (hereinafter ealkrl the Act).

The first respondent, Laxmi Narayan Chopra, carries on business as motor coach builder under the name and style of "Chopra ~fotors" having his factory at 139, Regent Park, Tollygunge in the suburbs of Ca.Jcutta. In the said factory number of ""C'nivenml Electric Motors" arc operated for the purpose of working electric rlrills. Within distance of 100 feet of the said factory, there is Post and Telegraph 'Vireless Station, which, besides functioning as coast station communicat-ing. with ships at sea, handles public messages in large volume from Darjeeling, Shillong, Gauhati, Agartala and New Delhi. In or about April, 1953, severe electrical interference was observed in the said station and experts attributed the same to local induction from tho first respondent's factory. On October 13, l!l53, tho Senior Electric Inspector issued notice to the first respondent to show cause writing as to why an order under s. 3t(2)(b) of the Act, read with notification No. 4193,COM dated August 14, 1929, requiring discontinuation ofthe operation of the Universal Electric Motors in tb\l

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

said factory premises should not be made. After soµie correspondence: on December 1, 1953, the Senior Electric Inspector made an order under s.3.4(2)(b) of the Act requiring the first respondent to remedy the injuries affecting the lines used for wireless telegraphic communications at the Wireless Receiving Centre. On January 12, 1954, the first respondent filed petition in the High Court at Calcutta under Art. 226 of the Constitution pray-ing for writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ directing the appellants to withdraw and cancel the said order and to forbear from giving effect to the same. The petition came np for hear-ing, in the first instance, before Sinha J., of that Court. It was contended, inter alia, that there was no "telegraph line" in the Post and Telegraph Wireless Station within the meaning of s.34(2)(b) of the Act, and, therefore, the notice issued by the Senior Electric Inspector was without jurisdiction. Sinha J., rejected the contention and dismissed the . petition. But on appeal, division bench of that High Court, consisting of Mookerjec, A. C, J., and H.K. Bose J., accepted the contention of the first respondent and issued writ as prayed for. The present appeal is directed against the said order.

Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the definition of "telegraph line" in the Indian Telegraph Act, (Act 13 of 1885), which is included by reference in tho Act, is wide enough to take in electric lines uslld for the purpose of wire-less telegraph and that the Appellate Bench of the High Court went wrong in invoking tho old maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et ortissima in lege in construing the provisions of modern statute. The first respondent is ex parte; but in this case his viewpoint is forcibly expressed in the judgment of the High Court under appeal.

To appreciate the rival contentions, it is' necessary at the outset to read the relevant provisit>ns ·of tp,e·A~t apd tl\e '.!'elegraph Act.·.

T1 .. ,s~or. i1st1rw

.. foopeolor · v. Laxm> Na't'afl<Jn Ohopra Sffbba Ra_o J,

1961 Tllo'Silttor ..... ,..,. . I,.,,,_.,, no..f i Y" .. ..,.,,,.,. ~·

SUPREMECOURT REPORTS (!962J

The Indian E'lectricity Ac,, tr/JO

Section 34. (2) If at :my time it is estab. lished to the Ratisfaction of the appropriate Govcrnment-

( h) thal any electric supply·lincs or other

works for the generation, transmission, supply or use of energy are attended with clanger to the public safety or to human lifo or injuriously affect any telegraph line,

tho appropriate Government may, by order in writing, specify the matter complained of and require lhe ownor , or user of such electric supply-lines or other works to remedy it in such manner as shall be specified in the order, and may also in like manner forbid the use of, and t.hc supply of energy to, any electric supply-line or works until the order is complied with or for sm·h time as is ~pcci-fietl in the order.

Section 2. In this Act, expressions <icfined

in the Indian Telegraph Act, 188:i, 01· in the F.lectricity (Supply) Act, 1948, have tl1e meanings assigned to them in cithrr of tho"e Aets .......... ..

The Indian Telegraph Act, 188:;

Section 3. (I) "telegraph" means an dHctric, galvanic or magnetic telegraph, and includes appliances ancl apparatus for making, transmitting or receiving telegraphic-. telepho-nic or other communications by means of .. Jectricity, galvanism or magnetism.

( 4) "telegraph line" means win· ur wires

used for the purpose of telegraph with any casing, coating, tube or pipe endosing the tiame and any appliances and apparntus con-nected therewith for the purpose of fixing or insulating the same.

combined reading -of the relevant provisions . . .· . . . . bf

3 S.C.R. StJl>Tu'.mME COURT REPORTS

the two Acts may be expressed thus: "Telegraph ;1:861 line" means wire or wires used for the purpose · 'lllfS•~l"Jllr.;,i;ic of an appliance or apparatus for receiving tel_egra-· r•1~"" ~-.~ P[hic or other cowmunications by means of electri-]-~,, city. ......._

~-.~ -~,, ......._ -su!iii11-liad·J.

. If it is established to the satisfaction of the

appropriate Government that any works for the generation transmission supply, or use of electrical energy injuriously affects such telegraph line the said'Government is authorized to take appropriate action under s. 34 of the Act. It is. not disputed that in the said factory num her of Universal · Electric Motors are operated for the purpose of working ele.ctric drills and it is also established that the interference with the reception of messages at the Telegraph Wireless Station is attributable to local induction from the said factory. But the dispute between the parties centres round the ques-tion whether the said interference with the recep-tjon of messages at the said Station injuriously affects any telegraph line within the meaning of s. 34 of the Act. The Telegraph Wireless Receiving 8tation clearly comes within the definition of "tele-graph" in the Telegraph Act. The Telegraph Act was passed in 1885. "Telegraph" then meant "an electric, galvanic or magnetic telegraph and appliance, and apparatus for telegraphic, telephonic or other cQ1nmunications by means of electricity, galva-nism or magnetism". At that time wirel8ss tele-graphy or radio had not been developed. In the year l !l 14, s. 3( l) of the said Act waH amended and the following words were inserted after the words "apparatus for" : "making transmitting or receiving''. With tho result thtit, after the amendment, receiving of communications by means of electricity was in.eluded in the definition. wireless receiving station certainly receives commu-nici;i,tiQl).B by J:P.eans of. e.lectricity, and therefore, jt is_"tiilegraph" within the meaning of said defini-~on. . Thengh · the said .station may bo within the definition of "telegraph", the question still remains

lHl

Tt.I Stnior B~lric IMpc<I., v. lCJKmi 1!.'.r.yan .c ••

152 stJPREME COURT REPORTS

wheth<'r thoro is "telegraph line", for, under the df"finition, to be "t-0legraph line" thon1 shall be wir<' or wires userl for the purpos(' of an apparatus receiving communications by means of electricity. Under thP hl'ading "wireless telegraphy" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 23, brief but adequat<' de~rription of wirelees telegraphy is given thus :

"A wirelcso transmitter 1s device for producing rapid oscillatory motion of electl'i-1•ity which iH the origin of elertric waves. ~nch electric waves ar<' detected at wirel08!< receiving station by the effects of the rapidly varying electric and magnetic forces wnioh constitute the electric wave-motion."

Arc any wires used for the purpose of the apparatus receiving the said communications ? In the Encylopacdia Britannica some of tho receivipg stations aro described and it shows that wires are invariably used a8 aerials for receiving tho said communicat.ions. In the present case. the Senior Electric Inspector filed an affidavit wherein he stated "it was established to my satisfaction that the operation and use of the Universal drills dur-ing the working hours of the factory caused serious interference by induction to the existing lines as well as to the receiving apparatus containing wires which are/were expressly u~ed for telegraphic communication at the S11id centrn." It is, there-fore, manifest that wires arc used for . the purpose of the apparatus recefring communications, that is, wires are used not only for the aerial but also inside the ;ipparatus. wireless transmitter transmits sound as electro-magnetic waves and the said waves arc detected by the aerial and fed into the receiving apparatus by wires. To put it shortly the wires of the aerial as well as of the apparatus are used for the purpose of the apparatus·receiving communication&. If so, it follows that the recei-Y'ing

3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

apparatus · employs - "telegraph lines" _,.within the meaning of s. 3(4) of the Telegraph Act.

The High Court gave two reasons for reject-ing the appellants' contention. The first reason is that the word 'line' in the expression 'telegraph line' connotes the existence of defined channel of communication which _has got physical exis-tence and that wireless telegraphy is qenendent upon transmission through space of electricwaves and that is not defined physical channel. We cannot accept this reasoning, for telegraph line is not defined to mean defined continuous physical channel from the point of transmission to the point of reception. The definition, as ,W,(J J;tavti pointed out, is comprehensive enough to fake i11 any wire used for the purpose of an apparatas for receiving communications by means of electri'· city.

The second reason given by tn~. Jearned Judges is that the expression "telegraph :1fue", as used ins. 34(2)(b) of the Indian Electricity Act, has, in the absence of any new definition in that -F l Act, to be given the same sense as the I,egislature had intended in 1885 by the definition of that ex-pression in the earlier Act. This reason is based upon the maxim contemporanea expositio est optirµ,a et fortissima in lege (contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law). To state it differently, in the year 1885 the Legislaturti could not have dreamt of the future discovery of wireless telegraphy and, therefore,. could not have intended to use the expression "telegraph line" in compre-hensive sense so as to take in electl'ic wires of receiving station of wireless telegraphy. It is necessary to consider the scope of the said maxim in its application _ to the __ interpreta---..,. tion of m.odern statutes. In Craies on _Statute Law, 5th edn., the said 1:ule is cxplaiqed iu the words of Coke thus at p. 77. · ·

• -F l --

-19()1 " ·~ ,. ·: :;·.:·,,. ;;. , ~ . 1·he :SitiiOr·-Ezectriv In.spector .. ,,~ ·:; ·v: .. ·. ~ . Laxtn'i-'.Jl,:,.drayan .~Parr.a. Subba Rao J.

1'he Sen;#r Eleelrie f~r v. l.1!'%.rnsi ~arayat• (1iqta -·-Subb4°llao J.

SUPRE!'r!E COURT REPORTS [1962]

"This and the like were the forms of ancient Acts ancl graunt8, am! the ancient Acts and grn.unts must be c'onstrued and taken as the law was holden at that time when they were made."

The discussion ended with the followmg words at

"In Assheton Smith v. Ou·en ('), Cozcns-Hardv, L. J., said : 'I do not think that tho doctrine of contemporanca cxpositio can bl' applied in construing Acts which are com-paratively modl'rn,' and tho Court declined to apply the rule t.o the intp,rpretation of local Acts of I i!J:J and 1800."

In Ha.lsbury°H Law~ of England, :!IHl e<ln., Vol. ;J:!, it is stated in the context of telegraph J<.gislatiun thus at p. 4 :

"The fa~t that ne-.·

methods of telo·

graph;'-· have been i11ve11focl since the <late of passing of the Act~ containing the definition docs not prevent the application of the Acts to such methods, provider! that they answer the requirements and fall within the terms of the definition."

In i':lutherland's Statutorv Constructiou, 3rd e<ln., Vol. 2, dealing with tlie said maxim, the learned author states at p. 508 as follows :

"As general rule it may be stated that legislative intent should be determined as of tho time the legislation goes into effect. But surrooncling circumstances am! situations occurring after tho enactment of the statute .. ~y be of great or even conclusive nssistanoe in determining meaning which was intended to be conveyed. Legislative ntanda\·ds are crencra.llv c:ouchcrl in tcrnrn which have con· ~idcrable breadth. Therefore 8tatute may be interpreter! to include circumstances or (IJ(l90f.1 !Ch.179,213

3 s:c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

situations which were unkrown or did not exist at the time of the enactment of the statute,"

Decided cases accepted the said liberal a,jlproach in· construing modern statutes. In The Attorney: aeneral v. The Edison Telephone Company of London ('), telephone was held to be "tele-graph" within the meaning of the Telegraphs Acts, 1863 and 1869, although the telephone was not invented or contemplated in 1869. Stephen, J., observed at p. 254:

"Of course no one supposes that the legislature intended to refer specifically to telephones many years before they were invented, but it is highly probaWe that they would, and it seems to us clear that they actually did, use langu 1ge embracing future discoveries as to the use of electricity for the purpose of conveying intelligence."

The Privy Council in In re Regitlation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada (') held tha.t broadcasting fell within the meaning of the cxpre~­sion "telegraphs" in s.92 of British North America Act; 1867, though at the time when that Act was made broadcasting was not in vogue. Ih The King v. Brislan ; ex parte Willi11>ms (') the questibn was whether law of the Commonwealth Parlia-ment with respect to radio broadcasting was orte with respect to "Postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services" under s. 1(5) of tfie Australian Commonwealth Act, and the Court held that the words were wide enough to take in radio broadca~ting. In James v. Commonwea.lth of A"'8tralia ([4]), Lord ·wrig)lt has stated the principle in felicitous language thus :

(l) (1880) 6 Q. B. D. 244.

(2) (193'-) A. C. 304. (41 (1936l'A.C: 57$; 64!.

(3) (1935) 54 C. L.R. 262.

The Sf1141it'-ctric ln8J'j6!or v. Lax»ri.:Nar(tyv.n ~; Subbn Rao J.

1961 -The SfniOr Electric LpijJ_,:-:to.r ... v. LaXlrti ~\'aroyr.ti Chopra

Sub/la /fao J.

JG(j SUPRE~fE COURT REPORTS

" ...... the meauing of the words changes, but the changing circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full import of that meaning." This Court in "onstruing the words "sale of goods" in Entr\· ·18, Li8t II of the Seventh Schedule to the Gov(·t·nmcnt of India Act, 193:3, accepted the aforesaid principle in Tiu: State of .~ladras v. Grinrwn Dunkerley and Co., (illadms) Ltd. (')and restated it at p. 416 thus: "The principle of these decisions is that wltc11, after the enactment of legis· la.tion, new facts and Rituations arise which could not have been in its cont-0mp· lat.ion, tht' statutory provisions could properly be applied to them if the words thereof are in u broad sense capable of . con,taining them."

Tho Ie(.&f: position may be summarized thus : The mi1±11n r,ontemporan.ea cxpositio as laid down by Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes but not to interpreting Acts which are comparatively modem. There is good reason for this change in the mode of interpretation. '!'he fundamental rule of co!lstruction is the same whether the Court is ~sked to construe provision of an ancient statute or ,tl1at of modern one, namely, what is the e_xpressed intention of the Legislature. It is jierhaps difficult to attribute to legislativ-0 body functioning in astatic society th~t its intention was couched in terms of considerable breadth so as to take within ito sweep the future developments ccimprchcn<le<l by the phraseology 11Rcd. It is more rcasonahl-0 to confine its intention only to the circumstances obtaining at the time the law was made. . But in modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for modern Legislature making laws to govern society which is fast moving must bo presumed to be aware (I) [1959] S. C.R. 379.

3. S.C.R. SUPREME· COURT REPORTS

of an enlarged meaning the same concept might ~ttract with · the march of time and with the revolutionary·. changes brought ft bout in social, economic, political and scientific ·~ml other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new fact~ and situations, if the words are capable of comprehend-ing them. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the maxim contemporanea expositio could be invoked in constrn-fag the word "telegraph line" in the Act.

For the' said reasons, we hold that the expres. sion "telegraph line" is sufficiently comprehensive t.o take in the wires used for the purpose of the apparatus of the Post and Telegraph Wireless Station.

In the result, we set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the petition filed by the first respondent. The appeal is allowed, bnt, in tht• eircumstances of the case, without costs.

Appeal allowed.

THE DOOARS TEA CO., LTD.

COMMISSIONER OF AGRICUL'TURAL INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SunnA RAo

and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)

Agricultural Income-Agricultural produce used for asses~ee's "'!'n business and not sold in the market-If by itself constitutes income-Market value-Mode of computation-Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 (IV of 1944), s. 2(1)(b)(I), Rule 4(2).

The appellant which carried on business of growing m;tnufacturing and selling tea held large tract of land o~ which qam!>oos, thatching grass and fuel ti!I!ber were grow!l

'1961 'l'he Sen{or El,ctric Inspector v. Lax mi Narayan Chopra· Subba Rao J.

1961 Augml 18.