V. T. S. CHANDARASEKHARA MUDALIAR (DIED) AND OTHERS. versus KULANDAIVELU MUDALIAR AND OTHERS.

4Ao ;SUPREME COuRT REPORTS [1963)

V. T. S. CHANDARASEKHARA 1\IUDALIAR · , (DIED) .AND OTHERS.

KULANDAIVELU MUDALIAR AND OTHERS. (A.K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and J.R. -. MUDHOLKAR, 'JJ.) .

Hindu LaW:-Adoption-Nearer Sapindas...:..Refusal of consent-When improper.

' The appellants, the nearer sapindas of the husband of the 2nd respondent who had adopted the !st respondent, the son of her agent, filed ·suit for declaration that the adoption was invalid on. the ground that they had pro-perly refus~ their consent an~ that _the remote sapii;da who had given hu consent was dJSquahfied from . so domg as he , did not believe in the Hindu scriptures. The appellants who had been asked for their consent had refused it on the ground that the 1st respondent was not an agnate and that among their grand children or children there were eligible boys wbom their parents were willing to give in adoption.. The ttial court at Madurai as well as tlie High Court of Madras dis-missed the suit, holding that the nearer sapindas had impro-perly refused their consent and that in the circumstances the adoption with ~he content of the remote sapinda was_ valid.

On appeal by certificate under Art. 133 (l)(c).

. Held, tbat the power of Hindu widow to adopt is co-extensive with that of her husband and when her discretion is not limited by her husband it is absolute and is only subject to the assent of the sapindas. Ba/usu Gurulingasu·ami _v. Balusu Ramala"8hmamma (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad.398, referred to;

The validity of an adoption has to be judged by spiritual rather than temporal considerations and that devolution of property is only of secondary importance.

-The Oollector of Madras v. Afootoo Ramalinga Sethupathy. ( 1868), 12 M.I.A. 397, Sri Raghunadha v. Bhri Brozo Kialwre . . (1876) K.R. 3. I.A. 154,Raja Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narasrvyya, (1876) L.R. 4, I.A J; Veera Basavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao, (1918), L.R. 4, I.A. 265, Amarendra Mansingh v. Banalan Singli, (1933) L.R. 60, I.A. 242 and Ghanta Ohina Ramasubbayya v. Moopar-. thi OhanChuramawa, (1947) L,R, 74, I.A. 162, referred to, -

2 s.o.R. SUPREME OOtJR'l' tmPOR'l'S 441

Held, further, that consent of .sapindas was an assurance of the b<mafide performance Of religious dut) and the guarantee against capricious action by widow in taking, ·boy in adoption and not the possible deprivation of proprietory interests of the reversioners. Sri Kriahnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahailur Garu; ( 1935) 69 M.L.J. 388, referred to. .

The sapindas who are in fiduciary relation to the widow should exercise their power objectively and without being actuated by their own self interest and that the rules regarding taking only sapinda In adoption were only recommendatory and the fact that the widow wishes to adopt non°sapinda is no proper ground for Withholding consent by sapindas.

Sundara Rama Rao v. Satynaraganamurn I.L.R 1950 Mad. 461, Venkamnia v. Subramaniam, (1906) L.R. 34 I.A. 22, Srimati Uma Devi v. Gohxitanund Das M1ihabata, (1876} L.R. 5 I.A. 40, Alluri Venkata Nararimbaraju, v. Alluri Bangarraju v. C. A. No. 226 of 1944 dated 25-7·46 by the Madras High Court and Venkatayudu v. Seahamma A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 745, referred to.

ObServations of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. in Subra-hamanyam v. Venkamma -(1903) I.L.R. 25 Mad, 127 held to be obiter and not approved.

The refusal of consent by the appellants was imP,roper.

Order XVI r. 4 and Or. XVIII r .. 3 (2) of the Supreme Court do not by themselves enable the High Court to limit the certificate under Art. 133 Of the Constitution to certain grounds and upon this grant of such certificate the whole appeal was before this Court and all questions urged before the High Court were open.

The consent given by the remote sapinda on .a proper

appreciation of the relevant facts and despite has non-belief in rituals, he still being Hindu, was valid. OmL APPlllLLATH JUBISDIOTION : Oivil App~ No. 289 of 1959.

Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 16, 1955, of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 231 of 1954. ·

N. 0. OhafJerjee, K.N • .Baja,gqpala Saski, V .8. Ven7eat.a Raman and 'l' •. K. 8-IMa- Raman, for the Appellants Nos. 2 to 6 . .A. ·V. V~ 8aatri, B. <laoo,patlifl l1J6"

Y. T.S. Chonda ....... Aara Modoliar v. Kulandiff</1 MvdGllar

JHI Y. T.S. Chn•..al>aro Jledaliar •. KuHllda-M..i.lia Subb1B .. J.

8. Gopa!aralnam and G. Gopal.akrishnan, for ree-pondent No. I:

T. S. Venkataraman, for respond<.>nt No.:!

I 962. April 26. The Judgment of the Court W88 delivered by

SUJIBA RAo, J.-This appeal on certificate

ill preferred against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras "onfirming thOfle of the Subordinate Judge, Madurai, in e. suit for e. decle.re.tion the.t the e.doption of the 2nd defend•mt by the lst defende.nt we.s invalid. The following genealogy will be helpful to e.pprecie.tc the fe.cts e.nd the contentions of the parties :

Ren,atha

lG t.olD 18

2 8.0.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

Shanmugha., Subramania. and Kula.nda.ivelu {Jr.) became divided in 1878 and since the division ea.ch of the three branches of the family was living separately. Kulandaivelu {Jr.) died in the year 1912 possessed of considerable property described in the plaint schedule leaving him surviving his widow, Gnruvammal Anni, who is the lst defendant as his sole heir. In 1951, Guruva.mmal Anni, with view to adopt the 2nd defendant to her deceased husband, wrote letters to her husband's sapinda.s who were majors i.e., plantiffs 1 and 2, and defen· da.nts 5, 11, 12, 14, 19 and 20, seeking their con-sent to her adopting the 2nd defendant. The said sa.pindas, except defendants 12 and 14, refused to give their consent for the reasons mentioned in their replies. Defendant 12 did not receive the letter, but the 14th defendant gal'e his consent to the adoption. On Ma.y 25, 1951, Guruva.mmal Anni adopted Knla.ndaivelu (Jr.), the 2nd defendant as a. son to her late husband. On May 30, 1951, she executed Ex. A-1, the adoption deed, and registered the same on June 12, 1951. Chandara-sekhara., the son of Su bra.mania., and his son, Kanniappa, and three minor grandsons filed 0. S, No. 156 of 1951 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Madurai, for declaration that the adoption of the 2nd defendant by the 1st defendant was . invalid, void and of no effect. Defendant 3, is the natural father of defendant 2; defendants 4 to 21 are the other upirida.s of 1st defendant's husband, being the descendants of Rengan~tha.. The particulars of their relationship to Kulanda.ivelu will be seen from the a.f~resa.id genealogy. It was, inter alia, alleged in the plaint that the adoption made by the let defendant of the 2nd defendant without the consent of the sapinda.s was bad and that the con· sent given by the 14th defendant was purchased and therefore would not validate it. Defendants I, 2 and 3 filed written-statement.a supporting the adoption; the7 pleaded that, u the nearer aapindN

IHI Y.T.S.

Y.T.S. Chan"'1•1ikhara Mu.li1r .. Kulfl#UUil!llu JllU./jmo --Suiha Ra, J.

lln Y.T.S. ~Aora Mudalw v. XlllacietvJia M...WW S""6aRaJ.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]

improperly refused to give the consent, the !'<lop-tion made on the basis of the consent given by the 14th defendant was v.11olid. The learned Subordi-nate Judge, on consideration of the evidence and the relevant law on the subject, came to the conclu-sion that the 12th defendant, though reoei~ed the notice seeking his ooneent, returned the same, that the other sapindas, excluding defendant 14, im pro-perly refused to give their consent to the adoption and that, therefore, the adoption made with the consent of defendant 14 wss valid in law. The Subordinate Judge also rejected the contention of the plantiff's that the 14th defendant, having regard to his disbelief in the religious efl'icacy of adoption and the Hindu rituals, was disqualified from giving his consent. Io the result, he dismissed the suit. On appeal division Bench of the Madras High Court, agreeing with the view of the learned Subordinate Judge, oame to the conclusion that the sapindas were actuated by improper motives in refusing to give their coneent. The eeooad conten-tion directed against the consent given by defendant 14 does not appear to have been seriously preseed be-fore the High Court. In the result the High Court dismissed the appeal with oosts. It may be men. tioned that the lat defendant, Guruvammal Anni, died pending the suit and that the let plaintiff died after the appeal was disposed of by the High Court. The other plaintiffs have preferred to present appeal against the judgment of the High Court.

The main question raieed in this appeal ia

whether the refuaal of the sapindas, other than defendant 14, to give coneent to the &dopti.on of the 2nd defendant by the let defendant was im-proper and, therefore, could be disregarded.

Before we coDBider the legal aspects of the

question raised, we shall briefly state the rnlevant.

facte, either adinittc or coLcori ently found l>

SUPREJ\IE COURT REPORTS - ·445

2 S.C.R.

the courts, below. Kulandaivelu, the last male• holder, died on January 29, )912, possessed of ex-tensive property. His widow, Guruvammal Anni, was managing the said property through power of attorney agents. ·rhe-1st ·defendant is the 3rd · defendant's father's mother's sister's daughter's. The 3rd defendant was also helping the 1st defen-dant - in respect of certain transactions during the management of her properties by one of her power of attorney agents. _ The 3rd defendant and his wife were living with the 1st defendant; and the second defendant was born in 1930 in the house of Guruvammal Anni. She was very much attached to him &nd- as he grew up she also per-formed pujas in company with him. The 2nd defen-dant studied_ in the District Board High t5chool, _ Sholavandan taking Sanskrit as his second language .. and was studying for B. A. (Hons.) degree in 1951 when he was adopted. In 1951 Guruvammal Anni was about 67 years old and.wanted to take boy in adoption who would not only discharge religious duties to her husband as his son and preserve the continuance of her husband's lineage, but would . _ also be of great solace and help to her during the - remaining years of her life. ~ith that object, she issued notices to the sapindas of her husband intimate in" them of her intention to adopt the 2nd. defen-.. da°nt, who, according· to her, had all the necessary · qualifications to fulfil tho role of an adopted son. The boy proposed to be adopted by her wa_s young healthy, educated, religions minded and devoted to her, having been born in her house and brought up by her. ·

Y. T.S. c..+iindu11•1kha11' Mud1Jli•" . K'ulandaifllu : "· Mulf•liar

Subba Rao o! ~

In April 1951, the 1st defendant sent· letters Ex.A-I to - the 1st plaintiff, ·Ex.A.JO to the · 2nd ' plaintiff, Ex.A·15 - to the 4th defemlant and similar one to the 5th defendant, Ex.A-18 to the 11th defendant, Ex. B-3 to ·the 12th ·defendant, Ex. B-62 to the 14th defendant, Ex.A.21 to the 19th defendant, and Ex.A·25 to the ~0th r · . . • , , ' , ; i'

lDG2 Y. T.s. Mudal/OF •• CWttadaiwlu Jlu4oliOF Satbo Ra.J.

c~·· Mudal/OF

446 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963}

defendant, seeking for their consent to her adopt-ing the 2nd defendant. As already stated, all the said persons excepting defendants 12 and 14, replied refusing to give their consent to the propoe· ed adoption; the 12th defendant received the letter but returned it unopened, and the 14th d<ifendant gave his consent.

Ex. A·3 is the reply sent by the lat plaintiff.

He has given various reasons for refusing to give his consent to the proposed adoption. As much of the argument turned upon the contents of this letter, we would briefly give the i::aid reasons. They are: (I) the Ist defendant did not think fit to take boy in adoption for many years though her husband died 38 years ago and that four yea111 ago there was some talk about it, but, at the instance of the let plaintiff and other agnates, she gave up the idea of making an adoption stating that she would not think of adopting boy to her husband; (2) the present attempt to take boy in adoption was at the instance of the 3rd defenqant, who was exetcising considerable influence over her: (3) .to take boy in adoption aged about 20 years and who was not an agnate was oppoaed to the uniform and invariable custom prevailing in the oommunity; and ( 4i there were eligible boys among hie grandsons under the age of 7 years and among his cousin's great.grandsons under tht> age of 18 years and the parents of thti said boys bad no objection to give any one of them in adoption. He summarized his objections in the following words:

"I do strongly object to the adoption of Kulandaivelu,your agent's son; not only for the reason that he is aged and ineligible, but also for the reasons that he is not agnate and the proposed adoption is prompted by corrupt and selfish design on the part of your agent. The proJ:,f,sed adoption has behind it the mo-Uve of · eatinf the le gltimate reve11irn117

2 S.C.R.

interest of your husband's agnatee and is absolutely wanting in good faith.''

Ex. A"l2 is the reply of the 2nd plaintiff, i.e., the eon of the let-plaintiff. He has· practically repeat,. ed the objections found in his father's letter; while the father stated in his letter that there were eligible boJll for adoption among his grandsons and great-grandsons of his cousin, the 2nd plaintiff only referred to his sons; he says in his letter: "More-over, if you really desire to take boy in adoption I have got eons who are less than seven years old and who are fit for being taken in adoption. I have no objection whatever to give in adoption anyone of the aforesaid boys whom you like." Ex.A·l.6 in the reply given by the 4th defendant. He has eligible boys, who are the great-grandsons of the cousin of the 1st plaintiff and who can be given in adoption; these are some of the boys mentioned by the · 1st plaintiff in his letter. He sets up the case that the 1st defendant's husband had adopted one Sankarlinga. Mudaliar even when he was alive. He refuses to give the consent on the ground that there was already an adoption. Ex. B-5 is the reply given by the 5th defendant and he only adopts the reasons given by his father, the 4th defendant. Ex·A-19 is the reply given by the II th defendant, who is the father of the 14th defendant. His reply is on the same lines as given by the let plaintiff. Ex:.B-4 is the reply given by the 14th defendant; he gives his wholeheart-ed consent to the adoption. He has four eligible sons, defendants 15 to 18, who oould be given in adoption. Ex.A-22 is the rf;lply of the 19th defen-dant and Ex.A-26 that of his son, the 20th defen-dant. The 19th defendant stated that he has grand-sons aged less than 8 yea.rs and that the parents of the said boys have no objection to give any one of ~hepi in adoption. The 20th defendant offers one

·Y. T.S. CAndaraukhara Mudaliar •• KuUmdeiD1lu .Mudalior SUbbaR .. J.

Y. T.S. CAnilliaroaikAora Mudaticr •. K oJ..,/. W.lu Nudolirir S~B .. J,

of his sons to be taken in adoption by the 1st de-fendant.

The position that emerges from the aforesaid replies is this: (I) the !st plaintiff suggested that-any onP. of his grandsons or his cousin's great-grandsons might be taken in adoption; (2) the 2nd plaintiff, the 19th defendant, the 16th defendant and the 20th defendant offered their sons or grandsons, as the case may be, for adoption; (:l) the 14.th defendant, the son of the 11th defenrlant gave his consent to the adoption; (4) to 12th dcfondant, who has only one son, though he receivf)d the notice did not reply; and (5) the 4th a.nd the 5th defendants Silt up another adoption by the last male-holder. In shm·t, tho elderly m1,mb<'rs of the branch of Danappa, except rlcfendant.s, 4, 5, 12 and 14, objected to the adoption mainly on the ground that the proposed hoy was not Hapinda and that they were willing to give one of their sons or grandRons. as the case may ho, in adoption. Tho other grounds given bv them arc similar to those given by tho 1st plaintiff. The sn.icl grounds indicato that t.hey were anxious that the widow should not take the boy in adoption but should leave the properties to th() reversi,1nere. The other reasons given, na.mely, the alleged influ-ence of the 3rd defondant over the widow, the cus-tom againRt adoption of person other tha.n a.n agnate and the ineligibility of tho boy, were a.II found by both the courts below to be untenable. The repliP,l! disclose a. concerted action on the pa.rt of the sapind&e to prevent the widow from ta.king the 2nd defendant in adoption. They ha.d nothing to say against the qua.lifiea.tions of the boy, for, as we have already noticed, be was in every wa.y the most suitable boy from the standpoint of the widow. The only objection, thereforr, was that the boy was not an agna.te a.nd that there were eligible boys among the a.gnates. Thti question. therefore, in this Ca.6e is whet her the refusal to give oonee~t to t1'e

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

adoption by the widow of boy, highly qualified in every way, on the simple ground that be waH not an agnate and the other agnates were avaifable for adoption would be an improper refusal by the sapin-das so as to entitle tho widow to ignore their re-fusal and take the boy in adoption with the consent of the remoter sapinda.

Mr. N.C. Chatterjee, learned counsel fore th

appellants, contends that the refmml uf the sapindas to give consent, in the circumstances nf the present case, was proper for two reasom .. namely, (I )accord-ing to Hindu shastms wi<low lms t'l t.ako only sapinda. in adoption in preferei:ce to one outside that class, and (2) the let plaintiff did not refuse but gave consent on condition that orw or other of his grandsons or great-grandsons of his couein should be taken in adoption and the Bl\id oondition is sanctioned by Hindu law.

Mr. Vishwanatha Sastri, learner] counsel for

the respondents, on the other hand, contends that the refusal by the agnates to give consent for the adoption was improper, for, they, bf>ing the guar· dians and protectors of the widow, were in fidu. ciary relationship with the widow and that they should have exercised their discretion objectively a.nd reasonably from the standpoint of the ad vis. ability of taking the 2nd defendant in adoption in the last male-holder's branch and that in the pre· sent case the agnates refused to give consent from selfish motives in order to protect their reversion-ary interest, and therefore the 11.doption made with the consent of the remoter sapinda was valid.

The main question that . a.rises in this appeal

is whether the refusai by the nearer sapindas to give consent to the adoption as learned counsel for the respondenta described it, or the giving of the constnt subject to condition as learned counsel fof the appellant calls it, is iµiproper, wit~ tJiii

V.T.S. Chandaraukhara ,\Juda/iur v. K u/andaiwlu Mudoli., S1tbba Rao .r.

Jiff Y. T.S. ChanJat...i.liara Mudal;ar v. KuJand.iwlu M"dclial S®HllaoJ,

450 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS r1ooa]

remit the adoption made by the let defendant of the 2nd defendant with the consent of the remoter reversioner w&& valid under the Hindu law.

Before we notice the relevent case·law and textual authority on the subject, it would be con-venient to clear the ground. Thie appeal arises out of an adoption made in the Dravida country and this case is governed by the school of Hindu law applioable to that part of the country. Further wo are not concerned here with an adoption in Hindu joint family but only with one in divided family. We must, therefore, steer clear of the ramifications of the doctrine of consent in its impact on an adoption made by widow in joint Hindu family. It is not disputed that in case where the last male-holdn is divid-ed member of the family, hie widow oan make an adoption with the consent of remoter eapinda if nean·r e&pinda or sapindas improperly refused to give consent to the adoption. It is also common case that an adoption of boy by a. widow outside the class of .eapindae ie valid.

Thie controversy centre11 round the question

whether in the present C&Be the conditional consent given by some of the sapindae and the refusal by the others to give consent to the adoption were proper. This question depends for ib solution on the a.newer we give to the following interrelated questions : (I) What is the source and the con-tent of the power of the widow to adopt boy ? (2) What is the object of adoption ? (3) Why is the condition of consent of the sapindas for an adoption requ\red under the Hindu law for itA v111idity ? (4 J What ie the scope of the power of the sapinda.e to give con•ent to an adoption by a. widow and the manner of its exercise ?; and (5) What are the relevant circumstances sapinda ha.a to bear in mind in Pxercieing his power to give consent to an adoption ? ·

2 s.c.n..

" It is common place that widow adopts boy to her husband and that nobody except widow can make an adoption .to her husband. The reason is that Hindu law recognizes her not merely as an agent of her husband but, to use the felicitous Hindu metaphor, as his surviving half : see Brihas. pati X.XV, II and Yagnavalkya I, 156. In Sarkar Sastri's Hindu Law. 8th edn., pp. 161-162, it is, stated that though according to the commentaries t' the widow adopts in her own right, the modern view is that she acts merely as delegate or repre-sentative of her husband, that ia to say, she is only an instrument through whom the husband is supposed to act. Mulla in his book "Principles of Hindu Law" stated that she aots as delegate of her husband.

The Judicial Committee in Balusu Guru.

lingaswami v. Balusu Ramlakshmamna (') pointed out that. if the consent of the husband's kinsmen ., ' has been obtained, the widow's power to adopt is i. co_-extensive with that of her husband. It is, there· fore, clear that Hindu widow in making au adoption exercises power which she alone can exercise, though her competency is conditioned by other limitations which we shall consider at later stage. Whether she was authorised by her husband to take boy in adoption or whether she obtained the assent of the sapindas, her discretion to make ~ an adoption, or not to make it, is absolute and uncontrolled. She is not bound to make an adop· tion and she cannot be compelled to do so. But if she choosiis to take boy in adoption the.re is an essential distinction between the scope of the authority given by her husband and that of the assent ·given by the sapindas. As the widow acts . ,,. only as delegate or representative of her husband, her discretion in making an adoption is strictly conditioned by the terms of the authority oonferred \l) (1899] I.LR. 22 Mad. 398, tOI.

V. T.S. ChandtWa.silchdtU MudtJlia' •• Kulandaioelu "lludali11r Subb•R4oJ.

JHI V. T.S CAattdaro11•.lGr• MudoJU. • Kul...to;..Ju M~oU..

'52 stJ'PREME OOURT REl'OB.'l'S fl96aJ

on her. But in the absenoe of a.ny specifio authori-1&tion by her husband, her power to take boy in adoption is coterminus with that of her husband, subject only to the assent of the eapindas. To put it differently, the power to adopt is that of the widow as the representative of her husband and the requirement of 888ent of the eapindas is only protection against the misuse of it. It is not, therefore, right to equate the authority of husband with the assent of the eapindas. If this distinction is borne in mind, it will be clear that in essence the adoption is an aot of the widow a.nd the role of the sapindae is only that of advisers.

The next question is, what is the object of

adoption ? It would be unnecessary and even be pedantio if we attempted to consider the old Hindu Ia w texts at this very late stage in the evolution of Hindu law on the subject, for the law on this aepeot had befon fully and adequately considered by the Judioia.I Committee from time to time. It would be sufficient if we notic6d few of the leading decisionP on the subject.

Sir James W. Colvile, speaking for the Judi-cial Committee, in The Collector of Madurai v. Mool.too Ramalinga Sathupathy ([1]) observed :

"The power to adopt when not actually

given by the husband oa.n only be exeroised when foundation for it is laid in the other· , wise negleoted observanoe of religious duty, as understood by Hindoos'•.

The Judioial Committee again speaking through Sir Jawes W. Colvile in Sir R11.9ht.11rw.dha v. Sri Brozo K iahore (') restated the principle with some modification thus :

"It may be the duty of Court of Juetioe administering the Hindu law to consider the (I) [168'1] 12 M.l.A. 317, 442. (2) 1876) L.R. JI.A., IS., UIS.

2 s.o.n.

SUPREME OOURT REroB.ts

religious duty of adopting sou as the eBSen-tial foundation of the law of adoption; and the effect of an adoption upon the devolution of property as mere legal consequence"

But he hastened to add :

"But it is impoBSible not to see-that there are grave social objections ·to making the succession of property-and it may be in the case of collateral succession, as in the present instance, the rights of parties in actual possee-sion-·dependent on the caprice of womai:i, subject to all the pernicious influences which interested advisers are too apt in India to exert over women possessed of, or capable of exercising dominion over, property".

This caution given by the Judicial Committee is . relied upon to emphasize the point that right to property of the last male-holder is dominant consideration in the matter of taking boy in adoption. But, if the passage was read along with that preceding it, it would be obvious that t.he Judicial· Committee emphasized the performance of religious duty as an essential foundation of the law of adoption, though it did not fail to notice that the devolution of property was legal oonse-quence. In Raja Vellanki Venkata f(mhna Row v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya (1), the Judicial Committee through Sir James W. Colvile- reiterated ' the priucip!'.l th&t adoption was made by widow only in bona fide performance' of religiobs duty. In V ellra Basavaraju v. Bal,asurya P'l"MrJda lf.uo- (') Mr. Ameer Ali, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Board, appeared to strike new note and lay more emphasis on property -rights. Thi' Board gave as _one of its reasons why the ooosent of Y divided brothers was required, namely. that they (I) (1876) L.R. 4 I.A. I, 14. (2} fl918) L.R. 45 I.A. 265, 273.

IHI

V. T. 8. Chanarauk4AN Mudaliar .. -JruUndaiVllU Mudaliar -SubiaBa.J.

IHI V. T. 8. Cltafli.au•llu• Jfu4a// .. •• Ko1"""4i..tu Jludaliaf'

4M SUPREME OOORT Rl!:POR.TS [11163]

had an interest in the protection of the inheritance. The Judicial Committee observed :

"It is true that in the judgment of this

Board in the Ramnad case (') some expressions are used which might imply that the question of rever~ionary interest forms only secon-dary consideration in determining what eapindas' aeeent is primarily requisite, but the remarks that follow as to the right of co-par-cenere in an undivided family to coneider the expediency of introducing new co-paroener, coupled with the observations of the Board in the subsequent case (4), show clearly that rights to property cannot be left out of con-sideration in the determination of the question".

It may be said with some justification that till this

stage the Judicial Committee had not clearly disclosed its mind, but was wavering between two positions, namely, whether religious duty was th., sole object of adoption or whother proprietary interests had an equal or subordinate place with or to that of religious object. B'ld in Amurendra Manaingh v. Snnatan Singh (')the Judicial Commit-tee reconsidered its earlier decisiond, resurveyed the entire law on the subject and veered round to the view that the validity of an adoption was to be determined by spiritual rather than temporal ooneideratioos. Sir George Lowndes observed :

" ...... it is dear that the foundation of '

Brahminical doctrine of adoption is the duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestors to provide for the continuance of the line and the solemnization of the neoeseary rites ............. "

"It oan, they think, hardly be doubtud

that in this doctrine the devolution of pro-perty, though recognized as the inherent right (I) (11158) ll(M.I.A. 397. \2) (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. :l_.2, 2411.

2 s.c.R.

SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS

of son, is altc;igether secondary considera-t1on • ...................... . »

"Having regard to this well-established

doctrine as to the religious efficacy of sonship,. their Lordships feel that great caution should be observed in shutting the door upon any' authorized adoption by the widow of sonless man ................ Nor do the authoritative texts appear to limit the exercise of the power by any considerations of property."

This decision is, therefore, clear pronouncement by. the highest judicial authority of the time that the . substitution of son of the deceased for spiri-tual reasons is the essence of adoption and the cons-equ'mt devolution of property is mere accessory to it. Whatever ambiguity there may have still remain-ed it was dispelled by later decision of the Privy Council in Gkanta China Rarrul8Uabbayya v, ,· .. Moparthi Ohenchuramayya van Nair, delivering the judgment ([1]), wherein Sir Madha-()D behalf or the • Board, after .a resurvey of the textual authorities and the earlier decisions, observed at p. 170:

"Under the Hindu law it is the "taking of

aon" as substitute for the failure of male issue. Its object is two-fold: ( 1) to secure the performance of the funeral rites or the person to whom the adoption ia made; and

(2) to preserve the continuance or hie lineage ... Adverting' to observation of_ Mr. Ameer Ali in V eera Benavaraju v. Balasurya Prasada Rao ('), he proceeded to state at p. 175:

:•The utmost that could be said in favour

of the appellants is the statement in . the judgment that right to property cannot be left out of consideration in the determina-tion of the question", . while the spiritual (I) (19+7) L.R. 741.A. 162. (2) (1918) L.R. 451.A 265, 275.

Y. T.S. C"4"®'""dliM• Mvdaliat' •• lfuland41H/u Mui#liar SutbaRaoJ,

V.T.S. ~,,... JlaJolwr •• Klhodai.U. Jl.aiial .\'1166c RM J.

welfare of the deceased also is referred to in

the course of tho judgment. That the above regular view of adopt.ion cannot any longer be maintained appear~ to be clear from the judgment of the Board in Amarendra Mansingh v, Sanatan Singh(')

Reverting to the object of adoption, he remarked

at p. 179:

"Their lordships do not desire to la hour

this point, as in their view the following opinion of the Board, delivered by Sir George Lowndes in Amarendra's ca.'le (1) should be considered to have sottlod the question finally so far as the Board is concerned."

It may, therefore, sR.fely be held that the validity of

an adoption has to be judged he spiritual rather than temporal considerations and that devolution of property is only of secondary importance.

The next question is, why does the Hindu law •

iilsi&t upon the assent of the sapindas as pre· requisite for the validity of an adoption made by widow ? basis for the doctrine of consent may be discovered in the well· known text of vasishtas:

"Let not woman give or aooept eon

·except with the assent of her Lord."

The following two texts of YagnaTalkya in Chapter

l, verse 85 and in Chapter 2, verse 130 are also ordinarily relied upon sustain the said doctrine:

"Let her father protect maiden; her

husband married woman; sons in old ega; if nom• of these, other gnatis (Kinsmen). She is not fit for independence.

"He whom his father or mother gives in ,

adoption is Dattaka (a son given)." (1) (19~3) LR. 60 1. A. 242, 248,

2 S.O.R. SUPREME OOUR't REl'ORTB

brief summary of the evolution of the law by subsequent commentators by the process of interpre-tation of the said two .texts is found in the judgment of division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sundara Rama Rao v. Satyanarayanamurti (1). It w_ail pointed out therein how Devanna Bhatta reconciled the two seemingly contradictory · positions by lay· ing· down that Hindu widow could give her son in adoption ·if she be authorized by an independent male, how by parity of reasoning the said principle was extended to .a widow taking boy in adoption, how the same view was expressed by Nanda" panditha, how Vidyaranyaswami in his Dattaka Mimamsa recognized the validity of an adoption by widow with the permission of the fat.her, etc., and how theJater commentators relying upon the word "etc.''. evolved thesis that the word "father" in the text was only iilustrative, and · gradually ex-tended -it to othllr kinsmen. The said doctrine is mainly founded on the state of perpetual tutelage . assigned to women by Hindu law expressed ·so tersely and clearly in the well-known text of Yagnavalkya in Chapter I, verse 85,_ quoted above. The leading decision, which may be described as classic on the subject, is what is popularly known as the Ramnad case ('). Sir James W. Colvile, who has made real contribution to the development of this aspect of Hindu law, o~served at p. 439:

"But they (tbe opinions of Pandits) shqw

considerable concurrence of opinion, to the effect that, where the authority of her Hus-band is wanting, Widow may adopt Son with the assent of his kindred in the Dravida Country."

The reason for the rule is clearly stated at p. 442 thus: · · ''The assent of kinsmen seems to be required by reason of the presumed_incapaoity (lj LU. 1950 M'.ado 461. (2) (1868) 12 MJ.A. 897, <Kl.

lHS . Y. T. IJ, Clintfarouillo1~ Muia/;., •• K11l•AiDll• Mudaliar Su!6oB .. J,

1~1 v.r.s. Oandara•6kMto Mu4'rliar v. K ulandai•lu Ml.UUliu,. Subb• RtlO J.

of women for independence, rather than the necetlflity of procuring the consent of all these whose vossible aud leversiouary interest in the estate would be dofeated hy the ;doption.

The nature and effect of the consent is stated thus:

"All that can be said is, that there should be such evidence of the assent of kinsmen 88 suffices to show, that the act is done by the Widow in the provn and bona fie,d perfor-m&nco of religious duty, and neither capri-ciously nor from corrupt motive."

The same principle has been affirmed and restated

by the Judicial Committee in subaequent decisions: See Raja VeUunlci Venkata Krishnti Row v. Venkaya Rama Lakshmi Narsayya 1[1]), Veera Basayaraju v. BalaB'Urya Prasada Rao(') Sri Krishnayya Rao 't. Surra Rao Bahadur Guru (') and Ghanta China Ramasubbayya v. Moparthi Chenchuramayya (').

It will be aeon that the reason for the rule is

not the poSBible deprivation of the proprietary in-terests of the reversioners . but the state of perpe-tual tutelage of women, and the (IOn&ent of kinsmen was considered to be an aSBurance that it was bona i<k performance of religious duty and sufficient guarantee against any capricious aetion by the widow in taking boy in adoption.

The next question, which is very impor~nt for the present inquiry, is, what is the scope and content of the power of consent the Hindu Jaw plaocs in the hands of the• kinsmen ? and why does the Hindu Jaw confer the said power on the kinsmen? In tl11: J/11mr111d Cuu ('), the judicial Committee described the father of tho husband as the natural guardilm of (I) (1876) L.R. 4 I.A. 1. 14. (2) (IQl8) L.R. 41 I.A. U.S. 273. (3) (1935) 69 MLJ. 388. (41 (1917) L.R. 741.A. 162. (S) (1868) I~ M.l.A. 397. ff2.

2 s.c.R.

the widow and her venerable protector. In Raja Vellanlci Venlcata Krishna Rrw v. Venlcata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya ([1]}; the Judicial Committee des· cribed the sapindas as the family council; in Venlcamma v. Sul!ra.maniam (') as the natural advisers of the widow; in Veera Basayaraju v. · Balasurya Pra.sada Rao (') as her natural guardians and protectors of her interest; in Sri Krishnayya Ra-0 v. S·uryu R11.o Balwrl·u.r Gil.ru (') as family council, natural guardians and protectors of her interest; and in Gh11.n~1. Ohinri Rnmasnbbnyya v: Moparthi Oherwhura.ma.yyn ([6]) as the widow's guardians and competent advisers. Whatever phraseology may have been used in the various decisions, it is manifest that all of them are only consistent with their exercisin;;-: fid11Ciary power having regard to the object for which tho said power was conferred on them. The scope of the exercise of the . power depends ( 1) on the nature of the power, and (2J on the object for which it ·is exercised. The nature of the power being fiduciary in character, · it is implicit in it that it ·shall not be exercised so as to further the personal interests of the sapindas. The law does not countenance conflict between duty and interest, and if there is any such conflict the duty is always ma.de to prevail over the interest. It would be negation of the fiduciary duty, were we to hold that sa.pinda could refuse. to give his consent on the ground that the members of his branch or those of his brother's would be deprived of their inheritance,. If that was the object of the refusal, it could not make any difference in the legal results, howsoever the intention was camouflaged. Suppose sapinda gives his consent on the condi-tion that member of his branch only should be adopted. In effect and substance he introdiwe11.

(I) (1876) L.R. 4 I.A. I, 14. (2) (1906) L.R. 34 J.A, 22. (3) (1918) LR. 45 I.A. 265, )73. (4) \ 193.~) 69 M.q. 348 15 l ( 19' 7) L.R .14 (.A. lfll.

V.T. S. O!iondara.Uha1 a. 11luda/iar •• K ulanda1111lu Mudalitr

Jin Y.T.S. a.--Mttdalior Y. Euload.oiorlu Jludaicr

SUPREME OOURT REPOR'l'S [1963]

his personal interest ia the matter of bis &88ent, with view to secure the properties to his branch. It would only be matter of degree should he extend the choice of the widow to the divided branches of his family comprehending a. large group of sapinda.s, for even in tha.t case the sapinda. seeks to inforoe his choice on the widow on extraneous considerations. In giving or withholding bis consent in his capacity as guurdian or the protector .of the widow, the sapinda. should form an honest and independent judgment on the advisability or otherwise of the proposed adoption with reference to the widow's branch of the family: see Sri Kriahnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu ('). Sapinda should bring to bei1r an impartial and judicial mind on tho problem pr1>sented to him and should not ha served by extraneous a.nd irrelevant considerations. He aha.II ask himself two que~tions, viz., (i) whether the proposed adoption would achieve the object for which it was intended, and (ii) whether the boy selected was duly qualified. We ha.ve already noticed tha.t the object of the adoption is two-fold: (1) to secure. the performance of the funeral rites of the person to whom the adoption is made, and (2) to preserve the continu-a.nee of his lineage. The sa. pinda. should first answer the question whether the proposed adoption would achieve the said purpose. If the widow's power to take boy in adoption was not exhausted, there would hardly be a'l occasion when sapinda could object to the widow taking boy in adoption, for every valid adoption would invariably be in discharge of a. religious duty. But is also perm iBBi-ble for sapinda to take objection in the matter of selection of the boy on the ground that he is not duly qualified for being adopted; be may rely upon any mandatory prohibitory rules laid down by shastras and recognised by courts in regard to the selection of particular boy, He ma.y object Q~ (I) (1935) 69 M~. S85.

2 S.C.R.

the ground that the hoy. belongs to a. different oa.ste or that he is married, for such a.n adoption would be invalid. He may also object on the ground th"t.the boy is an idiot,that he is suffering from an incurable disease, that he is notoriously in . bad character, for in such cases he would not· be suita-ble to continue the line. Such and similar other objections are relevant to the question of the.advis-ability of the adoption with reference to the widow's branch of the family. In this context an argument is raised to . the effect that sapinda is equally entitled to object to an adoption on the ground that the boy proposed to be adopted is not sapind". In modified form, it is further conten-ded that even if there is no ltJgal prohibition against non-sapinda being ta)ten in adoption by widow, the sapinda whose consent- is asked for can . legitimately relay upon the recom: mandatory texts of shastras in objecting to an adoption or imposing condition on the proposed adoption. This raises the question whether under the Hindu law there is any prohibition against. widow taking non-sapinda in adoption in preference to sapinda. In Kane's "History of Dharmasastra", Vol. Ill, it is pointed out that Dattaka Mimamsa and . Dattaka Chandrika quote passages of Saunaka and Sakal& to the effect that · man should refer sapinda or sagotra to one who is not sapinda or of the Rame gotra .. The follow-ing order is recommended: the full . brother's son, then sagotra A&pinda, then sapinda though not of the ea.me gotra, then one not sapinda though of the ea.me gotra, then one who is neither sapinda nor iiagotra. But the learned author opines that the said order is purely recommendatory and an adoption in breach of it is quite valid. In Mayne's Hindu Law, it is stated :

' "Acoording to the Dattaka Mimamsa and the Datta.kb Chandrika, in the first :emo.. _the ~t. male· sapinda- sho11ld be tole\ltfd,. 1f

Jllfl

Y. T. S. Chaiularm•h.,.• MwklW v. x.uMm.tu MllMZl<ir

1911 V. T.S. C~thara Jlud4liar •• KrJad1t11lu Mudal;. Subb•RaoJ.

suitable in other respects, and. if possible, brother"s son, as h<> is alr<'11d_v, in contempl11.-tion of lnw, son t,, his uncle. If no such noar sapind;i, is available, then one who ie more remote; or in default of any such, then one who i8 of family which follow the same spiritual guide, or, in 'the case of Sudra.s, any member of the caste.

The learned author is alsq of th(! opinion t·hat thoRI' precepts are merely recommendatory anil that the adoption of strang1•r is valid, evl'n though ncur re· latives, otherwise suitable, are in existence. It is suggested that this rule of rufercnce i~ not applica-ble to sudras and that iu their case any membor of tho caste oan be adopted and th1lt amrmg tho mem-bers of the caste no roforencos ars indicatPd. In Sarkar Sastri's "Hindu Law of Adopt.ion" the rele-vant passa!(e of Saunaka is translated thus at p. 309:

"Amongst Brahmins; tho affiliation of son should bt> made from amongst sapindru.; or on failure of th1·m non-sapinda (ma_v be affiliated); but. any other should not be affiliat-ed; amongst Kehatriyas, eone from their own tribe, or on!' whoso gotra is the same as that of the adopters guru or preceptor (may be affiliated) : amongst Vaisyas, from amongst those of the Vaisya tribe: amongst Sudras, from amongst those of the :5udra tribe : amongst all classes, from amongst their re~pee­tive classes, not from others."

Thie passage lends support to the suggestion madr by learned coun~el fol' the ro~pondents that amongRt· Sudras no preforen tial treatment is metc·d nut to sapinda in the matter of adoption. BP it as it may, for the purpose oft.his case, we ~hall assume that ac· cording to the commPntnt.ors n Mpinda mny have \o l)erefened to 1wn-sapi11oa in the mattet o{

2 S.C.R;

adoption. . The effect of the said rules was consi-dered by the Judicial Committee as early as 1878 in Srimati U ma Devi v. Gokookimmi Das Mahapatra (1 ), wherein Sir James W. Colvile observed:

., "Sir Thomas Strange, after recapitulating

the rules which ought to guide the discretion of the adopter, including the authorities on which the Plaintiff relies, says: "But the result of all the authorities rlpon this point is, that the selection is finally matter of conscience and discretion with the adopter, not of absolute prescription, rendering invalid an adopti<?n of one not being precisely in him who upon spiri-tual considerations ought to have been referred."

Then the Judicial Committee quoted Sir William Macnaghten in this regard: the relevant part of the pa.11sage reads:

" ... , ........ the validity of an adoption actually

made does not rest on the rigid observance of that rule; of selection, the choice of him to be adopted being matter of discretion."

The Judicial Committee concluded its decision thue at p. 54:

"Their Lordships feel that it would b!i high-ly objectionable on any but the strongest gro-unds to subject the natives of India in this matter to rule more stringent than that en- · unoiated by such text writers as Sir Willfam Macnaghten and Sir Thomas Strange. Their treatises have long been treated as of high authority by the Courts of India, and to over-rule the propositions in question inight disturb many titles." .

It may, therefore, be taken that as early as 1878 the Judicial Committee treated the said rules aa (1) (111'111} Wl. s LA. 40,51,51.

lln Y.T.S. Clumdarau!!iara Mudaliar .. A'ula"""""I" Mtulaliar

Subba &oJ.

llHlt

V. T . ••. Clatulaasrkhara MtMlal;~ v. K ulandaiw{u Mudaliar Subbo Rao J.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]

more moral injunction on the conscience of pious Hindu, and that the selection is finally matter of his discretion. If those injunotione were disobeyed and not followed in 1878 and adoption were made ignoring them, it would be unr!lalistic to rely upon them in the case of adoptions made in recent years. The choice of the boy is with the widow: it is matter of her coneoience and it is left to her discretion. The e&pind•ehip is not legal qualification nor the noneapin-iaship legal die· qualification either. An orthodox lady may give some heed to the religious texts which have fallen into desuetude, but she neAd not do so. It is open to her to select any qualified boy from large circ,le. It would be open to sapinda to e&y th~t the boy selected by her is not qu,Jified from ph:vei-cal, moral or religious stand-point. But it would be incongroue to hold that eapinda in giving hie advfoe should enforce the rule of preference which has no legal sanction behind it. This approl\Ch would have the effect of enforcing rule of prefer-ence which he.a fallen in desuetude by an indirect process: what w&e moral injunction oa the con-science of the ad.; pter in the oldPD days would now be made leszal injunction by circuitous method. If this be allowed, sapinda in the guise of moral injunction could deprive widow of her right to take qualified boy of her own choice ia adoption and thus securing the inheritance for himself, jf she does not adopt an unwanted boy or preserving the est&te for close relative of hie, if she does. We should therefore hold that sapinda hM no right to refuse to give hie consent or impose condition on ground that the widow should take e. eapinda in preference to non-eapinda in adoption. S11ch condition would in the modern conted be entirelv extraneous to the question of the selection of boy by widow for ad()ption to her husband's branch af the family.

2 S.C.R.

In this context two judgments of the Madras

.High Court on which strong reliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellants may b~ noticed. The first is judg.uent of division B1noh in S'llhrahmanyan v. Venkamma (1), wherein the learned Judges held that the adoption made by widow was invalid because she did not apply for the consent of one or the two sapindas of equal degree on the ground that such an application would have been in vain. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., speaking for the division Bench, made the following observation at p. 637:

"But, assuming, as the first defendant

says, that some five years before the adoption the plaintiff wanted her to take on.e of his sons in adoption, there is nothing improper in sapind't proposing to give his assent to the widow adopting his own son, if such son be the nearest aapinda, and refusing to give his a.ssent to her adopting stranger or dist'lnt sapinda, if there be no reasonable objection to the a.doption of hill own son ....... ;."

These obset'Vations are in the nature of obiter, for these were not necessa.ry for disposing of that appea.l in view of the fact that no consent of the said sapinda was asked for. Be it as it may, the observations of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., deserve the higb'.est respect, for his erudition in Hindu law ill unquestioned. But these observations were made iri. the year 1903 at time when the scope of the power of sapindas'. consent had not become crystallised. As we have already pointed out, the doctrine of fiduciary relationship was gradually evolved by later decisions. The recommendatory character of the preferential right of sapinda to be adopted was emphasised as early as 1875; and even tha.t moral force gradually ceased to have any per-· 11uss.ive effect on an adopter as time paesed by. In {l) (1903) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 627.

Jllfl

Y.T.S. Ch:mtlarn1•hara .'d.uclaliar •• K.Z..daiH/u Mudali<W Subb• Rao J.

Y. T.8. CAaatl.r11S1!thara Muialiar •• Kuladaivtlu MwdaJlar --Sui>i>a Rao J.

the modern conditions it would not be proper to a.1low the old texts. to be used by sapinda to force his son or nephew on an unwilling wido\V. In Amarendia' ca.se (I) it was finally decided that epiri· tual reasons a.re the eSBence of adoption and that devolution of property is only consequence of it, and therefore the preferential olaim of Slipinda. to be adopted ceased to have any validity. With greatest respect to the learned Judge, we must hold that tho said observations have no longer .any relevance in tho contA'lxt of modern a.dopt[1]on. The next decision, which is an unreported one, is . in All!tri Venkata Naraaimharaju v. Alluri Bangar-raju ('). In that case, widow made an adoption with the consent. of ooparoener of her deceased husband: two other coparceners. who were asked for permission refused to give the same. The said ooparceners suggested that ea.ch of them bad eons and that they were prep:ued to givo one of their sons in adoption. This offer was not aooeptable to the widow. They subsequently intimated their dt>sire to give their own sons in adoption, but the widow refused. Having regard to that fa.ct and othor circumstances of the case, the learned J udgee said that the refusal was proper. The learned Judges hnd not considered the question from the standpuint of the fiduciary power of sapindas, but they wtlre iuflucncoo mostly by the intransigent conduct of the widow in ta.king boy in adoption without considering their proposal with view to prevent the induction of an outsider into the joint family. That was case of an adoption by widow.Jo deceased memb"lr of coparcenary and it may be that different consideration might a.rise in such u. situation on which we do not propose to expreSB 8.ny opinion. Adverting to that judgment, Satyanarayana Rao, J., observed in Sunr/{Jra. Rama &so v. Sat.yanarnyanamu.rti ('):

Sat.yanarnyanamu.rti ll (19M) L. R. 60 I.A. 242. (

(2 Appeal& Noe. !Ir> & 2:16 af 19H ( ..... • \SJ J,J.;a, l9llO ........

U,1.1116).

"No genera.I rule ca.n, therefore, be laid down that in all cases and under all circum-stances the refusal of sapinda to give his assent to the adoption on the ground that the widow refused to accept the boy of his own in adoption as proper refusal. The question has to be considered on the facts of each case.''

Another division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Ba.Iakrishna. Ayya.r, J., in Venkatarayudu v. Sashamma ([1]), held that refusal by sa.pinda to give his assent to the proposed adoption by widow, of boy, on the gl'Ound that the boy was not. Sapinda or sago tr or gnati, was not proper. It 'is true in that case the sapinda did not offer his son or make aµy suggestion that sapinda or sagotra was avail-able for adoption. The learned Chief ·Justice, · speaking for the Court, observed:

"As Mayne (Hindu law, tenth Editiun)

remarks at pages 221 and 222 it is very diffi-cu It to ooneeive of case, wli.ere refusal by sapinda can be upheld as proper. "The practical result of the authorities ·therefore appears to be that sa.pinda's refusal to an adoption can seldom be justified". It may be that in case where the sapinda. refused his consent to the adoption of boy on the grou-nd that the boy was disqualified, say, on the ground of leprosy or idiocy, the refuse.I would be proper. In this case, we have no hesitation in holding that the refusal by the plaintiffs on. the ground that the proposed boy was not sapinda or sagotra or a. gnati was not proper." The division Bench did not follow the observation of Bhashyma. Ayyangar, J. Another division Bench of the Madras High Conrt, consisting of Sa.tyanara-yana Rao a.nd Viswana.tha. Sastri, JJ., noticed the \1) A. I. R. l 949 Mad. 745, 7t6.

V. T.S. Chandarosekluua Mudaliur •• .K ula1,daipelu Mudalior liub.bo RcoJ.

1gu v.1·.s. Clradara.:1tl"'•• M1.1tla/ior v. huluU.ii:elu Mutlalior Sobba RooJ.

SUPREME OOUR'!' REPOR'l'B [1963)

observations of Bhnsyham Ayyangar J., in Sundara

Rama Rao v. s~tyan rayana1mtrti (I). Viswauatha S88tri, J., obfc·rved:

Therein

"With tl~e !(Je11teet deference to that great

Judge, it seems to me to be questiona~le whe-ther refusal to consent by sapinda to an ado-ption by tht> widow except on condition that hie son should be adopted ie & valid or proper refusal."

In the present case, the High Court followed and

accepted tho said observations, and we also agree with them. We, therefore, bold that the observa· tions of Bbashyam Ayyangar, J., are only in the nature of obiter and that they have rightly been tre-ated as such in later decisions. That apart, ae we have poiuted out, the &aid observations are oppos· ed to the principle of fiduciary power which bas now bet•n accepted.

The result of the foregoing discussion may be

1ummarized tho~: The power of eapinda to give hie consent to an adoption by widow is fiducia· ry power. It is implicit in the said power that he must exercise it objectively and honestly and give his opinion on tho advisability or otherwise of the proposed adoption in and with reference to the widow's branch of the family. Ae the object of adop· tion by widow is two.fold, namely, (i) to eecure the reference of the funeral rites of the person to whom the adoption is made 8s well 8S to offer spin· das to that person and hie ancestors, and (2) to preserve the continuence of his lineage, he muet addrees himself to ascertain whether the proposed adoption promotes the said two objects. It is true that teu;iporal consideration, through secondary in imp01t~nce, cannot be eschewed completely but those considerations must neoe888rily be only those connected with that branch of the widow's family.

(I) l.L.R. 1950 Mad. 461.

2 S.C.R.

The sapinda may consider whether the proposed adoption is in the interest of the wellbeing of the widow or conducive to the better management ·of her husband's estate. But considerations such as the protection of the sapindas' inheritance would be extraneous, for they pertain to the self-interest of the sapinda rather than the wellbeiJ;ig of the widow and. her branch of the family. The sapindas, as guar-dians and protectors of the widow, can object to the adopticn, if the boy is legally disqualified to be ado-pted or if be is mentrilly defective or otherwise un-suitable for adoption. It is not possible to lay down any inflexible rule or standard for the guida-nc" of the sapinda. The Court which is called upon to consider the propriety or otherwise of sapi-nda's refusal to consent to the adoption has to take into consideration all the aforesaid relevant facts and such others and to come to its decision on the facts of each case. ·

Bearing the said principles in mind, let us now scrutinize the persons given by the different sapinda is refusing to consent to the pro-posed adoption with view to ascertain whether their refusal was proper or not. At an earlier st.age of the judgment we have given the reasons ·given by each one of the sapi!ldas who were approached by the widow for their 88B!l!lt.

The !st plaintiff is the only sapindl); who made genaral suggest that the widow . could make an adoption from one of his grandsons or his cousin's great grandsons. But scrutiny of his reply discloses that he also looked at the problem presented to him from personal and selfish angle. His reply reveals biased mind. He has expressed surprise that the .widow should have thought. fit to take boy in adoption, for earlier, according to him, she gave up the ideal of making an adoption at the request of the 1st pla.intilI and other a.gnat.el and a.llio stated tbai

V.T.S. Chant!ara1tkl1aro Mudaliat' •• K td ant!aioolu .Mutf.1litJ~ SuJba Rab J

Y.T.S. Cio""4<<Ukhat'a MtldOJiM Y. K"'4ndaU,,llJ MrulaliM SllbkR.o J.

4'70 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS fl963J

when she decided to make the adoption she would select suitable boy from those of his first cousin. This clearly shows that he was more concerned with the roversioners' inheritance to the estate of the last male-holder rather than with the religious benefit that would accrue to him. He then questions the widow's motivo, which again is an irrelevant consideration. He then relics upon the custom prevailing in their communitywhereunder an agnate alone could be taken in adoption, but no attempt has been made to establish the said custom: therefore, it may be taken that false reason is given. As regards the boy proposed to be adopted, he vaguely states that he is aged and ineligible for adoption. Finally, he declares that he has no objeo· tion to the widow making an adoption, provided one of his grandsons or the great-grandsons of his cousin is taken in adoption. It will be seen that except the vague generalities he cannot point out any particular disqualification attached to the boy either on religious or secular grounds: nor can he say that by adopting him the interests of the widow or of the branch of her family would be adversely affeoted. The entire reply disolosea cloeed and biased mind against the widow taking boy in adoption; and the propOt!al made to her to take one of the sapindas is only made with full consciousness on his part that it would be refused. On consideration of the entire letter, we have no heeitation in holding that the lat plaintiff impro-perly reful!lld to give his assent to the adoption.Tue refusal by defendants 4 and 5 was obviously improper, for they set up an adoption alleged to have been made by Kulandaivelu, the last male-holder, before his death. Defendant 12 did not care to reply1 he had only son and was, presumably, not willing to give his only son in adoption or take sides. Defendant ll in his reply offered one of his grandsons or of his brother's i.e., the only son of

2 s.c.B..

defendant 12 and the sons of defendant 14.. For

the reason already stated, 12 would not give his son in adoption, and defe11dant 14 had given hid consent to the adoption. Therefore, ll's grandsons were not available for adoption. This leaves only the replies of the 2nd . plaintiff and defendantB 19 and 20 for consideration. 2nd plaintiff wanted his son to be adopted, and defendant 19, and his son defendant 20, wanted the sons to be adopted. These three sapindas were clearly actuated by self-interest.

The replies given by the sapindas appear to us

to be part of their concerted action to prevent the widow from taking boy in adoption. The sapindas either singly or collectively did not bring to bear their impartial mind on the request made to them, but they either refused to give their consent or gave it subject to an improper condition with view to advanoo their self-interest. They did not consider the advisability or otherwise of the pro-posed adoption in and with reference to the widow's br.mch of the family. We, therefore, hold that their refusal was improper and that the widow rightly ignored it. ·

The next question is whether defendant 14 was

legally competent to give his consent to the question. It is contended that defendant 14 .was member of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, having no faith in Hinduism and Hindu scriptures and practice and therefore he was incompetent to give his advise on the question of adoption, waich is religious act. Learned counsel for the respondents conteniis that the certificate issued by the , High Court is conf'med only to one question, namely, whether the refusal by the spinda~ to give their consent to the adoption was improper on the fa.eta found and, therefore, it is not open to the appel-lantB to raise any other question before us. Reliance

IIU

V.T.S. Choo-U..,a Nulsllar ••

KulauoitlOlu Al rut.liar

Sul6< .. J.

V.1".S. Cltaniaroulil<m Nwl41iat v. Kvl~iP,/u Mtt'1Jliar

472 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1003]

is placed upon Order XVI, r. 4 and Order XVIII r. 3(2) of tile Supreme Court Rules. Under Orde; XVI, r. 4.

"Where party dcsirno to appea.I on grounds which can be raised only with the leave of the Court, tho petition of appeal shall be accompanied by separate petition indicatiug tho grounus so proposed to be raised and praying for leave to appeal on thoso grounds and the Ptitition shall, unlees tho Court. otherwiae directs, be heard at the same time as the appeal."

Under Order XVIII, r. 3 (2), the oase lodged by party " shall not travel Leyon<i the limits of the certificate or the ijpccia.I loave, as the case ma.y be, and of such additional grounds, if any, as the Court may allow to Le urged on application made for the purpose." The88 two pro visionH do not PT<YJITW vigore lay down that tho High Court can issue limited certificate; but they assume that under certain circumstances it can do so. Under Art. 133 of the Constitution, under which thti High Court gave the certificate, does no~ empower the High Court to limit certificate k any particular point. If the decree of the High Court is one of 11.ffirmanoe the High Court certifies that the appeal involves substantial question of law; and it has been the practice of some of tbti High Courts to state the substantial question of law in the certificate iBBued. Once tho certificate is issued and the appeal is properly presented before this Court, the entire appeal will be before it. The assumption under-lying tho said rules of the Supremo Court may appropriately iefor to 001 tificate iBSued by High Court under Art. 132 of the Constitution, whereunder the High Court <•ertifieJ that the case involves 1mbstuntial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution: and where such certificate is given ...... any party in the c11se may appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that any

2 S.C.R.

such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided and, with the leave of the Supreme Court, on any other ground." But we are not concerned here with certificate issued under Art. 132 of the Constitution. We, therefore,· hold that the entire appeal is before us. But it does not follow from .the said legal position that we should allow the appellants . to raise that plea before us, if they had failed to do so before the High Court. The points argued before . the High Court are recorded by the learned Judges thus:

Mr. Venkatasubramania Ayyar learned

counsel for the plantiffs appellants, did not address arguments to us to displace the findings of the trial .T udge on the additional issues though he made it clear that he was not abandoning thos.e any of his clients' conten-tions embodied in those issues. He however confined his arguments before us to Issues 1, 2 and 3." ·

From this statement it appears that though this point was not argued before the High Court, it was not abandoned. We shall, therefore, deal with the same.

The contention is that defendant 14 is

member of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, having no faith in Hinduism and Hindu scriptures and practice and, therefore, he is incompetent to give consent to the adoption, which is religious act. Under the Hindu law · ~ sapinda has power to give consent to proposed adoption by widow. Defendant 14 is admittedly sa.pinda and, there-fore, he can ordinarily give his consent to the adoption, unless it has been established that he is mentally or otherwise unfit to give his consent. It ·snot suggested that he is. not intellectually compe-.;ent to give an unbiased advice on the ·advisability of taking boy in adoption in the widow's branch

V.T. S. Cllandarastk/tora Muialiat v. KuLmtlait1tlu Mudaliar

SdlnJ B••J •

1162 V. T.S. C~horo -... luJ•liar •• Jrul..toi..i. Mt#Jliar -SuiklloaJ.

474 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]

of the family. But it is Raid that he has no belief in Hindu 8Criptures and, therefore, he e&nnot give consent to an adoption which is rdigious aot. The act of giving consent is not religious act; it is the act of guardian or protector of widow, who is authorised to advise the widow, who is presumed to be incompetent to form an independent opinion. His non-helief in Hindu scriptures cannot in any way detract from his capacity to perform the said act. That apart, defPndant 14 in his evidence clearly says that be had considered the qu:ilifica-tions of the proposed boy for adoption and gave his consent. His reasons are :

"Defendant 2 had fe.ith in God just like Defendant I. He used to go to the temples and give charities. He had good physical huild. He was in position to take over the managf\rnent of D~fenda1.t l's estate immedia-telv. In view ;_>f these facts I considered him to be flt for adoption. He was then reading in B. A. c!11Bs''.

These reasons clea.-ly disclose that he applied hie mind t-0 thE> crucial question and gave hie consent after satisfying himself about the a.dvisability of taking the boy in adopiion. But. it is suggested to him in the cross-examination that he had no faith in God, but be denies ii and says : "I believe that there is God but I do not believe in the meaning-less religious rites and ceremonies". To further question, he answers :

"I have no faith in taking boy in adop-

tion. Nor do I believe that person bas "atma" and that it should get salvation after death. Nor do I believe that there jg any-thing called "hell" or "paradiee''. Nor do I believe that. person leaving no eon will go to hell''.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

2 S.C.R.

The fa.ot that he does not believe in such thing does not make him any the less Hindu. The non-belief in rituals or even in some dogmas does not ipso facto remove him from the fold of Hinduism. He was born Hindu and continues to be one till he takes to another religion. But what is neces-sary is, being Hindu, whether he was in position to appreciate the question referred to Lim and give suitable answer to it. After going through his evidence, we have no do.ubt that this defendant had applied his mind to the question before him. Whatever may be his personal predilections or views on Hindu religion and its rituals, he is Hindu and he disoharged his duty as guardian of the widow in the matter of giving his consent. In the oircumstances of the case, his consent was sufficient to validate the adoption.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

S., S. GAREW AL

MESSRS. BHOWRA KANKANEE COLLERIES

(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P: B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.

WANOHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and T. L. VENKATARAl\IA AIYAR, JJ.)

Mines-Acci.Unl-Court of Inquiru-O•der to pay expen-ses.-;Amovnt no~ . quantified-Court, · if. becomes .functus off•eio on submitting !~por~-Subs~quent order quantifying ":mm.ml-If such quantif•cation ''.al•d-A_ssessors, if must join in alZ ora•rB of th;- Court of Ir:yuiry-Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), s. 24-Mines Rules, 19.<N, r. 22.

The Government of India under s. 24 of the Mines Act 19521 ordered an enquiry into the di.aster in the re<pondent'; ~lliery. The Court of Inquiry submitted its report on

CAaniar•seltharo

Mudcliar v. KulandciHlu Muia,J;,,

Subia Rao .1.

April 26.