J. PANDURANGARAO versus ANDHRA PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

J. PANDURANGARAO v. ANDHRA PRADESH 1 U BLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA. AYYANGAR, and T. L. VENKATARAMA_AIYER, JJ.)

State Judicial Service -Appointment-Notification laying down conditio'M-Oonstitutionat validity-The High Court Meaning of-Andkta State Judicial Service Rules, r. 12(b)-Oonstitution of India, Arts. 14, 16 (2).

In January 1962, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission invited applications for selection for the posts ~f District Munsifs in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The pet1· tioner applied but his application was rejected on the ground that he did not fulfil the first condition in para 4A( 1) of the Commission, notification which reads thuf·:-4-A( 1 )-"that at the time when the petitioner applies he is practising as an Advocate of the High Court". The question is whether the expression "The High Court" in the notification refers to the Andhra High Court alone or to all the High Courts in lndia. If the expres5ion means the Andhra High Court then the further question would be whether the R~le pr~­scribing the said requirement is ultra vires as being d1scr1m1-natory. The ~Clause in the notification is based on r. 12 (b) of the Andhra State Juducial Service Rules and reads that "no person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of District Munsiff by the method specified in column ( ~) of the table below unless he possess the qualifications specified in the corresponding entries in column (2) thereof" and among the qualifications specified is die same as in 4(A) (1) of the noti ication.

Held, that the subject matter of the rules is the appoint· ment of subordinate judicial orficers who would work in courts subordinate to the Andhra ·High Court, and so, the use of the definite pronoun "The" in the expression "the High Court" clearly indicates that it is not any High Court that is intended but it is the particular High Court of Andhra Pradesh that is in view. Therefore the expreasion «The High Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court.

1962 April, Jl.

• '4.ttdltrtJ Prad~sh Public Se11Jice Com nu ssion

708 SUPREM1£ COURT REPORTS (1963]

Held, further, that though Art. 14 forbids class Legis-lation, it docs not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rules or statu-tory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Art. H, its v•lidity can be sustained if two tests arc satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the gro'lp; and the second is that the differentia in question must have reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. The classification on which the statutory provision may be founded may be referable to different considerations. It may be based on geographical considerations or it may have reference to objects < r occupations or the like. In every case, there must be some nexus between the basis of the classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute.

The plea that all the rules must be considered together is entirely misconceived. It is quite clear that in testing the validity of any one of these rules, the true scope and effect of the impugned rule itself will have to be considered and the decision of the question would have to be confined to the relevant considerations in respect of the said rule and no more. Just as the presence of one invalid rule cannot invalidate the other rules which may be valid, so the presence of number of valid rules would not help to validate an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid.There is no rational basis for differentiating the advo-cates enrolled into the Andhra High Court from the rest as tne impugned rule purports to do. If the basis of the impugned rule is that person who applies for appointment to the post of District Munsiff, should have been enrolled as an Advocate of High Court, that basis can be sati.fied even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the Andhra High Court but of any other High Court. All the High Courts have the same stat.us; all of them stand for the same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice.

The impugned rule has introduced classification between one class of Advocates and the rest, and the said classfication must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of riiles. The impugned rule and the corr esp on ding portion of the paragraph of the notification based on it must Le held to be u!tra vire• and unconstitutional.

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Nallanthighal Bhaktavataalam Iyengar v. Secretary Amlhra Public Service Commission,, A.I.R. 1956. Andh. 14, overruled.

Shri R. K. Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279, relied on.

ORIGIN.AL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 355 of 1961 and 1 of 1962.

Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights.

Sarjoo Prasad, A. V eilavalli, A.. V. Rangam and T. Satyanarayan for the petitioner {in :Petn. No. 355/61).

A. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the peti·

tioner (in Ptn. No. 1, l962).

O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General/ of India,.

T. V. R. Tataohari and P. . .Llfenon, for the res-pondents.

1962. April l l. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GAJENDRAG.ADKAR, J.-These two petitions

have been filed by Uindra Bha.skaracharyulu Gupta and J. Pandurangara.o respectively under Article 32 of the Constitution and, in substance, they challenge the validity of one of the rules framed by the Governor of Andhra in exercise of the powers con-ferred on him by Art. '234 and the proviso to Art. 309 in respect of the Andhra Judicial Service. The facts on which the two petitioners have ba.eed their challenge are substantially similar and so, it would be sufficient for the purpose of deciding the point raised by them if we state the facts only jn one of them. We will accordingly state the facts in petition No. 355of1961. Our conclusion on the merits of the point raised by this petition will govern the decision of the other petition No. 1 of 1962.

1962 J, Panduran.tturao v. Andhra Pradesh Puhlic Service Commiasion

Gajendrafadkar J.

196B J, P•ndur•r111101 v. Antlhra .P10Jtsh Public S1rtJ1ct C.mmi•sion

The petitioner J. Pa.ndura.ngara.o belongs to a. family which has been settled in the district of Guntur in Andhra Pradesh for several generations past. The petitioner himself was born, brought up and educated in the said district. He passed his B. A. examination from the Andhra Christian College at Guntur 1950. Thereafter, he took his L.L.B. Degree from the Nagpur University in 1952 and in 1954 he got himself enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore High Court. Having thus been enrol-led as an Advocate of the Mysore High Court, he set up his practice in the Court in Tena.Ii in Guntur district and has been practising the.re ever since. In January, 1961, the respondent No. I, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, invited appli-cations for selection for the posts of District Munsifs in the State of Andhra. Pradesh. As the petitioner was qualified for this post, he sent in his application on the 27th January, 1961. Respondent No. I, how-ever, rejected his applications on the 25th Septem-ber, 1961 on the ground that he did not fulfil the 'londition set out in paragraph 4-A (1) of the Commission's notification published on the 17th December, 1960, by which applications had been invited. The said para.graph reads as follows:-

"That at the time whi>n the petitioner applies:

(I) he ilt' practising as an Advocate of the High Court:

(2) he has been actually practising in Courts of Civil or Criminal jurisdic-tion in India for period not leBB than three years."

According to respondent No. 1, the petitioner

1atisfied the second condition but did not 1&tisfy the first since he had not been practising as an

1 s.c.R.

AdTooe.te of the Andhra High Court. In his present petition, the pe.titi'oner alleges that respon~ent No. 1 ha.s misconstrued the requirement prescribed by para. 4A (1) when it assumed that the expression "the High Court" in that condition refers to the Andhra High Court and not to all the High Courts in India. In the alternative' the petitioner's contention is that if the expression "the High Court" means the Andhra High Court, then the rule prescribing the said requ!rement is ultra vire,s inasmuch as it contravenes the petitioner's funda-mental rights guaranteed by articles 14 and 16 (I) of the Constitution. It is on these to two alterna-tive grounds that the petitioner challenges the decision of respondent No. I and it is only if the first ground fails that the petitioner questions the validity of the impugned rule.

To this petition, the petitioner bas joined res-po "\dent No. 1 and respondent. No. 2, the Govern-ment of Andhra. Pradesh, represented by its Chief Secretary. On behalf of the respondents, it is urged that the construction sougl;tt . to be placed by the petitioner on the relevant clau~e in the n,otification is erroneous .. The expression '·the Hi~h Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court and no other. It is also urged that even on that construc-tion the requirement of the notification itself which is based on corresponding rule is valid.

It would thus be seen that though the petitioner technically did not challenge the validity of the ru]e on which the relevant clause in the notification itself is based, in substance, the dispute between the par-ties in the present proceedin'~s ultimately resolves into dispute as to the validity of the basic rule fram~d by the Governor of the Andhra Pradesh under "t. 234 and the proviso to Art. 309 of the Cunstitution. The oorresponding rule is Rule 12(b). T.he said rule provides speoia.l qualifications and says that ''no person shall be eligible for appointment

J. Panduranv•r•o 7 • .&ndhra l'ra<ilsh Publie s.ruice Commission Gajmlragodkllf' J,

J. PaadUtanzaru v. Antihro Prad1sh Publ~ ~1r1i,, Cornm1ssi1•

to the post of District Munsif by the method speci-fied in column ( 1) of the table below unless he pos-SPBses the qualifications specified in the correspon-ding entries in column (2) thereof." For direct rec-ruitment its District Munsif, several qualifi-cations are mentioned. One of them is that the applicant must be practising as an Advocate of the High Court, and the other is that he must be actually practising in Courts of Civil or criminal jurisdiction in India for period not less than three years. It would thus be seen that the relevant cl&11ses in the notification, the validity of one of which is challenged before us, are based on these provisions in the statutory rules.

The first question which calls for our rlecision is: what does the expres•ion "the Hirrh Court" me11.n when the rule requires that the 11.nnlic• nt mnst be practising as an Advocate of the High Court? It is urged by. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad that the expression "the Hi!!'.h Court" need not receive the narrow c<>nstruction as contended for by the respondents. He suggests that the expression "the High Court" really means a,ny High Court. In other words' his argument is that as soon as it is shown that the applicant has been practising as an Arlvocate is any High Court in India, that should be deemed to meet the requirement in question. We do not think th&t this arirument is well-founded. In the context. tli.e expression "the High Court" must, we think, mAan the Anrlhra High Court. In construing the expression "the High Court", we must bear in minrl the fact that the subject-matter of the rules is the appointment of subordinate judicial officers who would work in courts subordinate to the Andhra High Court; and so, the use of the definite pronoun '•the'' clearly indicates that it is not any or Hi2h Court that is intended but it is the partfoular High Court of Andhra Pradesh that is in view.

I S.C.R.

Besides, the scheme of the notification issued by respondent No. 1 clearly indicates that person practising as an Advocate of the High Court to whom the impugned rule refers, must be person practising in the Andhra High Court. In that conneotion, it is significant that the notification re.quires that the applications should be submitted to the. Commission through the High Court of And . bra. Pradesh if the candidates are practising in the High Court a.nd through the District Judge concern-ed and the High Oourt of Andhra Pradesh if they are practising in the subordina.te Courts. There can be no doubt that the High Court mentioned in the impugned rule is the Andhra High Court through which applications are required to be sent by the Advvcates practising in that Court. It would be unreasonable to assume that an Advocate · practis-ing in any other High Court should have been required to send his application through the Andhra High Court; but that would be the result if the ex-pression "the High Court" in this rule is read as mea-ning any High Court. Therefore, it is clear that the expression "the High Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court.

That immediately raises the question about the validity of the impugned rule. The petitioner argues that by prescribing the limitation that the applicant must be an Advocate of the Andhra. High Court, the rule has violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16( l) of the Constitution. As result of the rule, persons who are not practising as Advocates of the Andhra High. Court a.re disqualified and that amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. Art. 14 whioh provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality b~fo~e the Ia-w: or the equal protection of the lawA w1thm the territory of India, as well a.s Artide 16 (1) which provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in

J. P11111iura111ara• v •. Antlhra Prailesb Pu.•Uc Sert1i&1 Commissio11

7l~ SUPREME COURT REPonTs (1963)

matters relating to employment or appointment to anv office under the State, have been frequently considered by this Court. The scope and effect of the provisions of Article 14 can no longer be the Rubject-m'ttter of any doubt or dispute. It is well Aettled that t.hough Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14, its validity can be sus-tained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible difforentia which distin· guishes persons or things groupetl together from others left out of the group; and the second is that the differentia in question must have reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. As the decisions of this Court show, the classification on which the statutory provision may be founded may be referable to different considerations. It may be based on geographical consideratio11s or it may have reference to objects or occupations or the like. In every case, there must be dome nexus between the ha.sis of the classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute, vide Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (') It is in the light of these principles that we must now proceed to examine the problem raised by the peti-tioners for our decision in the present proceedings.

111! J. P1indt1r'lntarao •• ~nihra Pr1ul1sfl Public St¥vic1 Commissi1n Gaje'fl.rbopcl~oir J.

The object of the rule is to recruit suitable

and proper persons to the Judicial Service in the State of Andhra with view to senure fair and . efficient administration of justice, .and so, there can be no doubt that it would be perfectly competent to the authority concerned to prescribe qualifica-tions for eligibility for appointment to the said Service. Knowledge of local Jaws as well as know-ledge of the regional language and adequate \I) [1959] S. C.R. 279.

experience a.t the bar may be prescribed as qualifi· cations which the applicants must satisfy befor6 they apply for the post. In that connection, pra<>-tice in subordinate Courts or in the High Court may also be a. relevant test to prescribe. The respon-dents contend that the impugned rule seeks to do nothing more than to require the applicant to pos-sess knowledge of local laws and that being so, the validity of the rule can"Qot be impeached on the ground of discrimination. In support of this argu-ment, reliance is placed on the decision of the Andhra High Court in N allantkigkal Bhaktavatsalam Iyenger v. Se.cret,ary, Andhra Public Service Commi-ssion, Kurnool (') in which the validity of the impugned rule has been upheld.

It is also con tended that in considering the validity or the impugned rule, we must have regard to all the rules considered together. The a.rimment is that it would not be fair or reasonable to pick out one rule for challenge and in that sense, to ignore the context in which the said rule along with others has been framed. In this connection, our attention has been drawn to the fact that several qualifications have been prescribed by the rules. 'J hese relate to the educational qualifications, to the requirement as to age, to the knowledge of the local language and some other factors which un-doubtedly are relevant to the appointment to the judicial post in question. Thus considered, it is urged, the validity of the impugned rule cannot be successfully challenged.Dealing with his latter argument first, it seems to us that the plea that all the rules must be considered together is entirely misconceived. It is quite clear that in testing the validity of any one of these rnles, we will have to consider the true scope and effect of the impugned rule itself and the decision of the question would have to be 1 J A. I. R. 1956 Andhra J4,

19~1 --J. Panduronz.;r•n .A.iidhrtJ '· PrtJd1sh Public 8n1>ic• Commissio

1962 J. Pandwangaroo •• Andhro Proihsh Public Sered" Commission

Go/11ldragadkar J,

confined to the relevant oon~iderations in respect of the said rule and no more. .Just as the presence of one invalid rule cannot invalidate the other rules which may be valid, so the presence of number of valid rules would not help to validate an impug-ned rule if it is otherwise invalid. If, while prescri-bing relevant tests which must bl' satisfied by an applicant, the rule had stated that the applicant should satisfy the test, of particular height or colour for instance,-which factors are irrelevant for judicial service-the respondents could not be heard to say that because the other rules are valid, the ir~elevant rule about the requirement of the applicant's height or colour must also be treated as valid. If the heiuht or colour of the applicant is wholly irrelevimt in making an appointment to judicral post, it must be treated as irrelevant and invalid though it may havo been placed in code of rules and the rest of the rules may be perfectly valid. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument ur'.led by the learned Solicitor-General that the impugned rule cannot and need not be considered by itself but must be treated as part of bigger scheme of rules and since the other rules are valid, the impugned rule must also be treated as valid.

/ Does the impugned rule serve the object of requiring the applicant to possess knowledge of local laws? That is the next question to consider. It is urged by the respondents that since actual practice for three years which is the other condition prescribed, is practice in Courts of Civil or Criminal jurisdiction in India, it follows that even lawyers practising in courts outside the State of Andhra Pradesh would satisfy that test and that means that the satisfaction of the said test would not meet the requirement that the applicant should have knowlerlgo of local !awe. That is why, it is urged, the impugned cnndition requires that th!> applicant must be practising as an Advocate of the Andhra High Court. An Advocate of the

Andhra High Court would generally have had the benefit of apprenticeship for one year in the Chambers of a. senior Advocate and may have pass-ed the apprenticeship examination in different subjects prescribed by the Bar Council. It is in that way that he would have acquired the knowledge of local laws which he would have to administer if he is appointed to the post of District Munsif.

It is not clear. that the impugned rule can

effectively meet the alleged requirement of the knowledge of local laws. If the object intended to be achieved is that the applicant should have adequate knowledge ef local laws, the usual a.nd proper course to adopt in that behalf is to pres-cribe suitable examination which oandida.tes should pass, or adopt some other effective method. No material has been placed before us to show that the alleged requirement about the knowledge of local laws ca.n be met on the two grounds suggest-ed in support of the validity of the rule. Besides, study of general laws prevailing in the country M whole, and the dtudy of important local laws are .generally included in the curriculum prescribed for the law Degree, and obtaining Law Degree which would entitle person to be enrolled as an Advo-cate, in substance, meets the requirement of the knowledge of important lees.I laws.

There is another aspect of the problem which

is very important. It is common ground that under rule l(ii) of the Andhra Bar Council Rules, an·.advocate entered on the roll of Advocates of High Court <·stablished by law in India, other than ·the High Court of Andhra, is entitled to practise as an Advocate of the An<lhra High Court, provid-ed there is reciprocity between the Andhra High Court on whose roll hi} has been entered as an AdToO&te. This rule is subject to the further proviso th~t where any vcison ·.had been admitted

J. Panduranttn'U v. A.ndh•a Pradds" Public S1111ie1 Commission

as an advocate of such High Court without under· going course of study in the chambers of practi-sing advocate for period of one year, he shall be of not less than one yea.r's standing as an advocate of such High Court. It is thus clear that an Advocate enrolled in any other High Court who is entitled to the benefit of rule l(ii) would be eligible to praoties in the Andhro. High Court and as such, would satisfy the test of the impugned rule ; and in such ease, the theory that the impu· gned rule serves the purpose of requiring the applicant to possess knowledge of local laws com-pletely break down. By operation of rule l(ii) which is, doubt, based on the health convention of reciprocity between the different High Court in this country, Advoclte who can have no know· ledge of the local laws prevailing in Andhra would satisfy the test of the impugned rule, therefore, the main argument that the object intended to be achieved by the impugned rule is that the applicant should possess knowledge of local laws, cannot be sustained.

J. Pandutanttlt'tJIJ •• .Andhra P1aiksh Public S1 viei Commiuion

(Jaj1ntlragadkar J.

Then it is urged that person who has been

enrolled as an Advocate of the Andhra High Court would have feelings of attachment for the institu-tion of the Andhr11. High Court and would be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the said High Court and that would afford rational basis for diff& rentiating the class of advocates of the Andhra. High Court from the rest of the Advoeates in this coun-try. In our opinion, neither of the two grounds can be said to have any nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the rule. What is relevant and more important in the matter of recru-iting persons to judicial 15erviee is not only the applicant?' Loyalty and attachment to the institu-tion of particular High Court but their loyalty and sense of dedication to the oases of judicial administration and this feeling and sense of dedi-cation would be present in the minds of persona

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

enrolled as Advooates in the Andhra High Court as muoh in the minds of other persons enrolled as Advocates in other High Courts. The test of dis-oiplina.ry jurisdiation is hardly relevant because advocates of other High Courts would likewise be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of their High Courts ; and if person who continues to be on the roll of the Andhra High Court can be pre-sumed to be person worthy to belong to the profession of law and so, eligible for the judicial post, so can person who conti-nues on the roll of any other High Court be enti-tled to claim the same status. Therefore, in our opinion. there does not appear to be any rational basis for differentiating the advocates belongned to the Andhra High Court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do.In this connection, it may be permissible to point out that the second condition in regard to three years' actual practice might more appropri· ately have required that the said three years' practice should be in the Civil or Criminal Courts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Andhra High Court. '!'hat would have more effectively secured the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge of local laws and to have experience in the matter of the administration of the said laws. As it happens, the said condition under the relevant rule enables advocates practising in Civil or Criminal Courts all over India. to apply, and so, the requirement about the knowledge of local laws cannot invariably be Qatisfied by the said condition. But as we have just pointed out, the said test cannot be said to be satisfied by the impugned rule as well.

If the basis of tJ>.e impugned rule is that per-8'>n who applies for appointment to the post of District Munsif, should have been enrolled as an Adyooate of High Court, that basis can be satis-fied even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate

J. P.mdu•angtJru v. Andhra Pracl11h Public S1rtJic1 Commis1ion

Gaj1ndragadlo ar J,

J. /'aniur"r.zar::o v. And/,;• Prad1sh Public Servfo1 Commission

O.j1niJ-agad/r,ar J •

not of the Andhra High Court but of any other High Court. All the High Courts have the same status; all of them stand for the same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice, and advocates e-rolled in all of them are presumed to follow the same standards and to subscribe to the same spirit of serving the cause of the administration of justice. 'Pherefore, in our opinion, the impugned rule has introduced classification between one class of Advo-cates and the rest, and the said classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules. That being so, it must be held that the decision of the Andhra High Court in the case of Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar ia not correct.

In the result, the impugned rule and the oor-

responding portion of the paragraph of the notifica-tion based on it must be held to be uUra t'ires and unconstitutional. In that view of the matter, we issue direction calling upon the first respondent to entertain t.he applications of the petitioners and to deal with them in accordance with law. We were told by the learned Solicitor-General that the Public Service Commission has already conduc-ted the test in respect of large number of candi-dates and amongst them, the petitioners' cases have also been considered. If that be so, our present decision will not affect the procedure followed by the Commission. The effect of our decision is that applications of the persons like the petitioners can-not be rejected on the preliminary ground that they are not persons practising as Advocates in the Andhra High Court and that they should be consi-dered on the merits along with the rest of the app!i. cations. The petitions are accordingly allowed with easts.

Petiti<ma allowed.