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THE MANAGEMENT OF NEWSPAPER EXPRESS LTD. versus WORKERS & STAFF EMPLOYED UNDER IT AND OTHERS .

[1963] 3 S.C.R. 540 · AIR 1963 SC 569
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decision date
1962-08-02
Bench
P B GAJENAGADKAR

Parties

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4 case citations detected in this judgment's own text, but none resolved to a judgment page in this build yet.

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. JB9JI

540 SUPREME COURTR EPORTS [1963]

THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPRESS NEWSPAPER8 LTD.

WORKERS & STAFF EMPLOY.GD UNDER IT AND OTHERS . (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Industrial Dispute-Validity of reference-Lockout or cl?BUre-Whether industrial dispute-Determination of jurisdi-ctional fact by Trib1tnal -High Court's power to issue writ -Order of reference-Fair and reasonable construction--Cosn. titution of India. Art. 226-Industrial Dispute1 Act, 1947 (14 a/1947), ss. 10 (1) (d), 10 (3), (4). ,

The appellant is private limited company and it carries on the business.of printing and publishing newspapers and periodicals, In 1959 the appellants intimated the closure of its business in respect of its various publication at Madras. On the same day the appellant's Board of Directors resolved to sell items· of printing ·machinery and equipment to one private limited company and the next day the appellant inserted advertisement in local newspaper announcing that the premises of the appellant is «To let". Thereafter the respond-ents •truck work. The Government at this stage issued two orders. By one of these orders the Government referred the dispute to Industrial Tribunal under s. 10 ( l) (d) of ·the Industrial Disputes Act. The other order which was under •.10 (3) of the Act prohibited the continuance of the strike and lockout in the appellants concern.

The appellant thereupon filed two writ petitions against the above orders of the Government. Both petition• were heard together by Single Judge who held that since the order under '· 10 (3) was mere administrative order it was not open to the Court to quash it but since that order was not without jurisdi-ction the appellant was entitled to ignore it. With regard to the other writ petition he held that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain it even at an ·interlocutory stage and on the merits of the case he found that the action of the appellant did not amount to lockout but closure and the di•pute between the parties was not an industrial dispute. The respondents then preferred two appeals to the Division Bench concerning the order of the Government under s. 10 (3) the P!v!sion Bench upheld the decision if the Single Bench ~ncj

3 S.".R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

dismissed the appeal. With regard to the other appeal it help that ev.en though the High Court had .jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition since the deterniination of the question whether the reference was valid or not involved many compli-cated questions of fact the matter must be fully investigated and• tried in the first instance by the Tribunal.

The appellant then appealed to th,is Court. The main contention raised in the appeal was that since the action.of the appellant did not amount to lockout but closure there .was no industrial dispute. That being the position the reference was invalid and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to embark on the proposed enquiry. The next contention was that issue No. 1 in the reference which related to transfer of the publication anct business of the appellant was on the face of it bad since the appellant was entitled to make such transfer and the respond· ents;had no right to raise an industrial .dispute ·With ·regard to such transfer. Thirdly it was urged that the wording of issue No. 2 showed that the Govrnment had already determined the question raised by that issue and there was ·nothing left to the decision of the Tribunal.Held, that if the Industrial Tribunal proceeds to assume jurisdiction over non-industrial dispute that can be successfu-lly challenged before the High Court by petition for . an appropriate writ. The finding on the preliminary issue• whether an action of party amounts to lockout or closure is finding on jurisdic~ional fact. It is only when it is found that the action amounts to lockout that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. As general rule it is not proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of special tribunal to deal with juris· dictional facts should be circumvented· and the decision of such preliminary issue brought before the High Court on its writ jurisdiction.

On the facts and circumstances of the cace it would be idle to contend that issue No. 1 related to the transfer of business which could not be the subject matter of an industrial dispute.

Courts (should construe an Order of reference not too technically or in pedantic manner but fairly and reasonably. Construed in this manner and having regard to the content of the dispute covered by issue No. 2 that issue was not so worded as to ;exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the question whether the appellant's action amounted to closure or not,

111.t -Jlanagemenl •f 1!J lt/J•Nf 'N1wrJJSfJlrl ·lid. . v. W M'kws ani S'4J'

M~ftagemU.1 oj

Expriss .N ewJpajJetl

Lid. ...

Work1rs and Sl':'if

CIVIL APPELLATE Ju:RISDIOTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 574 and 575 of 1961.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 13, l 959, of the Madras High Court in writ Appeals Nos.73 and 85 of 1959.

A. V. Vi8wanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and

G. Gopa/,akrishnan, for the appellants.

M. K. Ramamurthy, R. K. Garg and T. S. Vankataraman, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

A- Ranganatham Ohetty and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. 4.

1962. August 2, The Jud3ment of the Court wa[0 ]delivered by

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-On the 30th of April, 1959, the Madras Governmtmt referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, for its adjudication two industrial issues which had arisen bet ;veen the appellent The Management of Express Ltd. and the respondents, its workmen. These two items of dispute were thus specified in the Order of Reference:-

1. Whether the transfer of the publication of Andhra Prabha and Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly to Andhra Prabha Private Ltd. In Vijayawada is justified and to what relief the workers and the working Journalists are entitled ?

2, Whether the strike of the workers and working Journalists from 27th April, 1959, and the consequent lookout by the .management of the Expr.,~s Newspapers Private Ltd. are Justified and to what relief the workers and the working Journalists a.re entitled?

This reference was made under section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Aot, 1947, (XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act).

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPoR.TS

On the same day, the Government of Madras issued another Order under section 10 (3) of the Act prohibiting the continuance of the strike and the lookout in the appellant concern. This Order was issued because the Government was of the opinion that it was expedient and necessary to prohibit the continuance of the said strike and lockout.

Against the latter Order, the appellant filed writ petition in the Madras High Court (No. 443 of 1959) on lst ofMay, 1U59, whereas on the 5th of May, 1959, it filed writ petition No. 450 of 1959 against the Order by which the dispute in question was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its adju-dication. Both the writ petitions were heard together by Bala krishna Ayyar J. He held that the Goveren-ment Order issued under s. IO (3) of the Act was an administrative order and it was doubtful whether it would be open to the Court to quash the said Order as it stood. Even so, the learned Judge held that the Government had no Jurisdiction to make the said Order and that .the appellant was entitled to ignore it. In the opinion of the learned Judge, the ends of Justice would be met if this clarification was made and so, that is the only order which he passed on writ petition No. 433 of 1959.

In regarif to writ petition No. 450 of 1959, the learned Judge held that he had jurisdiction to entti· rtain the said writ petition even at an interlocutory stage and so, he rejected the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. On the merits, he took the view that what the appellent had done did not amount to lookout but closure and so, the subs-tantial part of the dispute between the parties did not a.mount to an industrial dispute at all. That is why he came to the conclusion that it is only the latter parts of the first and second questions which could be tried by the Tribunal. In the result, the petition filed by the appellant was partly allowed

IHI ·-

Jl.lana1e1116n# of Expms Newapapsr; Lid. , v. W 011'1r1 and Staff -

Managemenhof Eltprsss ,Newrpopera Lid. .. W-0t.«1rs an<t-S tajf ·

and the Tribunal was directed to deal with only the second part of the two questions framed by the impugned reference.

This decision was challenged by the respqndent1< by preferring two appeals before Division Bench o the Madras High Court. The order passed on W.P. No. 443/1959 gave rise to writ appeal No. 85 of 1959, whereas the order passed on writ petition 450/1959 gave rise to writ appeal No. 73 of 1959. Thi appellate Court has agreed with the trial Judge in holding that the order issued by the Government under s. 10(3) of the Act was ill-advised and without jurisdiction and so, the appellant can with impunity ignore the said order. In regard to the main poin o( controversy between the parties as to the valj. dity of the reference itself, the Appeal Court tool the view that the questions which had to be decided in dealing with the appellant's contention that the reference was invalid, were complex ques-tions of fa.ct and that it would be appropriate that. the said questions should be fully investigated and tried in the first instance by the Industrial Tribunal itself. In other words, the Appeal Court held that though the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application for writ of Prohibition even at the initial stage of the proceedings commenced before Special rribunal, it would not be proper that writ of prohibition should be issued unless the ·dis-puted questions of fact were tried by the said Special Tribunal in the first instance. On this view, the order pa.seed by the trial Judge has. been modi-fied and the disputes referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication have been remitted to the said Tribunal for its .disposal in accordance with law. In making this.Order, the Appeal Court has indicated the nature of the dispute and the questions of fa.ct which the Industrial Tribunalma.y have to try and the limits of its jurisdiction. In the result, the writ apple No.73/1959 suooeeded

3 s.C.R.

Su.PR~Ml!l OOUR.T REPORTS

whereas writ appeal No.85/1959 failed. It is this

decision of the Court of Appeal that is challenged before us by Mr. Viewanatha Sastri on behalf of the appellant

Before. dealing with the appeal on the -merits,

it is necessary -to--set out very briefly the material facts which led to the present dispute between the parties. The appellant ·is·a Private Limited Liabi-lity Company incorporated under the Indian Compa-nies Act and it ·carries-on the business of printing and publishing •newspapers and periodicals, viz., the Indian Express, Sunday Sta.ndard (on Sundays), Dinamani, Dinamani Kadir, Andhra Prabha, Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly and screen. These papers were being printed and ptibl~hed by the appellant from Madras till the 27th April, 1959. On the 29th April, 1959, the appellant intimated the closure of its business .in respect of its various publications at-Madras. The announcement made by the appe-llant in that behalf indicated that its staff and workmen would be paid wages, one month's salary in lieu of notice and compensation as laid down under s.25 (f) and s.25 ( fff) of the Act. It was also stated that similar wages and compensation would be paid to journalists under the corresponding provisions of the working Journaliste (Conditions of Serv:ice and Miscellaneous Proviaions) Act,1955. It appears, on the same day, the appellant's Boa.rd of Directors resolved to sell items of printing mach-inery and equipment to the Andhra Prabha (Private) Ltd. for Rs.5,25,000/-. Accordingly in the •Hindu' of the 30th April, 1959, an advertise-ment was .inserted by the appellant under the "To-Let" column relating to the office accommod-ation and premises of the Express Newspapers Private Ltd. Jt is this action of the appella 'lt which as led to the pr esent dispute.

Managem~nl of Jilxprus N.wspapers 'Ltd. v.

Workers an.t Slaff

Goj8ndraga.tllar _J.

1982 Manag1mml oj liJxpr1ss N ewspaperg Ltd. .... Workera and Sta.ff

546 SOPREM'.E COUR'l' REPOR'l'S (I963j

At this stage, it may be relevant to refer very briefly to the background of the present dis-pute between the parties. It appears that between the apellant and its employees dispute arose on certain points including bonus in March, 1957. This dispute was referred for industiral adjudication which ended in an award in November, 1957. Thie award was challenged by the appollant by an appeal before this Court and we were told that the appell· ant's appeal had substantially succeeded. That is how the dispute of 1957 ultimately ended.

In March, 1958, the appellant notified its

intention to retrench 69 workmen and that led to an in<lustrial dispute which was referred for induB· tl'ial adjudicat.ion. The appellant raised prelimi-nary objection about the incompetence of the reference and took the dispute to the Madras High Court by its W. P. No. 810 of 1958. This objec-tion was, however, withdrnwn on the 5th December, 1958. On the 12th October, 1958, the respondents' Union made certain complaints to the State Government as result of which the Home Minister attempted to intervene, but his intervention was unsuccessful. Soon thereafter, the appellant inti-J"'ated its intention to close down its publications at Madras and notified its workmen accordingly. The Home Minister again intervened and this time his intervention was effective. As result, settle· ment was reached between the parties which was mbodied in memora:i.dum drawn up on the 6th of November, 1958 under s.12 (3) of the Act. This settlement was to operate for 2! years. The respondents' case is that Mr. R.N. Goenka, the appellant's Chairman, agreed in the presence of the Minster, Mr. Bhaktavatsalam, and the Labour Commissioner, Mr. Balasundaram, th.at the paper 'Andhra Prabha' would not he shifted for publica-tion to Vijayawada during the period of the settle-ment, and that the workmen would be continued

3 s.c.R.

to· be employed as before &t Madras. The respon-dents contend that this assurance was given verb-ally but had not been included in the terms of memoraudum. Broadly stated, the resp~ndents' case is that the transfer purported to have been effected by the appellant on the 29th April, 1959, ia in contravention of this verbal assurance and it is urged that the verbal assurance given by the appel1ant's Chairman constituted one of the terms of employment of the respondents and as such, became condition of their service. The impugned transfer materially affects that condition of service.

resp~ndents'

In March, 1959, about 60 part-time delivery boys demanded increased emoluments and when the said demand was not conceded, they went on strike. The apellant suspended them, but at the . instance of the Conciliation Officer, they were taken back upon their tendering an apology and the delivery boys then resumed duty. In March and April 195U, the· Madras Union of Journalists bega~ to protest to the Government against what it apprehended was the proposed move of the appellant to transfer the publication of the Andhra Pra.bha to Vijayawada in contraven-tion of the verbal assurance given to the respondents by the appellant's Chairman .. These protests., were followed by joint meetiri.g of the General Body of the Express Newspapers (Private} Ltd., Employees' Union and the Madras Union of Journalists, and at the said meeting resolution was passed condemning the transfer of the proprie· tory interest in the two periodicals to an alleged •benami' concern; this resolution characterised the transfer as mala fide and illegal. This resolution was followed by an intimation of strike on the 24th April, 1959, a.a tb.e appellant had intimated to the respondents by its letter of the 23rd April, 1959, the faots about, the impugned transfer. The appe-llant plainly informed the respondents that the

Mana1emant of Xff'.S 1N ewspape" ' Lid. v. Workers and Sta.If Gajmdra&adkar J.

1901 M anag1t1i1nl of Exty1s• N1U1SfJaperB • Ltd. .... ,,. W orklr1 and Sta.ff ~GaJ1nd1'azdJ/car J.

new concern at Vijayawada would take over the required workers and that the decision to transfer could not be altered or revoked. After receiving this communication, the respondents went on strike on the ~7th April, 1959, This strike was followed on t.he 29th April, 1959, by the announcement !!lade by the appellant about the closure of its business. '..o. hat, in brief, is the background of the present dis-pute b'tween the parties.

The true legal position in regard to the juris-diction of the High Court to entertain the appella-nt's petition even at the initial stage of the procee-dings proposad to be taken before the Industrial Tribunal, is not·ir1 dispute. If the action taken by the appellant is not lockout but is closure, bona-fide and genuine, the dispute which the respondents may raise in respect of such closure i11 not an ·ind-ustrial dispute at all. On the other hand, if, in fact . and in substa11ce, it is lockout, but the said action has adopted the disguise of closure, and dispute is raised in respect of such an action, it would be an industrial dispute which industrial adjudication is competent to deal with. The appellant contends that what it has done is closure and so, the dis-pute in respect of it cannot be validly referred for, ·adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal. There is no doubt that in law, the appellant is entitled to move the High Court even at the initial stage and seek to satisfy it that the dispute is not an industr-ial dispute and so, the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to embark upon the proposed enquiry.

There is also no doubt that the proceedings

before the Industrial Tribunal are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and in resvect of them .a writ of certiorari can issue in proper case, If the Industrial Tribunal proceeds to assume jurisdiction over non-industrial dispute, that can be success-fully challenged before the High Court by .petition ' .

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

for an appropriate writ, and the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ in that behalf cannot be questioned.

It is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial Tribunal, at the very commence· ment the Industrial Tribunal will have to examine as preliminary i~sue the question as to whether the disputA referred to it is an industrial dispute or not, and the decision of this question woul<l inevi-tably depend upon the vfow which the Industrial Tribunal may take as to whether the action taken by tJte appellant is "" closure or lockout. The fin-ding which the Industrial Tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whether it has jurisdiction to dertl with the merits of the disput or not. If the finding is that the action i)f the appe· Hant amounts to closure, there would be an end to the proceedings before the Tribunal so for as the main dispute is concerned. If, on t.he other hand, the findinµ-is that the action of the appellant amounts to lockout which has been disguised as ofosure, then the Tribunal will be entitled to deal with the reference, the finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is finding on jurisdictional fact and it is only when the jurisdic-tional fact is found against the appellant that the Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the di11pute, This position is also not in dispute.The Court of Appeal has held that having regard to the somewhat complex nature ofthe facts which have to be determined in dealing with the preliminary issue, it would be appropriate that the Industrial Tribunal which is specially appointed to try such issues, should first hold an enquiry in res-peet• · of that issue. The Court of Appeal has' elaborately set out in its judgment the pros and c:io.qe•of the dispute and it has indioated so~e·of

19111 Manarwnmtof ExpreSI Newapap-,,s Lid. v. Worket1t a11d·Slalf <1ajtndiagadfcar J.

the facts on which the two rival contentions are based. It, however, thought that having regard to the nature of the enquiry involved in the deci-sion of the preliminary issue, it would be inappro-priate for the High Court to take upon itself the task of determining the relevant facts on affidavits. proper and more appropriate course to adopt, it thought, would be to let the material facts be determined by the Industrial Tribunal in the first instance. That is why the Appeal Court wat not inclined to confirm the decision of the trial Court in W. P. No. 450/1959. The narrow question which we are thus called upon to consider in the pre-sent appeal is whether this view is erroneous in law.

Management l)j bXpress N •w1papera Lid. v. ~Yo rke1B nnd Staff Gajendragadkar J,

It seems to us difficult to accept Mr. Sastri's argument that the Appeal Court was in error in taking this view .. As we have just indicated, the legal position with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court is not in don bt. The only question ofi which the trial Court and the Appeal Court have differed is in regard to the propriety or the appropriateness of holding an enquiry on com-plicated question of fact in writ proceedings. It is well known that Industrial Courts are familiar . with the nature of the problem raised by the pre-liminary issue between the parties in the present writ proceedings. In fact, Industrial Tribunals have been specially esta.blished in order to deal with industrial disputes in different places, That is one consideration which is relevant. The other consideration which is equally material is that question of this complicated character cannot be satisfactorily dealt with marely on affidavits. The theorectical distinction between closure and lockout is well settled. In the . case of closure, the employer does not merely close down the place of business, but he closes the business itself; and so, the closure i~dicates t~e f:lnal and irrevocable

~ S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

termination of the business itsPlf. Lockout, on the other hand, indicates the closure of the place of business and not the closure of business itself. Experience of Industrial Tribunals shows that the Lockout is often used by the employer as weapon in his armoury lo com pell the employees to accept his proposals just as strike is weapon in the armoury of the employees to compell the employer to accept their demands. Though the distinct.ion between t.he two concepts is thus clear in theory, in actual practice it is not always easy to decide whether the act of closure really amounts to closure properly so-called, or whether it is dis-guise for Lockout. In dealing with this question industrial adjudication has to take into account several relevant facts and these facts may . be pro· ved before the Industrial Tribunal either by oral evidence, or by documentary evidence and by evid-ence of conduct and circumstances. Whenever serious dispute arises between an employer and his employees in regard to closure which the em· ployees allege is lockout, the enquiry which foll· ows is likely to be long and elaborate and the ulti-mate decision has always to depend on careful examination of the whole of the relevant evidence. That being so, it seems to us that the course ado-pted by the Appeal Court in the present proceed-ings is both proper and appropriate.The High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to ask the Industrial Tribunal to stay its hands and to embark upon the preliminary enquiry it-self. The jurisdiction of the High Court to adopt this course cannot be, and i~ indeed not, disputed. But would it be proper for the High Court fo adopt such course unless the ends of justice seem to ~ake it necessary to do so ?· Normally, the quest-10ns of fact, though they may be jurisdictional facts t~e decis~on of which depends upon the apprecia· twn of ey-1deµoe1 should be left to ~e t.ried by the

196?. Management of Express Newspaper• Ltd. v. w,rkers and Stajf · Gajendrog 1dkar J.

Management of E*pf'1as New1papers Ltd. v. War/c,rs and Staff -Gajen~riqadkar J.

552 SUPREME GeURT'REPORTS (1963]

Special Tribunals constituted for that purpose. If and after t.he Special Tribunals try the preliminary issue in respect of such jurisdictional facts, it would be open to the aggrieved party to take ·that matter before the High Court by writ petition.and ask for. an·appropriate writ, Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial juris· diction of the Special Tribunal to deallwith these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the demsion of such preliminary issue be brought before High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We wish to point out that in making these observations, we do not propose to lay down any fixed· or inflexible rule; whether or not even the preliminary fact should be tried by High Court in write peti-tion, must naturally depend upon the circumstances of eaoh case and upon the nature of the preliminary issue raised between the parties. Having regard to the circumstances of the present dispute, we think the Court of Appeal was right in taking the view that the preliminary issue should more appro-priately dealt with by the Tribunal. The Appeal Court has made it clear 'that any party who feels aggrieved by the finding of the Tribunal on this preliminary issue may move the High Court in accordance with law. Therefore; we are not prepared' to accept Mr. Sastri's argument that the Appeal Court was wrong in reversing the conclusion of the trial Judge in so for as the Trial Judge proceeded to deal with the question aR to whether the action of the appellant was closure or lookout.

Before we part with this topic, we wish . to make it clear that when the Tribunal ·proceeds to deal with the dispute between the parties, it need not be influenced by the several observations made either by the trial Court or the Court of Appeal in respect of the transfer effected by the appellant on the 29th April; 1959. In the course of their judg-ments, both the trial Court and the Court of Appea\'

s.c.R. SUPREME 'COURT RlnPORTS

553[1 ]

have indicated their preference for one view or the

other and for fair trial of the issue before Tribu-nal; it is of utmost• importance that' we ought to emphasise the fact that these observations either for for the appellant or against·it should be treated as obiter and the Tribunal should deal with the dispute on the merits· independently and uninfluenced by' these observations.

Mr. Saatri then contends·that on the face of it,

the : reference is bad. His argument is · that issue No. I which deals with the transfer of the Andhra Prabha.' and Andhra Prabha Illustrated Weekly cannot be said to be an issue in respect of an indus-trial dispute. The appellant is entitled tu transfer its busineas to whomsoever it likes and on whatsoo. ever terms.it chooses to accept. Similarly, the appe-llant is entitled to transfer its business from one place to another and the employees are not entitled to raise• an industrial dispute in respect of such transfer. That being so, it is urged, the' first part of issue No. I is outside the jurisdiction of the Industial Court as it does not fall within the definition of an industrial dispute at all; and if the first part is out-side,the Act, the second part qannot survive.

Thus presented, the argument is prima· facie

attractive. But in appreciating the scope of the en-quiry contemplated by issue No. I, we cannot ignore the contentions raised by the respondents. It is clear• that the case of the respondents is that dur-ing the. negotiations between the appellant and the Union in the presence of the Acting Labour Minister and the Commissioner of Labour, the appellant sought to insert clause in the agree-ment.I in .respect of its proposal to shift the Andhra · Prabha to Vijayawada and that the respondents • . objected to it. Thereupon, the appellant's Chair-Diail•gave 'a verbal assurance that the business of the a.ppelhmt rwould be carried on at Madras for

1982'' ManaUe;n~'nt of. Express N ew5papir1 · Ltd.· v. W arkers anil Stoff Gajtnd•agadkar J.

Managtment of Expresa Newspapers Ltd. .. W rrrkers and Slaff Gnjtnd.rogad.kar J.

2! years which was the life of the agreement. Basing themselves on this verbal assurance, the respondents contend that the said assurance was one of the terms of the conditions of the respond-ents' service and the transfer effected by the appe. Hant contravenes and materially modifies the said condition of service. It i~ in the light of this con-tention that the scope of the enquiry contemplated by issue No. 1 has to be judged. In this connec-tion, it may be relevant to refer to the fact that the appellant's Director, Mr. Phumbra, wrote to the respondents on the 20th April, 1959, inter alia, that when arrangements are finalised at Vijayawada; the concerned workman and others would be advised in writing to enable them to join at Vijayawada. Therefore, the nature of the dispute between the parties under issue No. l is based on the verbal assurance alleged to have been given by the appe-llant's Chairman to the respondents. We do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of this contrqversy at all. Whether or not verbal assu-rance was given as pleaded by the rt'spondents and if yes, whethar such an assurance would con· stitute condition of service, are questions which the Tribunal may have to try. But since the dis-pute centres round · this verbal assurance, it would be idle to contend that issue No. 1 rel-ates to the transfer of business which cannot be the subject matter of an industrial dispute. It is in the light of the contentions raised by the respond-ents that the limits of the issue are, in & sense, deter-mined and it would be within these limitations that the Tribunal would have to try this issue. There-fore, we a1·e not prepared to accept Mr. Sastri's argument that issue No. 1 could not have been vali-dly referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjud-ication.

Then in regard to issue No. 2, the argument

is that this issue has, in faot, been determined by ,

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ,

the Government and nothing is left to the Tribun-al to consider or decide. It may be qonceded that the wording of the issue is inartistic and unfortun-ate. As it is worded, it no doubt, prima facie gives an impression that the enquiry on this issue has to proceed on the assumption that the conduct of the appellant amounts to lockout, and this argu-ment is somewhat strengthened by the ill-advised and unfortunate order passed by the State Govern· ment under s. 10 (2). It is hardly necessary to emphasise that since the jurisdiction of the Indust-rial Tribunal in dealing with industrial disputes referred to it under section 10 is limited by s.l 0 ( 4) to the points specifically mentioned in the reference and matters incidental there to, the appropriate Government should frame the relevant orders of reference carefully and the questions which are intended to be tried by the Industrial Tribunal sho~ld be so worded as to leave no scope for embig· · uity or cnntroversy. An order of reference hastily drawn or drawn in casual manner often gives rise to unnecessary disputes and thereby prolongs the life of industrial adjudication which must always be avoided. Even so, when the question of this kind is raised before the Courts, the Courts must attempt to construe the reference not too technic-aJJy or in pedantic manner, but f~irly and reason-ably. Thus construed, even the inelegent phraseo-logy in framing the issue cannot conceal the fact that in dealing with the issue, tlie main point which the Tribunal will have to consider is whether the strike of the respondentfj on the 27th of April, 1959 was justified and whether the action of the appell-ant which followed the aaid strike is either lock-out or amounts to closure. The respondents will contend that it is lookout which is in the nature of an aot of represal on the part of the appellant, whereas the appellant will contend that it is not lockout but closure genuine and bonafide. Thus,

Mana1•mtnl of Expre.s Newspa/J1r,t Ltd. WorkerJ "· and Staff Gajendragadkar ,r.

Manag1m111t of Express .Newspapers Ltd. v. Workers ond Staff Gaj1ndragadkar " --. J,

having regard to the content of the dispute cover-ed by issue No. 2, it would not be right to suggest that the reference precludes the Tribunal from entertaining the appellant's plea that what it did on the 29th April is in fact not lockout but closure. The fact that the relevant action of the appellant is called lookout does not mean that the Tribunal must hold it to be lockout. In this connection, it may be recalled that in several cases where industrial disputes are referred for industrial adjudication in respect of certain persons named .as workmen, the employers raise the contention that the specified persons are not their workmen and it has never ·been suggested that merely because the said persons are described as workmen in the reference, the employer is preoluded from disputing their status or that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try such an incidental dispute. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Sastri is right in contending that issue · No.2 has been so worded as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with the question as to whether the appellant's impugned action amounts to closure or not. ·In the result, we "hold that the grievance made by the appellant against the decision of the Appeal Court in writ Appeal No.73/1959 is not well-founded. In order to avoid any cotroversy between the parties before the Industrial Tribunal as to the scope of the enquiry which the said Tribunal would be justified in holding on the present reference, we would like to state that in trying issue No.l, the Tribunal will deal with that issue in the light of the respondents' contention about the verbal assurance given by the appellant's Chairman to them during the course of the previous negotiations. In regard to the enquiry under issue No.:& the Tribunal will have to consider whether

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

the strike wa11 justified. It·will also have to consi-der whether the transfer effected by the appellant amounts to closure or lockout and in dealing with this issue, it will take into account all facts whioh are relevant and material.

That leaves only one minor point to be men-tioned and it relates to the order passed by the State Government under s.10(3) of the Act. We agree with the trial Court and the Court of Appeal that the State Government was ill-advised to issue the said order. It may be that the State Government was anxious to preserve industrial peace and so, it proceeded to exercise its jurisdiction under s.10(3). But it is obvious that the full implications of the order were not appreciated by the State Government before it issued the said order. Indeed, the inapp-ropriateness and the impropriety of the said order gave rise to au argument by the appellant that the Government was acting mala fide against it, and the State Government had to offer an explanation in the form of an affidavit and by way of sta.te-ment made by the Government Pleader at the Bar to meet. this challenge. If only the State Government had considered the ~atter more carefully before issuing the said order, -this complication could have been easily avoided.

The result is, the two appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one set of hearing fees in these appeals.

Appeals dismissed

M anagtm1nl of Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Workers and Sia.If --· Gaj,ndragadkat J.