ANAKAPALLA CO-OPERATIVE AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY LIMITED versus WORKMEN

1962 Octoh,,, 23.

WORKMEN

( P. B. GAJF.NDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)

Jndustrwl Dispute-Transfer of underta(ng-Wlten transferee is successor-in-interest of trnnsferor-Payment of compensation by transferor-Reinstatement clai1ned against transferee-Whether claim su.<tainable--Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), ss.25F, 25FF, 25H.

company running sugar 1nill was suffering losses· every year due to insufficient supply of sugar-cane and wanted to shift the mill. The cane-growers formed co-0pecative society and purchased the mill. As agreed between the company and the society, the company terminated tl1e services of the employees and paid retrenchrnent compensation to t!"!ein under s.25FF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917. The society employed some of the old employees of the company but did not employ , 49 permanent and 103 >easonal employees out of them. The dispute arising out of the refusal of the society to absorb these workmen was referred for adjudicatiOn. The Tribunal, by its award, directed the appellant society to re-employ with continuity of service as many of old employres as \Vere .left out in fav\1ur of new employees, and to re~empJoy the remaining employees cis and when vacancies occurred. The society contended that it was not successor-in-interest of the company and the claim for re-employment was not sustainabJe and that the services of the employees having been terminated upon payment of compensation by the company under s. 25FF no claim could be made against the transferee of the company.

Hel.d, that the appellant society was the successor-;n-interest of the company. The question as to whether,a purchaser of an indus:rial concern is successor-in-intere_st of the vendor has to be decided on consideration of several relevant facts such as whether the purchaser purchased the whole of the business; w;is the bilsiness p;irchased as going

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

concern; is the business carried on the same or similar as that carried on by the vendor; is it carried on at the same place; is the business carried on without substantial break in con-tinuity; has goodwill been purchased; is the purchase of all the parts or only of some etc. The decision of the question depends upon the evaluation of all the relevant factors and it cannot be reached by treating any one of them a• of over-ridinsi or conclusive sig-nificance. rn• the present case the society purchased the concern for the purpose of manufacturing sugai and carried on the same business, at the same place without any appreciable break.

Ramji/,al Nat/iu/,al v. Himabhai Mills Co. Lid., (1956) II L. L J. 244, New Gujarat Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Labour Tribunal, (1957) II L. L.J. I94andAntony D' Souza v. Sri Motichand Silk Mills, (1954) I L. L. J. 793, referred to.

Held, further that the claim of the employees for re· instatement was not mstainable. In all cases falling under s.25FF of the Act, if the transfer does not come within the proviso, the employees of the transferred concern arc entitled to claim compensation against the transferor but they cannot make any claim for re-employment against the transferee. The employees were not entitled to both compensation for termination of service and immediate re-employment at the hands of the transferee. Section 25H was not applicable t'> the case as the termination of service upon transfer or closure is not retrenchment properly so called. Termination of service with which s. 25FF. deals cannot be equated with retrenchment covered bys 25 F. The words "as if" in s. 25FF clearly distinguish between retrenchment under s.2(00) and termina-ti'?n of ser:ice under _s.25FF. Nor could the principles under-lymg ~· 25H ~e applied. tn the _case. '.Th~ general principles of social JUS!lce and fa1r play did not JUst1fy the claim for re-employmei;t simultaneously with the payment ofre~nchment compensation.

HaripNUJad Bhivshankar ,S,hulda v. A. D. DitJalcar, [1957] S. C. R: 121, ¥-/s. HatAVJingh Manufaclurif&g Co. Lid. v. Union of India, [1960] 3 S. C.R. 528 and Indian llutM Pipe Co. Lt4. v. The Workmen. [1960] 2 S.C.R. 32, referred to.

C1vrr. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 224of1962.

Appeal by special leave from the award dated June 6, 1961, of the Industrial Tribunal, Andhra

Analcapalla Co-opn11ti'11 Agrin1l· lural & Industrial So<iltr Ltd. v. Work"""

1962 A.11.ak.ap;u~ Go· operiltiri1 AgiiCul· tural -antf J11d11st1ial "'o1iet} Li'.'lite_d· v •. Workmen 1

Gajendragadk11r, J.

Pradesh, Hyderabad in Industrial Dispute No. 1.3 ,of 1960, I ,, •' t • 1.[1 ]r - .f Il!· i 'I . , I · ' I( I I• J,Q. JC Daphtary, .Solicitor General of , India, K. 'Sirinivasamurthi and Namiit Lal)o1•for !he a.·p' p'·e·11anf:· ' 1•· , ' 1< · · · Joi; JI IJ ,, I 1 " " . I • .. , •I '~· 1 t. j. U\ '1[1 ]'B. ·P. 11Jaheshwari; for i·espoudent No. 1 I· 11 '''i_ 'Ill Iii''' •I 111 !• ''.; J» •l I r .• • , 'J • , ... ~· ., • .. .!•.A; S. ·R. Chari/ .M: K .. Rnmarnurthy, R1ilL.Garg and 7'. S. Venkataraman. for the respondent No. ~. 1 • ·, "1962. . 1. -" · . ~ October I , , \ . . ' ~ 23. , .. '{he t ,, ·, \ .Ju~gment ' , , . "bf -- t .(l(e , '<;;ourt, was delivered,by .. · .1 .,, .. ·•1 • 1 , 1 · · , ·I , , , t• ,., I ' I • • . "· . " , . ~ GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Thc ·principal question which' ari,ses'ih'thi~. appeal has relation to t)1e·•"s'cope and'cffegt o,fs';'3~,l~ .. ~! ~\l~'. Ip.d.~?ttfal J?isputcs J1tt, ~947,(14 of.19*1) ,(hcremafter. called the A_<;t,). An industrial dispute between the appellant, Anakapa]Ja, Co·operative'Agricultnral & IndustriaL Society, and the respondents; its· workri:ieii, \vas teferrcd bv the G.9v,epio'(of;~n.4hra Prad~sh for : adjud.i~a5ion 'to .the lndusfrial,.Tnbun;,tl, Hyderabad, u!fc)~r .~. l.9(l)(d) of the Act on December 7, 1960. The r~spondents who. were ·in the employment of Vizagapillnam Sugar.and Refirirry ·Ltd:" (hereinafter ·called the Company) clain'icd that' 'tb;ey were"eriiit\ed to re-employment in .the said con~ern ~hi~h had been .. p1,1rchased by the appellant,. and since ;thein demand for. rc-emp\oyment by -the appellant•was not accepted by it, tbey ... reprc-sented to the State Governmmt that the said demand s!10uld b.e. a~jrn;iicated _upon by an Industrial T,ribu-nal. 'That 1s how their d.emand for .re-er,npfoyment cametobe~eferredimders.•lO(L)(d): . · . \• .. - .. 1 l ~J I ,.. • · ' , It appears that the Company was an old qompany.wbich manufactured SU!!,'<IL . .Its .. business, however, did not result in profits, because th,e•s.upply of sugar-cane was insufficient and the management apprehended that, it could not face the losS\'S' from year to year;, a;o.d so, it thought of, shifting its•busirie;~sto Yerravaram in East Godavari where it antici-pated that the supply of sugar-cane was asmred. This attempt of the management, however, did not succeed because of the local cane growers. The local cane growers decided to form co-opera ti vc society themselves and to purchase the concern of the Company. Accordingly, the appellant Society was formed and the sale transaction was effected between the said concern and the appellant on October 7, 1959. It was agreed between the appellant and the Company that the Company should pay retrenchment compensation to its employees and terminate their services leaving the appellant full freedom to choose its own employees. Accordingly, Rs. 1,90,000/-were paid by the Company to its employees by way of retrenchment compensation. Before the completion of this transaction, however, the employees had suggested that their Union could itself purchase the concern, but the Union could not manage to effect the proposed sale transaction. It, however, suggested that the compensation of Rs.l,90,000/- which the Company had to pay to its employees may be credited to the accour;t of the Society and the employees paid the said amount by imtalments, but this suggestion was not accepted and as result of the sale transaction, the appellant took over the concern and employed such perrnns as it needed according to the recommendations of committee appointed by the appellant in that behalf. It appears that on the rolls of the Company, there used to be 800 workmen in all ; of these 329 were permanent workmen, whereas 4 71 workmen joined the Company as seasonal workmen. The appellant has employed 678 employees in all, 248 of whom are permanent and the rest seasonal employees. Out of 248 employees who are engaged on permanent basis, 220 are from amongst the employees of the Company and about 28 have been newly appointed. In the result, about 49 permanent employees and 103

Anakapalla C•-operative Agricul· tural & lndustritl•Society LtJ. v. Workmen

Gajeniragadkar, J.

Anakapalla Co~ operative Agricv/ .. llfura: & lnduslrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen

:ajendrogadkar, J.

seasonal employees of the Company have not been absorbed by the appellant and the demand which has been referred for adjudication in the present proceed-ings is that these permanent and seasonal employees should be absorbed by the appellant.

The appellant disputed this claim on three grounds. It urged that the dispute referred to the adjudication of the Tribunal was not an industrial dispute and so, the reference was incompetent. This argument was based on the allegation that the Thummapala Sugar Workers Union which had sponsored the present demand was not representa-tive Union. On its roll, very small number of the appellant's present employees were shown as members. The bulk of its membership consisted of the previous employees of the Company. The appellant's employ-ees have formed separate Union of their own and this latter Union has not only not sponsored the present demand, but it seeks to resist it. The Tri-bunal considered the evidence bearing on this point and held that the sponsoring Union was, in law, competent to raise the present industrial dispute, and so, it rejected the appellanfs contention about the invalidity of the reference.

The next contention raised by the appellant was that it was not successor-in-interest of the Company and as such, under industrial law, the c!aim made by the respondents for re-employment of the permanent and the seasonal employees was not sustainable. The Tribunal has held that the appe-llant is successor-in-interest of the Company and so, it has come to the conclusion that the demand for re-employment of the said specified employees was permissible under the industrial law.

The last argument raised by the appellant was that it had ali-eady employed full complement of the labour force that it needed and so, there was no

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

scope for the re-employment of any of the workmen on whose behalf the present dispute was raised. Th!s contention has been rejected by the Tribunal and It has ordered the appellant to re-employ as many of the permanent employees out of 49 as were left out in favour of the new employees and to re-employ the remaining permanent employees as and when vaca~­cies occur. In regard to the seasonal employees, it made similar direction. This order requires the appellant to 1;uarantee to the re-employed workmen continuity of service and one-fourth of the back waircs. The Tribunal has, however, held that if the Society has employed less workers, then only as many old workers should be reinstated as the new workers appointed in their place. In that case, the old workers will be absorbed in the order of seniority. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this' Court by special leave.

The first question which falls to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant is successor-in-interest of the Company. The learned Solicitor-General contends that the agreement of sale under which the appellant has arrived on the scene, clearly shows that it cannot be treated as successor-in-intcrcst of ths Company. The terms of the agreement of sale show that the appellant has left with the Company pare of its land, its investments to the tune of Rs. 19 lakhs and its liability to the tune of Rs. 27 lakhs. 4,000 bags of processed sugar have also been left with the Company at the time of the transaction. Clause 8 of the agreement :·rovides that the Company will be entitled to withdraw and appropriate to itself all advances, part payments and deposits made by it either in cash or security and the Society shall have no right over them. Clause 13 similarly provides that the Company will pay all its liabilities, secured and unsecured, determined or to be ·determined and the Society will not be liable to pay the same. Under cl. 11, the godown in which the stocks of sugar were

Anakapal't: Co-o.berative Agricul-tu1al ar.d lndust1fol Soc;etv Ltd. v. lVorkmen

Gajendragadkar, J.

Anakapalla Co-o fleratiw Agrieul .. lural and Industrial SocUty ltd. v. Workmen Gajendragtitlkar, J.

stored was to continue in the possession of the Company free of rent or compensation until the entire stock was released, sold and delivered. The C-1mpany had also agreed to terminate the services of its emp-loyees on or before October 9, 1959, and cl. 7 which deals with this topic, has provided that whatever claims are to be paid to such employees on account of such termination will be paid by the Company. The appellant has also not purchased the goodwill of the Company. The argument, therefore, is that though the work of the Company was, in sense, going concern when it was purchased by the appe-llant, the appc:lant had not purchased the entire concern including the goodwill; and so, it would be inappropriate to describe the appellant as the succcsscr-in-intcrcst of the Company.In support of his argument, the learned Solicitor-Genera l has relied on the decision of the Labour Appellant Tribunal in the case of Ramji/,al 1Yathulal v. liinmbhcii Jfilfo Compcmy Ltd. ([1]). In that case, the Appellate Tribunal had to consider the effect of two transfers: (1) in favour of the Himabhai Mills Company Ltd., and(~) in fav<iur of the New Gujarat Cotton Mills Company Ltd. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal was that the first transfer did not make the transferee successor-ii1·intcrcst, where-as the second one did. In regard to the first transfer, it was found that the transferee Company had not purchased the transferor Company as going concern and had not accepted any liabilities of the old Company and had started completely new business of its own. On the other hand, under the second transfer, the transferee had purchased not only all the tangible assets of the old Company, but the good-will which was expressly valued in the sale-deed at very large sum of Rs. 3 lakhs. It was also found that the transferee Company carried on the same business as the transferor Company in the result, the employees of the transferor Company in the first (I) (1956) II L. L.J. 244.

transaction were held not entitled to make claim for re-employment by the transferee Company, whereas claim made by the employees of the transferor Company in regard to the second transfer "Yas he~d. to be sustainable in law. It appears that this decJSJon was challenged by writ petition before tlie Bombay High Court, and the High Court took the view that in view of the relevant findings recorded by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in respect of the transfer in favour of the New Gujarat Cotton Mills Ltd., there would be no justification to interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution, vide New Gujarat Cotton .lit ills Ltd. v. Labour Tribunal(1).

ThG lea.rned Solicitor-General has also referred to another decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Antony D'Souza v. Sri Motichand Silk Mills('). The question which fell for the decision of the Appellate Tribunal in that case was whether the purchaser could be said to be successor-in-interest within the meaning of s. 114 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and it was held tliat the purchaser was not successor-in-interest, because the transaction was purchase of only plant, machinery and accesso-ries and not of going concern or running business. We ought, however, to add that the decision in this case was substantially, if not entirely, based on the fact that the workmen of the transferor Company had executed document in which specific and unambi-guous demands had been made which supported the purchaser's claim that the transfer did not make the purchaser successor-in-interest of the vendor. This question was sought to be raised before this Court in the case of Workmen of Dahingeapara Te,a Estate v. Dahingeapara Tw Estute(') as well as in the case of Keys Constructions Go. (Private) Ltd. v. Its Work-men('), but on both the occasions, the Court tliought it unnecessary to decide it.

. The question as to whether purchaser of an indu-strial concern can be held to be successor-in-interest

I I) 1957 II l . L. J. 194.

(2) (1954) IL. L.J. 793.

(3) A. I. R. (!958J, S. C. 1026.

(4) A. I. R. (1959) S, C. 208.

Anaka;.11 o .. op,,.ati.. Agricul-turdl and Jntlustrial Soci417 Lt'. v. Workmen

G•jenira1at!k•r, J.

A1wka/Jalla Co-operative A!:rilul-tu•o.l and Industrial Society Limited v.

lV01kmtn

Gajtt11!ragudkar, J.

of the vendor will have to be decided on consideration of several relevant facts. Did the purchaser pure.base the whole of the business ? Was the business purchased going concern at the time of the sale transaction ? Is the business purchased carried on at the same place as before ? Is the business carried on without substantial break in time ? Is the business carried on by the purchaser the same or similar to the business in the hands of the vendor ? If there has been break in the con· tinuity of the business, what is the nature of the break and what were the reasons responsible for it? What is tl_le length of the break ? Has goodwill been purchased ? Is the purchase only of some parts and the purchaser having purchased the said parts purchased some other new parts and started busi-ness of his own which is not the same as the old business but is similar to it ? These and all other relevant factors have to be borne in mind in decid· ing the question as to whether the purchaser can be said to be successor-in-interest of the vendor for the purpose of industrial adjudication. It is hardly necessary to emphasise in this connection that though all the facts to which we have referred by way of illustration arc relevant, it would be unreasonable to exaggerate the importance of any one of these facts or to adopt the inflexible rule that the presence or absence of any one of them is decisive of the matter one way or the other. If industrial adjudica-tion were to insist that purchaser must purchase the whole of the property of the vendor concern before he can be regarded as successor-in-interest, it is quite likely that just an insignificant portion of the property may not be the subject-matter of the conveyance and it may be urged that the exclusion of the said fraction precludes industrial adjudication from treating the purchaser as successor-in-interest. Such plea, however, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that in deciding 'this question, industrial adjudication will look at the subsklnce of the matter

and not be guided solely by the form of the transfer. What we have said about the entirety of the property belonging to the vendor concern, will apply also to the goodwill which is an intangible asset of any industrial concern. If goodwill along with the rest of the tan()'ible property has been sold, that would strongly support the plea that the purchaser is _a successor-in-interest; but it does not follow that if goodwill has not been sold, that alone will necessarily show that the transferee is not successor-in-interest. The decision of the question must ultimately depend upon the evaluation of all the relevant factors and it cannot be reached by treating any one of them as of over·nding or conclusive significance.It is in the light of this legal position that til<C question about the character of the appellant vis-a-vis the vmdor company has to be judged. It would be recalled that the vendor company sold the concern to the appellant because it was faced with the pro-blem of recurring losses, and so, the appellant, in purchasing the concern, was not prepared to have both the advances and the outstandings included in the sale transaction. The appellant Society has been formed by the local cane growers with the object of manufacturing sugar which would suit each one of them in turn and so, the purchaser was not particularly interested in including the goodwill of the Company ill the sale transaction. The exclusion of 4,000 bags of processed sugar shows that the purchaser wanted to accommodate the Company m.that '!latter. On t~1e other hand, the appellant has earned. on the busmess of the Company without ~n appreciable break; the business thus carried on Is t?e sa_me as that of the Company, the place of ?us1~ess is the same, and. the very object of enter-mg mto the sale transaction was to enable the local ~ane growers to carr~ on.the business of the Company. fherefore, we arc mclmed to take the view that having regard to all the relevant facts in this case,

Anaka/Jalla Co-operativ~ !;rinil-tural 11nd Jmiu>lrial Soc-'ety Limited v.

lVorkmtn

Cajendragad,~- a· . .f,

Anakapalla Co-operative Agricul-tural & Industrial

Sodety Ltd. v.

Workmen

Gajendragadkar, J.

the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the cO'll-clusion that the appellant is successor-in-interest of the Company.

That takes us to the question as to what would be the nature of the appellant's liability to the employees of the Company. Before s. 25-FF was introduced in the Act in 1956, this question was considered by industrial adjudication on general considerations of fairplay and social justice .. In all cases where the employees of the transferor concern claimed re-employment at the hands of the transferee ooncern, industrial adjudication first enquired into the question as to whether the transferee concern could be said to be successor-in-interest of the transferor concern. If the answer was that the transferee was successor-in-interest in business, then industrial adjudication considered the question of re-employment in the light of broad principles. It enquired whether the refusal of the successor to give re-employment to the employees of his predecessor was capricious and unjustified, or whether it was based on some reasona-ble and bonafide grounds. In some cases, it appeared that there was not enough amount of work to justify the absorption of all the previous employees; some-times the purchaser concern needed bonafide the as.sistance of better qualified and different type of workers; conceivably, in some cases, the purchaser has previous commitments for which he is answerable in the matter of employment of labour; and so, the claim of re-employment made by the employees of the vendor concern had to he weighed against the pleas made by the purchaser concern for not employ-ing the said emplovees and the problem had to be resolved on generai grounds of fairplay and social justice. In such case, it was obviously impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules. Ind.eed, exp~ri­ence of industrial adjudication shows that m resol'?ng industrial disputes from case to case and from time

·to time, industrial adjudication generally avoids- as it should-to lay down inflexible rules because it is of the essence of industrial adjudication that the problem should be resolved by reference to the facts in each case so as to do juotice to both the parties. It was in this spirit that industrial adjudication approached this problem until 1956 whens. 25-FF was introduced in the Act. Sometimes, the claim for re-employment was allowed, or sometimes the daim for compensa-tion was considered. But it is significant that no industrial decision has been cited before us prior to 1956 under which the employees were held entitled to compensation against the vendor employer as well as re-employment at the hands of the purchaser on the ground that it was successor-in-interest of the vendor.

It was in the background of this broad position which had evolved out of industrial adjudications that the Legislature enacted s. 25-FF on September 4, 1956. As it was then inserted, s. 25-FF read thus:-

"Notwithstanding anything contained in section 25-F, no workman shall be entitled to compensa-tion under that section by reason merely of the fact that there has been change of employers in any case where the ownership or management of the undertaking in which he is employed is t:ansferrcd, whether by a,greement or by opera-tion of law, from one employer to another :-

Provided that-

( a) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by reason of the trans for;

(b) the terms and conditions of service applica-ble to the Wdrkman after such transfer are not in any way !cos favourable to the work-man than those applicable to him immedi-ately before the transfer; and

Analcapall• Ct-oP,ratiw A.gricu[1]-tural & Industrial s~ciety Lid. v. Workmen

Gajen4r11~adkar, J.

(c) the ~mployers to whom the ownership or management of the undertaking is so transferred is, under the terms of the trans-fer or othe~ise, legally liaJ:ile to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment compensation on the basis that his servic~ has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer."

Anal-opal/a Cr>-operative AgYicul-tural & [nr/ustrial Society ltd. v. H'orkmen

Gaj,rrulrogadkar, 1.

It may be relevant to add that this section conceivably proceeded on the assumption that if the ownership of an undertaking was transferred, the cases of the employees affected by the transfer would be treated as cases of retrenchment to which s. 25-F would apply. That is why s. 25-FF begins with non-obstante clause and lays down that the change of ownership by itself will not entitle the employees to compensation, provided the three conditions of the proviso are satisfied. Prima facie, if the three conditions specified in the proviso were not satisfied, retrenchment compensation would be payable to the employees under s. 25-F; that apparently was the scheme which the Legislature had in mind when it enacted s. 25-FF in the light of the definition of the word "retrenchment" prescribed by s. 2(oo) of the Act.

The validity of this assumption was, however, successfully challenged before this Court in the case of Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A. D. Divikar('). In that case, this Court was called upon to consider the true scope and effect of the concept of retrench-ment as defined ins. 2 (oo) and it held that the said definition had to be read in the lig!it of the accepted connotation of the word, and as such, it could have no wider meaning than the ordinary connotation of the word, and according to this connotation, retrenchment means the disc!iar~e nf surplus labour or staff by the employer for any- ~eas~m whatsoever, othe~~se.than as punishment mq1cted by way o.f d1sc1plu:1;ary action, and does not mclude termmatlon of services (1) [1957) S.C.R. 121.

1 S.C.R.

of all workmen on bonalide closure of industrv or on change of ownership or management thereof. ' In other words, the effect of this decision was that though the definition of the word "retrenchment" may perhaps have included the termination of services caused by the closure of the concern or by its transfer, these two latter cases could not be held te fall under the definition because of the ordinary accepted conno-tation of the said word. This decision necessarilv meant that the word "retrenchment" in s. 25FF had to b2ar corresponding interpretation. In that case, the employees of the Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd. had made claim for retrenchment compensa-tion under s. 25-FF against the purchaser of the Railway Co., and the employees of the Shri Dinesh Mills Ltd. had made similar claim against their employer on the ground that the Mills had been closed. .These claims had been allowed by the Bombay High Court and the employers had come to this Court in appeal. This Court having held that the word "retrenchment" necessarily postulatrd th(' termination of the employees' ,services on the ground that the employees had become surplus, allowed the appeals preferred by the employers and held that the employees' claim against the purchaser in one case and <'gains! the <'mployer who had closed his business in the other, could not be sustained. Thm, as result of this decision, it was realised that if the' object of the legislature in introducing section 25-FF was to enable the employees of the transferor concern to claim retrenchment compensation unless the three conditions of the proviso to the said section were satisfied, it could not be carried out any longer. The decision of this Court in Hariprasad's case (') was pronounced on November 27, 1956.

This decision led to the promulgation of an Ordinance .No. 4 of 1957. By this Ordinance, the original s. 25-FF ~s it was inserted on September 4, 1956, was substantially altered. Section 25-FF as it (I) 11957] S.C.R. 121.

Anf1lt11/u1 la Co· operatfoe A,gri-cut1u1al and Indus-trial Society Ltd. v.

f¥01Jme11

Gajendra,o;r.dkar, J

has been enacted hy the Ordinance reads thus ;-

"Where the ownership or management of an undertaking is tr~nsferrcd, whether by agree-ment or by operat10n of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to new employer, every workman who has been in continuoµs service for not lrss than one year in that undertaking, immediately before such transfer, shall be entitled to notice and compen-sation in accordance with the provisions of s. 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched:

Anal:apalla Co-operative Agricul-tural and Indus-trial Sociaty Ltd. v. Workmen

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to workman in any case where there has been change of employers by reason of the transfer, if-

( a) the service of the workman has hot been interrupted by such tran<fer;

(b) the terms and conditions of service applica-ble to the workman after such transfer are not in any way less favourable to the work-man than those applicable to him immedi-ately before the transfer; and

( c) the new employer is, under the terms of the transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that his service has b~cn continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer."

In due course, this Ordinance was followed by Act 18of1957 on June 6, 1957. _By this Act, s. ~5-FF as it was enacted by the Ordmance has b~en mtro-duced in the parent Act. It would be.noticed that the Ordinance came into force retrospectivc;ly as from December 1, 1956, that is to say, three. days ~fter th~ judgment of this Court was pronounce'.! m Hanprasad s case(').

c11 [t957J s.c.R. 121.

1 S.C.R.

The Solicitor-General contends that the question in the present appeal has now to be determined not in the light of gener<il principles of industrial adjudi-cation, but by reference to the specific provisions of s. 25-FF _itself. He argues, and we think rightly, that the first part of the section postulates that on transfer of the ownership or management of an undertaking, the employment of workmen engaged by the said undertaking comes to an end, and it provides for the payment of compensation to the said employees because of the said termination of their services, provided, of course, they satisfied the test of the length of service rrescribed by the section. The said part further provides the manner in which and the extent to which the said compensation has to be paid. Workmen shall be entitled to notice and I compensation in atcordance with the provisions of : s. 25-F, says the section_. as if they had been retrench-ed. The last clause clearly brings out the fact that the termination of the services of the employees does not , in law amount to retrenchment and that is consistent with the decision of this Court in Hariprasad' s case('). Tfie Legislature, however, wanted to pro-vide that though such termination may not be retrenchment technically so-called, as decided by this Court, nevertheless the employees in question whose services are terminated by the transfer of the under-·, taking should be entitled to compensation, and so,\ s. 25-FF provides that on such termination compensa- , tion would be paid to them as if the said termination was retrenchment. The words "as if" bring out the legal distinction between retrenchment defined by s. 2(oo) as it was interpreted by this Court and termination of services consequent upon transfer with which it deals. In other words, the section provides that though termination of services on transfer may not be retrenchment, the workmen concerned are entitled to compe11sation as if the said termination was retrenchment. This provision has been made for the purpose of calculating th<' amount (1) (1957] S.C.R. 121.

An«kapalia Co-operative Ag1 icu/ tural arid lndUJtri.. SocUi-, Ltd.

v. tt'orkmen

Gajendrogodkar, ~

1962 An.U;.114 Cc· •/>l'•liDI iltricul-tural & l•J.strial s .. ;.,, Lid. •• Wiri'""' Sajmdragadkar, J.

of compensation payable to such workmen; rather than.provide for the measure of compensation over again, s. 25-FF makes reference to s. 25-F for that limited purpose, and, therefore, in all cases to which· s.25-FF applies, the only claim which the employees of the transferred concern can legitimately make is a: claim for compensation against their employers. No claim can be made against the transferee of the said concern.

The scheme of the proviso to s. 25-FF em-phasises the same policy. If the three conditions specified ·in the proviso are satisfied, there is no termination of service either in fact or in law, and so, there is no scope for the payment of any com-pensation. That is the effect of the proviso. There-fore, reading section 25-FF as whole, it does appear that unless the transfer falls under the proviso, the employees of the transferred concern are entitled to claim compensation against the transferor and they cannot make any claim for re-employment against the transferee of the undertaking. Thus, the effect of the enactment of s.25· FF is to restore the position which the Legislature had apparently in mind when s. 25· FF was originally enacted on September 4, 1956. By amending s. 25-FF, the Legislature has made it clear that if industrial undertakings are transferred, the em.ployees of such transferred under· takings should be entitled to compensation, unless, of course, the continuity in their service or employment is not disturbed and that can happen if the transfer satisfies the three requirements of the proviso.

In this connection, it is necessary to point out that even before s.25-FF was introduced in the Act for the first time, when such questions were consider· ed by industrial adjudication on general grounds of fair play and social justice, it does not appear that employees of the transferred concern were held entitled to bath compensation for termination of service and immediate re-employment at the hands

of the transferee. The present position which results from the enactment of s. 25-FF, as amended, is, therefore, substantially the same as it was at the earlier stage. It is common ground that if transfer is fictitious or 'benami', s. 25-FF has no application at all. In such case, there has been no change of ownership or management and despite an apparent transfer, the transferor employer continues to be the real employer and there has to be continuity of service under the same terms and conditions of service as before and there can be no question of compensation.

Mr. Chari, however, urges that the preoent case

ought to be governed by the provisions of s. 25-H of the Act. This argument proceeds on the assump-tion that the case of termination of service resulting from the transfor of ownership or management of an undertaking to which s. 25-FF applies is case of retrenchment properly so-called. In our opinion, this assumption is clearly not well-founded. The first difficulty in accepting the correctness of this assumption is the decision of this Court in Hariprasad's case ([1]) to which we have already referred. The decison of this Court in that case clearly shows that the termination of services resulting from transfer or closure is not retrenchment, and it is on the basis of the correctness of this decision that s. 25-FF as amended has been enacted. Besides, on construction of s. 25-FF itself, it is difficult to equate the termina-tion of services with which it deals, with retrench-ment covered by s. 2u-F. As we have already in' dicated, s. 25-F is referred to in s. 25-FF to enable the assessment of compensation payable to the .;mplovees covered by s. 25-FF. The clause "as if"\ clearly shows the distinction between retrenchmen I ' under s. 2( oo) and termination of service under s. 25-FF. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of this Court in M s. Hatisingh jfanufactur-ing Go. Ltd. v. Union of India('). In that case, {I) [1957] S.C.R. 121-(2) (l!JC!)j 3 S. C.R. 528.

Anakap.l/c C.-operative .A.griculturcl and industrial Society Ltd.

v. lVorkmen

Gajet1dragitlk.ar, J,

1962 Anakapalla Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Saciety Ltd. v. Workmen G1j .. dragaJkar, J.

this Court had to consider the effect of the words "as if" occuring ins. 25-FFF, and it has been held that by the use of the words "as if the workmen had been retrenched" under the said section, the Legis-lature has not sought to place closure of an under-taking on the same footing as retrenchment under s.25-F. Therefore, the plea that s.25-H applies to the present case cannot be accepted.

Mr- Chari then argued that though in terms s. 25-H may not apply to the present case, the general principle underlying the provisions of the said section should be invoked in dealing with the claim made by the respondents against. the appellant. His argument is that too much emphasis should not be placed on the identity of the individual employer in dealing with the present question and he suggested that what is important to bear in mind is the identity of the hndertaking which was run by the vendor before and which is run by the vendee now. If the undertaking is the same, there is no reason why the workman should not be entitled to claim continuity of service in the said undertaking. In our opinion, this argument is misconceived. Once we reach the conclusion that in the case of transfer of any under-taking the Legislature has by s. 25-FF provided for payment of compensation to the employees on the clear and distinct basis that their services have been terminated by such transfer, it is difficult to see how. any questions of fair play or social justice would justify the claim by the respondents that they ought to be re-employed by the appellant. It is true that in cases falling under s. 25-F, workmen may get retrenchment compensation and they may yet be able to claim re-employment under s. 25-H and in that sense, some workmen may get both retrenchment compensation and re-employment. That is no doubt the effect of reading s. 25-F ands. 25-H together. But it must be borne in mind that in the case of retrenchment, the undertaking continues and only

I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

some workmen are discharged as surplus and it is the problem of re-employment of this small number of discharged workmen that is tackled by s. 25-H. Besides, under s. 25-H, discharged workman may not be entitled to claim re-employment immediately after retrenchment or even soon thereafter. It is only if the employer who discharged him as surplus requires additional workmen that his opportunity may occur. In the present case, however, the position is entirely different. As soon as the transfer is effected under s. 25 FF, all employees are entitled to claim compensation, unless, of course, the case of transfer falls under the· proviso ; and if Mr. Chari is right, these workmen who have been paid compensation are immediately entitled to claim re-employment from the transferee. This double benefit in the form of payment of compensation and immediate re-employ· ment cannot be said to be based on any considerations of fair play or justice. Fair play and justice obvious-ly mean fair play and social justice to both the parties. It would, we think, not be fair that the vendor should pay compensation to his employees oD the ground that the transfer brings about the termi· nation of their services, and the vendee should be asked to take them back on the ground that the principles of social justice require him to do so. In this connection, it is relevant to remember that the industrial principle underlying the award of retrench-ment compensation is, as observed by this Court in the case of The Indian Jlunie Pipe Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen (1), "to give partial protection to workmen who are thrown out of employment for no fault of their own, to tide over the period of unemployment"; and in that sense, the said compensation is distinguish· able from gratuity. Therefore, if the transferor is by statute required to. pay retrenchment compensation to his workmen, it would be anomalous to suggest that the workmen who received compensation are entitled to claim immediate re-employment in the con-cern at the hands of the transferee. The contentioq

1962 Anakapalla Co· ojnrative Agricultural and fndustria/ Society Ltd. v. Workmen Gajtndragadkar, J.

(1)[1960)2. S. Q, R, 32.

: l ' '

Anakapalla Co-tierative Agricultural and Industrial Socie~y Ltd. v. lVorknun 'Jajendragi1dkar, J.

1962 Ottob1r, 24.

that in cases of this kind, the workmen must get retrenchment compensation and re-employment al-most simultaneously is inconsistent with the very basis of the concept of retrenchment compensation. We are therefore, satisfied that the general principles of social justice and fair play on which this alternative argument is based, do not justify the claim made by the respondents.

In the result, the appeal is allowed and the award is set aside. There would be no order as to costs.

Appeal allnwed.

T. V. V. NARASIMHAM AND OTHERS v.

THE STATE OF ORISSA

(S. K. DAS, K. SUBRA RAO and N, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.J.)

Estate1J Abolition-Estates recogniaed by the Governmtnt-"Recognition", meaning of-Mere inaction, if amounts to recognitiun-Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (1 of 1908), s. 3(2)\d).

The Government of Orissa, treating the villages in ques· tion as estates, issued notifications under the provisions cf the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, declaring that the said estates became vested in the State free from all encumbrancei from the dates specified therein. The inamdars of the respective \"illages challenged ~he legality of t~e notifications by filing petitions in the High Court of Onssa under~·-226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the said mams were not estates within the meaning of s. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as they were excluded from the assets