TILKAYAT SHRI GOVINDLALJI MAHARAJ versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

to-an order for possession of the premises in ques-tion. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

TILKAYAT SHRI GOVINDLALJI MAHARAJ

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

(B. P. SINHA, c. ]., P. B. GAJF.NDRAGADKAR,

K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and

j. C. SHAH, jj.)

Nnthdwara Ttmple-I'ril'Gle or public t•mple-Te<l&-Yalidity of enactment pro,.iding for proper arlministration of temple-Constitutfo'Jl,ality-~\'athdu1ara Tf'm7J/e Act, 1959 (Raja.~­than .13 of 19-W) ss. 2 (viii), .1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 16, 21, 22, 27, 28, .JO, J:i, Jr;, 37-Consfitution of India, Art•. U, 19 (1) (/), .. "5 ' -''G ) ' . ·1 I ( '') ,_ .

The history of the Nathdwara Temple in the District of Udaipur showed that Vallabha, who was the founder of the dcnominati0n known as Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya, installed the idol of Srimthji in temple and that later on his descendants built the Nathdwara Temple in I 761. The reli-gious rcputati6n of the temple grew i11 importance and several grants were made and thousands of devotees visiting the temple made ofl'erings to the temple. The succession to the Gaddi of the 'filkayat received recognition from the Rulc::rs ofMewar, but on seve1al occasions the Rulc::rs interfered whenever it was found that the affairs of the temple were not managed pre perly. In 1934 Firman was issued by the Ucfaipur Darbar, by which, inter alia, it was declared that according to the law of Udai .. pur all the property dedicated or presented to or otherwise coming to the Deity Shrinathji was property of the shrine, that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being was merely custo-dian, Manager and Trustee of the said property and that the Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to supervise that thr.

1963 Krishanl'I lshwarlnl Dtsai v. Bai Vijkor Gujendrai.Okar J.

Ja,.uary, 2J.

Ti/l;"J4l Slrn Gocin•lalji Mohiir"j v. 't•te ef Rcja.sthan

562 SUPREME COt]RT REPORTS (1964] VOL.

property dedicated to the shrine was usecl for the legitimate purposes of the shrine. The m1n1gement of the affairs by the appellant Tilkayat was not successful and it became necessary that scheme should be framed for the management of the Temple. On February 6, J 9j9, the Governor of Rajas than promulgated an Ordinance, which was in due course replaced by the Nathdwara Temple /\cl, J 9j9, The appellant challen-ged the validitv of the Act on the grounds, inter alia, that the idol of Shrinathji in the Nathd-wara Temple and all the pro-perty pertainin'?' to it were his private properties and, as such, the State Le~islature was not competent to pass the. Act, that even if the ~athdwara Temple was held to be public temple, he as Mahant or Shebait had beneficial interest in the office of the high priest as well as the properties of the temple and thaf on that footing, his rights •:nder Aris. 14, 19 (I) (f) and 31 (2} of the Constitution of India had heen contravened by the Act. It was also urged that the provisions of the Act infringed the fundamental ·rights guar.lnteed to the Denomination under Aris. 55 (I) and 26 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The question was also raised as to whether the tenel5 of the Vall-.abha denomination and its religious practices required that the worship by the devotees should be performed at the private temple and so the existence of public temples was inconsistent with the said tenets and practices.

Hdd, (I) that neither that tenet• nor the religious prac-tices uf the V41labha school necessarily postulate that the followers of the school must worship in private temple.

(2) that in view of the documentary evidence in the case it could not be held that the temple was built by the Ti!kayat of the dJ.y as hh private temple or that it still coatinues to havc·thc character of private temple; that though from the outside it had the appearance of liaveli, the majestic st~ucture inside was cohsistcnt "•ith the dignity of the idol and with the charac-ter of the temple as public temple.

(3) that an ausolule mnnarch was the fountain-head of all Jegislativo, executive and judicial p:>wcrs, that it was of the very essence of sovereignty which vested in him that he could supervise and control the administration o~ public charity, and that this principle applied as much to Hindu m:1narchs as to any other absolute mo11arch. Any order i5sued by such Ruler would have the force of law and govern the rights of the parties affected thereby: and that, accordingly, the Firman issued by the Maharana of Cdaipur in 1934 was law by which the affairs of the :\athdwara Temple were governed after its issue.

Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] I S. C.R. 9:17, relied on. ·

(4) that under the law of Udaipur the Nathdwara Temple was public temple and that the Tilkayat was no more than the Custodian, :0.fanager and Trustee of the property belonging to the temple. -

(5) that having regard to the terms of the Firman of 1934 the right claimed by the Tilkayat could not amount to right l:o property under Art. 19 (I) (f) or constitute property under .\rt. 31 (2) of the Constitution; that even if it were held that 'his right constituted right to hold property, the restrictions .imposed by the Act must be considered as reasoaable and in the interests of the public under Art. 19 (5).

Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balu.sami Ayyar, (1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 302 and the Commissioner, Hindu Rdigious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirt/ia Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [19541 S. C.R. 1005, considered.

(6) that the Art was not invalid on the ground of discri-mination under Art. 14.

Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, [1959] S. C. R. 279, relied on.

(7) that the right to mana~e the properties of temple was purely secular matter and could not be regarded as religious practice under Art. 25. (I.) or as amounting to affairs in[1 ]matters of religion under Art. 26 (b). Consequently, the Act in so far as it· provided for the inanagement of the properties of the N'athdwara Temple under the provisions of the Act, did not contravene Arts. 25 ( l) and 26 (b).

The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, [1962] IS. C.R. 333, referred to.

(8) that the expression "Law'' in Art. 26 (d) meant law passed by competent legislature and under that Article the legislature was competent to make law in regard to the ad~ ministration of the property belonging to the denominatilln and that the provisions of the Act providing for the constitution of Board to administer the property were valid.

Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, p 954) $·C.R. !Qj5, referrecl to, ·

J96J Tilkayat Sh1i Govindl1tji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan

Ti/4·11ya: Shri (;cJl"inJlilji Malaroj •• Stat1 of R1jo1th'n

(9) that the schernc envisaged by ss. 3, 4, 16, 22 and 34 of the Act 1ncrcly allo\\·ed the a<ln1inistration of the propcrtie! ef the ternple \Vhich was purely secular n1attr.r to be undertaken by the Board and that the sections were valid.

(10) that under s. 5 (2) (g) it was necessary that the members' of the Board other than the Collector of Udaipur District should not only profr.ss Hindu religion but must also belong to the P11shti Margiya \'allahhi Sampradaya; and that the proviso to s. 5 (2) (g) which enabled Collector to be statutory member of the Board even though he may not be Hindu and may not belong to the denomination, did not contravene Arts. 25 (I) and 26 (b).

(II) that the expression "affairs of the temple" ins. 16 referred only the purely secular affairs in regard to the adminis· tration of the temple and thar the section w~'s valid.

(12) that s. 30 (2) (a) in so far as it conferred on the State Government power to m.i.ke rules in re:spect of the q11ali· fications for h'>lding the oOice of the (f,'lswami, W.&! invalid.

(13) that "· 5, 7, JO, 11, 21, 27, 28, 3.i, .'l6 and 37 were valid.

C1v1r, ArrEUTt: Ji.:1t1~01crros: Civil Appeals Nos. 652, 61):1 and 71)7 of l!l62.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated

January 31, I 962, of the Rajasthan High Court in

D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. !JO of l 95!l.

AND

VICE VERSA

(b) Civil Appeals l\os. 6i>4, fi;i5 and 758

of l!l62.

Appeals from the judE(ment and order dated

January :lJ, l!l62, of the Rajasthan High Court in ·o. B. Civil Writ Petition No. :no of l!l.~!l.

VICE VERSA

(c} Civil Appeal No. ll56 of J!Hi2.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 31, 1962, of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4~ I of 1960.

(d) Writ Petition No. 74 of 1962.

Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India,

G. S. Pathak, B. B. Desai, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and B. C. Misra, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 652 of 1962) and respondent No. 1 (in C. As. Nos. 653 and 757 of 1962).

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G. C. Kasliwal Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan, M. M. Tewari, S. K. Kapur, B. R. L. Iyengar., Kan Singh, V, N. Sethi, B. R. C. K. Achar and P. D. Menon, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in C. C. A. Nos. 652 A. No. 654/62), respondents Nos. 2 and . 656/62) respondent No. 1 (in and 3 (m -C. A. No. 75'1/62), respondent No. 11 (in C. A. No. 758/62) and appellants (in C. A. Nos. 653, and 655/62). .

Sarjoo Prasad, S. B. L. Saxena and K. K. Jain, for respondents Nos. 3 to 5 (in C. A. No. 652/62) respondents Nos. 2-4 (in C. A. No. 653/62), respon-dents Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 (in C. A. No. 654/62), the Board and its members (in C. A. No. 655/62), respondents Nos. 3-12 (in C. A. No. 656/62) and the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 757 and 758 of 1962.)

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Balkrishna Acharya and M. V. Goswami, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 654/62), respondents Nos. 1-10 (in C. No. 655/62) and respondents Nos. 1-10 (in C. A. No. 758/62).

P. K. Chakravarty, for the appellant (in C. A.

No. 656/fi2).

1963 Tilkt?y•t Shri GfJointll•!fi · M[1]1haraj v. Ststa of RaJasth'J."I

1965 Tillcoyal . Silti GM1ittilolji Mah-.r6j v. S1ot1 of &j11StMn

Go1,.•••1dJc.,, J.

G. S. Pathak, B. Datta and B. P. Mahe&hwari, for the petitioner (in W. P. No. 74/62).

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, S. KaBliwal, Advocate-General for the State of Raja&· than, M. M. Tewari, S. K. Kapur, B. R. L. Iyengar, Kan Singh, Y. N. Sethi and P. D. Menon, for respondents Nos. l and 2 (in W. P. No. 74/62).

S(trjoo l'ra&ad, S. 8. L. S e:ceoo

and K. K.

Jain, for respondents Nos. 3-12 (in \V. P. No.74/62).

l!J63. January 2 I. The J u<lgment of the Court was delivered by

G.&JENDRAGADKAI!, J .-This group of seven

cross-appeals arises from three writ petitions field in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, in which the validity of the Nathdwara Temple Act, J 95!) (No. XIII of l\l."1'1) (hereinafter called the Act) has been challenged. The principal writ petition was Writ Petition No. DO of 1950; it was filed by the p~esent Tilkayat Govindlalji (hereinafter. ~ailed the T1lkayat) on February 28, 1959. That Petition chall-enged the validity of the ::\athdwara Ordinance, HJ59' (No. II of 1959) which had been issued on Ftbruary 6, 1959. Subsequently this Ordinance was repealed by the Act which, after receiving the assent of the President, came into force on March 28, 1959. Thereafter, the Tilkayat was allowed to amend his petition and after its amendment, the petition challenged the vires of the Act the provisions of which are identical with the provisions of its predecessor Ordinance. Along with this petition Writ Petition No. 310 of 1959 was filed on August l 7, 1959, by, ten petitioners who purported to act on behalf of the followers of the Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya. This petition attacked the validity of the Act on behalf of the Denomination of the followers of Vallabha. On November 3, 1960,

the third Writ Petition (No. 421 of 1960) was filed on

behalf of Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji who as direct descendant of Vallabha, set up an interest in himself in regard to the Nathdwara Temple, and as person having interest .in the said Temple, he challenged the validity of the Act. These three peti-tions were heard together by the High Court and have been dealt with by common judgment. In substance, the High Court has upheld the validity of the Act, but it has struck down as ultra vires part of the definition of 'temple' ins. 2 (viii), part ofs. 16 which refers to the affairs of the temple; s. 28, sub-ss. (2) and (3); s. 30 (2)(a); ss. 36 and 37. The petitioners as well as ·the State of Rajasthan felt aggrieved by this decision and that has given rise to the present cross-appeals. The Tilkayat has filed Appeal No. 652 of 1962, whereas the State has filed appeals Nos. 653 and 757 of 1960. These appeals arise from Writ Petition No. 90 of 1959. The Deno'!I\ination has filed Appeal No 654 of 1962, .wh€reas the State has filed Appeals Nos. 655 and 758 of l !Jo2. These appeals arise from Writ Petition No. 310 of 1059. Ghanshyamlalji whose Writ Petition '.'lo. 421of1U60 has been dismissed by the High Court on the ground that it raises disputed questions of fact which cannot be tried .u.nder Art. 226 of the Constitution, has pre-ferred Appeal No. 656 of 1962. Since Ghanshya-mlalji's petition has been dismissed in limine on the ground just indicated, it was unnecessary for the State to prefer any crms-appeal. Besides these seven appeals, in the present group has been included Writ Petition No. 74 of 1962 filed by the Tilkayat in this Court under Art. 32. By the said writ petition the Tilkayat has challenged the vires of the Act on some additional grounds. That is how the principal point which arises for our decision in this group is in regard to the Constitutional validity of the Act.

At this stage, it is relevant to indicate broadly the contentions raised ·by the parties before the High

'Tiikayat Shri Gtnimdlo{ji MtthtJ.ruj · v. State tJj R!ljaslhan GtJjen(ragadkar~ J,

7ilb)IGI MN Gooittilolji MeMr•j •• S1411 oJ R<j11Stiln G~1nbo1""'4r, J.

Court and the conclusions of the High Court dn the points in controversy. The Tilkayat contended that the idol of Shri Shrinathji in the Nathdwara Temple and all the property pertaining to it were his private properties and as such, the State Legis· lature was not competent to pass the Act. In the alternative, it was urged that even if the Nathdwara Temple is held to be public temple and the Tilkayat the Mahant or She bait. in charge of it, as such Mahant or Shebait he had beneficial interest in the office of the high priest as well as the properties of the temple and it is on that footing that the validity of the Act was challenged under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Incidentally the argument for the Tilkayat was that the idols of Shri Navnit Priyaji and Shri Madan Mohanlalji were his private idols and the property pertaining to them was in any ca~e not the property in which the public co.uld be ~aid to be interested. The Denomination substantially supported the Tilkayat's case. In addition, it urged that if the temple was held to be public temple, then the Act would be invalid because it contravened the fundamental rights guaranteed to the denomina-tion under Art. 25 (l) and Art. 26 (b) and (c) of the Constitution. Ghanshyamlalji pleaded title in him-self and challenged the validity of the Act on the ground that it contravened his rights under Art. 19 (l) (f).

On the other hand, the State of Rajasthan

urged that the Nathdwara Temple was public temple and the Tilkayat was no more and no better than its manager. As such, he had no substantial bene-fical interest in the property of the temfle. The con-tention that the Tilkayat's fundamenta rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) have been contravened by the Act was denied; and the plea of the Denomination that the fundamental rights guaranteed to it under Arts. 25 (1) and 26 (b) and (c) had been infringed was also dispu· ted. It was urged that the law was prefectly valid and

1 S.d.R.

did no more than regulate the administration of the property of the temple as contemplated by Art. 26 (c) of the Constitution. The Tilkayat's claim that the two idols of Navnit Priyaji and Madan Mohanlalji were his private idols was also challenged. Against Ghanshyamlalji's petition, it was urged that it raised several disputed questions of fact wpich could not be appropriately tried in proceedings under Art. 226.

The High Court has upheld the plea raised by the State against the competence of Ghanshyamlalji's petition. We 'Ought to add that the State had con-tended that the Tilkayat's case about the character of the temple was also mixed question of fact and law and so, it could not be properly tried in writ proceedings .. The High Court,. however, he)d t.hat it would be inexpedient to adopt .a technical attitq.de in this matter and it allowed the merits of the dispute to be tried before it on the assurance given by the learned counsel appearing for the Tilkayat that the character of the property should be dealt with on the documentary evidence adduced by him. Considering the documentary evidence, the High Court came to the conclusion that the temple is public temple. -It examined the several Firmans and Sanads on which- reliance was placed by the Tilkayat and it thought that the said grants supported the plea of the State that the temple was not the private temple of the Tilkayat. It has, however, found that the Tilkayat is spiritual head of the Denomination as well as the spiritual head of the temple of Shrinathji. He alone is entitled to perform 'Seva' and the other religious functions of the temple. In its opinion, the two minior idols of Navnit Priyaji and Madan Mohanlalji were the private idols of the Tilkayat and so, that part of the definition which included them within the temple of Shrinathji was struck down as invalid. In this connection, the High Court has very strongly relied on the Firman issued by the Maharana ofUdaipur on December 31, 1934, and it

IJ63 Ti/U;>., Mri G<Wini/o(j i M•h•aj v. Stale tJj &jastlum G•j•nirq•lklr, J.

TilU,1<ll Slrti Gocit1llc1ji M•"-1tt•j v. Sl•t1 ef Raj1111Mn G•i""'8&•4"r, J.

has observed that this Firman clearly established the fact that the temple was public temple, that the Tilkaya twas 110 more than Custodian, :-.fan ager and Trustee of the property belonging to the temple and that the State had the absolute right to supervise that the property dedicated to the shrine was used for legitimate purposes of the shrine. Havin~ found that the Tilkayat was the head of the denommation and the head priest of the temple, the High Court conceded in his favour the right of resi· dence, the right to distribute Prasad and the right to conduct or supervise the worship and the perfor-mance of the Seva in the temple. In the light of these rights the High Court held that the Tilkayat had beneficial interest in the properties of the temple and as such, was entitled to contend that the said rights were protected under Art. 19 (1) (f) and could not be contravened by the Legislature. The High Court then examined the relevant provisions of the Act and held that, on the whole, the major operative provisions of the Act did not contravene the fundamental rights of the Tilkayat under Art. 19 (I) (f); ss. 16, s. 28, sub-ss. (2) and (3), s. 30 (2) (a), ss. 36 & 3i, however, did contravene the Tilkayat's fundamental rights acccording to the High Court, and so, the said sections and the part of the definition of 'temple' ins. 2 (viii) were struck down by the High Court as ultra vire,,. The plea that the fundamental rights under Art. 25 (I) and Art. 26 (b) and (c) were contraveneisd did not appeal to the High Court to be well-founded. In the result, the substantial part of the Act has been held to be valid. It appears that before the High Court plea was raised by the Tilkayat that his rights under Arts. 14 and 31 (2) had been contravened by the Act. These pleas have been rejected by the High Court and they have been more particularly and specifically urged before us by the Tilkayat in his Writ Petition No. i4 of 1962. That, in brief, is the

nature of the findings recorded by the High Court in the three writ petitions filed before it.

T.tkayaJ Shri GninJl,lji Mc/Ju6} •• State •f R4;..sthan

Before dealing with the merits of tte present dispute, it is necessary to set out brie!ly the historical background of the temple of Shrinathji at Nathdwara and the incidents in ·relation to the management of its properties which ultimately led to the Act. The temple of Shrinathji at Nathdwara holds very high place among the Hindu temples in this country and is looked upon with great reverence by the Hindus in general and the Vaishna v followers of Vallabha in particular. As in the case of other ancient revered Hindu temples, so in the case of the Shrinathji temple ' at.Nathdwara, mythology has woven an attractive . web about the genesis of its construction at Nathdwara. Part of it may be history and part may be fiction, but the story is handed down from gene· ration 10 generation of devotees and is believed by_ all of them to be true. This temple is visited by thous.;.1ds of Hindu devotees in general and by the followers of the Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya in parti-cular. The followers of Vallabha who constitute denomination are popularly known as such. The denomination was founded by Vallabha (1479-1531 A. D.)* He was the son of· Tailanga Brahmin named Lakshmana Bhatt. On one occasion, Lakshmana Bhatt had gone on pilgrimage to Banaras with his wife Elamagara. On the way, she gave birth ta sori in 1479 A. D. That son was known as Vallabha. It is said that God Gopala Krishna manifested himself to Vallahha on the Govardhana Hill by the name of Devadamana, also known as Shrinathji. Vallabha saw the vision in his dream and he was commanded by God Gopala Krishna to erect shrine for Him and to propagate amongst his followers the cult of worshipping Him in order to obtain salvation ('). Vallabha then went to the hill and he found the image corresponding to the vision which he had seen in this dream. Soon thereafter, he got small

*Some ~cholar~ think that \[7]alfo.hha ,\·a<i born in 1473 A:D .. vide The Cultural Heritage ol India vol. Ill at p. 347.

(1) Bhandarkar on 'Vaishnavism, S'aivi!m & Minor Religious aystem.s at p; 77,

'63 TiLll!J•I · SliTi G1r:'.rr,/lclji MaltsrtJi . v. Slatt ef N•j&Jtlre

572 SUPllMi COURT REPORTS [1964'] VOL.

temple built at Giriraj and-installed the image in the said temple. It is believed that this happened in i500 A. .. devotee named Ramdas Chowdhri was entrusted with the task of serving in the temple . Later on, rich merchant named Pooranmal was asked by Govardhannathji to build big temple for him. The building of the temple took as many as 20 years and when it was completed, the Image was installed there by Vallabha himself and he enga1'ed Bengali Brahmins as priests ~n the said temple, (' ).

In course of time, Vallabha was succeeded by his son Vithaltiathji who was both in learning and in saintly character worthy son of worthy father. Vithalnath had great organising capacity and his work was actuated by missionary zeal. In the denomination, Vallabha is described as Acharya or Maha Prabhuji and Vithalnath is described as Gosain or Goswamin. It is said that Vithalnath removed the idol of St.rinathji to another temple which had been built by him. It is not known whether any idol was installed in the earlier temple. Vithalnath lived during the period of Akbar when the political atmosphere in the c;ountry in Northern India was actuated by spirit of tolerance. It appears that Akbar heard about the saintly reputation of Vithal-nath and issued Firman granting land in Mowza of Jatipura to Vithalnathji in order to build building11, gardens, cowsheds and workshops for the temple of Govardhannathji. This Firman was issued. in 1693 A. D. Later, Emperor Shahajahan also issued another Firman on October 2, 163 3, which shows that some land was being ranted by the Emperor for the use and expenses o Thakurdwara exempt from payment of dues.Goswami Vithalnath had seven sons. The tradi· tion of the denomination believes that besides the idol of Shrinathji Vithalnathji received from his father (I) .Bliai M1nilal 0. Porekh'a 'A Religion of Grace',

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

seven other idols which were also "Swaroops" (mani· festations) of Lord Krishna. Before his death, Vithal· nathji entrusted the principal idol of Shrinathji, to his eldest son Girdharji and the other idols were given over to each one of his other sons. These brothers in turn founded separate shrines at various places which are also held by the members of the denomi·

nation in high esteem and reverence. .

When Aurangzeb came on the throne, the genial atmosphere of tolerance disappeared and the Hindu temples were exposed to risk and danger of Aurangzeb's intolerant and bigoted activities. Col. Todd in the first volume of his 'Annals of Rajasthan' at p. 451 says that "when Aurangzeb prescribed Kanaya and rendered his shrines impure throughout Vrij, Rana Raj Singh offered the heads of one hundred thousand Rajpoots for his service, and the God was conducted by the route of Kotah and Rampoora to M~war. An omen decided the spot of his future residence. As he journeyed to gain the capital of the Sessodias, the chariot-wheel sunk deep into the earth and defied extrication; upon which the Sookuni (augur) interpreted the pleasure of the deity that he desired to dwell there. This circumstance occurred at an inconsiderable village called Siarh, in the fief of Dailwara, one of the sixteen nobles of Mewar. Rejoiced at this decided manifestation of favour, the chief hastened to make perpetual gift of the village and its lands which was speedily confirmed by the patent of the Rana. Nathji (the god) was removed from his car, and in due time tempte was erected for his reception, when the hamlet of Siarh became the town of Nathdwara. This happened about 1671 A. D." This according ·to the tradition, is the genesis of the construction of the temple at Nathdwara. Since then, the religious reputation of the temple has ~rown by leaps and bounds and to-day it can legitimately claim to be one of the few leading religious temples of the Hindus. Several

Tilkayat Shri Gouirua.Jji Maharaj v. Stat1 of Rajastltan

T1U·•yol Shri Go; in1/,;/ji Mahar"J v. S141t of R1Jja.sthari Cajtnb~11dkar, J.

grants were made and thousands of devotees visiting the temple in reverence made offerings to the temple almost everyday throughout the year. No wonder that the tern pie has now become one of the richest religious institutions in the country.

The succession to the Gaddi of the Tilkayat has, from the beginning, been governed by the rule ot Primogeniture. This succession received recogni· tion from the rulers of Mewar from time to time. It appears that in 1813 A. D. Tilkayat Govindlalji was adopted by the widow of Tilkayat Damodarji and the ruler of .l\lewar recognised the said adoption. Later, the relations between the ruler of Mewar and the Tilkayat were strained during the time of Tilkayat Girdharlalji. It seems that the Tilkayat was not content with the position of spiritual leader of the denomination but he began to claim special secular rights, and when the Darbar of Udaipur placed the vilhges hdonginc; to the Nathdwara Temple under attacl1mcnt, protest was made by the members of the denomination on behalf of the Tilkayat. It was as result of this strained relation· ship between the Darbar and the Tilkayat that in 1876 Tilkayat Girdharlalji was deposed and was deported from Nathdwara by the or<ler passed by the Ran11 of Mewar on May 8, l SiG ...... The reason given for this drastic step was that the Tilkayat disobeyed the orders of the ruling authority and so, could not be allowed to function as such. In place of the deposed Tilkayat, his son Gordhanlalji was appointed as Tilkayat. Girdharialji then went to Bombay and litigation started between him and his Tilkayat son in respect of e>;tensive properties in Bombay. Girdharlalji claimed the properties as his own where-as his Tilkayat son urged that the fact that Girdharlalji had been deposed by the Rana of Udaipur showed that the properties no longer vested in him. ft appears that the Bombay High Court · consistently took the view that the order passed by

the Rana ofUdaipur on May 8, 1876, was an act of foreign State and did not effect his right to property in Bombay. It was observed that Girdharlalji was regarded as owner of the property, he had not lost his right as such to the said property in consequence of his deposition, and if he was merely trustee, he had not been removed from his office by any competent Tribunal vide Nanabai v. Shriman Goswami Girdharji ([1]). Goswami Shri Girdharji Maharaj Shri Govindraiji J11aharaj Tilkayat v. Madhowdas Premji and Goswami Shri Govardhanlalji Girdharji Maharaj (') and Shriman Goswami Shri 108 Shri Govardhanlalji Girdharlalji v. Goswami Shri Girdharlalji Govindrajji ([3]). So f<ir as the N athd wara temple and the properties situated in Mewar were concerned, the Tilkayat Gordhanlalji who had been appointed by the Rana of Udaipur continued to be in possession and management of the same. ·

Unfortunately, in 1933, another occasion arose when the Rana of Udaipur had to take drastic action. After the death of Goverdhanlalji on September 21, 1933, his grand son Damodarlalji became the Tilkayat. His conduct. however, showed that he did not deserve to be spiritual leader of the deno-mination and could not be left in charge of the religious affairs of the Shrinathji temple at Nathdwara. That is why on October 10, 1933, he wa5 deposed and his son Govindlalji, the present Tilkayat, was appointed the Tilkayat of the temple. Before adopting this course, the Rana had given ample opportunities to Damodarlalji to improve his conduct, but despite the promises made by him D.imodarlalji persisted in the course of behaviour which he had adopted and so, the Darbar was left with no othar alternatiye but to depose him. That is how the present Tilkayat's regime began even during the lifetime of his father.

(l] 12 Bom. 351.

(2) 17 Bom. 600.

(3) 17 Bom, 620

1963 Tilka,.vet !>hri .t Guvindla/j • Maharaj y, Stat(of Rqjast""' G•j1ntlragadlrar, J.

1163_ ..

1iik.,.t . SJ ri G1Wti/(llji MllltlTaj ••

Sim of ~stM•

As on the occasion of the deposition of Girdharlalji in 1833, so on the occa~ion of the depo· sition of Damodarlalji, litigation followed in respect of Bombay properties. On January 6, 1934, Damodarlalji filed suit in the Bombay High Court (No. 23 of 1934) against the Tilkayat and other persons representing the denomination, In this suit, he claimed declaration that he was entitled to and had become the owner of all the properties mentioned in the plaint and that he was the owner of all the rights, presents, offerings, and emoluments arising in and accruing-from the ownership of the idols, Shrinathji and Shri Navnit Priyaji as well a~ his position as the Tilkayat Maliaraj in due course of his succession. J,1 the said suit. the idols of Shrinathji arid Shri Navnit Priyaji were added as defendants. At. that time, the Tilkayat was minor. Written statements were filed on his behalf and on behalf of the two idols. counter claim was preferred on behalf M the idol< tkll t[1]1c properties belonged to them. Subsequently, the suit filed by Damodarlalji was withdrawn; but the counterclaim made by the idols was referred to the sole arbitration and final determination of Sir Chimanlal H. Setalvad, lead-ing Advocate of the Bombay High Court. On April 10, 1942, the arbitrator made his award and in due course, decree was passed in terms of the said award on September 8, l!l42. This decree pro-vided that all the properties, movable, and immovable, and all offerings and Bhents donated to the idol of Shri11athj i or for its worship or benefit belonged to the said idol, whereas properties donated, dedicated or offered to the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being, or at the Krishna Bhandar Pedhis if donated, dedicated 0r offered for the worship or benefit of the idol belong-ed to the said idol. It also provided that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being in actual charge at Nathdwara is entitled to hold, use and manage the "properties of the said idol according to the

usage of the Vallabhi Sampradaya." The said award and the decree which followed in terms of it were naturally confined to the properties in the territories which then comprised British India and did not include any properties in the territories ·which then formed part of princely Indla or Native States as they were then known. Meanwhile, after Damodarlalji was deposed and his son Govindlalji was appointed the Tilkayat, the Rana of Udaipur issued Firman on Decem· ber 31, 1934. By this Firman it was laid down that the shrine of Shrinathji had always been and was religious institution for the followers of the Vaishnavas Sampradayak and all the properties offered at the shrine were the property of th,e si)rine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj was merely Custo· dian,. Manager and Trustee. of the said proprrty for the shrine. It also provided that the Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to supervise that the property dedicated _to the shrine is used for legitimate purpose of the shrine. It also made· certain oth« provisions to which we shall have occasion to return later.

1969 'Iilk"Jll( Shri OoDlnll•U i Ma/uJtqj , y. ' . Slalt •/ R4/dl"'°" O•J••1•.·1 ---

When he was appointed the Tilkayat, Qovindlalji was minor and so, the management of the temple and the property remained with the Court ol Wards, till April 1, 1948. On that date, the management of the Court of Wards was withdrawn and the charge of the property was handed over .. to the Tilkayat. It appears that the ·management of affairs by the Tilkayat was not very liappy or successful and the estate faced financial difficulties. In order to meet this difficult situation the T~lkayat appointed ·committee of management. corisisting of 12 members belonging to the denomination some time in 19.52. This wii.~ followed .by another commi· ttee of 21 ·members appointed ori June II, i953 • .. Whil,t this• latter committee' was In Charge of the

r.u.,., SArl GoWulloffe M.Uqj ' •. Slelef ~llltMn ~"'"""· /,

management, some valuables stored and locked in the room in the premises of the Temple of Shrinathji were removed by the Tilkayat in December, 1957. This news created excitement amongst the members of the public in general and the followers of the denomina-tion in particular, and so, the Rajasthan Government appointed Commission of Enquiry. In the preamble to the notification by which the Commission of Enquiry was appointed, it was stated that the State of Ra jasthan as the successor of the covenanting State of Mewar had special responsibility to supervise that the endowments and properties dedicated to .the shrine are safeguarded and used for the legitimate pur~es of the shrine. The Commission of the Enquiry made its report on October II, 1959. This report passed severe strictures against the conduct of the Tilkayat. At this stage, we ought to add that the dispute between the Tilkayat and the Rajasthan Government as to the ownership of the valuable articles removed from the temple was later referred to the sole arbitration of Mr. Mahajan, the retired Chief Justi.ce of this Court. The arbitrator made his award on September 12, 1961, and held that except in regard to the items specified by him in his award, the rest of the property belonged to the Tilkayat; and he found that when the Tilkayat removed the properties, he believed that they were his persona 1 properties.

It was in the background of these events that

the State of Rajasthan thought it necessary that scheme should be drafted for the .nauagement of the Temple and this proposal received the approval of the 'J'.ilkayat. In order to give effect to this proposal· it was agreed between the parties that suit under, s. 92, Code of Civil Procedure. should be filed in the· Court of the District Judge at Udaipur. The parte then thought that the suit would be non-contentious and would speedily end in scheme of ma:i8ea r ment being drafted with the consent of parties

Accordingly, suit No. 1 of 1956 was filed in the Dis-trict Court at Udaipur, and in accordance with the agreement which he had reached with the authorities, the Tilkayat filed non contentious written statement. However, before the suit could make any appreciable progress, Ghanshyamlalji and Baba Raj vi, the son of Tilkayat, applied to be made parties to the suit and it became clear that these added parties desired to raise contention~ in the suit and that entirely changed the complexion of the litigation. It was then obvious that the litigation wou Id be long-drawn out affair and the object of evolving satisfactory scheme ~or the management of the affairs of the temple would not be achieved until the litigation went through protracted course.It was under these circumstances that the Governor of Rajasthan promulgated an Ordinance called the Nathdwara Ordinance, J959 '(No. II of 1959) on February 6, 19J9. The Tilkayat immediately filed his Writ Petition No. 90 of 1959 challenging the validity of the said Ordinance. The Ordinance was in due course replaced by Act 13 of 1959 and the Tilkayat was allowed to amend his original writ petition so as to challenge the vires of tI.e Act. Shortly stat ~d, this is the historical background of the present dispute.

The first question which calls for our decision is whether the tenets of the Valla bh denomination and its religious practices postulate and require that the worship by the devotees should be performed at the private temple owned and managed by the Tilkayat, and so, the existence of public temples is inconsistent with the said tenets and practices. In support of this argument, the learned Attorney-General has placed strong reliance on the observa-dons made by Dr. Bhandarkar in his work on Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems, ti 80. In the section dealing with Vallabh and his

1963 Tiltayat jhri Goviruilolji Maharaj v, State of RajtJJth!ln. Gqjendra.fadkar, J,

r.u., .. ~ri GoriNlloJji MalatJroj Y. S1a11 •I R~"'tli.n CojlodrU"dlar, J.

1>80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL"

school; the learned Doctor has incidentally observed that the Gurus of this sect ordinarily called Maharajs are descendants of the seven sons of Vithalesa. Each GiJru has temple of his own, and there are no public places of worship. He has also added that the mfluence exercised by Vallabh and his successors over their adherents is kept up by the fact that God cannot be worshipped indcpendenily in public place of worship, but in the house and temple of the Guru or the Maharaj which, therefore, has to be regularly visited by the devotees with offerings. These temples are generally described as Havelis and the argument is that the said description also brings out the fact that the temples are private temples owned by the Tilkayat of the day. It· is true that the observations made by Dr. Bhandarkar lend support to the contention raised before us by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the Tilkayat, but if the discussion contained in Dr. Bhandarkar's work in the section dealing with Vallabh is considered as whole, it would be clear that these observations are incidental and cannot be tak~n to indicate the learned Doctor's conclusions after careful exami-nation of all the relevant considerations bearing on the point. Since, however, these .observations are in favour of the plea raised by the Tilkayat, it is nece-ssary very briefly to enquire whether there is any-thing in the tenets or the religious practices of this denomination which justifies the claim made by the learned Attorney-General.

What then is the nature of the philosophical doctrines of Vallabh? According to Dr. Radha Krishnan ('), Vallabh accepts the authority not only of the Upanishads, the Bha~vad ·git and the Brahma Sutras, but also of the Bhagavata Purana. In his works, Anubhasya, Siddhantarahasya and Bhagavata-Tikasubodhini, he offers theistic interpretation of the Vedanta, which differs from those of Sankara and Ramanuja. His view is called Suddhadvaita, or (I) ''Indian PhiloJOpby" by Dr. Radba Krishnan, pp. 756 •nd 758.

pure non·dualism, and declares that the whole world is real and is subtly Brahman. The individual souls and the inanimate world are in essence one with Brahman. Vallabha looks upon God as the whole and the individual as part. The analogy of sparks of fire is employed by Him to great purpose. The Jiva bound by maya cannot attain salvation except through the grace of God, which is called Pushti. Bhakti is the chief means of salvation, though Jnana is also useful. As regards the fruit of Bhakti, thPre are diverse opinions, says Dasgupta ('). Vallabha said in his Sevaphala·vivrti that as result of it one may attain great power of experiencing the nature of God, or may also have the experience of continual contact with God, and also may have body befitting tl:ie service of God. Vallabha, however, is opposed to renunciation 'after the manner of monistic sanya.~,a, , for this can only bring repentance; as being ineffica-cious. Thus, it will be seen that though. V i;tllabha in his philosophical theories differs from Sankara and Ramanuja, the ultimate path for salvation which he has emphasised is that of Bhakti and by Bhakti the devotee obtains Pushti (divine grace). That is why the cult of Vallabha is known as Pushtimarg or the path for obtaining divine grace.

Tilk"!Yal Shri Govim/lal}t Maharaj v. !.tale qf /!Jija1tl.m Gaj1nJragod/uu. J.

1>r: · Bhandarkar points out that according to

Vallabha, l\fahapushti, or the highest grace, is that which removes great obstacles and conduces to the attainment of God himself. Thus Pushtibhakti is-of four kinds: ( l) Pravaha-Pushtibhakti, (2) Maryada-Pushtibhakti, (3) Pushti-Pushtibhakti and ( 4) Sudha-Pushtibhakti. The first is the path of those who while engaged in worldly life with its me and mine, do acts calculated to bring about the attainment of God. The second is of those who, withdrawing their minds from worldly enjoyments, devote them-selves to God by hearing His praise and listening to discours!S about Him. The third is ofthose who already enjoyed God's grace and are made competent

(I) history on "Indian Pbilo.K>pby" by Das GuE\!1. pp. US-356.

Tilltoyal ~h1i Gov1ttdlblji Mdlunaj . • St11lt oj RajaJtlian 6'ajnu/rq10W, J.

to aquire knowledge useful for adoration and thus come to know all about rhe ways of God. The fourth is of those wh<> through mere love devote themselves to the singing and praising of God as if it were haunting passion .. Thus, it would be seen that the tenets of the cult emphasised the importance of Bhakti, and the religious practices accordingly cente-red round this doctrine of Bhakti.

The practical modes of worship adopted by the members of this cult bring out the same effect. Lord Krishna as child is the main object of worship. His worship consists of several acrs of performance every day in the prescribed order of ceremonies. These begin wirh the ringing of rhe bell in the mor-ning and putting the Lord to bed at nil{ht. After the Lord is awakened by the ringing of the bell, there is blowing of the conch shell, awakening of the Lord and offering morning refreshments; waving of lamps; bathing; dressing; food; leading the cows out for grazing; the mid-day meal; waving of lamps again; the evening service; the evening meal and going to bed. These rituals performed with meticulous care from day to day constitute the prescribed items of Seva which the devotees attend every day in the Vallabh temple. In order to be able to offer Bhakti in proper way, the members of this denomination are initiated into this cult by the performance of two rites; one is Sharana .\fantropadesh and the other is Atma Nivedan. The first gives the devotee the status of Vaishnava and the second confers upon him the status of an Adhikari entitled to pursue the path of service of devotion. At the performance of the first rite, the mantra which is repeated in the ears of the devotee is "Shree Krishna Sharanam Mamah" and on the occasion 'tulsi Kanthi' is put around the neck of the devotee. At the second initiation, religious formula is repeated, the effect of which is that the devotee treats himself and all his properties as belonging to Lord Krishna. We have already

1 s.c.R.

referred to the original image which Vallabha ins· tailed in the temple built in his time and the seven idols which Vithalnathji gave to his sons. These idols are technically described as 'Nidhi'Swaroops'. Besides these idols, there are several other idols which are worshipped by Vaishnava devotees after they are sanctified by the Guru. It is thus clear that believing in the paramount importance and efficacy of Bhakti, the followers of Vallabha attend the worship and ser· vices of the Nidhi Swaroops or idols from day to day in the belief that such devotional conduct would ulti-mately lead to their salvation.

It is significant that this denomination does not recognise the existence of Sadhus or Swamis other than the descendants of Vallabha and it emphasises that it is unnecessary to adopt ritualistic practices or to repeat Sanskrit Mantras or in cantations in wor· shipping the idols. Besides, another significant fea· ture of this cult is that it does not believe in celibacy and does not regard that giving up worldly. pleasures and the ordinary mode of house-holder's life are essential for spiritual progrt:ss. In fact Vallabha himself lived house-holder's life and so have all his descendants. This cult does not, therefore, glorify poverty and it ·teaches its followers that normal house-holder's life is quite compatible with the prac· tice of Bhakti, provided of course, the devotee goes through the two ceremonies of initiation and lives up to the principles enunciated by Vallabha.

The question which we have to decide is whe-ther there IS anything in the philosophical doctrines or tenets or religious practices which ate the special features of the Vallabha school, which prohibits the existence of public temples or worship in them. The main object underlying the requirement that devotees should assemble in the Haveli of the Guru and worship the idol obviously was to encourage collective and congregational prayers. Presumably

Tilk4yal Shti Gouindlalji Maharoj v. Stale of Rajas""'" Gajllldrogadkar, I·

Tilu.JOl Slui Govindlalji ,,,_'ii •• ef

•• Slal< ef RajastlitPi

it was realised by Vallabha and his descendants that worship in Hindu pubEc temples is apt to clothe the images worshipped with formal and rigid character and the element of personality is thereby obliterated ; and this school believes that in order that Bhakti should be genuine and passionate, in the mind of the devotee there must be present the nece· ssary element of the personality of God. It is true that Vaishnava temples of the Val!abha sect are generally described as Havel is and though they are grand and majestic' inside, the outside appearance is always attempted to resemble that of private house. This feature can, however, be easily explain· ed if we recall the fact that during the time when Vithalnathji with his great missionary zeal spread the doctrine of Vallabha, Hindu temples were cons· tantly faced with the danger of attack from Aurangzeb. In fact, the traditional story about the foundation of the Srinathj i temple at Nathdwara itself eloquently brings out the fact that owing to the religious persecution practised during Aurangzeb's time, Srinathji himself had to give up his abode near Mathura and to start on journey in search of place for residence in more hospitable and congenial surroundings. Faced with this immediate problem Vithalnathji may have started building the temples in the form of Havelis so that from outside nobody should know that there is temple within.

It may also be true historically that when the first temple was built in the life time of Vallabha it may have been modest house where the original image was installed and during the early years just few devotees may have been visiting the said temple. Appropriately enough, it was then called Haveli. Later, even when the number of devotees increased and the temples built by the Vallabha sect began to collect thousands of visitors, traditional adherence to time-honoured words described all subsequent temples also as Havelis however big and maJcatic

they were. Therefore, we are satisfied that neither the tenets nor the religious practices of the Vallabha school necessarily postulate that the followers of the school must worship in private temple. Some temple's of this cult. may have been private in the past and some of them may be private even today. Whether or not particular temple is public temple must necessarily be considered in the light of the ·relevant facts relating to it. There can be no general rule that public temple is pro-hibited in V allabha School. Therefore, the first argument urged by the learned Attorney-General in challenging the finding. of the High Court that the Srinathji temple at Nathdwara is public temple, cannot be accepted.The question as to whether a· Hindu temple is private or public has often been considered by judi- . cial .decisions. temple belonging to family which is private temple is not unknown to Hindu law. In the case of private te_mple it is also not unlikely that the religious reputation of the founder may be of such high order that the private temple founded by him may attract devotees in large numbers and the mere fact that large number of devotees are allowed to worship in the temple would not necessarily make the private temple public temple. On the other hand, public temple can be built by subscriptions raised by the public and deity installed to enable all the members of the public to offer worship. In such case, the temple -would clearly be public temple. Where evidence in regard to the foundation of the temple is not clearly available, sometimes, judicial decisions rely on certain other facts which are tn·ated as relevant. Is the temple built in such an imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be public temple ? The appearance of the temple of course cannot be decisive factor; at best it may be relevant factor. Axe the members of the public entitled to an entry

TilknJ•at Shri Gooindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajastlum Gajendragadkar, J.

1963 r;Jt.y'll Shri GDDW/lolji Mah4Foj •• StoU of RajaJINm G•fandra1aJAar, J.

in the temple ? Are they entitled to take part in offering service and taking Darshan in the temple ? Are the members of the public entitled to take part in the festivah and ceremonies arranged in the temple ? Are their offerings accepted as matter of right ? The participation of the membrrs of the public in the Darshan in the temple and in the daily Acts of worship or in the celebrations of festival occasions may be very important factor to consider in determining the character of the temple. In the present proceedings, no such evidence has been led and it is, therefore, not shown that admission to the temple is controlled or regulated or that there are other factors present which indicate clearly that the temple is private temple. Therefore, the case for the Tilkayat cannot rest on any such considerations which, if proved, may have helped to establish either that the temple is private or is public.

There are, however, certain ancient documents which show that the tempk cannot be private temple. We have already referred to the Firmans issued by Akbar and Shahjahan. These Firmans are strictly not material for the purpose of the present dispute because they have no relation to the temple at Nathdwara .. However, aii matter of history, it may be worthwhile to recall that the Firman issued by Akbar on May 31, 1593 A. Il. shows that Vithalrai had represented to the Darbar that he had purchased on paying its price land from the owners thereof in the Mowzah of J atipura, situated in the Paraganah, adjoining Gordhan and had caused to be built thereon buildings, gardens, cowsheds and Karkhanas (workshops) for the temple of Gordhan Nath and that he was residing there. Having rectiv-ed this representation, Akbar issued an order that . the above-mentioned Mowzah had been given over tax-free into the possession of the above-mentioned Goswami from descendant to descendant. It would thus be seen that though the grant by which the land

in question was exempted from payment {)f taxes is

in the name of the Goswami, there can be no doubt that it was so named on the representation made by the Goswami that he had purchased the land and built structures on it for the temple of Gordhan Nath. Thus, in substance, the grant was mad.e to :he Goswami who was managing the temple of Gordhan Nath. The grant of ~bah Jahan made in. 1633 A. D. is to the same effect. These grants are in reference to the temple built by Vithalrai inJatipura. We have already seen that the idol of Shrinathji was removed from the said temple and brought to Nathdwara in about 1671.The earliest document in regard to Siarh is of the year 1672 A. D. The document has been issued by the Rana of Udaipur and it says that "Be it know that Shrinathji residing at Sihod Let unculti-vated land as may desire be cultivated till such time. When Shrinathji goes back to Brij the land of those to whom it belongs will be returned to them. If any one obstructs in any way he will be rebuked." The next document is of 1680 A. D. It has been issued by Rana of Udaipur and is in similar terms. It says that when Shrinathji goes back to Brij from Singhad Brahmins will get the land which is of the Brahmins. 1 hey will get the land as is entered in previous records. So long as Shrinathji stays here, no Brahmin shall cultivate towards the West of Shah Jagivan's wall up to and across the foot of the hillock. If any one cultivates fine of Rs. 225/-shall be realised collectively. Fortunately, for Nath-dwara, the temple which was then built for Shrinathji for temporary abode has turned out to be Shrinathji's permanent place of residence. These two documents clearly show that after Shrinathji was installed in what is now known as Nathdwara, the land occupied for the purpose of the temple was given over for that purpose and the actual occupants and cultivators were told that they would get the land back when Shrinathji goes back to Brij. ·

Tilkayct Shri Govmdlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajaslho Gajendragadkar, J.

/963 Tilka}'dl Sltti G~ilttllolji MaA·•ruj v. Sto/1 of Rajaduua Coj1Nf,01adJ:or, J.

We have already cited the extract from Col. Todd's 'Annals of Rajasthan' in which he has graphically described the traditional belief in regard to the choice of Siarh for the abc.Je of Shrinathji. That extract shows that as soon the chariot wheel of Shrinathji ·stopped and would •iot ml)ve, the chief hastened to make perpetual gift of the village and its lands which was speedily confirmed by the pa tent of the· Rana. Nathji was removed from his car and in due course of time temple was :rected for his reception. That is how the hamlet of Siarh became the town of Nathdwara. This assurance given by the chief was confirmed by the tw" grants to which we have just referred. Thus, tht.·e can be ·no doubt that the original grants were for the purpose of the temple.

deed of dedication executed by Maharana Shri Bhim Singhji in favour of Gusainji in Sambat 1865 also shows that the lands therein described had bt'en dedicated to Shriji and Shri Gusainji and that all the income relating to thos~ lands would be dediCated to the Bhandar of Shriji.

letter written by the Maharana on January 17, 1825, speaks to the same effect. "Our ancestors," says the letter, "kept the Thakurji Maharaj and the Gosainji Maharaj at the village of Shinhad which is near Udaipur and presented that village to the Thakurji. After this, our ancestors became followers of that religion and agreed to obey orders. They all granted lands and villages for the expenses of the God. Besides these certain I ands were granted for the grazing of the cows belonging to the Thakurji." This letter contains certain orders to the officers of the State to respect the rights of the temple and Gosainji.

Consistently with this record, we find declara-tion made by Tilkayat Gordhanji in 1932 in which he

1 S.C.R.

stated that "the money of Shri Thakurji as is the prac- .

tice now, that it is not spent in our private expenditure the same will be followed", though along with this de-claration he added that the propriet::.ry right was· his own from the time of the ancestors. In conformity with · the same, the entry will continue as usual in the acc-ounts of credit and debit as is the continuing mutation. Even though the Tilkayat set up the claim that the temple was private, it is consistently adhered to that the income derived from the properties of the temple is not intended to be and has never been used for the personal requirements of the Tilkayat.It is true that there are other grants which have been produced on the record by the Tilkayat for the purpose of showing that some gifts of immovable property were made in favour of the Tilkayat. Such grants may either show that the gifts were made to the Tilkayat because he was in the management of the temple, or they may have been made to the Tilkayat in his personal character. Grants falling in the former category would constitute the property of the temple, whilst those fallin!' in the latter cate-gory would constitute the private property of the Talikayat. These grants, however, would not affect the nature of the initial grants made to the temple soon after Shrinathji came to Nathdwara. Th'erefore in our opinion, having regard .to the documentary evidence adduced in the present proceedings, it would be unreasonable to contend that the temple was built by the Tilka yat of the day as his private temple and that it still continues to have the character of private temple. From outside it no doubt has the appearance of Haveli, but it is common ground that the majestic structure inside is consistent with the dignity of the idol and with the character of the temple as public temple.

We have referred to these aspects of the matter because thc!y were elaborately argued before us by

Trlkayat Slui Govindbilji Maharaj •. St"te of &fiastha.n Gajrndragadkar, J.

Tilt..7"' S!ri Goci•dlolji M..Jtarqj •• St.u ef R.V utli ... GajnulragaJka•, J,

the . learned Attorney-General. But as we will presently point out, the Firman issued by the Udaipur Darbar in 1934 really concludes the controversy between the parties on these points ;md it shows that the Shrinathji Temple at Nathdwara is undoubtedly public temple. It is therefore, now necessary to consider this Firman. This Firma:-. consists of four clauses. The first clause declares that according to the law of Udaipur, the shrine of Shrinathji has always been and is religious institution for the follo-wers of the Vaishnava Sampradaya and that all the property immovable and movable dedicated, offered or presented to or otherWise coming to the Deity Shrinathji has always been and is the property of the shrine and that the Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being is merely Ci;stodian, Manager and Trustee of the said property for the shrine of Shrinathji and that the Udaipur Darbar has absolute right to supervise that the property dedicated to the shrine is used for legitimate purpose of the shrine. The second clause deals with the question of succession and it provides that the law of Udaipur has always been and is that the succession to the Gaddi of Tilkayat Maharaj is regulated by the law of Pri-mogeniture, and it adds that the Udaipur Darbar has the absolute right to depose any Tilkayat Maharaj for the time being if in its absolute discre-tion such Maharaj is considered unfit and also for the same reason and in the same way to disqualify any person who would othenvise have succeeded to the Gaddi according to the law of primogeniture. The third clause provides that in case the Tilkayat Maharaj is minor, the Darbar always had and has absolute authority to take any measures for the management of the shrine and its pr.lperties during such minority. The la~t clause adds that in accor-dance with the said law of Udaipur, the Rana had declared Shri Domodarlalji unfit to occupy the Gaddi and had approved of the succession of Goswami Govindlalji to the Gaddi of Tilkayat

1 S.C.R.

Maharaj, and it ends with the statement that the order issued in that behalf on October 10, 1933, was issued under his authority and is lawful and in accor-dance with the law of Udaipur.

In appreciating the effect of this Firman, itis

first necessary to decide whether the Firman is law or not. It is matter of common knowledge that at the relevant time the Maharana of Udaipur was an absolute monarch in whom vested all the legis· lative, judicial and executive powers of the State. In the case of an absolute Ruler like the Maharana of Udaipur, it is difficult to make any distinction . between an executive .order issued by him or legis· lative command issued by him. Any order issued by such Ruler has the force of law and did govern the rights of the parties affected thereby. This posi-tion is covered by decisions of this Court and it has not been disputed before us, Vide Madhaorao Phalke v. The State of !Yladhya Bharat (1). Ammer-un-Nisa Begum v: Mahboob Begum ('), and Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali (').

It is 'true that in dealing with the effect of this

Firman, the learned Attorney-!}eneral sought to raise before us novel point that under Hindu law even absolute monarch was not competent to make law affecting religious endowments and their administra· tion. He suggested that he was in position to rely upon the opinions of scholars which tended to show that Hindu monarch was competent only to administer the law as prescribed by Smritis and the oath which he was eicpected to take at the time of his coronation enjoined him to obey the Smritis and . to see that their injuncti!lns were obeyed by his subject. We do not allow the learned Attorney· General to develop this point because we hold that this novel point cannot be accepted in view of the well-recognised principles of jurisprudence. An (I) [1960] l s.c.R. 957. (2) A.I.R. 1955 s.c. 352. (3) A.J.R, 1956 8. C. 60.

Tilka)'Ol

Skri Govindlalji · Mahaaj v. Stall of R<jastlulll Gqjendra1adkar, J.

1901 Ti/Kayat Shri Gotindlalji Maharaj . y, Stalt of Rojasthari Gajtndragnd~ar, ) .

absolute monarch was the fountain·head of all legislative, executive and judicial powers and it is of the very essence of sovereignty which vested in him that he could supervise and control the administra· tion of the public charity. In our opinion, there is no doubt whatever that this universal principle in regard to the scope of the powers inherently vesting in sovereignty applies ?S much to Hindu monarchs as to any other absolute monarch. Therefore, it must be held that the Firman issued by the Maharana of Udaipur in 193! is law by which the affairs of the Nathdwara temple and succession to the office of the Tilkayat were governed after its issue.Then the learned Attorney-General contended that in judging about the effect of this Firman we should not ignore the background of events which necessitated its issue. Damodarlalji had been deposed by Maharana and it was more in an~er that the Firman was issued to meet the challenge of the said incident. Damodarlalji had filed certain suits in the Bomb<1.y High Court and it appeared as if doubt would arise in the minds of the followers and devotees of the temple as to v. hether the deposition of Damodarlalji was valid or not. It was with view to meet this specific particular situation that the Firman was issued and so, it need not be treated as law binding for all times. In our opinion, this argument is clearly misconceived. Whatever ·may be the genesis of the Firman and whatever may be the nature of the mischief which it was intended to redress, the words used in the Firman are clear and as provisions contained in statute they must be given full effect. There can be little doubt that after this Firman was issued, it would not be open to anyone to contend that the Shrinathji temple was private temple belonging to the Tilkayat Maharaj of the day. This law declares that it has alwavs been and would always be public temple. The validity of this law was not then and is not now open to any

challenge when it set ks to declare that the temple in question has always been public temple. We have already seen that the original grants amply bear out the recital in cl. I of the Firman about the character of this temple. The Firman then clearly provides that the Tilkayat Maharaj is merely Custodian, Manager and Trustee of the said property and that finally determines the nature of the office held by the Tilkayat Maharaj. He can claim no better and no higher rights after the Firman was issued. The said clause also declares that the Darbar has absolute right to see to it that the property is used for legiti· mate purpose of the shrine. This again is an assertion which is validly made to assert the sovereign's rights to supervise the administration of public charity. Clause 2 lays down the absolute right of the Darbar to depose the Tilkayat and to disqualify anyone from claiming the succession to the Gaddi. It shows that succession to the Gaddi and continuing in the office of the Tilkayat are wholly dependent on the discretion of the Darbar. The Right of the Darbar to depose the Tilkayat and to recognise emccessor or not is described by this clause as absolute. The third and the fourth clauses are consistent with the first two clauses. Reading this Firman as whole, there can be no doubt that under the law of Udaipur, this temple was held to be public temple and the Tilkayat was held to hr no more than the Custodian, Manager and Trustee of the property belonging to the said temple. It is on the basis of this law that the vires of the Act must inevitably be determined.

Til.t.vlll Smi Gavill,t.lji Malurtcj •• St•l1 of Rl!jast""11 GojtnthagadW, J,

The learned Attorney.General has invited our. attention to some decisions in which the temples of this cult were held to be private temples. We would now very briefly refer to these decisions before we proceed to deal with the other points raised in the present appeals. In Gossamee Sree Greedhareejee v. R•~manlolljee Gossamee, ([1]), the Privy Council held that when the worship of Thakoor has· been (I) 16 J, A. 157.

Toi~"' SAri G"'""'1alji Malwtqj v. s..u •! Rf!i•Sl/ion Caj1.Jr.,""'4r, I.

founded under Hindu law, the shebaitship is held to be v.ested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwis-:, or that there has been some usage, course of dealing, or circumstances tci show different mode of devolution. Greedhareejee who as the plaintiff appeared before the Privy Council as the appellant had been deposed by the Rana of Udaipur in lis7ti. He claimed the rights of shebaitship of certain consecrated idol and as incident thereto to the things which had been offered to the idol. This claim was based on the allegation that by the rule of primogeniture he had preferential right and not his opponent RumanlolI jee Gossamee. The High Court of Calcutta by majority judgment had held that Greedhareejee's title as founder had been established and that the bar of limitation pleaded by the respondent applied to the temple and the hnd on which it was built but not to the image and the movable property connected with it. In the result, Greedhareejee got decree for so much of his claim as was not barred by lapse of time. This conclusion was confirmed by the Privy Council. It would be noticed that since the dispute was between two ri,·al claimants neither of whom was interested in pleading that the temple was public temple, that aspect of the matter did not fall to be considend in the said litiga-tion, and so, this deci<ion can be regarded as an au-thority only for the proposition which it laid down in regard to the succession of the Shebaitship. The learned Attorney.General no doubt invited our atren-tion to the fact that in the course of his judgment, Lord Hobhouse has mentioned that all the male members of the Vallabh's familv are in their lifetime esteemed by their community. as partakinl( of the Divine essence, and as entitled to veneration and worship. This observation, however, can be of little help to the Tilkayat in the present proceeding~ where we have to deal with the matter on the basis·of the Firman to which we have just referred. Besides, we

may incidentally add that the Tilkayat's claims

to property rights in the present proceedings based on the allegation that the members of the denomina-tion regard all successors of Vallabha with the same respect which they. had for Vallabha himself, sounds incongruous with the essential tenets of Vallabha's philosophy.

In Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj (!), the di~pute which was taken before the Privy Council was in regard to the right claimed by the sons of daughter to the shebaitship of the temple of Vallabha sect, and in support of the said right the sons of the daughter relied upon the earlier decision of the Privy Council in the case of Gossam-mee Sree Girdharee}ee ('). In rejecting the plea made by the ~aid sons, the Privy Council observed that the principle laid down in the earlier case cannot be applied so as to vest the shebaitship in persons who, according to the usages of the worship, cannot per-form the rites of the office. In that case it was found that the sons of the daughter who were Bhats and who did not belong to the Gosain Ku! were incompetent to perform the "diurnal rites for the de.ty worshipped by the sect" and so, the decision of the High Court which had rejected their claim was confirmed. In this case again neither party was interested in plea-ding the public character of the temple and so, that point did not arise for decision.The same comment falls to be made about the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Gopal Lalji v. Girdhar Lalji ('). It is true that in that case the plaintiff challenged gift deed executed by one Goswami of the Vallabha sect in favour of ano-ther Goswami and in doing so he alleged that the donor Goswami was Trustee and not the owner of the property. But in the course of the evidence, it was virtually conceded by him that the property be-longed to the donor Goswami, and so, the case was (1) 40 I.A. 97. (2) 16 I.A. 137. (5) A.I.R 1915 All. H.

l,Y63 Tilkayat Shri Go1indla!Ji j\f ,.h~rnj v. Stqie of Rojasrh_11.n G'ljenr/rag..ulk:u, !·

IHS

7i!U,., SAri MWroj G..;,uw ~ ·; •• StoU •f Roj111,,,.,. c.i;..w.,.au., /,

deeided on that basis. In its judgment, the High Court observed that there can be no doubt that if we must regard the property as "trust property" in the strict sense, dedicated for charitable or religious purpose in the hands of duly constituted trustees of the charitable or religious object, one or more of such trustees would h)lve no power to alienate the.. trust property or delegate their powers and duties contrary to the trust. But the High Court found that the evi· dence adduced conclusively established that the pro-perty in question was private property and so, the challenge to the validity of the !(ift was repelled. This decision also cannot be of any assistance in deci-ding the question as to wherher the temple with which the present proceedings concerned is private or public temple. Besides, as we have already indicated, this question is really concluded by the Firman of 1934 and so, the temple must be held to be public temple and in consequence the challenge to the vali-dity of the Act on the b1sis that the Act has inter· fered with the Tilkayat's rights of ownership over his private property cannot succeed.

Let u~ now examine the material provisions of the Act before dealing with the contentions of the Tilkayat that the said provisions contravene his fund-amental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Arts. 14 and 31(2) even on the basis that the temple is public temple. The Act was passed to p mvide for the better administration and governance of the temple of Shri Shrinathji, at Nathdwara. It consists of 38 sections. Section 2 is qefinition section; under s. 2(i) "Board" means the Nathdwara Temple Board established and constituted under the Act, ar.d s. 2 (ii) defines "Endowment" as meaning all property, movable or immovable belonging to or given or endowed in any name for the maintenance or support of the tt"mple or for the performance of any service or charity con· nected therewith or for the benefit, convenience or comfort of the pilgrims visiting the temple, and

includes-

(a) the idols installed in the temple.

(b) the premises of the temple.

(c) all jagirs, muafis and other properties, movable or immovable, .wherever situate and all income derived from any source whatsoever and standing in any name, dedicated to the temple or placed for any religious, pious or charitable purposes under the Board or purchased from out of the temple funds and all offerings and bhents made for and received on behalf of the temple.

but shall not include any property belon· ging to the Goswami personally although the same or income thereof might hitherto have been utilised in part or in whole in the service of the temple.

Section 2 (viii) defines "temple" as meaning the tem-ple of Shri Shrinathji at Nathdwara in Udaipur Dis-trict and includes the temple of Shri Navnitpriyaji and Shri Madan Mohanialji together with all addi-tions thereto or all alterations thereof which may be made from time to time .ifter the commencement of the Act.

Sections 3 and 4 are important provisions of the Act. Section 3 provides that the owne!'Ship of the temple and all its endowments including all offerings which have been or may hereafter be made shall. vest in the deity of Shri Shrinathji and the Board constituted under the Act shall be entitled to their possession. In other words, all property of the temple vests in the temple and the right to claim possession of it vests in the Board. As corollary to

Tilkoya' Shri Gouindl a/ji Mu!uirqj v. Stai. ef H•jastian Gqjenm•pd/iar, J.

Tilkayat Slui Coti.ull11 ji i\lalrotaj St.It ef '" Roj11stha11

5!18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J64] VOL.

the provisions of s. 3, s. 4(1) provides that the admi· nistration of the temple and all its endowments shall vest in the Beard constituted in the manne.- hereinafter provided. Sub section (2) lays down that the Board shall be body corporate by the name of the Nathd-wara Tempk Board and shall have perpetual succession and comm or. seal with power to acquire and hold property, both movable and immovable, and may sue or be sued in the said name. The composition of the Board ha! bee:1 prescribed by s. 5: it shall consist of President, the Collector of Ud<1ipur District and nine other memb~rs. The provi5o to the section is important : it says that the Goswami shall be one of such members if he is not otherwise disqualified to· be member and is willing to serve as such. Section 5 (2) prescribes the disqualifications specified in clauses (a) to (g)-unsoundness of mind adjudicated upon by competent Court, conviction involving moral turpi-tude; adjudication as an insolvent or the status of an undischarged insolvent; minority, the defect of being deaf-mute or leprosy; holding an office or being servant of the temple or bemg in receipt of any emoluments or perquisites from the temple ; being interested in subsisting contract entered into with the temple ; and lastly, not professing the Hindu religion or not belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. There can be no doubt that "or" in clause {g) must mean "and", for the context clearly indicates that way. There is proviso to s. 5 (2) which lays down that the disqual"ification as to the holding of an office or an employ-ment under the temple shall not apply to the Goswami and the disqualification about the religion will not apply to the Collector ; that is to say, Collector will be member of the Board even though he may not be Hindu and follower of the denomination. Section 5 (3) provides that the President of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government and shall for all purposes be deemed to be member. Under s. 5 (4) the

1 S.C.R.

Collector shall be an ex-officio member of the Board. Section 5 ( 5) provides that all the other members specified in sub-cl. (1) shall be appointed by the State Government so as to secure representation of the Pushti-Margiya Vaishnavas from all over India •• This clearly contemplates that the other members of the Board should not only be Hindus, but should also belong to the denomination, for it is in that manner alone that their representation can be ade· quately secured. Section 6 gives liberty to the Preaident or any member to resign his office by giving notice in writing to the State Government. Under s. 7 (1), the State Government is given the power to remove from office the President or any member, other than the ex-officio member, including the Goswami on any of the three grounds specified in clauses (a), (b) & (c); ground (a) refers to the dis-qualification specified by s. 5 (2), ground (b) refers to the absence of the member for more than four consecutive meetings of the Boar:! without obtaining leave for absence ; and ground (cl refers to the case where member is guilty of corruption or misconduct in the administration of the endowment. Section 7 (2) provides safeguard to the person against whom action is intended to be taken under sub-cl. (1) and it lays down that no person shall be removed unless he has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his removal. It would be noticed that by operation of s. 7 (1 ), the Goswami is liable to be removed, but that removal would, in sense, be ineffective because the proviso to s. 5 requires that the Goswami has to be member of the Board so that even though he is removed for causes (b) and (c), he would automatically be deemed to be member under the proviso to s. 5. It would be different matter if the Goswami is removed by reason of the fact that he is disqualified on any of the grounds described• in s. 5 (2). Such disquaJifi. cation may presumably necessitate the appointment of successor, Goswami in lieu of the disqualified

Tilkayat Shri GorNullalji Maha,aj' v. Stole of RojaJtluut CGjmdrogatlkar, J.

TW..pu Shri Gooil&dialj i Malrarqj •• Stott of RrjaJIMn Gaj,,,JrqtHlkar, J,

61)() SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.

one and then it would be the successor Goswami who will be member of the Board under the proviso to s. 5 (l). This position is made clear if we look at s. I I which lrovidcs that any person ceasing to be member shal , unless disqualified under s. 5 (2) be eligible for re appointment, whereas other members who are removed under s. i ( l) for causes specified in clauses (b) and (c) may not be eligible for re-appointment, the Goswami would be entitled to such re.appointment. · Section 8 prescribes the term . of office at 3 years. Section 9 provides for the filling up of casual vacancies. Section IO empowers the State Government to dissolve the Board and reconsti-tute it if it is satisfied that the existing Board i~ not competent to perform or persistently makes default in performing the duties imposed on it under this Act, or exceeds or abuses its powers; and this power can be exercised after due enquiry. This section further provides that if Board is dissolved, imme-diate action should be taken to reconstitute fresh Board in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 10 (2) provides safeguard to the Board against which action is proposed to be taken under sub-s. (I) inasmuch as it requires that before the notification of the Board's dissolution is issued, Government will communicate to the Board the grounds on which it proposes so to do, fix reason· able ti111c for the Board to show cause and consider its explanation or objections, if any. Se1=tion IO (3) empowers the State· (}overnment, as provisional and interim measure, to appoint person to perform the functions of the Board until fresh Board is reconstituted, and under s. IO (4), the State Government is given the power to fix the remunera-tion of the person so appointed. Section I2 makes every member of the Board liable for loss, waste or misapplication of any money or property belonging to the temple, provided such los5, waste or misappli-cation is direct consequence of his wilful act or omission, and it allows suit to be instituted toobtain such compensation. Under s. 13, members of the Board as well as the President are entitled to draw travelling and halting allowances as may be prescribed. Section 14 deals with the office and meetings of the Board and s. 15 provides that any defect or vacancy in the constitution of the Board will not invalidate the acts of the Board. Sec-tion 16 is important. It lays down that subject to the provisions of this Act and of the rules made thereunder, the B.Jard shall manage the properties and affairs of the temple and arrange for the conduct of the daily worship and ceremonies and of festivals in the temple according to the cmtoms and usage of the Pushti-M.irgiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. Sec-tion 17 (1) provides that the jewellcries or other valuable moveable prop~rty of non-perishable character the adm:nistration of which vests in the Board shall not be transferred without the·previous sanction of the Board, and if the value of the ptoperty to be transferred ex:ceeds ten thousand rupees, the previous approval of the State Government has to be obtained. Section 17 (2) requires the previous sanction of the State Government for leasing the temple property for more than five years, or mortgagmg, selling or otherwise alienating it. Section 18 imposes ban on the borro-wing power of the Board. Section 19 ( 1) provides for the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer of the temple, and the remaining four sub-sections of s. 19 deal with his terms and conditions of service. Section 20 speaks of the powers and duties of che Chief Executive Officer which relate to the administration of the temple properties. Section 21 provides that the Board may appoint, smpend, remove, dismiss or reduce in rank or in any way punish all officers and servants of the Board other than the Chief Executive Officer, in accordance with rules made by the State Government. Section 22 is very important. It provides that save as other-wise express! y provided in or under this Act, nothing

Ti/kayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj _ v. State of Rajasthan Gajendragatlkar, J.

7 iU.a~·at Shri GoVu dlolj i lifaltaraj "· Stolt of Rojasthan Cajnttfr(lgadAa• _ ).

herein contained shall affect any established usage of the temple or the rights, honours, emoluments and perquisites to which any person may, by custom or otherwise, be entitled in the temple. Section 23 deals with the budget, s. t4 with accounts and s. 25 with the Administration R, port. Section 26. confers on the State Government power to call for such information and accounts as may, in its opinion, be reasonably necessary to satisfy it that the temple is being properly maintained, and its admi-nistration carried on according to the provisions of this Act. Under this section, the Board is under au obligation to furnish forthwith such information and accounts as may be called for by the State Govern-ment. Under s. 27, the State Government may depute any person to inspect any movable or immov-able property, records, correspondence, plans, accounts and other documents relating to the temple and endowments, and the Board and its officers and servants shall be bound to afford all facilities to such persons for such inspection. Section 28(1) specifics the purposes for which the funds of the temple may be utilised and s. 28(2) provides that without prejudice to the purposes referred to in sub-s. (1), the Board may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, order that the surplus funds of the temp!e be utilised for the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) to (e). Sec-tion 28(3) requires that the order of the Board under subs. (2) shall be published in the prescribed manner. Section 29 deals with the duties of trustee of specific endowment; s. 30(1) confers the power on the State Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of the purposes of the Act ; s. 30(2) provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the State Government shall have power to make rules with reference to matters covered by clauses (a) to (i). Under sub-section (3) it is provided that the rules made under this Act shall be placed before the House of the StateLegislature at the session thereof next following. Section 31 provides that the State Govern-ment or any person interested may institute suit in the Court of District Judge to obtain decree for the reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) to (e). These reliefs correspond to the relief which may be obtained in suit under s. 1!2 Code of Civil Procedure. In consequence, s. 31(2) provides that ss. 9:! and 93 and 0. I, r. 8, of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure shall have no application to any suit claiming any relief in respect of the administration or management of the temple and no suit in respect thtreof shall be instituted except as provided by this Act. In other words, suit which would normally have been filed under ss. 92 and \J3 and 0. I, r. 8, of th~ Code has now to be filed under s. 31. Section :Ji deals with the resistance or obstruction in obtain-ing possession and it provides that the order which may be passed by the Magistrate in such matters shall, subject to the result of any suit which may be filed to establish the right to the possession of the property, be final. Section 33 deals with the costs of the suit, etc. Section :!4 provides that this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force or in any scheme of management framed before the commencement of this Act or in any decree, order, practice, custom or usage. Section :!5 contains transitional provision and it empowers the State Government to appoint one or more persons to dis-charge all or any of the duties of the Board after the Act comes into force and before the first Board is constituted. Under s. 36 it is provided that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to any of the provi-sions of this Act, the State Government may, by order, give such directions and make such provisions as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose of removing the difficulty. Section 37 prescribes bar to suit or proceeding against the State Govern-ment for anything done or purported to be done by

Tilkayat Shri Gvvindlo/j1 Maharaj v •

• ~tale of Raja1lh1,11

G1Jjrt1du1gadl,&1, J,

it under the provisions of this Act. The last section deals with repeal and savings. The Rajasthan Ordinance No. 2 of 1959 which had preceded this Act has been repealed by this section. That in brief, is the scheme of the Act.

1963 Tilkayal Shri Gotindloiji A!aMraj .. Stair of Roja.st/um Gojnulro1adkar, J,

Later, we will have occasion to deal with the specific sections which have been challenged before us, but at this stage, it is necessary to coQsider the broad scheme of the Act in order to be able to appreciate the points raised by the Tilkayat and the denomination in challenging its validity. For the purpose of ascertaining the true scope and effect of the scheme envisaged by the Act it is necessary to concentrate on sections a, 4, 16, 22 and 34. The scheme of the Act, as its preamble indicates, is to provide for the better administration and governance of the temple of Shri Shrinathji at Nathdwara. It proceeds on the basis that the temple of Shrinathji is public temple and having regard to the back-ground of the administration of its affairs in the past, the legislature thought that it was necessary to make more satisfactory provision which will lead to its better administration and governance. In doing so, the legislature has taken precaution to safeguard the performance of religious rites and the observance cif •. religious practices in accordance with traditional usage and custom. When the validity of any legis-v lative enactment is impugned on the ground that its matetial provisions contravene one or the other of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitu- · tion, it is necessary to bear in mind the primary rule of construction. If the impugned provisions of the Statute are reasonably capable of construction which does not involve the infringement of any fundamental rights, that construction must be pre-ferred though it may reasonably be possible to adopt another construction which leads to the infringement of the said fundamental rights. If the impugned

1 S.C.R.

provisions are reasonably not capable of the cons-truction which would save its validity, that of course is another matter; but if two constructions are reason-ably possible, then it is necessary that the Courts should adopt that construction which upholds the validity of the Act rather than the one which affects its validity. Bearing this rule of construction in mind, we must el\amine the five sections to which we have just referred. Section 3 no doubt provides for the vest· ing of the temple property and all its endowments including offerings in the deity of Shrinathji, and that clearly is unexceptionable. If the temple is , public temple, under Hindu Law the idol of Shri-nathji is juridical person and so, the ownership of the temple and all its endowments including offerings made before the idol constitute the property of the idol. Having thus stated what is the true legal position about the ownership of the temple and the endowments, s. 3 proceeds to add that the Board constituted under this Act shall be entitled to the possession of the said property. If the legislature intended to provide for the better administration of the temple properties, it was obsolutely essential to comtitute pmper Baard to look after the said administration, and so, all thats. 3 does is to enable the Board to take care of the temple prop'erties and in that sense, it· provides that the Board shall be entitled to claim possession of the said properties. In the context. this proviSion does not mean that the Board wou Id be entitled to dispossess persons who are in pmses•ion of the said properties : it only means that the Board will be enti1led to protect its possession by taking such steps as in law may be open to it and necessary in that behalf. Section 4 is :i mere corollary to s. 3 because it provides that the administration of the temple and all its endowments >hal1 ve;t in the Hoard. Thus, the result of reading ss. 3 and 4 is that the statute declares that the pro· perties of the temple vest in the deity of Shrinathji and provides for the administration of the said

1963 Ti/kayat Shri Govirz4lalji Maharaj •• Stal• oj RajaJthan Gl!imdra1adku, /.

1963 Tilk'!J'll Shri Govmdlolji Mahataj •• Stat• of RajOJlhan ';ajtndrago.dkat, J,

properties by appointing Board and entrusting to the Board the said administration,

The true scope and effect of these provisions can be properly appreciated only when they are co-related toss. 16 and 22. Section 16 prescribes the duties of the Board; it requires that subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules framed.under it, the Board has to manage the properties and affairs of the temple and arrange for the conduct of the daily worship and ceremonies and of festivals in the temple according to the customs and usages of the Pushti-margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. It would be noticed that two different categories of duties are imposed upon the Board. The fint duty is to manage the properties and secular affairs of the temple. This naturally is very important part of the assignment of the Board. Having thus provided for the dis· charge of its important function in the matter of administering the properties of the temple, the sec· tion adds that it will be the duty of the Board to arrange for the religious worship, ceremonies and festivals in the temple, but this has to be done accor· ding to the customs and usages of the denomination. It is thus clear that the duties of the Board in so far as they relate to the worship and other religious ceremonies and festivals, it is the tr<tditional customs and usage which is of paramount importance. In other words, the legislature has taken precaution· to safeguard the due observance of the religious cere-monies, worship and festivals according to the custom and usage of the denomination. ~ection 22 makes this position still clearer; ·it provides that save as otherwise expressly provided iu or under the Act, nothing herein contained shall affect any established usage of the temple or the rights, honours, emolu-ments and perquisit~s to which any person may, by cu~tom or otherwisC', be entitled in the temple. The saving provisions of s. 22 are very wide; unless there is an express provision to the contrary in the

l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS · 607

Act, all matters which have been saved by s. 22 will be governed by the traditional usage and custom. If only we consider the very wide terms in which the saving clause under s. 22 has been drafted, it will be clear that the legislature was anxious to provide for the better administration of the temple properties and not to infringe upon the traditional religious ceremonies, worship and festivals in the temple and the rights, honours, emoluments and the perquisites attached thereto. Section 34 which provides for the over-riding effect of the Act must be read along with s. 22 and so, when it provides that the Act shall have effect notwithstanding practice, custom or usage, it only means that practice, custom and usage will not avail if there is an express provision to the contrary as prescribed bys. 22.-Reading these five sections together, it seems to us clear that the Legislature has provided for the n ppointment of Board to look after the administra-tion of the property of the temple and manage its secular affairs as well as the religious affairs of the temple, but in regard to these religious affairs consisting of the worship, services, festivals and other ceremonies, the custom prevailing in the tempi!" consistently with the tenets of Vallabha philomph y are to be .respected. The learned Attorney-General no doubt attempted to read ss. 3 and 4 in very wide manner and he sought to place narrow construction on s. 22, thereby indi-cating that even religious ceremonies and rites and festivals would remain within the exclusive jurisdic-tion of the BJard without reference to the traditional custom or usage. We do not think that it would be appropriate to adopt such an approach in construing the relevant provisions of the Act. We have no doubt that when ruleq are framed under s. 30 of the Act, they wou Id be framed bearing in mind these es5ential features of the material provisions of the Act and will help to carq• out the object of the Act in keeping the religious part of the services and wor-

1963 Tilkq;iat Shri Govindlalji Maharqj v. State of Rajasthan GajmdragadAar, J,

1965 Tilhyot ·'-Mi Covindlolji Ma."4roj ... Sta11 of ti.njtJJ hon Gcjtt1dragodkt1f, J.

ship at the temple apart from the secular part of the administration of the temple properties. Broadly stated, the former will be carried out according to the traditional usage and custom and the latter according to the provisions of the Act.

On behalf of the Tilkayat, the main contention which h:is been raised before us by the learned Attorney· General is that his right of property has been infringed under Art. 19 (l) (f) and Mr. Pathak has added that the relevant provisions infringed the Tilkayat's rights under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. As we have already indicated this latter contention is raised in the writ petition filed by the Tilkayat in this Court. Now in deciding the validity of these contentions it is necessary to revert to thP. Firman issued by the Rana of Udaipur in 1934, because the rights of the Tilkayat have to be judged in the light of the said Firman. We have already noticed that the said Firman clearly declares that the Tilkayat is merely Custodian, Manager and Trustee of the property of the shrine Shrinathji and that the Udai-pur Darbar has the absolute right to supervise that the property dedicated to the shrine is used for lt>giti-mate purpose of the shrine. Having regard to the unam· bie;uous and emphatic words used in clause l of the Firman and having regard to other drastic provisions contained in its remaining clauses, we are inclined to think that this Firman made the Tilkayat for the time being Custodian, Manager and Trustee, and nothing more. As Custodian or Manager, he had the right to manage the properties of the temple, subject, of course, to the overall supervision of the Darbar, the rie;ht of the Darbar in that behalf being absolute. He was also Trustee of the said property aud the word "trustee" in the context mmt mean trustee in the technical legal sense. In other words, it is not open to the Tilkayat to claim that he has rights of Mahant or Shebait; his rights are now defined and he cannot claim any higher rights after the Firman was issued. There can be no doubt that the right to

have the custody of the property such as the Custo-dian has, or the right to manage the property such as the Manger possesses, or the right to administer the trust property for the benefit of the beneficiary which the Trustee can do, cannot be regarded as right to property under Art. 19 (l)(f) and for the same reason, - it does not constitute property under Art. 31(2). If it is l.eld that the Tilkayat was no more than Cus-todian, Manager and Trustee properly so called, there can be no doubt that he knot entitlec! to rely either on Art. 19(l)(f) or on Art. 31(2). Therefore, on this construction· of clause 1 of the Firman, the short answer to the pleas raised by the Tilkayat under Arts. 19(l)(f) and 31(2) is that the rights such as he possesses under the said clause cannot attract Art. 19(1 )(f) or Art. 31 (2).It has, however, been strenously urged before us that the words "Custodian, Manager or Trustee" should be liberally construed and the position of the Tilkayat should be taken to be similar to that of Mahant of Math ·or Shebait of temple. Under Hindu Law, idols and Maths are both juridical per-sons and Shebaits and Mahants who manage their properties are recognised to possess certain rights and to claim certain status. Shebait by virtue of his office is the person entited to administer the property attached to the temple of which he is Shebait. Similarly Mahant who is spiritual head of the Math or religious institution is entitled to manage the said property for and on behalf of the Math. The position of the Mahant under Hindu law is not strictly that of Trustee. As Mr. Ameer Ali delive-ring the judgment of the Board observed in Vidya Varuthi 1'hirtha v. Balusami Ayyar ('), "called by whatever name he is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution." When the gift is direc-tly to an idol or tempie, the seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. In almost every case the Mahant is given the right to (I) (1921) L, R. 48 I.A. 302, 311.

Ti1loly•t Shri Gtvindl•lj i Mahttraj •• Stale oj R•jasthan Go.jenir•:•tlkar, J

TUk.tJ.at .'1hri ('~'fttlla/Ji Mc.'i~11j •• Stal# of RnjtJJtluzrz

part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom. In no case was the property con\'cyerl to or vested in him, nor is he "trustee" in the Ellglish sense of the term, though in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, he is answerable as trustee in the general sense for mal-administration. This position has been accepted by this Court in The Conuni.~sioner, IJindu Rcliuiou.~ /~'ndo11.·111e11ts, Mr1dras v. Sri f.A1kshmindm 'l'hirtha Su•amiar of Sri Shirur Mntt. ('). Speaking for the unanimous Court in that case, Mukherjea, J., observed, "Thus in the conception of :\Iahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the clements of office and property, of duties and personal interest arc blended together, aud neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial interest of the 1fahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration and 1i:, right to create derivative tenures in respect to endmn cl pro-perties; and these and other rights of similar ch;irac-ter invest the office of the Mahant with the char.1cter of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still genuine legal right." On this view, this Court held thar the right of this character vesting in Mahant is right to property under Art. 19( I) (f) of the Constitution. Relying on this decision, it is urged that the Firman should be construed to make the Tilkayat Mahant or Shebait and as such, clothed with rights which amount to right to pro-perty under Art. l!J(l)(f) and which constitute pro-perty under Art. 31 (2).

Assuming that the construction of clause I of the Firman suggested by the learned Attorney.General is possible, let us examine the position on the basis that the Tilkayat can, in theory, be regarded as Mahant of the temple. What then are the rights to which, according to the relevant evidenr:e produced in this case, the Mahaut is entitled in respect of the temple? As Tilkayat, he has right to reside in (I) [1954] S.C.R. 1005.

the tempk; as such Mahant he has right to conduct or arrange for and supervise the worship of the idol in the trmple and the S("rvices rendered therein in accordanc:c with the traditional custom and usage. He has also the right to receive bhcnts on behalf of the idol and distribute Prasad in accordance with the traditional custom and usage. So far as these rights arc concerned, they have not been affected by the Act, and so, no argument can be raised that in affec-ting the said rights the Act has contravened either Art. 19(l)(f) or Art. 31(2). It is, however, argued that as Mahant, the Tilkayat had the right to manage the properties of the temple, to lease them out and in case of necessity, to alienate them for the purpose of the temple; and it is suggested that these rights constitute right to property under Art. 19(1) ( f) and property under Art. :H (2). The learned Attorney-General fairly conceded that there was no evidence to show that the right to alienate had ever been exercised in this case, but he contends that the existence of the right cannot be denied. It is also conceded that the right to manage the properties was subject to the strict and absolute supervision of the Darbar, but it is suggested that eveu so, it is right which must be regarded as right to property. In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to bear in mind that the extent of the rights available to the Tilkayat under clause 1 of the Firman cannot be said to have become larger by virtue of the fact that the Constitution came into force in 1950. It is only the rights to property which subsisted in the Tilkayat under the said Firman that would be protected by the Constitution, provided, of course, they are rights which attract the provisions of Art. 19(l)(f) or

Art. 31(2).

This branch of the argument urged on behalf of the Tilkayat naturally rests on the decision of this Court in the .case of the Cmnmissinn-, Hindu Reli-gi'.ous Endou·111ents, Mrulm.~ ('), that right of Mahant (I) [IV54] S.C.R. 1005.

lJ63 Tilkl,yat Shri GellinJla(ji Maharuj v. ~\'tate of Rajas than <:•jtndrazadkt.r, J.

Ti~.u Shri GIDiniWji Mohn•i v. .<1111 ef &jutMtl 1;.;'"""""'· J.

does amount to "a genuine legal right" and that the said right must be held to fall under Art. 19(1 ){f) because the word "property" used in the said clause o~ght to receive very liberal interpretation. lt will be recalled that in the said case, this Court in terms and expressly approved of the decision of Mr. Ameer Ali in Vidya Viruthi Thirtha's case('), which ,exhautively dealt with the position of the Mahant or the Shebait under Hindu law. We have already quoted the relevant observations made in that judgment and it would be relevant to repeat one of those observations in which the Privy Council stated that in almost every case the Mahant is given the right to part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoy· ment and the amount of usufruct depending again on usage and custom. It is true that in the passage in Mr. Justice .'.\Iukherjea's judgment in the case of thr. Commissioner, Hindu Religi01is Endowments, 1l1adras ('), this partk·dar statement has not been cited; but having refem,d to the rights which the Mahant can claim, the learned Judge has added that these and other rights of similar character invest the office of the Mahan! with the character· of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still genuine legal right. It is clear that when this Court held that the rights vesting in the Mahant as manager of the Math amount to genuine legal right to property, this Court undoubted-ly had in mind the fact that usually, the Mah ant or Shebait is entitled to be maintained out of the property of the Math or the temple and that the extent of the right to part of the usufruct and the mode of enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct always depended on usage and custom of the ;'\,fath or the temple. It is in the light of these rights, including particularly the right to claim part of the usufruct for his maintenance that this Court held that the totality of the rights amount to right to property under Art. 19 (1) (f).

(IJ (1921) L.R. 46 I.A. 302, 311.

(2) [19)4J S.C.R. 1005.

That takes us to the question as the nature and extent of the Tilkayat's rights in regard to the temple property. It is clear that the Tilkayat never used any income from the property of the temple for his personal needs or private purpose. It is true that the learned Attorney-General suggested that this consistent course of con-duct spreading over large number of years was the result of what he described as self-abnegation on the part <?f the Tilkayats from generation to generation and from Tilkayat's point of view, it can be so regard-ed because the Tilkayat thought and claimed that the temple and his properties together constituted his private property. But once we reach the conclusion that the temple is public temple and the properties belonging to it are t!1e properties of the temple over which the Tilkayat has rio title or right, we will have to take into account the fact that during, th~ long course of the management of this temple, the ·Tilkayat has never claimed any proprietary interest to any part of the usufruct of the properties of the, temple for his private personal needs, and so, that proprie-tary interest of which Mr. Ameer Ali spoke in dealing with (he position of the Mahant and the Shebait and to which this Court referred in the case of Commis-sioner, Hindu Religions Endowments, Madras ([1]),-ls lacking in the present case. What the Tilkayat can claim is merely the right to manage the property, to create- leases in respect of the properties in reason· able manner and the theoretical right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple; and be it noted that these rights could be exercised by the Tilkayat under the absolute and strict supervision of the Darbar _of Udaipur. Now, the right to manage the property belonging ·to the temple. or the right to create lease of the property on behalf of the temple, or the right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple under the sup_ rvision of the Darbar cannot, in our opinion, be equated with the totality of the powers· generally possessed by the Mahant or (I) (t954J S.C.R. 1005.

Tilkayat Shri Gooinlila(j i Maharaj v. Stal• of Rcjaslhan Gaju.drazadkar, J.

'Tilkay«I 'hri (;ooind!a/;; . ...fitharaj v. ttat1 ~J Rajo.'lh•n

even the Shcbait, and so, we are not prepared to hold that having regard to the character and extent of the rights which can be legitimately claimed by the T1lkayat even on the basis that he was Mahant governed by the tenm of the Firman, amour.t to right to property under Art. 19 (I) (f) or constitl!te property undrr Art. 31 (2).

Besides, we may add that even if it was held that thesl' rights constituted right to hold property their regulation by the relevant provisions of the Act would undoubtedy be protected by Art. 19 (5). The temple is public temple and what the legislature has purported to do is to regulate the administration of the properties of the temple by the Board of which the Tilkayat is and has to be member. Having rt"gard to the large estate owned by the Tilkayat and having regard to the very wide extent of the offerings made to the temple by millions of devotees fr.:im day to clay; the legislature wa> clearly justified in provid-ing for proper adminis1ration of the properlies of the temple. The restrictions imposed by the Act must, therefore, be treated as reasonable and in the interests of the general public.

Turning to l\fr. Pathak's argument that the rights constitute properly under Ari. 31 (2) and the Act contravenes the said provision because no com-pemation had been provided for, or no priociples have been prescribed in connection therewith, the answer would be the same. The right which the Tilkayat posscsst:s cannot be rc.~ardcd as property for the purpose of Art. 31 (:!). Besides, even if the said rights are held to be property for the purpose of Art. :ll (i), there are some obvious answers to the plea which may be briefly indicated.After Ari. 31 (2) was amended by the Cunsti· tution (Fourth Arr.endmcnt) Act, 19.?5, the pi_isition wilh regard to the scope and effect of the provmons of

1 S.C.R.

Art. :n (1) and 31 (2) is no longer in doubt. Article 31 (2) deals with the compulsory acquisition or requisition of citizen's property and it provides that citizen's property can be compulsorily acquired or requisi· tioned only for public purpose and by authority of law which provides for compensation and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which and the ma1;mer in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and it adds that no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate. Art. 31 (2A) which is expressed in negative form really amounts to this that where law provides for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquiiition or requisition'of property. If, on the other hand, the transfer of the ownership or the right to possession of any property is not made to the State or to corporation owned or controlled by the State, it would not be regarded as compulsory acquisition or .requisition of the property, notwith-standing that it does deprive any person of his property. In at.her words, the power to mah compulsory acquisition or requisition of citizen',; property provided for by Art. :l L(:2) is what the American lawyers described as "eminent domain"; all other cases where citizen is deprived of his pro-perty are covered by Art. :11 ( L) and they can broad-ly be said to rest on the police powers of the State. Deprivation of property falling under the latter category of cases cannot be effected save by autho-rity of law; this Court has held that the expression "save by authority of Jaw" postulates that the law by whose authority such deprivation can be effected must be valid law in the sense that it must not contravene the other fundamental rights guaranteec:j by the Constitution,

1963 Tilkayat Shri Gorindlalji Maharaj v. Slate of RajtJStll.Ofl Gajeru/ragal,".ar, J.

Tilk1yct Shri G1•inilclji M<Jlurr1j v. S11t1 ef R6.iaslh111 C:i.jtt1drff1odkar 1 1:

The argument which has been urged before us by Mr. Pathak is that the right to administer the properties of the temple which vested in the Mahant has been compulsorily acquired and transferred to Board constituted under the Act which Board is con-trolled by the State. We will assume that the Board in question is controlled by the State; but the ques-tion still remains whether the right which is allowed to vest in the Tilkayat has been compulsorily acquir-ed and has been transferred to the Board. In our opinion, what the Act purports to do is to extinguish the secular office vesting in tqe Tilkayat by which he was rr.anaging the properties of the temple. It is well-known that Mahant combines in himself both religions and secular office. This latter office has been extinguished by the Act, and so, it cannot be said that the rights vesting in the Tilkayat to administer the properties .have been compulsorily acquired. Acquisition of property, in the context, means the extinction of the citizen's rights in the property and the conferment of the said rights in the State or the State owned corporation. In the pre-sent case, the Act extinguishes the Mahant's rights and then creates another body for the purpose of administering the properties of the temple. In other words, the office of one functionary is brought to an end and another functionary has come into existence in its place. Such process cannot be said to cons· titute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of the rights vesting in the person holding that office ..Besides, there is annther way in which this question may perhap> be considered. What the Act purports to do is not to acquire the Tilkayat's rights but to require him to share those rights with the other member; of the Board. w~ have already seen that the Act postulates that the Mahant for the time being has to be mern ber of the Board and so, the administration of the properties which was so long carried on b'y the Mahant alone would here after

I S.C.R.

have to oe carried on by the Mahant along with his colleagues in the Board. This again cannot, we think, be regarded as compulsory acquisition of the Tilkayat's rights. It is not suggested that the effect of the relevant provisions of the Act is to bring about the requisitioning of the said rights. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the rights claimed by the Tilkayat constitute property under Art. 31(2), we do not think that the provisions of Art. 31(2) apply to the Act. But as we have already held, the rights in question do not amount to right to hold property under Art. 19(l)(f) or to property under Art. 31(2).

That takes us to the argument that the Act is invalid because it contravenes Art. 14. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. We have referred to the historical background of the presc::it legislation. At the time when Ordinance No. II of 1959 was issued, it had come to the know-ledge of the Government of Rajasthan that valuables such as jewelleries, ornamenj:s, gold and silver-ware and cash had been removed by the Tilkayat in the month of Dec em her 195 7, and as the successor of the State of Mewar, the State of Rajasthan had to exercise its right of supervising the due administra-tion of the properties of the temple. There is no doubt that the shrine at Nathdwara holds unique position amongst the Hindu shrines in the State of Rajasthan and no temple can be regarded as compa-rable with it. B,sides, the Tilkayat himself had entered into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining proper scheme for the administration· of the temple properties and for that purpose, suit under s. 92 of the Code had in fact been filed. Commission of Enquiry had to be appointed to investigate into the removal of the valuables. If the temple is public temple and the le~islature thought that it was essen-tial to safeguard the interests .of the temple by taking adequate legislative action in that behalf, it is difficult to appreciate how the Tilkayat can seriously

J96!J Titkvat Shri Gouindlalji Maharaj •• State of Rojasthan Goj111d1agadkar1 J,

1963 TilktfYat o!J'lni Gor1fodlt;lji Maharaj v. Stat1 of Rujasrh~n Gajendragadkar, :J.

contend that in passing the Act, the legislature has been guilty of unconstitutional discrimination. As has been held by this Court in the case of Shri Ram J[rishna D.t./mir& v. Shri J·ustice 8. R. Tendolkar ('), that law may be constitutional even though it relates to single individual if, on account .Df some special circumstances or rea.iom 2-ppli..;able to him and not applicable to others, that sing!.; individu.il may be treated as class by himself. Therefore, the plea raised under Art. 14 fails .

The next point to consider is in regard 'to the pleas raised more by the denomination than by the Tilkayat hims~lf under Arts: 25 and 26 of the Cons-ti,tution. The.attitude adopted by the denomination in it> writ petition is not very easy to appreciate. In the writ Retition filed on lJehalf oflhe denomina-tion, it was urged that the Tilkayat himself is the owner of all the .properties of the temple and as such, wal; en ti tk<l to manage· tl1cm in his discfetion and as he liked. This plea clearly supported the Tilkayat's stand that the temple in question was .a-pr-ivate temple belonging to h'.msdf and as such, ail the temple properties were his private properties. The denomination was cle~.i'ly ir, two minds. It was inclined more to support the Tilkayat's case than to ~ut up an alternative case that the denominati0n was interested in the mauagern~nt of th~se properties. Even so, so111~ allegations have been made in the writ petition filed on behalf :of the denomination from which it may perhaps be inferred that it was the alternative case of the denomination that the temple and the properties connected therewith belonged to the denomination according to its usages and tradi· tion, 'and therefore, the manag~ment of the said temple and the properties cannot be transferred to the Board. It is this latter alternative plea which .is based on Art. 2 5 (!} and Art. 26(b) of the Cons-titution. The argument i~ that the Art Contravenes the right guaranteed io the denomination by (I) [1949) S.C.R. 279, 297. '

1 S.C.R~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS

. Art: 25(1) freely to practise its religion and that it 1963_ also. contravenes the denomination's right guaranteed Titka;pat ·under Art. 2G(b) . and (d) to manage its own affairs Shri Govindlalji Maharaj in matters o religion, and to· administer its property. v. in accordance with law. For the purpose of dealing· · Sta'• o] RajaJthan with these arguments, we will assume that the Gojmdragadk.ar, denomination has beneficial interest in the proper-ties of the temple.·

Titka;pat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v.

Gojmdragadk.ar, J.

Articles 25- and 26 constitute the fundamental rights to freedom of religion guaranteed to the citizens of this country. Article 25 (1) protects the citizen's · fundamental right to freedom of conscience and his right freely to profess, practise .'and propagate reli-. gion .. The protection given to this right is, however, not absolute. It is subject to public order, morality and health as Art. 25 (1) itself denotes. It is also subject . to the laws, existing or future, which are specified in Art. 25. (2). . Article 20 guarantees frt:edom of the denominations or sections thereof to manage their religious . affairs and their properties. Article 26 (b) provides that subject to public order; morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion ; and-Art. 26 (d) lays down similar right to administer the property of the denomination· in · accordance with law. Article 26 (c) refers to the right of the denomination to own' and acquire movable and immovable . property and it is in respect of such "property that · clause (d) makes the provision which we have just quoted. The scope 'and effect of these articles has been considered by this Court on several occasions. "The word "religion" used in Art. 25 (l)," observed· Mukherjea, J., speaking for the Court in the case of the Commissioner; "Hindu Religious Endowments, JJ!adras ('), "is matter of faith-with individuals and communities and· it is not necessarily thristic. It undoubtedly has its basis in system cif hP!iefs or doctrines which are regarded l:iy those who profess '. {I) [1954) S.C.R. !COS.

1963 TilJ:OJOl Sh.ri Got·iruilalji Maharaj v. S1atr of Rajc1t1*i Caj1ndra1adkar, J.

620 S\.JPREME l.OURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.

that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it is not correct to say that religion is nothing else b•1t doctrine or belief. religion may not only lay down code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which arc regarded as integral parts of religion and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress."

In Shri Venkataramana Devara v. The State of Mysore ('), Venkatarama Aiyar, J., observed "that the matter of religion in Art. 26 (b) inclurle even practices which are regarded by the community as parts of its religion." It would thus be clear that religiom practice to which Art. 25 (!) refers and ~ffairs in m:1tters of religion to which Art. 26 (b) refers, include practices which are an i"ntegral part of the religi9n itself and the protection guaranlcl'J by :\rt 1,; (I) and Art. 26 (b) extend~ to such practices.

In deciding the question as to whether given religious practice is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always would br. whether it is regarded as such by the C'l'll'll'tnity fo'!owing the religion or not. This for.nub may in some cases present difficulties in its operation. Take the case of practice in relation to food or dress. !f in given proceeding, one section of the community claims that while performing certain rites while dress is an intrgral part of the religion itself. whereas another section contends that vcllow dress and not the white dress is the essential part of the religion, how is the Court going to decide the question ? Similar disputes may arise in regard to food. In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as to competing religious practices the Court may not be able to resolve the dispute by blind application of the formula that the community decides which

(1) [1958] S.C.R. 895, 909.

practice is an integral part of its religion, because the community may speak with more than one voice and the formula would, therefore, break down. This question will always have to be decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion. It is in the light of this possible compli-cation which may arise in some cases that this Court struck note of caution in the case of The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali ('), and observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated as part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part ; otherwise even purely secular practices which arc not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with religious form and may make claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 25 ( 1).In this connection, it cannot be ignored that what is protected under Arts. 25 (1) and 26 (b) respectively are the religious practices and the right to manage affairs in matters of religion. If the practice in question is purely secular or the affair which is controlled by the statute is essentially and absolutely secular in character, it cannot be urged that i\rt. 25 (1) or Art. 26 (b) has been contravened. The protection is given to the practice of religion and to the denomination's right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Therefore, whenever claim is made on behalf of an individul citizen that the impugned statute contravenes his funda-mental right to practis~ religion or claim is made on behalf of the denomination that the fundamental right guaranteed to it to manage its own affairs in (I) [1962) I S.C.R. 383, 411.

IMJ Tilkoyt1t Shri Gouinilclji Mt1h«raj •• Stat~ fJj Rajasthan CajenJra:adkar, J

1963 ·1iU:ayat lhti G~it1,l1/ji Mahmoj s .. 1, of RojostAon "

622 SUPREME COURT REPpRTS (1964] VOL.

matters of religion is contravened, it is necessary to consider whether the practice in question is religious or the affairs in respect of which the right of management is alleged to have been contravt>ncd are affairs in matters of religion. If the practice is religious practice or the affairs are the affairs in matters of religion, then, of course, the rights guaran-teed by Art. 25 (I) and Art. 26 (b) cannot be contravened.

It is true that the decision of the question as to whether certain practice is religious practice or not, as well as the question as to whether an affair In question is an affair in matters of religion or not, may present difficulties because sometimes practices, religious and secular, arc inextricably mixed up. This is more particularly so in regard to Hindu religion because as is well known, under the provi-sions of ancient Smritis, all human actions from birth to death and most of the individual actions from day to day are regarded as religious in character. As an illustration, we may refer to the fact that the Smritis regard marriage as sacra-ment arid not contract. Though the task of disengaging the secular from the religious may not be easy, it must nevertheless be attempted in dealing with the claims for protection under Arts. 25 (1) and 26(b). If the practice which is protected under the former is religious practice, and if the right which is protected under the latter is the right to manage affairs in matters of religion, it is necessary that in judging about the merits of the claim made in that behalf the Court must be satisfied that the prac-tice is religious and the affair is in regard to matter of religion. In dealing with this problem under Arts. 25(1) and 26(b), Latham, C. J.,'s. observation in Adela·1'.de Company of Jehovah's witne8ses lnr,or. poraUd v. 'l'he Commonwealth('), that "what is reli-gion to one is superstition to another", on which Mr. Pathak relies, is of no relevance. If an obviously (1) 67 C.L.R. 116, 123.

1 s.c.R..

secular matter is claimed to be ~atter of religion, or if ~n obviously secular practice is alleged to be reli-gious practice, the Cpurt would be justified in rejec-ting the claim because the protection guaranteed by Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b) cannot be extended to secu-lar practices and affairs in regard to denominational matters which are not matters of religion, and so, -a claim made by citizen that purely secular matter amounts to religious practice, or similar claim made on behalf of the denomination that purely secular matter is an affair in matters of religion, may have to be rejected on the ground that it is based on irrational considerations and cannot attract the pro-visions of Art. 25(1) or Art. 26{b). This aspect of the matter must be borne in mind in dealing with the true scope and effect of Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b).Let us then enquire what is the right which has been contravened by the relevant provisions of the.Act. The only right which, according to the denomination, has been contravened is the right of the Tilkayat to manage the property belonging to the temple. It is urged that throughout the history of this temple, its properties have been managed by the Tilkayat and so, such management by the Ti!kayat amounts to religious practice under Art. 25( 1) and constitutes the denomination's right to manage the affairs of its religion under Art. 26(b). We have no hestitation in rejecting this argument. The right to 'manage the properties of the temple is purely secular matter and it cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as reli-gious practice so as to fall under Art. 25( I) or as amounting to affairs in matters of religion. It is true that the Tilkayats have been respected by the followers of the denomination and it is also true that the management has remained with the Tilkayats, except on occasions like the minority of the Tilkayat when the Court of Wards stepped in. If the temple had been private and the properties of the temple had hr.longed to the Tilkayat, it wa.q another matter.

1963 Tilkt1y«t Shti G1M,.tll1lji Maharaj v. Stile of Raj4st"4n GtJjendt•zaikar, J, 1

024";'· 'sUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.

But once it is held that the temple is_ public temple, it is difficult to accede to the argument that the tenets of the Vallabha : cult require as· matter of religion' that the properties must be managed by the Tilkayat. In. fact, no' such tenet has been adduced before us. · So long as, the denomination believed that the pro:· .perty belonged to the Tilkayat · like the temple, there · was no occasion· to consider whether ·the manage-- ment of. the property should be .in the hands of any- --body. else. The course of conduct ·of the denomina-. tion and the ·Tilkayat based on that belief may have spread for . many years, but, in our opinion, such -course of conduct cannot be regarded as giving rise to religicius 'practiceunder Art; 25(1). · distinc-tion must always be made between practice which · •is religious and practice in regard to matter. which is purely· secular and has no element of religion asso-ciated with it. ·. Therefore, we, are satisfied that the ··claim made -by·· the denomination that the Act im-pinges. on the rights guaranteed to it by Art. 25(1) and 26(b) must be rejected. ·

"'"· . Tilk•;111t , Shri G•11i11tilalji M•lwaj v. ,,'l•te ef Rajaslhan C1jmiraz«dku, J.

That leaves one more point to be considered

. under Art. 26(d). · It is urged that the right of the denomination to administer its property has virtually been taken away by the· Act, and so, it is invalid. It would be noticed that Art. 26(d) recognises the denomination's right· to administer its propertv, but 'it clearly provides that the said right to administer the property must be in accordance with law. l\fr. · .Sastri for the denomination suggested that law in the context is the la\v prescribed by the religious' tenets of the denomination and not legislative enact•· ment passed by -a competent legislature: In our _ opinion, this argument is wholly untenable. In the · context, the law means law passed by a· competent · legislature and Art. _ 26(d) provides that though the· denomination· has .the right to .administer its pro- -perty, it must ·administer the property in accordance ·-·with law. In other words, this clause emphatically . ·

brings ciut the competence of the legislature to make

law in regard to the administration of the property belonging to the denomination. It is true that under the guise of regulating the' admi-nistration of the property by the denomination, the denomination's right must nQt be extinguished or altogether destroyed. That is what thi9 Court has held in the case of the Oommissianer, Hindu Reli-giou9 Endowments JJ!adras .([1]) and Ratilal Panai;oond Gandhi v. The State of Bomhay (').

Incidentally, this clause will help to detennine

the scope and effect of the provisions of Art. · 26(·b). Administration of the denomination's property which is the subject-matter of this clause is obviously out-side the scope of Art. 26 (h). Matters relating to the administration of the denomination's property fall k> be governed by Art. 26(d) and cannot attract the pro-vi.sions of Art. 26(b). Article 26 (b) relates to affairs in matters of religion such as the performance of tile religious· rites or ceremonies, or the observance of religious festivals and the like; it does not refer to the administration of the property at all. A"ticle 26(d) therefore, justifies the enactment of law to regulate the administration of the denomination's property and that is precisely what the Act has purported to do in the present case. If the clause "affairs in matters of religion" were to include affairs in regard to all matters, whether religious or not the provision under Art. 26 Id) for legislative regulation of the adminis-tration of the denomination's property would be rendered illusory.

It is however, argued that the constitution of the Board in which the administration of the pro-perty now vests is not the denomination, and since the administration is now left to the Board, the den'.>mination has been wholly deprived of its right to administer the property. It is remarkable that this plea should be made by the representatives of· the (IJ [1954] S,C.R. ICO~. (2) [1954] S.C.R. JC»5.

19113 \l'".U.,.t >h<i ·-"~'I M-.j y, .. &Ml of 114i«1llwo ___,... {)qJ,,.,,.,..,, J,

Til.t.i1•1

Slwl Goootl/l•lii . M•mlj y. &.u ef ~"--Ga} ... .,..... J.

denomination who in their writ petition were pre· pared to support the Til!<ayat in his case that the temple and the properties of the tl"mple were his private property. That apart, we think that the constitution of the Board has been ddiberately so prescribed by the ·legislature as to ensure that the denomination should be arlequately and fairly repre-sented on the Board. We have al!'t'ady construed s. 5 and we have held thats. 5 12) (g) requires that the members of the Board other than the Collector of Udaipur District shou Id not only profess Hindu religion but must also belong to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhi Sampradaya. It i~ true that these members are nominated by the State Governmt"nt, but we have not been told how else this could have been effrctively arranged in the interests of the temple itself. The number of the devotees visiting the temple runs into lacs ; there is no organisation which comprehensively represents the devotees as cla~s ; there is no register of the devotees and in the very naturt" of things, it is impossible to keep such register. Therefor<", thl" very large mass of Vallabh's followf'rs who constitute the denomination can be represented on the Board of :nanagement only by proper nomination made ~>y the State Government. and so, we are not impressed by the plea that the management by the Board constituted unrler the Act will not be the management .,f the denomination. In this connection, wr may refer to clause l of the Firman which vt"sted in the Darbar absolute right to supervise the management of the property. As successor-in-interest of the Darbar, the state of Rajasthan can be trusted to nominate members on the Board who would fairlv represent the denomina1ion. Having regard to all the relevant circumstances of this case: we do not think that the legislature could have adopted any other alternative for the purpose of constituting the Board. Tht"refore, we must hold that the challenge to the validity of the Act on theground that it contravenes Arts. 25 (1), 26 (b) and 26 (d) must be repelled.

It still remains to consider the provisions of the Act which have been challenged by the Tilkayat and the denomination as well as those which have been struck down by the High Court and in respect of which the State has preferred appe· ls. We will take .these sections in their serial order.. We have considered ss. 3, 4, 16, 22 and 34 and have held that these sections are valid because the scheme envisaged by the said sections clearly protects the religious rites, ceremonies and services rendered in the temple and the Tilkayat's. status and powers in respect thereof. The said scheme merely allows the ad-ministration of the properties of the temple which is purely secular matter to be undertaken by the Board, and so, it is not necessary to refer to the sa;d sections again.

Section 2 (viii) which defines temple as inclu-ding the temple of Shri Navnitpriyaji and Shri Madan Mohanlalji has been struck down by the High Court in regard to the said two subsidiary deities. The High Court has held that the two deities Navnitpriyaji and Madan Mohanlalji are the private deities of the Tilkayat and it was not competent to the legislature to include them within the definition of the temple under s. 2 (viii). It was urged before the High Court that the said two idols had been transferred by the Tilkayat to the public temple and made part of it, but it has held that there was no gift or trust deed .by the Tilkayat divesting himself of all his rights in tho~e two idols and its property and so, the validity of the section could not be sus-tained on the ground of s11ch transfer. The correct-ness of this conclusion is rhallenged by the learned Solicitor-General on behalf of the State. In dealing with this question, the conduct of the Tilkayat needs to be examined. On October 15, 1956 report

J96S Tallwp S/,ri Gollindhljl M.Juw'!i v. S1ot1 of /!Jij.utlwt Gqjnulraga4ar, J.

r ilA:a ;iat Slrrl GoWtdloli M"""'•i Y. 51411 •/ RojaJlhan C.jm/To1odAm, J.

was made by Mr. Ranawat to the Tilkayat in respect of these two idols. It appears that the grant of some villages in respect of these idols stood , in the name of the Tilkayat and after the said villages were re· sumed by the State, question arose as to the com-pensation payable to the ow11er of tht said villages. In that connection, Mr. Ra11awat reported to the Tilkayat that it would be to the ajvantage of the two idols if the said lands along with the idols were treated, as part of the public temple. He cited the precedent ofthe lands belonging to the Nathdwara Temple in suP.port of his plae. On receiving this report, the Ttlkayat was pleased to "transfer the ownership of Shri Thakur Navn"tpriyaji, Shri Madan Mohanji and Bethaks to the principal temple of Shri Shrinathji. Of course, he retained to himself the right and privilege of worship over rhose temples and Bethaks as in thr. case of Shrinathji temple. The Tilkayat also expressed his concurrence with the proposal made in this report and si~ned in token of his -a~eement. It appears that after .orders were issued in accordance with the decision of the Tilkayat, the two temples were treated as part of .the bigger temple of Shrinathji. This is evidenced by the resolution which was passed •at· the meeting of the Power of Attorney Hlllders of theTilkayat on the same day i.e., 15·10-1956. One of the resolutions passed at the said meeting shows that the proposal regarding the temples and Bethaks owned by His Holiness stating therein that His Holiness had been pleased to transfer the ownership thereof to Shrinathji, was considered. That proposal along with the list of temples and Bethaks was produced before the Committee. The Tilkayat was present at the meeting and he confirmed the proposal and put his signature thereon before the Committee. Thereupon, the Committee accepted the proposal with thanks and instro1cted the Executive Officer to do the needful in that behalf. Thus, .the Tilkayat proposed to the Committee of his Power of Attorney

Holders that the two idols and their Bethaks should be transferred from his private estate to the principal temple of Shrinathji and that proposal was accepted and thereafter the two idols were treated as part of the principal temple.

After this transfer was thus formally completed it appears that the Tilkayat was inclined to change his mind and so, in submitting to the Committee list cif temples and Bethaks transferred by him to the principal temple of Shrinathji, he put heading to the list which showed that the said transfer had been made for management and administration only and was not intended to be an absolute transfer. This was done 011 or about November 23, 1956.

This conduct on the part of the Tilkayat was naturally disapproved by the Committee and the heading of the list was objected to by it in letter written on December 31, 1956. To this letter theTilka-yat gave reply 011 January 7, 1957, and he sought to explain and justify the wording adopted in the heading of the list. It is thus clear that the heading of the list forwarded by the Tilkayat to the Commi-ttee must be ignored because that heading clearly shows change of mind on the part of the Tilkayat and the question as to whether the two idols form part of the principal temple ot Shrinathji must .be decided in the light of what transpired on Octo-ber 15, 1956. Judged. in that way, there can be no doubt that the Tilkayat solemnly transferred the two idols to the principal temple and in that sense, gave up his ownership over the idols and formal proposal made in that behalf was accepted by the Committee. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in not giving effect to this transfer on the ground that no gift or trust deed had been duly executed by the Tilkayat in that behalf. dedi-cation of private property to charity need not be made by writing: it can be_ made.orally or eveu cau

1963 Tilkayat Shri Govi•dl~ji · Mahoraj · v. Siate of RtYasthon Gujendragadkar, I•

'*' Tui•.141 6Jrri ... ,n-1i.u1 MlllrMoj •• Stou oj Rojostb """"".,,..,, J.

li30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l!Jti4J VOL.

be inferred from conduct. In rhe present cas~, there is much more than conduct in support of the State's plea that the two idols had been transferred. There is formal report made by the Mana~er to the Tilkayat which was accepted by the filkayat ; it was followed by formal proposal made by the Tilkayat to the Commitree and the Committee at its meeting formally accepted that proposal and at the meeting when this proposal was accepted, the Tilkayat was present. Therefore, we musr hold that the two idols now form part of the principal temple and have been properly included within the defini· tion of the word "temple" under s. 2 (viii). We should accordingly set aside rhe decision of the High Court and uphold the validity ofs. 2 (viii).

The proviso to s. 5 (2) (g) has been attacked by the learned Attomcy·General. He contends that in making the Collector statutory member of the Bt:'-rd even though he may not be Hindu and may not belong to the denomination, the legislature has contrav~ned Arts. 25 (I) and 26 (b). We have already dealt with rhe general plea raised under the said two artides. We do not think that the provi-sion that the Collector who is statutory member of the Board n~ed not satisfy 1he requirementS' of s. 5 (2) (g), can be said to be invalid. The sole object in making the Collector member of the Board is to associate the Chief Executive Officer in r.he District with the administration of' the property of the temple. His presence in the Board would naturally help in the propr.r administration of the temple properties and in that sense, must be treated as valid and proper. This provision is obviously consistent with the State's right of supervision over the mana-gement of the temple properties as specified in the Firruao of 1934.

Sections 5, 7 and 11 have already been consi-dered by us with particular reference to the possible

1 S.C.R.

removal of the Tilka yat under s. 7 and its conse-quences. It may be that in view of the fact that even if the Tilkayat is removed under s. 7 (I) (b) and (c) he ha~ to be again nominated to the Board, the legislature may well have exempted the Tilkayat from the operation of s. 7 (1) (b) and (c). That, however, cannot be said to make the said provision invalid in Jaw.

Sections 10 and 35 have been attacked on the ground that they empower the State Govern-ment to leave the administration of the te.nple property to non-Hindu. It will be noticed thats. 10 contemplates that if Board is dissolved for the reasons specified in it. the Government is required to direct the immediate reconstitution of another Board and that postulates that the interval between the dissolution of one Board and the consti-tution of fresh Board' wauld b~ of v~ry short duration. If the legislature thought it necessary to provide for the management of the temple propertie5 for such short period on an ad hoc basis, the provision cannot be seriously challenged. What is · true about this provision under s. 10, is equally true about the transitional provision in s. 35.

·part of s. 16 ha5 been struck down by the High Court in so far as it refers to the affairs of the temple. This section authorises the Board to manage the properties and affairs of the temple. The High Court thought that the expression "affairs of the temple" is too wide and may include religious affairs of the temple; and since in managing these affairs of the temple, the section does not require that the management should be according to the customs and usages of the denomination, it came to the conclusion that the clause "affairs of the temple" is invalid an.cl should, therefore, be struck down.

We are not satisfied that this view is correct.

In the context the expre5sion "affairs of the temple"

1963 Ti/~·~• Shri c;;J;.di 'l(jl MahM.j •• Slal1 of Rajastlwa Gajt11Jra1atlkt1r, J.

Til.k,1oi ,(/iri &aUintllalji }JaAlnoj v. S14to of Roj4•/""" Gqj111drogndkor, J.

(i32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.

clearly refers tu the purely srcular affdirs in regard to the administration of the temple. Clearly, s. Hi can-not be construed in isolation and must be read long with s. 2:l. That is why it has been left to the Board to manage the properties of the temple as well as the purdy secular affairs of the temple, and so, this management need not be governed by the custom and usage of the den0mination. If the expression "affairs of the temple" is construed in this narrow sense as it is intended to be, then there is no infirmity in the said provisions. We may add that the ex-pression "affairs of the temple" has been used in s. 28 (I) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charit-abl-:: Endowments Act No. 22 of 195!! in the same sense. Therefore, we would hold that the High Court was in error in striking down the clause "affairs of the temple" occuring ins. 16.The next section to ci:.nsider is s. 21. This section gives to the Board complete power of appoint-ment, suspension, removal, dismissal, or imposition of any other punishment on the officers and servants of the temple or the Board, the Chief Executive Offirer being exempted from the operation of this section. It has been urged before us that this section mighl include even the l\fokhia and the Assistant Mukhia who are essentially religious officers of the temple concerned with the performance of religious rites and services to the idols; and the argument is that if they are made the servants of the Board and are not sub-jected to the discipline of the Tilkayat, that would be contrary to Art. 25 (!) and 26 (b) of the Consti-1.ution. In considering this argument, we must have ,·egard to the fact that the Mukhia and the Assistant Mukhia are not only concernfd with the religious worship in the temple, but ar ~ also required to handle jewellery and ornaments of very valuable order which are put on the idol and removed from the idol every day, and the safety of the said valuable jewellery is secular matter within

the jurisdiction of the BJard. That is why it was necessary' that the Board shou Id be given jurisdiction over those officers in s<i far as they are concerned with the property of temple. \Ve have no doubt that in working out the. , Act, the Board will act reasonably and fairly by the Tilkayat and nothing will be done to impair his status or to affect his authority over the servants of the temple in so far a~ they are concerned with the religious part of the worship in the temple. ~ince the worship in the temple and the ccremoriies and festivals in it are requir-ed to be conducted according to the customs and usages of the denomination by s. 16, the authority of the Tilkayat in respect of the servants in charge of the said worship and ceremonies and festivals will have to be respected. It is true that soon after the Act was passed a:nd its implementation began, both parties appeart;d to have adopted unhelpful attitudes. We were referred at length to the correspondence that passed between the Tilkayat and the Committee in res-pect of some of these matters. We do not think it neces· sary to consider the merits of that controversy because we are satisfied that once the Act is upheld, it will be -implemented by the Board consistently with the true spirit of the Act without offending the dignity and status of the Tilkayat as " religious head in charge of the temple : and the affairs in matters of religion conn~cted with the temple. Therefore, we do n;it thin!(" it would be right to strike down any part of s. 21 as suggested by the learned Attorney-Genera\.

The validity of s. 27 has been challenged by the learned Attorney-General on the ground that it empowers the State Government to depute any person to enter the premises of the temple, though, in given case, such person may not be entitled to make such an entry. Even non-Hindu person may be appoin-ted by the;: State Government to inspect the properties of the temple and if he insists upon making an entry in the temple, that would contravene the provisions

Talkayat ~:;n· Got•indlalji la-faharaj •• State of Rajasthara Gajendragadkar, },

1963 Ti/4o.J41 Mri GoWtJ/alji Mtzlr11aj •• Sl•U of R1jttst~ori Gajuulratadkar, J.

of Art. 25 (I) and 26 (b) of the Constitution; that is the argument urged in support of the challenge to the validity of s. 27. We do not think tliere is any sub-stance in this argument. All that the section does is to empower the State Government to depute person to inspect the properties of the temple and its records, correspondence, plans, accounts and other relevant documents. We do not think that the section consti-tutes any encroachment of the rights protected by Art. 25 (1) or Art. 26 (b). If the administration of the properties of the temple has been validly left to the Board constituted under the Act, then tl7e power of inspection is necessarily incidental to the power to administer the properties1 and so in giving the power to the State Government to depute person to mspect the properties of the temple,· no effective complaint can be made against the validity of such power. The fear expressed by the learned Attor-ney-General that non-Hindu may in.•ist upon enle· ring the temple in exercise of the authority conferred on him by the S1ate Government under a. 27 is, in our opinion, far-fetched and imaginary. We are satisfied that the power of inspection which the State Government may confer Uj)On any person under s. 27 is intended to safeguard the proper administration of the properties of the temple and nothing more. Thr.refore, we do not think that s. 27 suffers from any constitutional infirmity. In this connection, we may add that similar provision contained in the Madras Religious Endowments Act has been upheld by this Court in the case of The Oommiaaioner, Hindu Reli-gious Endowment8, Madras ([1]).

That takes us to s. 28 (2) and (3). These two sub-sections have been struck down by the High Court because it thought that they were inconsistent with the view expressed by this Court in the case ot Ratilal Panachand Gandhi ('). While di!ICUSSing the validity of these two sub-sections, the High Court has observed "that without entering into an elaborate (I) (195f] S.o.R.1005. (2) [115t] Lc.a.11155,

discussion on the point, we may point out that such provision has been held to J:>e invalid by the Supreme Court in the case of Rutilal Panachand Gandhi" ('). The learned Solicitor-General contmds and we think, rightly, that the observations on which the High Court has relied sup;:iort the validity of the two sub-sections and are inconsistent with the decision of the High Court itself. In the case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi ([1]), this Court was dealing with the validity of ss. 55 and 56 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. 1950 (No. i!9 of 1950). Section 55 of the said Act purported to lay down the rule of cy pres in relation to the administration of religious and chari-table trust; and s. 56 dealt with the powers of the courts in-relation to the said application of cy pres doctrine. This CJurt observed that these two sections purported to lay down how the doctrine of cy pres is to be applied in regard to the administration of public trust of religious or charitable character; ,md then it proceeded to examine the doctrine of cy pres as it was developed by the Equity Courts in England and as it had been adopted by our Indian Courts since long time past. Ia the opinion of this Court, the provisions of ss. 55 and 56 extended the said doctrine much beyond its recognised limits and further intro-duced certain principles which ran counter to well-established rules of law regarding the administration of charitable trusts. It is significant that what the impugned sections purported to authorise was the diversion of the trust property or funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the court consi-dered expedient or proper although the original ob-jects of the founder could still be carried oµt-and that was an unwarrantable encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs. In support of this view, the tenets of the Jain religion were referred to and it was observed that apart from the tenets of the Jain religion, it would be violation of the freedom of religion and of the right which religious (I) (1958] S,C.R. 1055,

1962 Tilka;·m Shri Govindialji Mal:araj •• Statrof Rojauhari Gajendragadkar, J.

1Ukayot ~h•i Gouircdlulj t M•ltfffo:j v. SlaJt oj Raj<ulM"

denomination has, to manage its own affa:rs in matters of religion, to allow any secular authority to divert the trust money for purposes other than those for which the trust was created. On this view, s. 5:i (3) which contained the offending provision, and the corresponding provision relating to the powers of the Court occurring in the latter part of s. 56 (I) were struck down. In this connection, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that in dealing with this question, this Court has expressly observed that the doctrine of cy pres can be applied where there is surplus left after exhausting the purposes specified by the settler. In other words, the decision of this Court in the case of Rutilal Panachand Gandhi (1 ). cannot be applied to the provisions of s. 28 (2) and (3) which deal with the application of the surplus in fact after this ·decision was pronounced, the relevant provision of the Bombay Act has been amended an<l the application of the doctrine of cy pres is now confined to the surplus available after the purposes of the trust have been dealt with. The High Court has not noticed the fact thats. 28 (2) and (3) dealt with the application of the surplus funds and that postulates that these two sub·sections can be invoked only if and after the main purposes of the public temple have been duly satis-fied. Therefore, we hold that the High Court was in error in striking down s. 28 (2) and (3) on the gruund that they are inconsistent with the decision of this Court in the case of Rati/al Panaclwnd Gandhi ('). We may add that this position was not seriouly dis-puted before us by the learned Attorney· General.

The next section is 30 (2) (a). It confers on the State Government the power to make rules in respect of the qualifications for holding the office of and the allowances payable to the Goswami. This sub-section has been struck down by the High Court and the learned Solicitor.General does not quarrel with the · conclusion of the High Court. He has, however, fairly conceded that though the first part of (I) (t95f] S.C.R. 105.5.

1 S.C.R.

s. 30 (2) (a) may be struck down, the latter part need

not be struck down. This latter part allows rules to be framed by the State Government in regard to the allowances payable to the Goswami. We think it is but fair that this part should be upheld so that proper rule can be made by the State Government determining the quantum of allowances which should be paid to the Go1wami and the manner in which it should be so paid. We would, therefore strike down the first part of s. 30 (2) (a) and uph'Jld the latter part of it which has relation to the allowances pay· able to the Goswami. The two parts of the said sub-section are clearly severable and so; one can be struck down without affecting the other.

In regard to s. 36, the High Court thought that

it give1 far too sweeping powers to the Government and so, it has struck it down. Section 36 merely empowers the Government to give such directions as nuy be necessary to carry out the objects of the Act in case difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. We may, in this connection, refer to the fact that similar provision is contained ins. :rn of the Jagannath Temple Act (Orissa 11 of 1955). The object of s. 3fl in the Act is merely to remove difficulties in the implementation of the Act. It i5 in that seme that the section must be narrowly construed and the scope and ambit of the power conferred on the State Government be circumscribed. If the section is so construed, it would not be open to any serious objection. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High CJurt was in error in striking down this section on the ground that -the powers conferred on the State Government are too wide.That takes us to s. 37 which has been struck down by the High Court on the ground that it can be utilised as drfence to suit under s. 31. We have already noticed that s. 31 empowers person having an interest to imtitute suit for obtaining any of the

1!63 Tilkayat Shri Go1intllalji Maharaj •• )late of R12Ja1than Gajentfra,e.idkar, J.

Ti/kayat Sl11i Go11indl1lji Mcltaraj •• Sttttt of R'fia.1thon 1."a}tndragaJkar, J.

reliefs specified in clauses (a) to (e) of that section. The High Court thought that s. 37 may introduce an impediment against suit brought by private in-dividual under s. 31. We are satisfied that the Hi!(h Court was in error in taking this view. All that this section purports to do is to provide for bar to any suits or proceedings against the State Government for any thing done or purported to be done by it under the provisions of the Act. Such provisions are contained in many Acts, like, for instance, Acts in regard to Local Boards and Municipalities. It is true that s. 37 does not require that the act done or purported to be done should be done bona fide, but that is presumably because the protection given by s. :-11 is to the State Government and not to the officers of the State. The effect of the srction merely is to save acts done or purported to be done by the State under the provisions of the Act; it cannot impinge upon the rights of citizen to file suit under s. 31 if it is shown that the citizen is interested within the meaning of s. ~I (I). We are inclined to hold that the High Court haJ, 'with respect, mis-judged the true scope and effect of the provisions of s. 37 when it srruck down the said section as being inv?.Jid. We must accordingly reverse the said con-clusion of the High Court and uphold the validity of s. 37.

The result is that the appeals preferred by the Tilkayat, the denomination and Ghanshyamlalji fail and are dismi~sed. So does the writ petition filrd by the Tilkayat fail and the sJme is dismissfd. The appeals pt cf erred by the Srate substantially succeed and the decision of the High Court striking down as ultm !'ires part of s. 2 (viii) in relation to the idols of Navnitpriyaji and Madan .Mohanlalji; part of s. Hi in so far as it refrrs to the affairs of the temple; s. 28 (2) and (:l), s. ::16 and s. :ii is reversed. We however, confirm the decision of the High Court in so far as it has struck down s. 30 (2) (a) in regard to

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT RgPORTS

the qualifications for holding the office of the Goswami but we reverse its decision in so far as it relates to the latter part of s. 30 (2) (a) which deals with the allowances payable to the Goswami. In the circumstances of this case, we direct that parties should bear their own costs throughout.

·Appeal dismissed.

CHANDRA DEO SINGH

PROKASH CHANDRA BOSE & ANR.

(S.J. IMAM, K. SuBBA RAo, N. RAGHUBAR DAYAL, and J. R. M UDHOLKAR, JJ.)

Criminal Law-Proceeding under •· 202 Criminal Pro<»-dure Oode-Revision.pelitim by rllllpondent No. 1 and the other persons-IVhelher rllllpondent No. 1 has locus Btandi to conteRt criminal ca-Be before i .. ue of process-Procedural defect-Powers of M"ilistrate in committal proceedings and in con•idering evidence-Recording of reasons-Gode of Criminal Proce· dure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), sa. 202, 203.

first information report was filed stating that the respondent No. I and some others committed murder. There-after person claiming t.; be relative of the dccea•ed filed complaint alleging that the first information report was false and that certain persons other than those stated in the first information report had committed the murder. It was prayed that process be issued against these persons. The Sub-Divi· sional Ma~istrate before whom thii complaint was filed directed the First Class Magistrate to inquire into the allegation and to make report. Subsequently the nephew of the deceased filed complaint alleging that respondent No. 1 had committed the murder. The Sub-Division-11 Magistrate directed the First Class Magistrate to enquire into this complaint also and to report. During the enquiry aparl from the witness produced

Tilkayal ";hri Govindlt1lji Maharaj v. .51011 of Rajaslhan Gqjmdr11adkar, J.

1963 January, 22.