SHYAM BEHARI AND 0THERS versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS

Hori CliaNn K111'11fl' Y. Stol• of Biliar Ga/•ndragadkor C.I.

JNI

unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on the con-fession of co-accused person, the presumption of innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the accus-ed person and compels the Court to render the verdict that the charge is not proved against him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is precisely what has happened in these appeals.

In the result, the appeals are allowed and the orders of

conviction and sentence passed against the two appellants Haricharan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam are set aside and the accused are ordered to be acquitted.

Appeals allowed.

SHY AM BEHAR! AND 01HERS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)

Land Acquisition-Who/• comp•nsation to b• paid by th• company-No declaration that the land wa.r needed for compani-Yalidlty-. T.st- Land Acquisition Act, (I of 1894), ss. 4, 6(1).

The Government issued notification on December 3, 1960 under 1. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act stating that the land described in the anncxure to the notification was required for public purpose, namely, for the construction of buildings for god.owns and administrative office. The appellants challenged the validity 'of the notification in the High Court contending that the notification under s. 6 of the Act did not describe the land to be acquired with sufficient particularity and that although the notification mentioned that the land was required for public purpoSe, in fact it was required for company, which was entirely different from Government and was therefore invalid. Soon after the writ petition Was filed, the State Government issued fresh notification on April 19, 1961 mainly under s. 17(1) read withs. 17(4) of the Act The notiftc:a-tion stated that it was declared under 1. 6 of the Act that tho land wu required for public purpo5e, namely, "for the Premier Refractory Fae-. tory and work connected therewith." At the time of beari111 of the writ petition in the High Court, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that llotb the notifications nndu 1. 6 of the December 3, 1960 lllld AprD I,,

6 S.C.R.

1961 were invalid became the acquisition was not for public purpose IJU as stated therein; in fact it was for company which was entirely diff• . rent from Government. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and Slayam ••llM held that the notifications under s. 6 must in substance and in law be Stall of" M""1qs deemed to be for acquisition of land for company in the present case. Prml~61t

Held: Where the entire compensation is to be paid by company, the notification under s. 6 must contain declaration that the land is needed for company. No notification under s. 6 can be made where the entire compensation is to be paid by company declaring that the acquisition is for public purpose, for, such declaration requires that either wholly or in part, compensation must come out of public revenue1 or some fund controlled or managed by local authority.

Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Puniab, [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459, followed.

In the present case, the whole compensation was to be paid by th• company, therefore the notification under s. 6 had to declare that the land was needed for company. There was nothing in either of the two notifications of December 3, 1960 and April 19, 1961 to show that thl land was needed for company, therefore they were invalid in view of lhe proviso to s. 6 (I ) of the Act and all proceedings following on 1uc:h notifications would be of no effect under the Act.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 111

of 1962.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 8, 1961, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 81 of 1961.

Naunit Lal, for the a'?pellant.

l. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 1-4.

Rajani Patel and l. N. Shroff, for the Intervener.

February 3, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

.,,_,,,,,_ I.

W ANCHOO J .-This is an appeal by special leave 8gainst the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The appellants filed writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of notification issued under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, No. I of 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Their case was that they were owners of certain lands in Chhaparwah. On July 8, 1960, notification was issued under s. 4 of the Act to the effect that certain land in village Chhaparwah was required for

SUPREME, COURT REPORTS

19/U public purpose, namely, "for the construction of building~ 111y11111 B•lulrl for godowns and administrative office". Thereafter proceed-v. irgs appear to have been taken under s. 5-A of the Act and Stat• P':!,d,1:,•dhya an inquiry was made by the Collector. It may be mentioned that the acquisition proceedings were taken at the instance Wanclwo I. of the Premier Refractories of India Private Limited, Katni, which is company. The Collector reported that the land was essential for the company and was needed for public purpose and the objections of the land-owners has no S!!bst· ance. He therefore recommended that declaration under s. 6 of the Act might be made. He also reported that draft agreement to be executed between the company and the Government as required by s. 41 of the Act was being sub· milted along with draft notification under s. 6. This report was made on October 17, 1960. On December 3. 1960, the notification under s. 6 was issued stating that the State Government was satisfied that the land described in the annexure to the notification was required for public pur· pose, namely, for the construction of buildings for godowns and administrative office, and hence the notification was issued. It may be noticed that the notification under ·s. 6 did not say that the land was required for company. There-upon the appellants filed writ petition in the High Court on March 20, 1960, and their main contentions were two, namely. II) that the notification under s. 6 did not describe the land to be acquired with sufficient particularity and was therefore of no effect, and (2) that the notification mentioned that the land was required for public purpose, though in actual fact the land was required for company, which was entirely different from Government and therefore was in-valid. Soon after the writ petition was filed, the State Gov-ernment issued fresh notification on April 19, 1961. This notification was mainly under s. 17 ()) read with s. 17(4) of the Act, which provides that in case of urgency, the State Government may direct the Collector before the award is made under certain circumstances to take possession of a..'ly waste or arable land needed for public purpose or for company. Curiously enough this notification stated that the State Government also directed that the provisions of ;,. S-A would not apply, though as we have already stated, all inquiry under s. S-A had already been made before the notl-6cation of December 3, 1960 was issued. The notificatioi

6 $.C.R.

i964 Shyam IJehiul v. tale of Ma h1•• Pradesh Wanchoo /,

fr.rther stated that it was declared under s. 6 of the Act that the land was required for public purpose, namely, "for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith". s I t appears owever t at t rea reason or 1 1ssmng . . t h" 1s notl· . fication in this form was to make good the lacuna which appeared in the notification of December 3, 1960 inasmuch as the property to be acquired was not specified with suffi· cient particularity in that notification. It may be noticed that this notification of April 19, 1961, treating it as notification under s. 6 as well, nowhere specified that the land was re· quired for company; it only stated that the land was required for public purpose, namely, for the Premier Re-fractory Factory and work connected therewith.

When <the matter came to be argued before the High Court, the main point that was urged was that both the notifications under s. 6 of December 3, 1960 and April 19, 1961 were invalid, because the acquisition was not for public purpose as stated therein; in fact the acquisition was for company which was entirely different from Govern· ment. The High Court apparently held that the substance of the notifications showed that the land was being required for public purpose as well as for the punpose of com-pany. The High Court was further of the view that insofar as the declaration spoke of the acquisition of land for public purpose it was ineffective, as admittedly the compen-sation for the property was to be paid wholly by the com-pany and no part of it was to be paid out of public funds. Even so, the High Court held that the declarntion must be read in substance and in Jaw as one for acquisition of land for company. namely, .the Premier Refractories of India Private Limited. In this view of the ma~ter, the High Court dismissed the writ petition.

The only question that has been urged before us on behalf of the appellants is that the High Coun was in error in reading the two notifications as in substance amounting to declaration that the land was required for company. Section 6 (1) of the Act requires that whenever any land is needed for public purpose or for com('any, declaration 1hall be made to that effect. Further the proviso to s. 6(1) provides that no such declaration shall be made unless the·

compensation to be awarded for such i;>roperty is to be paid by company, or wholly or partly out of pub!~ revenues or .some .some fund controlled or managed by local authority. ThIS clearly contemplates two kinds of declarations. 1n the first place, declaration may be made that land is required for public purpose, in which case in view of the proviso, the compensation to be awarded for the property to be acquired must come wholly or rpartly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. No declaration under s. 6 for acquisition of land for public purpose can be made unless either the whole or part of the compensation for the property to be acquired is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority; see Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab ( [1]). In the second place, the declaration under s. 6 . may be made that land is needed for company in which case the entire compensation has to be paid by the company. It is clear therefore that where the entire compensation is to be paid by company, the notification under s. 6 must contain declaration that the land is needed for company. No notification un~er s. 6. can be made where the entire compensation is to lie paid by company declaring that the acquisition is for public purpose, for such declaration requires that either wholly or in rpart, compensation must come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. In the present case it is not in dispute that no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority; on the other hand the whole compen-sation was to be paid by the company. Therefore the notifi-cation under s. 6 if it was to be valid in the circumstances of the present case had to declare that the land was needed for company. No valid notification under s. 6 could be made in the circumstances of this case declaring that the · 1and was needed for qiublic purpose, for no part of com-pensation was to be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. That ·is why the High Court felt that the notification under s. 6 declaring that the land was needed for public purpose

Shyam Beh•rl f' 0Prad<1h Wanchoo I.

Shyam Beh•rl by company, or wholly or partly out of revenues l/State 0f' Madhya or .some .some fund controlled or managed by local authority.

(I) [19611 2 S.C.R. 3S9.

6 S.C.R.

would in the circumstances of this case be ineffective. But 1964 the High Court went on liO hold that the notifications under Shy"'" B1,_., s. 6 must in substance and in law be deemed to be for v. acquisition of land for company in the present case. We Slate P °ttJ !{""iJis are of opinion that this view of the High Court is incorrect. '-"-There is nothing in either of the two notifications dated W411Clroo I. December 3, 1960 and April 19, 1961 to show that the land was needed for company. The notification of De-cember 3, 1960 says in so many words that it was required for rpublic purpose, namely, for the construction of build-ings for godowns and administrative office. No one read-ing this notification can possibly think that the land was needed for company. Similarly the notification of April 19, 1961 says that the land was needed for public pur-pose, namely, for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith. Now the company for which the land in this case was in fact required is the Premier Refractories of India Private Limted, Katni. There is nothing in the notification of April 19, 1961 to show that the land was needed for this company or any other company. All that the notification of April 19, 1961 says is that the land was needed for public purpose, and the public purr,iose mention-.,4 there was that the land was :equired for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith. The High Court thought that in substance this purpose showed that the land was required for the company mentioned above. Bnt we do not see how, because the purpose specified was for the Premier Refractory Factory and work cbnnected therewith, it can be said that the notification declared that the land was needed for the company. It is not impossible for the Government or for local body to own such factory and construct works in connection therewith. The mere fact that the public puripose mentioned was for the Premier Refractory Factory and work connected therewith, therefore, cannot mean that the land was needed for com-pany; as one reads the notification of April 19, 1961 one can only come to the conclusion that the land was needed for public purpose, namely, for the construction of some work for factory. There is no mention of any company anywhere in this notification and it cannot necessarily be concluded that the Premier Refractory Factory was com-134-159 S.C.--41

paLy, for "factory" is something very different from "company" _and _and may belong to company or to Govern-ment or to local. body or even to an individual. The mere local. body or even to an individual. The mere body or even to an individual. The mere fact that the pubhc purpose declared in the notification was for the Premier Refractory FactQry and work connected therewith cannot therefore lead to the inference that the acquisition was for company. It follows that when the two notifications declared that the land was needed for public purpose in case where no part of the compensation was .to come out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority, they were invalid in view of the proviso to s. 6 (1) of the Act. All proceedings following on such notifications would be of no effect under the Act.

Sllyam Behari "company" _and _and may belong to company or to Govern-&.I• 0;" Madhya ment or to local. body or even to an individual. The mere local. body or even to an individual. The mere body or even to an individual. The mere Pradesh fact that the pubhc purpose declared in the notification was Wanchoo J. for the Premier Refractory FactQry and work connected

We therefore allow -the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and quash the notifications under s. 6 of the Act and restrain the respondents from taking any steps towards the acquisition of the land notified thereunder. As however the point on which the appellants have succeeded was not specifically taken in the writ petition, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.

1964 February, 3

MRS. M. N. CLUBW ALA AND ANR.

FIDA HUSSAIN SAHEB AND ORS.

(K. SuBBA RAo AND J. R. MunHoLKAR JJ.)

Licence or Lease-Provision requiring notice to vacate-If inconsistent with licence-Intention of parties-To be ascertained from Agree· ment-lnference from circumstance.! and conduct, if formdl docu-ment absent-Exclusive possession if conclusive evidence of lease.

In disputes regarding extra fees in respect of meet-stalls in private market owned by the appellants, the respondents-~tall-holders filed sujt alleging that the relationship between them and the appellants was that of lessees and lessors; while according to the appellants, the respondents