UNION OF INDIA versus WEST PUNJAB FACTORIES LTD.

U.'JION OF INDIA

WEST PUNJAB f'ACTORJES LTD.

August 24, 1965

[!'. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., N. WANCllOO, ,\1, HIDAYATULLAH, J. C. Sll'll AND [K. ]s. M. SJKR•; JJ.)

Indian Railways Act, s. 72-Responsibilty of railways for loss of good.< ---Whether continues of delivery not taken within three days of reaching destination, after which demurrage is payable under zhe rules- Main-tainabi/ily of suit for damages by consignor of goods when risk not transferred to consignee-Damages whether payable at contract rate or market rate-Jnreresl whether payable on amou.'lt of dc11nages for peri.c>d before date of suit.

There was fire at railway station in which certain gooili \\'ere daitroyed. TY.·\) $tilts \lo'cre filed claiming damage for Joss ot goods by the soid fire. The first suit was tiled by factory which claimed to he owner of the goods as consignor. The other suit was filed by consignee in whose favour the relevant docum.!nts "'ere endorsed. The Union of India resisted both the suits. The !rial court and the High Court concur-ren!ly held that !he loss was due to !he negligence of the Railways. Tho Union of India appealed 10 this Court.

It was contended on behalf of tho appellant : ( l) The sui:S, a.> filed, were not maintaa1ahle. ( 2) Jn the fintt suit delivery of the goods had been made to the consignee and the High Court's finding to tl1c con-trary was wrong. (3) Damages should have been awarded at the con· rrac! rate and not the market rate ( 4 J Interest could not be awarded for !he period before the suit on the amount of damages decreed. (5) Jn the second :iUit notice ho.d been given to the consignee that the consign-ment had arrived on February 23, 1943. "llle consignee did not come lo remove !he goods till March 8, 1943 when the fire broke our. and the liability of the railway administration ceased :ifter the ]apse of reawnablc time after arrival of the consignment at the railway admioistratjon.

HELD : (i) railway receipt i3 document of title to good! C.."'lvcred by ii, bur from that alone ii does not follow, where !he consignor and consignee are different, that the consignee is necessarily the owner of the goods and the consignor in such circun1stanccs can never he the owner of the goods. It i~ quite possible fer the consignor to retain title in the goods himself \i.:hile 1he consignment is booked io the name of another person. In the fir!.t of the present !!'Ui!s the risk remainOO with the consignor according to the agreement of the parries, and it had not been proved 1ha1 !he consignor had parted with !he property in the goods. Therefore the suit by he consignor was maintainable. [586 D-H)

In the second !t'.Jit the railway receipt wa~ cndor5ed in the consignee's favour and the courts helow had concurrco1ly found that the consignfX" wa, the owner of the goods. There could therefore be no dispute about !he maln!ainabili'y of the second suit also. [58¥ DJ

(ii) Though there wa, token delivery to tho consignee in !he lirsl ~ult as appeared from th'! fact that the raihv:ry receipts had be~n sur~

rendered and the delivery book had been sigaed, there was no real delirnry by the railway to the consignee. The goods had not been un-loaded and were still under the control and cmtody of the railway and the evidence of the Assistant Goods Clerk was that his permission had still to be taken before the goods could be actually removed by the consignee. The contention in the first suit that the delivery had been made to the consignee before March 8, 1943 therefore, in the pecuiiar circumstances of tho case had to fail. [590 C-D]

(iii) 111e High Court rightly calculated the damages on the basis of the market price on March 8 as it is well settled that it is the market price at the time the damaa:e occured which is the measure of iliz damages to be awarded. [590 E-F]

(iv) In the absence of any usage or contract, express or implied, or of any provision of law to justify the award of interest it is not possible to award interest by way of damages and therefore no inteterot should have been awarded in the pn>1ent two suits up to the date of filing of either suit. [591 A]

Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. v. Rutlanji Ram, & Ors. 65 I.A. 66, Seth .Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India [1955] 2 S.C.R. 48, Union of India v,, A. L. Ra/lia Ram, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 164 and Union of India v. Watkins Mayer & Co. C. As. Nos. 43 and 44 of 1963 dt. 10-3-65, relied on. (v) Under s. 72 of the Indian Railways Act, the responsibility of the railway administration for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to the administration to be carried by railway is, subject to the other provisions of the Act, that of bailee under ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act. Th~ responsibility continueo until terminated in accordance with sSi. 55 and 56 of the Railways Act. [591 E]

It may be that Wlder the Rules framed by the Railways goods are kept at the railway station of destination only for one month, und that demurrage has to be paid after three days of reaching the destination. But the responsibility of the railway is under s. 72 of the Indian Railways 'Act and it cannot be cut down by any rule. Even if owing to the said Rules the responsibility of the railway as carrier ends within reason-able time after the goods have reached their destination-station, its res-ponsibilty as warehouseman continues and that responoibility is the same at that of bailee. [592 E-H]

Chapman v. The Great Western Railway Company, (1880)5 Q.B.D. 278, distinguished.

In the present case the consignee (in thB second suit) claimed the goods well within the period of one month mentioned in the rules. The fact that he was fable to pay demurrage because he did not take delivery of the goods within three days did not relieve tho railway of its respon-sibility as warehouseman. As it had been concurrentlv found by the courts below that there had been negligence by the railway within the meanfag ef ss. 151 and 152 of the Indian Contract Act, the railway was liable to make good the loss caused by the fire. [593 A-BJ

Crv!L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 601 and 602 of 1963.

Appeals from the judgment and decree dated December 9, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeals Nos. 373 of 1945 and 92 of 1946.

SUPRl!MB COUllT Rl!POR'IS

WITII

Civil Appeal No. 60.1 of 1963.

Appeal by special kave from the judgment and decree dated December 9, 1958 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal f'o. 374 of 1945.

.V. D. Karkha11i.1· and R . . \'. Sac/it hey, for the appellant (in all the three appeals).

G. S. Pathak, Rameswar l\'ath, S. N. Andley and P. L. for the respondents (in all the three appeals).

Vohra,

The Judgment of the Court wa' delivered by

Wanchoo, J. These thr.:e appeals raise common qu~stions and will he dealt with tllgcther. They arise out of two suits filed against the Government llf India claiming damages for h;, nf go<xh which were destroyed by lire on the railway platfonn at Morar Road Railway Station. One of the suits was filed by Birl;i Cotton factory Limited, now r~prescnted by the West Punjab Factoric.~ Limited (hereinafter referred to as ~ Factory). It related to six consignments of cotton bales booked from six stations on various dates in February and March 1943 by the Factory to Morar Road Railway Station. In five of the cases, the consignment was con-'igned to J. C. Mills while in one it was consigned to sdf. The comignrnents arrived at Morar Road Railway Station on various date5 in March. Delivery was ~iven of part of one consignment on March 7, 1943 while the remaining goods were still in lbe · custody and possession of the railway. On March 8, 1943. fire broke out at the Morar Road Railway Station and these goods were involved in the fire and severe damage was caused to them. It is not necessary to refer to the details of the damage for that matter is not in dispute between the parties. The case of the F~ctory wa' that the damage. and loss was causc<l while the goods were in the custody and control of the railway administration and it was due to misconduct. negligence and carelessness on the part of the railway administration. CollSe<Juently, the suit was ti!ed for Rs. 77,000 and odd along with interest upto the date of the suit and interest pmdentt lire and future interest.

In the other suit there was one consignment of 45 bales ,,f cot-ton yam. This consignment was booked from Belangunj tn Morar Road Railway Station on February 22. 194'.l and the railway receipt relating to this consignment was endorsed in favour of lshwara Nand Sarswat who filed the suit. This consignment arrived at

Morar Road Railway Station on February 23, 1943. Ishwara Nand Sarswat went to take delivery of this consignment on March 10, 1943, his case being that he had received the railway receipt on March 9, 1943. He then came to know that the consignment was involved in fire which had taken place on March 8, 1943 and severe damage had been done to the consignment. Ishwara Nand Sarswat therefore filed the suit on the ground that damage and loss was due entirely to the gross-negligence of the railway administra-tion. He claimed Rs. 72,000 /- and odd as damages and also claimed interest upto the date of the suit and pendente lite and future interest.

The suits were resisted by the Government of India. In the first suit by the Factory, it was pleaded that the Factory conld not sue as the goods in five of the receipts had been consigned to the J. C. Mills; secondly, it was pleaded that delivery had been given of atleast five of the consignments to the J.C. Mills before the fire broke out and the railway administration was not therefore res-D ponsible for the damage done by the fire, for it was the fault of tbe J. C. Mills not to have removed the goods immediately after the delivery; thirdly, it was pleaded that damages should have been granted at the rate of Rs. 38/- per bale, which was the price con-tracted for between the buyer and the seller and not at the market rate on the date of the damage as was done by the courts below; fourthly, it was pleaded that no interest should have been allowed for the period before the suit; and lastly, it was pleaded that the conduct of the railway administration was not negligent and there-fore the railway was not bound to make good the loss.

On these pleas, five main issues relating to each of them were framed by the trial court. ,The trial court found that the Factory could maintain the suit and decided accordingly. It also found that in the case of five consignments by the Factory, delivery had been given before the fire broke out and therefore the railway was not responsible; in the case of the sixth consignment it held that there was no proof that delivery had been given before the fire broke out and that the railway would be responsible if negligence was proved. On the quantum of damages, the trial court held that the damages had to b~ calculated at the market price on the date of the fire and not at the contract price between the buyer and seller. On the questiSLn of interest, the trial court held that !I [interest before the date of the suit should be allowed on equitable ]grounds. Finally, on the question of negligence, the trial court held that there was negligence by the railway and it was therefore liable for loss and damage caused by the fire which broke out on L7Sup./65-9

March 8, 1943. As however, the trial court had held that delil'ery had been given in the case of five consignments, though the goods had not been removed, the railway was not responsible for the loss. It therefore decreed the suit in· part with respect to the sixth consignment about which it had found that there had been no delivery.

The same issues were raised in the suit by Ishwara Nand Saras-wat. But there was one additional i"uc in that suit based on the contention of the Government of India that it had given notice to lshwara Nand that the consignment had arri\•ed on February 23, 1943, Ishwara Nand however did not come to remove the goods till March 8, 1943 when the fire broke out; therefore it was urged that the liability of the railway administration as carrier had ceased after the lopsc of reasonable time after arrival of the consignment at the railway station. This reasonable time could not ht: beyond thrl!e days in any case and therefore the railway administration was not bound to make good the loss even if it had been occasioned on nccount of the ne.glic:cnce of the administration. As Ishwara Nand should have rctrn~·cd the consignment within three days of Febru-ary 23, it was his failure to do ><J which rcsulte<l in the damage and loss. The issues which were common to this suit and the suit by the Factory were decided on the same lines by the trial court as in the suit by the Factllry. On the further issue which arose in this suit as to the delay in the removal of goods after notice to lshwara Nand, the trial court held after reference to certain rules made by the railway administration that even if the railway admini\tration·s responsibility as carrier had ce:1sed after the lapse of reasonable time, it was still Ibbie as bailee either as warehouseman or as gratuitious bailee. It therefore gave decree for Rs. 76,000 and odd to Ishwara Nand.Then followed three appeals to the High Court two in the suit by the Factory and one in the suit of Ishwara Nand. The appeal in the suit by Ishwara Nand was by the Gm'Crnment of India; one appeal in the suit by the Factory was by the factory with respect to that part of the claim which bad been dismissed. and the case of the Factory was that in fact no delivery had been made to it and it was entitled to the entire sum claimed as damages. The other appeal was by the Government of India with respect to the amount decreed by the trial court and it raised all the contentions which had been raised before the trial court.

The High Court dealt with the tliree appeals together. Tn all ap~als the High Court confinned the finding of the trial court that there had been negligence on the part of the railway which

resulted in damage to the goods. On the question whether the suit could be maintained by the plaintiffs, the High Court affirmed the finding of the trial court that both the suits were maintainable. The High Court also affirmed the finding of the trial court with respect to the rate at which damages should be calculated and on the question of interest befo.re the date of the suit. Further in the suit by Ishwara Nand, the High Court held that even if the railway administration ceased to be responsible as carrier after reason-able time had elapsed after the arrival of the goods at Morar Road Railway Station, it was still responsible as warehouseman. The appeal therefore of the Government of India in Ishwara Nand's suit was dismissed. On tJ:e question of delivery in the Factory's suit the High Court disagreed with the finding of the trial court that there had been delivery of five consignments. It held that there was no effective delivery even of these five consignments. In consequence, the appeal of the Factory was allowed while that of the Government of India was dismissed.

Then followed applications to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court in the Factory's suit. The High Court granted the certific.ate as the judgment was one of variance and the amount involved was over rupees twenty thousand. However, in the suit of Ishwara Nand, the High Court refused to grant certificate as the judgment was one of affirmance and no substantial question of law arose. Thereupon the Government of India applied to this Court for special leave in Ishwara Nand's suit and that was granted. The three appeals have been consolidated in this Court for as will be seen from what we have said above, the principal points in-volved in them are common.

Learned counsel for the appellant has not and could not chal-lenge the concurrent finding of the trial court and of the High Court that the frre which caused the damage was due to the negli-gence of the railway administration. But the learned counsel has pressed the other four points which were raised in the courts below. He contends---(i) that the suits as filed were not maintainable, (ii) that the High Court was in error in reversing the finding of the trial court that the delivery had been given with respect to five of the consignments in the Factory's suit, (iii) that damages should have been awarded at Rs. 38/- per bale which was the contract price between the buyer and seller and not at the market price on the date on which the damage took place, and (iv) that interest could not be awarded for the period hefore the suit on the amount of damages decreed.

Re. (i).

The contention of the appellant with respect to five of the consignments in the suit of the Factory was that as the consignee of the five railway receipts was the J.C. Mills, the consignor (namely, the Factory) could not bring the suit with respect thereto and only the J.C. Mills could mainrain the suit. Ordinarily, it is the con-signor who can sue if there is damage to the consignment, for the contract of carriage is between the consignor and the railway administration. Where the property in the goods carried has pas-sed from the consignor to some-one-else, that other person may be able to sue. Whether in such case the consignor can also sue does not arise on the facts in the present case and as to that we say nothing. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the r:1ilway receipt is document of title to goods [sees. 2( 4)] of the Indian Sale of Goods Act, No. 3 of 1930), and as such it is the ccnsignec who has title to the goods where the consignor and consignee are different. It is true that railway receipt is docu-ment of title to goods covered by it, but from that alone it does not follow, where the consignor and consignee are different, that the consignee is necessarily the own~r of goods and the consignor in such circumstances can never be the mmer of the goods. The m«e fact that the consignee is different from the consignor docs not necessarily pass title to the goods from the consignor to the consignee, and the question whether title to goods has passed to the consignee will have to be decided on other evidence. It is quite possible for the consignor to retain title in the goods, himself while the consignment is booked in the name of another person. Take simple case where consignment is booked by the owner and the consignee is the owner's servant, the intention being that the servant will take delivery at the place of destination. In such case the title to the goods would not pass from the owner to the consignee and would still remain with the owner, the consignee being merely servant or agent of the owner or consignor for purposes of taking delivery at the place of destination. It cannot therefore be accepted simply because consignee in railway receipt is different from consignor that the consignee must be held to be the owner of the goods and he alone can sue and not the consignor. As we have said already, ordinarily, the consignor is the person who has contracted with the railway for the carriage of goods and he can sue; and it is only where title to the goods has passed that the consignee may be able to sue. Whether title to goods has passed from the consignor to the consignee will depend upon the facts of each case and so we have to look at the evidence produced in this case to decide whether in the case of five con·

signments booked to the J.C. Mills, the title to the goods had passed to the Mills before the fire broke out on March 8, 1943. We may add that both the courts have found that title to the goods had not passed to the J. C. Mills by that date and that it was still in the consignor and therefori; the Factory was entitled to sue. We may in this connection refer briefly to the evidence on this point.

The contract between the Factory and the J. C. Mills was that delivery would be made by the seller at the godowns of the J. C. Mills. The contract also provided that the goods would be des-patched by railway on the seller's risk up to the point named above (namely, the godowns of the J. C. Mills). Therefore the property in the goods would only pass to the J. C. Mills when delivery was made at the godown and till then .the consignor would be the owner of the goods and the goods would be at its risk. Ordinarily, the consignments would have been booked in the name of "self' but it seems that there was some legal difficulty in booking the consignments in the name of self and therefore the J. C. Mills agreed that the consignments might be booked in the Mills' name as consignee; but it was made clear by the J. C. Mills that the contract would stand unaffected by this method of consignment and all risk, responsibility and liability regarding these cotton con-signments would be of the Factory till they were delivered to the J. C. Mills in its godowns as already agreed upon under the con-E tract and all losses arising from whatever cause to the cotton thus consigned would be borne by the Factory till its delivery as indi-cated above. This being the nature of the contract between the consignor and the consignee in the present case we have no hesita-tion in agreeing with the courts below that the property in the goods was still with the Factory when the fire broke out on March 8, 1943. Therefore the orilinary rule that it is the consignor who can sue will prevail here because it is not proved that the consig-nor had parted with the property in the goods, even though th<-consignments were booked in the name of the J. C. Mills. We are therefore of opinion that the suit of the Factory was in view of these circumstances maintainable.

As to the suit by Ishwara Nand, he relies on two circumstances in support of his right to maintain the suit. In the first place, he contended that he was the owner of the goods and that was why the railway receipt was endorsed in his favour by the consignor though it was booked to "self". In the second place, it was con· II tended that as an. endorsee to document of title he was in any case entitled to maintain the suit. The trial court found on the evidence that it had been proved satisfactorily that lshwara Nand

was the owner of the goods. It also held that as an endorsee of d~ument of title he. was entitled to sue. These findings of the tnal court on the evidence were accepted by the High Court in these words :-

"It was not contended before us that the finding arrived at by the learned court below that the plaintiff had the right to sue was wrong. nor could, in view of the over-whelming evidence, such an issue be raised. The evidence on the point has already been carefully analysed by the court below. We accept the finding and confirm it. It was also pointed out that Ishwara Nand was the endor-sed consignee and in that capacity he had in any case right to bring the suit. The correctness of this state-ment was not challenged hcfore us.""

Thus there arc concurrent findings of the two courts below that Ishwara Nand was the owner of the goods and that was why the railway receipt was endorsed in his favour. In these circum-stances he is certainly entitled to maintain the suit. The conten-tion that the plaintiffs in the two suits could not maintain them must therefore be rejected.

Re. (ii).

The contention under this head is that five of the consignments had been delivered to the J. C. Mills before March 8, I 943 and therefore the railway was not responsible for any loss caused by the fire which broke out after the consignments had been delivered on March 6 and 7, 1943. It was urged that it was the fault of the J. C. Mills that it did not remove the consignments from the rail-way station by March 7 and the liability for the loss due to fire on March 8 must remain on the J. C. Mills. The trial court had held in favour of the appellant with respect to these five consign-ments. But the High Court reversed that finding holding that there was no real delivery on March 6 and 7, though the delivery book had been signed on behalf of the J. C. Mills and the railway receipts had been handed over to the railway in token of delivery having been taken. It was not disputed that the delivery book had been signed and the railway receipts had been delivered to the railway; but the evidence was that it was the practice at that rail-way station, so far as the J. C. Mills was concerned, to sign the delivery book and hand over the railway receipts and give credit vouchers in respect of the freight of the consignment even before the goods had been unloaded from wagons. It appeared from the evidence that what used to happen was that as soon the wagons

arrived and they were identified as being wagons containing con-signments in favour of the J. C. Mills, the consignee, namely, the J.C. Mills, used to surrender the railway receipts., sign the delivery-book and give credit vouchers in respect of the receipt of freight due even before the goods were unloaded from wagons. This practice was proved from the evidence of Har Prashad (D.W. 6) who was the Assistant Goods Clerk at Morar Road at the relevant time. He was in-charge of making delivery of such goods, there being no Goods Clerk there. He admitted that signature Of Ishwara Nand as agent of the .T. C. Mills was taken as soon as the consign-ments were received and identified by Ishwara Naud without being unloaded. He further admitted that there had been no actual delivery to Ishwara Nand of the consignments and this happened with respect to all the five consignments. Ishwara Nand signed the delivery book in token of having received the delivery and surrendered the railway receipts though when be did so the wagons were not even unloaded. On this evidence the High Court held that it could not be said that there was any effective delivery of the goods to the J. C. Mills through Ishwara Nand, though token delivery was made inasmuch as the delivery book had been signed and the railway receipts surrendered. It also appears from the evidence of Har Prashad that before the goods were actually re-moved, Ishwara Nand used to take the pennission of Har Prashad to remove them. This shows that though there might be token delivery in the form of signing the delivery book and surrendering the railway receipts, actual delivery used to take place later and the removal of goods took place with the permission of Har Prashad. On this state of evidence the High Court wa~ of the view tliat the so-called delivery by signing delivery book and sur-F rendering the railway receipts was no delivery at all for till then the goods had not been unloaded. The unlol!ding of goods is the duty of the railway and there can be no delivery by the railway till the railway has unloaded the goods. It is also clear from the evidence that even after token delivery had been made in the manner indicated above, the consignee was not authorised to remove the goods from the wagons and that it was the railway which unloaded the wagons and it was thereafter that the con-signee was permitted to remove such goods with his permission as stated by Har Prashad in his evidence. The High Court there-fore held that there was no clear evidence that delivery of goods had been made over to the consignee in these cases. Further there was no evidence to show that the consignee could remove the goods from the wagons without further reference to the railway, on the other hand it appeared that after such token delivery pennission

of Har Pra~had was taken for actual removal of goods. There-fore, the High Court came to the conclusion that real delivery had not been made when the fire took place on March 8, for the goods were till then in wagons and the railway was the only aulhority entitled to unload the same. Till they were unloaded by the railway, they must be in the custody of the railway and no delivery could be said to have taken place merely by signing the delivery-book and surrendering the railway receipts. We arc of opinion that on the evidence the view taken by the High Court is correct. Though there was token delivery m; appears from the fact that railway receipts had been surrendered and the delivery book had been signed, there was no real delivery by the railway to the consignee, for the goods had not been unloaded and were still under the control and custody of the railway and Har Prashad's evidence is that his permission had still to be taken before the goods could be actually removed by the consignee. The conten-tion that the delivery had been made to the consignee before March 8. 1943 must therefore in the peculiar circumstances of this case fail.

Re. (iii).

It is next contended that damages should have been awarded at the rate of Rs. 38/- per bale which was the contract price bet-ween the factory and the J. C. Mills. This contract was made in November 1942. The contract price is in our opinion no measure of damages to be awarded in case like the present. It is well-settlcd that it is the market price at the time the damage occurred which is the measure of damages to be awarded. It is not in dis-pute that the trial court has calculated damages on the basis of the market price prevalent on March 8. In these circumstances this contention must aiso be rejected.

Re. (iv).

The next contention is that no interest could be awarded for the period before the suit on the amount of damages decreed. Legal position with respect to this is well-settled : (see BcnRal NaRpur Railway Co. Limited v. Ruttanji Ramji and Others) ([1]). That deci-sion of the Judicial Commiuee was relied upon by this Court in Seth Thawardas P/1crumal v. The Union of India('). The same view was expressed by this Court in Union o.f India v. A. L. Rallia Ram([3]). In the absence of any usage or contract, express or im-plied, or of any provision of law to justify the award of interest, it is not possible to award interest by way of damages. Also sec

(~) (1955] 2 S.CR. 48.

(3) [1964) 3 S.C.R. 164.

recent decision of this Court in Union of India v. Watkins Mayer & Company ( [1]). In view of these decisions no interest could be awarded for the period upto the date of the suit and the decretal amount in the two suits will have to be reduced by the amount of such interest awarded.

We now come to the additional point raised in Ishwara Nand's suit. It is urged that Ishwara Nand's consignment had reached Morar Road Railway Station on February 23, 1943 and Ishwara Nand should have taken delivery within three days which is the period during which under the rules no wharfage is charged. The responsibility of the railway is under s. 72 of the Indian Railways Act (No. 9 of 1890) and that responsibility cannot be cut down by any rule. It may be that the railway may not charge wharfage for three days and it is expected that consignee would take away the goods within three days. It is however urged that the railway is carrier and its responsibility as carrier must come to an end within reasonable time after the arrival of goods at the destina-D tion, and. thereafter there can be no responsibility whatsoever of the railway. It is further urged that three days during which the railway keep.s goods without charging wharfage should be taken as reasonable time when its responsibility as carrier ends; there-after it has no responsibility whatsoever. Under s. 72 of the Indian Railways Act, the responsibility of the railway administra-E tion for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to the administration to be carried by railway is, subject to the other provisions of the Act, that of bailee under ss. 151, 152 and 161 of the Indian Contract Act, (No. 9 of 1872). This responsibility in our opinion continues until terminated in accor-dance with ss. 55 and 56 of the Railways Act. The railway has framed rules in this connection which lay down that unclaimed goods are kept at the railway station to which they are booked for period of not less than one month during which time the notice prescribed under s. 56 o.f the Railways Act is issued if the owner of the goods or person entitled thereto is known. If delivery is not taken within this period, the unclaimed goods are sent to the un-claimed goods office where if they are not of dangerous, perishable or offensive character they are retained in the possession of the railway. Thereafter public sales by auction can be held of un-claimed goods which remain with the railway for over six months. This being the position under the rules so far as the application of ss. 55 and 56 is concerned, it follows that even though the res-ponsibility of the railway as carrier may come to an end within reasonable time after the goods have reached the destination-station, its responsibility as warehouseman continues and that responsibility is also the same as that of bailee. Reference in this connection is made to Chapma11 v. The Great JVe.wcm Rail-way Co111pa11y([1 ]). Jn that case what had happened was that cer-tain goods had arrived on March 24 and 25. On the morning of March 27, fire accidentally broke out and the goods were con-sumed by the fire. TI1e consignor then sued the railway as com-mon carrier on the ground that that liability slill subsisted when the goods were deslroycd. The question in that case was whether the liability of the railways w:Ls still as common carrier. on March 27 or was that of warehousemen. The queslion was of illlportancc in English law, for common carrier under th~ English law is an insurer :mu is liable for the loss even though nnt arising from any default on his part whik warehouseman was only liable where there was want nf proper care. It was held that the liability as common carrier would come to end not immediately on the arrival of the goods at the destination but sollletime must elapse between the arri\·al of goods and its delivery. This interval how-ever must be reasonable and it was held in that case that rc:ison-able time had elapsed when the fire hroko out on March 27 and therefore lhe railway's responsibility was not that of carrier but only as warehouseman. The position of law in India is slightly -different from that in England. for here the railway is only bailee in the absence of any special contract and it is only when it is proved that the railway did not take such care of the goods as man of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstance take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality and value as the goods bailed, that the railway's responsibility arises. warehouseman is also bailee and therefore the railwav will continue to be warehouseman under the bailmcnt, even ·if its responsibility as carrier :1fter the lapse of reasonable time after arrival of goods at the destination comes to an end. But in hoth cases the responsi-bility in India is the same, namely, that of hailee. and negligence has to be proved. Jn view of the rules to which we have already referred it is clear that the railway's responsibility as warehouse-man continues ewn if its responsibility as c:irrier comes to end after the lapse of reasonable time after the arrival of goods at the destination. The responsibility as warehouseman can only come to end in the manner provided by ss. 55 and 56 of the Railways Act and the Rules which have heen framed and to which we have already rd~rred as to the disposal of unclaimed ~oods. Jn the present case under tl1e Rules the goods had to remain at Morar (t) (1S80) 5Q.R.D.278.

Road Railway Station for period of one month after their arrival there and Ishwara Nand can1e to take delivery of them on March 10-well within that period. It may be that as he did not come within three days he has to pay wharfagc or what is called demurr-age in raihyay parlance, but the responsibility of the railway as warehouseman certainly continued till March 10 when Ishwara Nand went to take delivery of the goods. As it has been found that there had been negligence within the meaning of ss. 151 and 152 of the Indian Contract Act, the railway would be liable to make good the Joss caused by the fire.

The appeals therefore fail with this modification that the decre-e taJ amount would be reduced by the amount of interest awarded for the period before the date of each suit. The rest of the decree will stand. The appellant will pay the respondents' costs--One set of hearing fee. In CA 603/63 interest will be calculated from 6-8-62 in accordance with that order.

Appeal dismissed, and decree modified.