MAFATLAL NARAINDAS BAROT versus DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

MAFATLAL NARAINDAS BAR<>T

DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER

December 13, 1965

[I'. B. G•.JE;>;DRAGAOKAR C.J., K. N. WASCHOO,

M. llrnAYATuLLAJ!, V. RAMASWAMI AND

P. SATYASARAYA'IA RAJt.:, JJ.]

[)is1r1is.'iti/-t•111plr.Jyef' abst•nt \ritltout lr<n'e and failing to repc>r/ for duty ,..,tzen dirt~cted-Disnzissed 011 pay111ent of /\\.'O 1110111/is' salary i1: lieu of '1<>tice-/~egt1hifio11s go\:er11i111:: .H'rl·ice t·ondi1io11 providing for onpor-runity 10 shoK' C<lf1.w: <1gai11st proposed pur:islunenr 1101 co1npfi,·d wllh--Propriety of dis1nissal.

The appellant. \.\'ho \Va"i permanent employee of the re . ,pont.lent State Tran"'port Corpor;1tion, proc\!c<lc<l on 15 days' lc.l.vc on J;inu;irv 15. 1962 ;.ind thereafter applied for an extension of his lcilvc on n11.:Ji.:al grounds. 1·hi'\ extension ,..,as refused and although the appellant v .. as . directed to report for duty imreediatcly. he continued to he ahsent and \l:ro1e to the respondent on ~1arch 3. 1963. intimating him of' his inahilily to join duty as he \\'as still not \\"ell. Ry an order of the respondent dated ~1arch 9. 196~. the appellant\ services \Vere terminalcd \\.:th effect from January 16, 1962 on the ground of long absence.

After his representations and an appeal to higher authorities in the Corporation had been rejected, 1hc appellant filed petition for " wru of ('ertiorari to quash the dismi~al order, hut this petition \Vas di.;,n1i~'icd in litnin(',

It \\'3S contended on behalf of the appellant that in accordance v.·ith clauses 4(b), 38 and 40 of Schedule to the Regulations guvmung hi• ·service conditions, charge should have been framed against him ~ind th:it he was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the proposed ·punishment. On the other hand it v•as the respondents' conrention that ·though the order of dismissal ref~rred to long absence as the cause of termination. the termination itself \\·a<: not by \.\'ay of puni<:hment and the only right of the appellant under Regulation 61 \\·as to 1wo month"' Ol)licc in lieu of pay; and that an examination of the correspondence! and rhe ci rcum"tances of the case showed that the appellant had heen gi\'cn ;an -opportunity to show cause and that there was in fact and in :-.uh .. tance ·compliance \\'ith the rules of natural justice.

HELD : The order of termination passed against the appellant must be quashed as it v.-as bad in lay.· since it contra\·ened the pio\•isions of cl. 4(b) of the Regulations and also the principles of natural justice. 144 B)

Clau~s 38 and 40 provided that absence without leave and 'vithout rca!-lonahle caU$C, and failure, without sunicient cause~ to report for duty when directed amount to acts of mis-conduct. Under clause 4(h) it wa!I: therefore obligatory on the pan of 1he respoodont to give 1he appellant reasonable opportunity to show cause. by providing him wilh copy of the charge or chargC""> as "·ell :1'\ 1h~ ~latement of the allC!--"Jtions th:ll had heen rnadc Jg.ainst h;nl. f41 fJ

M. N. BAROT v. S. T. CORP. (Raju, J.)

Crv1L AI_>PELLATE IuRISDicnoN : Civil Appeal No. 757 of

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order, dated

the 28th May, 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 419 of 1963.

R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the appellant.

N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. A.char, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Satyanarayana Raju, J. This . appeal, by special leave, is against the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, dated May 28, 1963, dismissing in limine an application filed by the appellan~ under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

The facts material for tile purposes of this appeal may be bfiefiy stated. The appellant was permanent employee of the State Tr~port Corporation, Corporation, Gujar11t, hereinafter referred ta as ~ Corporation. At the material tiJile h.e. was employed as WritcJ: in the Visnagar Depot of the Corporation in Mahasana Distri~ On January 15, 1962, th.e appellant applied to the Div®~ Controller, State Transport, Mahasana, for leave for 15 days on the ground that he had to attend to hia ~~~nal work'. On J&lluary 16, 1962, he was transferred from Visnagai.: to Ambtit w~re .there was vacancy in th.e-0ffice ol the. DepQtMaDo11ge.r., Oa. January 31, 1962, formal order transferring the aPBCJllan\-the aPBCJllan\-aPBCJllan\-Visnagar to Ambaji was passed, and he was directed to join duty at Ambaji.

Tr~port Corporation, Corporation, Gujar11t, hereinafter referred ta as ~

January 31, 1962, formal order transferring the aPBCJllan\-the aPBCJllan\-aPBCJllan\-~

On that date, the appellant applied for extension of leave on· medical grounds but his request was reftllCd by an order, dated February 15, 1962. He was directed to report for duty at Ambaji within 48 hours of the receipt of notice failing which, he. was warned, he would be removed from service. On March 3, 1962, the appellant wrote Jetter to the Divisional Controller intimatini him of his inability to join duty as he wu still not well. To this letter, he enclosed medical certificate.

By an order, dated March 9, 1962, the services of the appellant were terminated with effect from January 16, 1962, on the ground of long absence. The appellant made representation to the Divisional Controller on March 17, 1962 and thereafter preferred an appeal to the General Manager of the Corporation. Bo.t,ll of them were rejected. further appeal preferred by him to th• L9SupCJ/'6-4

appellate Committee was also uruucccssful. The Committee held that the leave applications of the appellant were made only with view to evade joining ducy at Ambaji.

The appellant applied to the High Court of Gujarat under Arti. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, impleading the Divisional Controller as respondent, for the issue of writ of certriorari to quash the order of dismissal. His petition Wai dismissed in llmbte on May 28, 1963. On June 17, 1963, the appellant applied for certificate to appeal to this Court but it was refused. Thereafter, he applied for special leave and that was granted by this Court.

It may be stated at the outset that the respondent is an auto-nomous statutory Corporation formed under the provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It is not disputed that the appellant could not invoke the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution.

The short question for determination in the appeal is whether the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment as required by regulation No. 61 of the Regulations which govern the service conditions of the employees of the Corporation. It is admitted that no charge was framed against him nor was he given an opportunity to show cause.

It is contended for the respondent that though the order of termination referred to long absence as the cause of termination, the termination itself was not by way of punishment and the only right of the appellant was to two months' pay in lieu of notice under regulation No. 61, that assuming that the termination was by way of punishment, the appellant, as would be evident from the correc-pondencc and the circumstances of the case, had been given an opportunity to show cause and that there was in fact and in sub· stance compliance with the rules of natural justice.

We may, at this stage, read the relevant regulations which admittedly govern the service conditions of the employees of the Corporation. Regulation No. 61 provides as follows :

"The service of an employee, who docs not hold permanent appointment in State Transport or lien on perrnanent appointment in any Government Depart-ment from which he is transferred, are liable to be terminated by the Competent Authority by giving calendar month'• notice or calendar month'• pay ta lieu:

Provided that the services of casual workers and part-time workers may be terminated without any notice; . Provided further that permanent employee of State Transport shall be entitled to 60 days' notice or 60 qays' pay in lieu."

Clauses 38, 40 and 4(b) of Schedule to the Regulations provide:

"38. Irregular attendance, absence without leave and without reasonable cause and absence without permis-sion."

40. Failure, without sufficient cause, to report, when directed, for duty, on the part of an employee to whom the leave he has applied for is refused."

"4(b). person against whom action is proposed

to be taken for any act of misconduct, shall be provided with copy of the charge or charges as well as state-ment of allegations that have been made against him, and over which enquiry is being held."

Clause 3 defines two classes of offences named acts of mis-conduct and minor lapses and delinquencies, respectively and sub-cl. (ii) of cl. 3 states inter alia that the misconducts are those specified in Schedule A.

Regulations 38 and 40 provide that irregular attendance, absence without leave and without reasonable ·cause and failure, without sufficient cause, to report, when directed, for duty amount to acts of misconduct. Clause 4(b) is specific and clear. Under that clause, it is obligatory on the part of the respondent, to give the appellant reasonable opportunity to show cause, by providing him with copy of the charge or charges, as well as the statement of the allegations that have been made against him. Admittedly, the respondent did not frame charge against the appellant nor conduct any enquiry.

It is true that the respondent may visit the punishment of dis-charge or removal from service on person who has absented himself without leave and without reasonable cause, but this cannot entail automatic removal from service withOIJt givini such person reasonable opportunity to show cause why he be not removed. The appellant is entitled to reasonable opportunity to show cause which includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can do. only when he knows what the charges levelled against him are and the allegatio115 on

(1966) 3 S.C.R.

SuP!lEME COURT llEPORTS

which 1uch charges are based. In our judgment, the appellant wu entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him.

The order of tennination passed against the appellant is bad in law since it contravenes the provisions of cl. 4(b) of the Regulation and also the principles of natural justice. In all the circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the impugned order must be quashed. writ of certiorari will accordingly issue quashing the order of dismissal, but this will not preclude the respondent from making fresh enquiry against the appellant after giving him reasonable opportunity to show cause as provided under cl. 4(b) of the regulations.

The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.

Appeal .J/qwed.