V ALLIAMMAI ACHI versus NAGAPPA CHETTIAR & ORS.

V ALLIAMMAI ACHI

NAGAPPA CHE'ITIAR & ORS.

January 23, 1967

{K. N. WANCHOO, R. S. BACHAWAT AND J. M. SHELAT, JJ.]

Hhrilll Law-Joint family property bequeathed by will-Effect on character of property.

Indian Succession A.ct, (39 of 1925) s. lS~Scope of el!ction under.

Hindu died after making 4 will in respect of certain joint family properties and appointed bis son as the executor. The son obtllioed pro-balo of the will, provided for the legacies indicated therein and came into possessiOn of the residue of the property. Thereafter, be adopted the plaiotl1f. The adoptive father died after Ute Hindu Succession Act came iolo force and the plaintiff filed the suit claiming two-thirds share of the properties left by his father. The defendants (viz .. the widow and mother of ih~titr's adoptive father) contended that the conduct of the plain-tiff's · ve father in obtaining the probate of the will and carrying out ill terms amounted to 1111 election and therefore the father became absolute owner of the residue of the properties bequeathed ro him by the will, ar.d as the election to take under the will would bind the plaintiff also he could not claim half the property on the ground that it was joint family property of himself and his father. The trial Court decreed the suit, which in appeal was upheld by the High Court. The defendants appealed to this Coun.

HELD: The appeal must be dismissed.

The character of the property did not change because of the will and it would still be joint family property in the hands of the plaintiff's father as far as his male issue was concerned. Further, as soon as the plaintiff was adopted be acquired interest in the joint family property in the bands of his adoptive father and this interest of his was independent of that of his father. In such circumstllnces even if his father could be said to have made an election there could be no question of the plaintiff being bound by that election, for he was not claiming through his father. [453 C, E-Fl Election under s. 180 of the Indian Succession Ac~ would only arise where the legatee derives some benefit from the will to which be would not be entitled except for the will. In such case he has to elect whether to confirm the will or dllsent from it. But where there is no question of the legatee deriving <1ny benefit from the will to which he would not be en-titled except for the will the fact that be confirm5 the will and accepts what the will provides would not amount to election, for he would have in any case got what the will gave him. Thus election only arises where the legatee has to choose between his own property which might have been testator and which the testator has given to the legatee by the will. [451 H-452 C]

CIVIL APPELlATE JURISDICTIO:'ol: Civil Appeal No. 806 of 1964.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated JulY 13, 1962, of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 347 of 1958.

C. B. Agarwala, B. Dutta, T. S. Kris/111aswamy lyeng.tr, P. L. Meyyappan and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant.

A. K. Sen and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondent No. I.

K. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhury, for rc;po.ndent No. 2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Wattchoo, J. This is an appeal by special leave against t~e

judgment of the Madras l;figh Court. The facts. are not now m dispute and may be bnefly narra.ted. smt was brought by Nagappa Chettiar, respondent No. I (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) against Villiammi Achi appellant and Nachiammai Achi now dead and represented by her legal representative. The respondent claimed two-thirds share· of the properties left by his father, Pallaniappa and prayed for decree for separate possession of that share after partition. The facts· on which this claim was based are not now in dispute and are these. The respondent is the adopted son of i>allaniappa having been adopted in 1941. The· appellant is the widow of Pallaniappa and Nachiammai Achi was Pallaniappa's mother. Pallaniappa's father also named Nagappa had considerable properties. This Nagappa made will on June IO, 1934 by which after making certain dis-positions in favour of certain persons including his own wife he gave the residue of his property absolutely to Pallaniappa and appointed him as the executor of the will. In one place the will stated that all the property e1:cept small part was the exclusive and self-acquired property of the testator while at the end the testator said that he had made the will with the full consent of his son Pallaniappa After Nagappa's death in July 1934 Pallaniappa obtained probate of the will and after providing for the legacies to others as indicated therein came into possession of the residue of the property. In. 1941 the respondent was adopted by Pallaniappa.

In the trial court there was ·dispute between the parties whether Pallaniappa and his father were members of joint Hindu family a'ld whether properties left by Pallaniappa's father were the joint family properties of both. But it has been found that all the pro-perties left by Pallaniappa's father were joint family properties of Pallaniappa and his father which Pallaniappa could acquire by survivorship on his father's death. This finding was upheld by the High Court and is. not now in dispute. We have to proceed on the basis that even though Pallaniappa's father said in the will that the properties, except small part, were his self-acquired prnperties . ip. fact all t~e. prope~es mentioned in the will of Pallaniappa'; father were JOtnt fanuly properties of Pallamappa and his father.

The case ~ the appellant was ~3:t even t):iough the properties. left by Pallamappa's father were JOtnt family properties which MlSup.CI/67-15

Pallaniappa could acquire hy survivorship. the conduct of Pallaniappa iiJ obtaining prohate of the will and carrying out its terms amounted to election and thereafter l'allaniappa hecame ~bsolule owner of the residue of the propertic:s bequeathed to him by th~ will. The consequence of this was that when Pallaniappa adopted the respon-dent in 1941 long after he had hecome the absolute owner of tbe properties. the respondent acquired no interest in the properties left by his grand-father by virtue of the adoption. Pallaniappa died on September 16. 1956 after the Hindu Succession Act, (No. 30 of 1956) came into ;orce. As there was no joint family property of Pallaniappa and the respondent at the time of Pallaniappa's death. the respondent could not claim half the property on the ground that it was joint family property of himself and Pallaniappa, as Pallaniappa's elec'tion to take under the will of his father would bind the respondent also. Reliance in this connection was placed on s. 180 of the Indian Succession Act, (No. 39 of 1925) also.The reply on hehalf of the respondent to this contention was l wo-fold. In the first placc.'it was urged that there was no question -0f election even by Pallaniappa in this case and s. 180 of the Indian Succession Act would not apply. It was further urged that even ~suming that there could be election by Pallaniappa the respon-dent would not be bound by that election as the property left by his grand-father was joint family property and the respondent would acquire interest therein as soon as he was adopted by Pallaniappa, even though Pallaniappa might have been the sole co-parccner for sometime i.e. between 1934 and 1941. This interest of the respon-dent in the joint family property was independent of his father Pallaniappa and even though Pallaniappa might be bound by any election that he might have made the respondent would not be so bound and would he entitled to treat the property as joint family property in the hands of Pallaniappa in which he would acquiro interest on being adopted. In the second place the respondent's case was that in any case after his adoption Pallaniappa threw the entire property into the family hotch-pot and therefore it became joint family properly hy blending.

Two questions therefore arose for consideration in this case namely-{i) whether there was election by Pallaniappa and if so whether the respondent would be bound by it, and (ii) whether Pallaniappa threw the entire property into the family botch-pot after adoption of the respondent and therefore it became joint fall'ily property in any case. The trial court accepted the case put forward· on behalf of the respondent and decreed the suit passing preliminary decree giving two-thirds share to the respondent and one-sixth each to the appellant and the mother of Pallaniappa.

The appellant then appealed to the High Court. The High C.ourt dismissed the appeal. On the question of election, the

High Court held that as Pallaniappa and his father were members of joint Hindu family and as the entire property left by Pallania-ppa's father was joint family' property, Pitllaniappa had interest in the residue as survivor and in consequence there was no ques-tion of election by Pallaniappa for all the property he got by will would have come to him by survivorship. In such case there could be no question of election, for Pallaniappa had title to the property irrespective of the will. The High Court also held that in any case the claim of the respondent as member of the joint family was not under his father but independent of him and there-fore the respondent would not be bound, even if Pallaniappa were held to have made an election. The High Court also found in favour of the respondent on the question whether the property was thrown into family botch-pot after the adoption of the respon-dent and in the result dismissed the appeal.

The High Court having refused to grant certificate to appeal to this Court, the appellant applied for and obtained special leave from this Court; and that is how the matter has come before us.

The same two questions, as indicated above. arise for consi-deration in this appeal. We shall fil·st consic!e1 :he question of election in the background of the fact that the entire pr:>perty left by Pallaniappa's father was joint family property of himself and Pallaniappa and that Pallaniappa had interest in . that property as member of joint Hindu family. Section 180 of the Indian Succession Act which enunciates the doctrine of election as known to English law for this country is in these terms :

"Where r person, by his will professes to dispose

of something which he has no right to dispose .of, the person to whom the thing belongs shall elect either to confirm such disposition or to dissent from it, and, in the latter case, he shall give up any benefits which may have been provided for him by the will."

It is urged on behalf of the appellant that s. 180 would apply to the facts of the present case for the property willed by Pallaniapp" 's father was not his which he could will away as it was joint family property in which Pallaniappa who was the residuary legat•e had also equal interest. Therefore Pallaniappa had either to confirm the disposition or dissent from it, and his conduct showed that he had confirmed it for he took out probate. Therefore it must be held that after probate was taken out the residue became the absolute property of Pallaniappa and lost its character as joint Hindu family '.)roperty.

Now it is clear from s. 180 that after the legatee elects to dis-sent from the will he must give up any benefits provided for him by' the will. This shows that election under s. 180 would only arise

where the Jega1ce derives some benefit from the will to which he would not be entitled except for the will. In such case he has to elect whether to confirm the will or dissent from it. But where there is no question of the legatee deriving any benefit from the will to which he would not be entitled except for the will, the fact that he confirms the will and accepts what the will provides would not amount to election, for he would have in any case got what the will gave him. Thus election only arises where the legatee has to choose between his own property which might have been willed away to somebody else and the property which belongs to the testator and which the testator has given to the legatee by the will. The matter is brought out in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 14, at p. 588, para 1091 in the following words :-

"Where testator by hfs will purports to give property to which in fact belongs to and at the same time out of his own property confers benefits on .... in such cir-cumstances ... is not allowed.to take th~ full benefit given him by the will unle~ he is prepared to carry into effect the whole of the testator's dispositions. He is accordingly put to his election to take either under the instrument or against it. If he ele.:ts to take under the will he is bound and may be ordered to convey his own property to A; if he elects to take against the will and to keep his own property, and so disappoints A, then he cannot take any benefits under t~e will without compensating out of such bene-fits to the extent of the value of the property of which is disappointed."

Following this principle the High Court held that as the P• operty which the will gave to Pallaniappa would in any case have come to him as member of the joint family, there was no question of election even by Pallaniappa in this case. This view appears to us to be correct.

But even assuming that there was some kind of ele.:tion by Pallaniappa we cannot see how the nature of Jhe property left by Pallaniappa's father would change merely because Pallaniappa's father made will giving the residue absolutely to pallaniappa and Pallaniappa took out probate of the will. The property being joint family property Pallaniappa's father was not entitled to will it away and his making will would make no difference to the nature of the property when it came into the hands of Pallaniappa. fathe{ cannot turn joint family property into absolute property of his son by merely making will, thus depriving sons of the son who might be born thereafter of their right in the joint family property. It is well settled that the share which co-sharer ohtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issues. They take an interest in it by birth whether

they arc in existence at the time of partition or are born subse-quently : [see Hindu Law by Mulla, Thirteenth Edition p. 249, para 223 (2) (4)1. If that is so and the character of the ancestral property does not change so far as sons are concerned eveQ after partition, we fail to see how that character can change merely because the father makes will by which he gives the residue of the joint family property (after making certain bequests) to the son. father in Mitakshara family has very limited right to make will and Pallaniappa's father could not make the will disposing of the entire joint family property, though he gave the residue to his son. We are therefore of opinion that merely because Palla-nappa's father made the will and P'!llaniappa probably as dutiful son took 011t probate and carried out th~ wishes of his father, the nature of the property could not change and it will be joint family property in the hands of Pallaniappa so far as his male issues are concerned.

Further it is equally well settled that under the Mitakshara law each son upon his birth taxes an interest equal to that of his father in ancestral property, whether it be movable or immovable. It is very important to note that the right which the son takes at his birth in the ancestral property is wholly indepenc!ent of his father. He does not claim through the father .... " (see Mulla's Hindu Law, Thirteenth Edition, p. 251, para 224). It follows therefore that the character of the property did not change in this case because of the will of Pallaniappa's father and it would still be joint farr.ily property in the hands of Pallaniappa so far as his male issue was concerned. Further as soon as the respondent was adopted he acquired interest in the joint family property in the hands of Pallaniappa and this interest of his was independent of his father Pallaniappa. In such circumstances even if Pallaniappa could be said to have made an election there can be no question of the respondent being bound by that election, for he is not claiming through his father.

In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the question whether Pallaniappa, after the responden.'s adoption, threw the property into the family botch-pot.

The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

Appeals dismissed.