DEVI DAS GOPAL KRISHNAN & ORS. versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DEVI DAS GOPAL KRISHNAN & ORS.

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

April IO, 1967 (K. SUBBA RAo, C.J., J. C. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, V. BHARGAVAl AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]

Statutory necessity, if.

Rate fixation-Delegation-Constitutional and Statutory necessity, if. proper guides-East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (46 of 1948),. s. 5.

Severabi/ity-C/Jarging section made subject to section granting power· to fix rates-Latter declared void-If charging section also void-Effect of subsequent amendment-East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 ( 46· of 1948), ss. 4, 5, 6-Ea!I Punjab General Sales Tax (Second Amend-ment) Act, 1952 (19 of 1952).

EaSI Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948-Leglslative competenct-· Section 2 Cl. (ft)-'Acqulsitlon' meaning of-Valuable consideration. meaning of-Act, if in conflict with Sale of Goods Act, 1930; Central' Sales Tax Act, 1956, s. 15.

Section 5 of the East Punjab Sales Tax Act, 1948, as originally enact·· ed, conferred on the Government power to levy tax at such rates as the "Government might fix. The section was amended by Act 18 of 1952, with retroSpective effect, fixing the rate of tax at "not exceeding two pice> in defines-a rupt;e". "Purchase" Section 2(ff) of the Act as the 11acquisition" as ot amended the gooc1s by Act "tor 13 ~se of in 1959. the· manufacture of goods for sale, for cash or deferred payment or other· valuable consideration otherwise than under mortgage hypothecation, charge or pled~e". The appellants' petition in the High Court c!Wleng-ing the imposition of rurchase tax for the years 1958-59 and 1959-© on the purchase of oi seeds, steel scrap and cotton for manufacture of goods for sale, were dismissed, and they appealed to this Court. Mean-while. the High Court had considered the validity of the Act in Sales Tax Reference and declared s. 5, as it originally stood, void. In this Court it was contended : (i) since s. 5 as originally enacted, was declared void, that being the charging section, the entire act was void and the Amend-ing Act of 1952 could not revive an Act which was non est, and (ii) section 2(ff) was invalid for want of legislative competence.

HELD : (i) Section S as it stood before the amendment was void·· but the section as amended by the Amending Act of 1952 is valid. '

An Act conferring power to fix rates of taxation must lay down clear. le~slative policy or guide-lines in that regard and the doctrine of ~titullon~ and statutory needs would not afford reasonable guide·lines 10 the fixation of such rates. There was nothing in the provisions of the Act, inc.luding the preamble disclosing any policy or guidance to the State f~r fixing rates. Section 5 as it stood before the Amendment con-f~ed on the Govemment an uncontrolled power in the matter of fixa-tion of rates and was therefore void. [565 G-566 B; 569 FJ

p I atn [,Cedorporatlon ]. [of ][Calcutta ][v. ][Liberty Cinema, ][[1965) ][2 ][S.C.R. ][377, ][ex-]

State of Madras v, Gannon Dunkerlev & Co. (Madra•) Ltd. [19591 S.C.R. 379, 435, ·vasantlal Maganhhai Sanjanwalti v. State of Bombav

{1961) l S.C.R. 341 and The Union of India v. Ml s. Bhona Mal Gul:arl .Mal, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 627, referred to.

Although s. 5 was void, the entire Act was not void. Section 4 is the charging section and Section 5 dealt only with the quantification of tax, · that is, the. charging section was intact and what was struck down was only the section providing for rates. The fact that s. 4 is made subject to s. 5 does not render the former void on the principle of non-60Verability, ·because, under the Act, there is clear distinction between chargeability and the quantification of tax. Therefore, strikin~ out s. S only made s. 4 unenforceable. The amendment of s. S bas, 1n sult>tance, the effect of amending an existing Act. [567 G-H; 568 F-0; 569 B.CJ

B. Shatha Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry, S.C.R., distinguished.

[1967) 2

Kesoram Industries and Cotton Miiis Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth :Tax (Central) Calcutta, [1966] 2 S.C.R. 688, referred to.

Conferment of reasonable area of discretion by fiscal statute is ·permissible and the discretion to fix the rate between I ~ioe and 2 pi,de cannot be said to exceed the permissible limits. [569 0-F)

Khandlge Sham Bhat v. The Agricultural Income Tax Officer, (1963) . 3 S.C.R. 809, referred to.

(ii) Clause (ff) of s. 2 is not void for want of legislative ~ ·tence.

and "valuable consideration in of the Aot indicate, prima facle, "sale", these ex-a restricted meaning. The ex-l;be

Althoujlh the words "acquisition" and "valuable consideration in ctbe definition of "purchase" in s. 2(ff) of the Aot indicate, prima facle, that this definition is wider in scope than the definition "sale", these ex-pressions in the context must be ~ven restricted meaning. The ex-pression "acquisition" in the definition means only "transfer" and l;be expression "valuable consideration" takes colour from the preceding ex-pression "cash or deferred payment" and can only mean some other monetary payment in the nature of cash or deferred payment. [571 F-0; 572BJ

The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley cl Co. (Madras) Ltd. (1959) S.C.R. 379, Sales Tax Officer v. Budh Prakash, A.1.R. 1964 S.C. 459 and George Oakes v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1039, re-ferred to.

Dunkerley cl Co. (Madras) Ltd.

Purchue tax, under the Act is I.viable on the purchase of goods and · not in respect of manufacture of goods and therefore Is not an eitclae . duty. The purpose for which goods are p~hased Is only relevant for fixing the t&Xable event and the taxable event is fixed before the goods are actually manufactured. [572 H-573 BJ

Ml s. Shlnde Bros. v. The Deputy Commissioner, Rakhur, C.As. Nos. 1580-1586 and 1590-1600 of 1955 (decided on 26-9-1966). referred to.

The Act does not enable levy of tax on the same goods at more than one stage a'1d therefore is not in conflict with s. IS of the Central Sales Tax Act 1596. Manufacture changes the identity and the good• pur-chased and the goods sold are not identical and therefore the same goods ·are not taxed at two stages. Further, cl. (ff) of 8. 2 of the Act during. the periods relevant to the present case, in terms, fixed. the stage for taxation, i.e., the stage of purchase by dealer for use in the manufac-ture of goods. [573 B.C; 576 BJ

The fact that the same goods when purcllesed by manufacturer would be taxed but would not be taxed when purchased by person other than manufacturer would not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution as s. 2(ff) discl05es reasonable classification. [S72 C-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 526, 527 and 529 of 1964.

Appeals from the judgment and order dated December 15, 1959, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 827, 826 and 823 of 1959 respectively.

Civil Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965.

Appeals by special leave from the judgments and orders dated March 30, 1961 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Nos. 467, 473, 476, 474 and 477 of 1960 respectively.

Civil Appeal No. 81 of 1965.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 2, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No . .155 of 1963.

o Civil Appeal No. 540 of 1965.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 206 of 1962.

M. C. Setalvad, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the appel-

lants (In C.As. No. 526, 527 and 529 of 1964).

R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in

C. A. Nos. 526, 527 and 529 of 1964).

Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for the appellants lin C.As. Nos. 39-43 of 1965).

Hardev Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in C.As. Nos. 39-43 of 1965).

S. T. Desai and 0. C. Mathur, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 81 and 540 of 1965).

R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in

C.A. No. 81 of 1965).

0. P. Malhotra and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents (in

C.A. No. 540 of 1965).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Sobba Rao, C.J. The decision on these appeals depends upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Punjab Act 46 of 1948), as amended by Punjab Act 7 of 1958, relating to three categories of goods namely, oil-seeds, iron and cotton. '

The facts may be briefly stated.

The asscssees in Civil Appeals Nos. 526, 527 and 529 of 1964 cany on business· at Moga in Punjab and each owns an oil-mill. They purchase oil-seeds and, after crushing the same in their oil mills, sell the oil and the residual oil-cake. They are registered dealers under tbe Act. The Amending Act imposed purchase-tax of 2 % on the purchase of oil-seeds "for the use in the manu-facture of goods for sale." .This was in addition to the sales-tax leviable on the sales of oil and oil-cake. On June 23, 1959, the Excise and Taxation Officer, Ferozepore, the 3rd respondent in the said appeals, issued notices to the 3 appellants--assessees to the effect that they did not submit their return5' for the year ending 1958-59 and failed to pay purchase-tax in respect thereof and asked them to show cause why they should not be prosecuted for the said default. The appellants filed 3 petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab questioning the validity of the relevant provisions of the Act and for appropriate reliefs. Division Bench of· the High Court heard the petitions, along with other connected petitions, and dismissed the petitions of the appellants so far as they related to purchase-tax on oil-seeds. Hence the appeals.

Civil Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965 relate to purchase-tax on iron. The appellants carry on business in rolling steel at Gobind-garh. They purchase steel scrap and steel ingots and convert them into rolled steel sections. Under the Act, the assessing authority imposed purchase-tax at the rate of 2 % on the purchase of steel scrap and steel ingots made by them during the period April l, 19 5 8 to March 31, 19 5 9 for making rolled steel section and selling the same. The appellants filed petitions under Art.· 22ll of the Constitution in the High Court for appropriate writs for quashing the orders of the assessing authorities and for prohibiting them from levying purchase-tax on the goods purchased and for refund of the tax illegally collected from them. Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petitions. Hence the appeals.

Appeals Nos. 81 of 1965 and 540 of 1965 relate to purchase-tax on cotton. The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 81 of 1965 are the trustees of Birla Education Trust. They own cotton and te:ttile mill, Bhiwani. They purchase cotton from various dealers in Punjab and outside for the manufacture of yarn and cloth. By an order dated March 11, 1962, the District Taxation Office~ Hissar, imposed purchase-tax on the appellants in respect of the cotton purchased by them for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 540 of 1965 is limited company carrying on the business of producing and selling yarn. For the purpose of its business it acquires cotton from commission agents. It is registered dealer under the Act. The Excise and Taxation Officer, Hissar, by his order dated November

DEVI DAS v. PUNJAB (Subba Rao, C.J.)

29, 1961, assessed the appellant to purchase-tax for the assessment year 1958-59 in respect of the cotton purchased by it and so too on Janua!J'. 27, 1962, he had taken proceedings for making assess· ment to purchase-tax for the assessment year 1959-60 in respect of the same commodity. The appellants in both the appeals filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court questioning the validity of the said orders. The said writ petitions were dismissed by Division Bench of the High Court. Hence the appeals.

We shall at first take the points raised which are common to all the appeals and then proceed to consider 1he points peculiar to some of the appeals.

Mr. M. C. Setalvad, learned counsel appearing for the appel·

!ants in the batch of appeals relating to tax on purchase of oil· seeds, raised before us the following points which are common to other appeals : ( 1 ). Section 5 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax, Act, 1948, was held to be void on the ground that it conferred essentially legislative power on the provincial Government and, therefore, the said section was still-born and that, as the said sec-tion was the charging section, the entire Act was void, with the result Act 19 of 1952, which amended s. 5 with retrospective effect could not breathe new life into the said Act. void Act was non.est and, therefore, could not be brought into force by an amending Act. (2) Clause (ff) of section 2 introduced by Act 7 of 1958 defining "purchase", subject to the conditions mentioned therein as taxing event was ultra vires the State Legislature inas-much as the transaction de.fined therein was not "'sale" within the meaning of that expression in entry 52 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution and was in fact an "excise" duty inas-much as it wa·s imposed on the production of oil in the garb of purchase tax. (3) The said amendment was also bad in that it made an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of taxation bet-ween the same classes of goods based on the character of the pur-chaser. If the goods were purchased by manufacturer, they were liable to purchase tax; and if the same goods were purchased by an ordinary dealer, they were not liable to the said tax. (4) The amended provision, section 2(ff), was also void because it contravened ss. 14 and 15 of the Central Sales-tax Act, 1956, whereunder sales-tax was prohibited to be imposed on the declared goods at more than one stage, whereas under the Act it could be imposed both at the purchase point and at the sale point of the transactions entered into by the manufacturer. (5) Purchase-tax was not leviable on oil-seeds, as the ·sessees did not manufacture oil. out of the seeds but only produced the oil.

We shall now proceed to consider the points seriarim. The provisions relevant to the first two points read thus : L?Sup . .CI/67-6

SUP.llBMB COUll.T 11.BPOl!.TS

[1967) 3 S.C.R.

East Punjab General Sales Tax Act (46 of 1948)

Section 5. Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be levied on the taxable turnover every year of dealer tax at su.ch rates as the Provincial Govern-ment may by notification direct.

East Punjab General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 (Act No. 19 of 1952).

Section 2. Amendment of section 5 of Punjab Act 46 of 1948:

In sub-section (1) of section 5 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, after the word "rates" the following words shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted, namely, 'not exceeding two pice in rupee'.

The High Court of Punjab held that s. 5 of the Act was void as it gave an unlimited power to the executive to levy sales-tax at rate which it thought fit. But it held that the amendment of sec-tion 5 by the Punjab Act 19 of 1952 cured the defect in the said Act and had the effect of giving new life to it.

The first question, therefore, is whether section 5 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 ( 46 of 1948 )., as it originally stood, was void, and the second question is, if the said section was void, whether the amendment could give life to it.

The law on the subject is fairly well settled, though difficulties are met in its application to each case. In Corporation of Calcutta, v. Liberty Cinema(') on which Mr. Ganapati Iyer relied relates to levy imposed on cinema houses under the Calcutta Municipal Act (33 of 1951). There, the majority held that the levy therein was tax, that the fixing of rate of tax was not of the essence of legislative power, that the fixing of rates might be left to non-legislative body and that when it was so left to such body, the Legislature must provide guidance for such fixation. The majo-rity held in that case that such guidance was found in the mone-tary needs of the Municipality for discharging !he functions en-trusted to it under thei Act. Sarkar J., speaking for the majority .Mid thus:

"It (the Municipal Corporation) has to perform vari-ous statutory functions. It is often given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed. For all this it needs money and its needs will vary from time to time, with the prevailing exigen-cies. Its power to collect tax, however, is necessarily

(I} [IY~l) 2 S.C.R. 477-:-

limited by the expenses required to discharge those func-tions. It has, therefore, where rates have not been spe· citied in the statute, to fix such rates as may be necessary to meet its needs. That, we think, would be sufficient guidance to make the exercise of its power to fix the rates valid."

If this decision is an authority for the position that the Legislature can delegate its power to stat~t~ry authority to levy. taxes and fix the rates in regard thereto, 1t 1s equally an authority for the position that the said statute to be valid must give ~uidance to the said authority for fixing the said rates and that guidance can· not be judged by sterotyped rules but. would de~n? up0n t~e provisions of particular Act. To that extent this 1udgment JS binding on us. But we cannot go further and hold, as the learned counsel for the respondents asked us to do, that whenever statute defines the purpose or purposes for which statutory authority is constituted and empowers it to levy tax that statute necessarily contains guidance to fix the rates : it depends upon the' provisions of each statute.Learned counsel for the State argued that under Art. 162 of the Constitution the executive power of the State shall extend to matters with respect to which the Legislature of State has power to make laws : that is to say, the executive power of State ex-tends to matters mentioned in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, that under Art. 266 (I) of the Constitution all the taxes collected will go to the Consolidated Funds of the State, that the State has an unlimited power to raise funds by taxation to dis-charge its vast constitutional duties and that necessarily the amount of tax required would depend upon its needs which can only be ' known to it. In the said circumstances, the argument proceeds,. the doctrine of constitutional and statutory needs would afford reasonable guidelines for the Government to fix the rate and that the principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision ~ould equally apply to this case. If this argument be accepted, 1t would mean that every statute conferring naked power on 0 the ~overnment to impose taxes would be good, for in every case· the discharge of the constitutional duties by the Government would be deemed to be sufficient guide for fixing the rate. We cannot ac~ept this ~rgument for three reasons, namely, (!) the decision of this Court m Calcutta Corporation v. Liberty Cinema(') should be coi;ifine~ only to the provisio!15 of the Calcutta Municipal Act wherein this Court found guidance; (2) the provisions of the Sales :rax Act, including the pr~amble, do not disclose any policy or guidance to the Stat~for fixing the rates: and (3) the general'

(I) [1965J 2 S,C,R, 477,

constitutional power to impose taxes has no relevance for dis· covering statutory policy under particular Act.

Nor does the decision of this Court in The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co., (Madras) Ltd.(') lend support to the argument so widely advanced by the learned counsel. That case has nothing to do with the fixation of rates of taxes. There section 6(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, as amended by Madras Act 25 of 194 7, provided that no tax will be payable on any sale of goods specified in the schedule to it. Section 6(2) of that Act authorised the State Government to amend the schedule by notification. The amendment of the Schedule by the State Government was challenged on the ground that section 6(2) was invalid as it was delegation of the essential power of legislation of the State Government. Venkatarama Aiyar, J., speaking for the Court, in rejecting that contention, observed thus :

"Now, the authorities. are clear that it is not uncon· stitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation Jaws, such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and the like."

It is not necessary to scrutinize the correctness of this statement, having regard to the decisions relied upon, for t1'Js Court in Cor-poration of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema([2 ]) accepted it, but made it clear that such power to fix the rates must be supported by some reasonable guidance given under the Act whereunder the said power was conferred. Nor the observations of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in the said decision speaking for the minority, lend support to the contentions of the respondents.

The decision in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay(') raised the question whether section 6(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, ·1948 (Bom. 67 of 1948), which enabled the Government to fix the rent payable by tenant within the maximum limits prescribed thereunder, was valid. When it was argued that it was bad because of excessive delegation, this Court sustained it on the basis of legislative policy disclosed by section 12(3) of the Act.

In The Union of India v. Messrs. Bhana Mal Gulzari Mal([4 ]) this Court rejected the contention that caluse l lB of Iron and Steel (Control of Production & Distribution) Order, 1941, whereunder the Central Government· was authorised to issue notification fixing the maximum price of steel, was void on the ground of excessive delegation, as it found that the said clause only further canalized the policy disclosed in ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.

(1\ {1959] S.C.R. 379, 435.

(2l [1965] 2 S.C.R. 477.

(3) [1961] l S.C.R. 341.

(4) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 627.

Further citation is unnecessary, for the principle of excessive delegation is well settled and the cases are only illustratio~s of the application of the said principle. The law on the subject may briefly be stated thus :

"The Constitution confers power and imposes duty on the legislature to make laws. The essenti~l lejli· slative function is the determination of the leg1slat1ve policy and its formulation as rule of conduct. Obvi-ously it cannot abdicate its functions in favour of an-other. But in view of the multifarious activities of welfare State, it cannot presumably work out al~ the. de-tails to suit the varying aspects of complex situation. It must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other agency. But there is danger inherent in such process of delegation. An overbur-dened legislature or one controlled by powerful execu-tive may unduly overstep the limits of delegation. It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. This self efface-ment of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for Court to hold on fair, generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature exceeded such limits. But the said liberal construction should not be carried by the Courts to the extent of always trying to discover dor-mant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary power conferred on executive authorities. It is the duty of the Court to strike down without any hesitation any arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature.

Sec Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjamva/a v. The State of /Jombay(') at pp. 356-357.

.Under. section 5 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, as it ongmally stood, an uncontrolled power was conferred on the provincial Government to levy every year on the taxable turn-oyer of dealer tax at. such rates as .the said Government might direct Under that sect10~ the Legislature practically effaced itself 1~ the matter of fixat10n of rates and it did not give any guid-ance either under that section or under any other provisions of the Act-no other prov1s1on was brought to our notice. The

(I) [1961) J S.C.R. 341.

argument of the learned counsel that such policy could be gather-ed from the constitutional provisions cannot be accepted, for, if accepted, it would destroy the doctrine of excessive delegation. It would also sanction conferment of power by Legislature on the executive Government witho11t laying down any guide-Jines in the Act. The minimum we expect of the Legislature is to lay down in the Act conferring such power of fixation of rates clear legis-lative policy or guide-lines in that regard. As the Act did not prescribe any such policy, it must be held that section 5 of the said Act, as it stood before the amendment, was void.

The next step in the argument of Mr. M. C. Setalvad was that sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948, together formed group of charging sections and they were so integrally connected with each other that if section 5 was void, sections 4 and 6 also fell with it, as 911e was not severable from the other. As the charging sections were the crux of the Act, the argument proceeded, the whole Act was void and therefore the Act amending section 5 could not revive the Act which was still-born.

The relevant provisions may now be read.

Section 4 (1). Subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6, every ,dealer except one dealing exclusively in goods declared tax-free under section 6 whose gross-turnover during the year immediately preceding the com-mencement of this Act exceeded the taxable quantum shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on all sales effec-ted after coming into force of this Act.

Section 5 has already been extracted.

Section 6 ( 1). No tax shall be payable on the sale of goods specified in the first column of Schedule sub-ject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof and no dealer shall charge sales tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax-free from time to time under this section.

It will be seen that section 4 is charging section, that section 5 provides for fixation of rates and that section 6 prescribes for exemptions. Section 4 is made subject to sections 5 and 6. If section 5 is struck out, will section 4 become void ? This will depend upon two questions, namely, (i) whether section 5 is charging section ? and (ii) even if section 4 alone is the charging section, as it is made subject to section 5 and as the section subject to which it is made was still-born, whether section 4, on the appli-cation of the doctrine of severance, becomes void.

In the context of Income-tax Act it was held by this Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, (Central), Calcutta(') that tho charging section for the purpose of income-tax was section 3 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the annual Finance Acts only gave the rate for quantifying the tax. Section 3 of the said Income-tax Act read :

"Where any Central Act enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in ac-cordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or the members of the association individually."

Section 2 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1957, read:

"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) a.nd (S) for the year beginning on tho 1st day of April, 1957,-

(a) income-tax shall be charged at tho rates specified

in Part I of the First Schedule, and, in tho cases to which Paragraphs A, B. and of that Part apply, shall be increased! by surcharge for purposes of tlie Union and special surcharge on unearned income, calculated in either case in .the manner provided therein;"

It was argued that the liabiUty to tax did not arise till the Finance Act was made and the tax quantified. Dealing with this question, this Court by majority observed :

"A liability to pay income-tax. is present liability though it becomes payable after it is quantified in accord-ance with ascertainable data."

The onlr .di~erence between Income-tax Act and the present Act is that while m the Income-tax Act seetion 3 thereof does not ex-pressly make the liability subject to the provisions of the Finance Act which fixes the rate, under the Sales-tax Act in question sec-tion 4 thereof in terms is made subject to section S. But under both the Acts there is clear distinction between chargeability and the quantification of tax. While it is true that the tax cannot be rea-lised without it being quantified, the non-quantification of the liabi-lity will not destroy the liability under the charging section. The liability has to be distinguished from its enforceability. It cannot be said, and indeed ii is not said, that the Income-tax Act has no legal existence till the Finance Act is made, though till the Finance

(I) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 688, 7,8.

Act is made it cannot be enforced. But reliance is placed on sec-tion 67B of the Income-tax Act in support of the contention that its existence in the statute book keeps the Act alive, for the rate prescribed by the previous Finance Act is applicable till the new Finance Act is passed. But it will be noticed that: the Court's decision was not based on the existence of the said provision but on that of the charging section itself. It follows that striking out section 5 does not make section 4 void, though till an appropriate section is inserted it remains unenforceable. The decision of this Court in B. Shama Rao v. The Union Territory of Pondicherry(') is clearly distinguishable. There, sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 10 of 1965, provided that :

"The Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (No. 1 of 1959) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commence-ment of this Act shall extend to and come into force in the Union of Territory of Pondicherry subject to the following modifications and adaptations, ...... "

Section 1 (2) of the said Act provided that the Act would come into force on such date as the Government by notification may appoint. The effect of the section was that the Madras Act as it stood on the date of the notification issued would be in force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. Indeed it turned out that the Madras Act was amended before the said 'notification. This Court held that there,was total surrender in the matter of sales-tax legisla-tion by the- Pondkherry Assembly in favour of the Madras legis-lature and for that reason the said sections were void or still-born.

It was argued that the Act could not be said to be still-born as it contained certain provisions independent of the Madras Act, viz., section which provided for the appellate tribunal and the schedule. But it was pointed out that the core of th(l taxing statute was in the charging section and that the remaining sections had no independent existence. In the present case the charging sec-tion was intact and what was struck out was only the section pro-viding for rates. It cannot, therefore, be said that when section 5 was struck out, section 4 or other sections fell with it.It was then contended that even if the whole Act was not still-born, section 5 was non est, that the amending Act did not insert new section 5 but purported to amend the earlier section 5 which was not in existence. Now under the East Punjab General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 (Act No. 19 of l 952) section 5 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, l 948 was amended. Section 2 of the said amending Act says :

"In sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, after the word 'rates' the fo11owing words shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted, namely :-'not exceeding two pice in rupee'."

No doubt in terms the section inserts the words "not exceeding two pice in rupee" in section 5. If section 5 is inserted in the Act by the Amending Act with the said words added, there cannot possi-bly be any objection, for that would be an amendment of an existing Act. But in substance the amendment brings about the same effect. The words "shall be deemed always to have been so inserted" indicate that in substance section 5, as amended, is inserted in the Act with retrospective effect.

Even so it was contended that section 5, as amended, only gave the maximum rate and did not disclose any policy giving guidance to the executive for fixing any rate within that maximum. Here we are concerned with sales-tax. If the Act had said "2 pice in rupee" it would be manifest that it was clear guidance. But as the Act applies to sales or purchases of different commodities it had become necessary to give some discretion to the Government in fixing the rate. Conferment of reasonable area of discretion by fiscal statute has been approved by this Court in more than one decision : see Khandige Sham Bhat v. The Agricultural Income-tax Officer('). At the same time larger statutory dis-E cretion placing wide gap between the minimum and the maximum rates and thus enabling the Government to fix an arbitrary rate n:ay n?t be sustained. In the ultimate analysis, the permissible d1screl!on depends upon the facts of each case. The discretion to fix t~e :ate betwe~n 1 pice and 2 pice in rupee is so insignificant that 1t 1s not possible to hold that it exceeds the permissible limits. It follows that section 5 of the Act as amended is valid.

The next argument is that section 2(ff)' inserted in the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, by the East Punjab General Sales Tax (Ame~dment) Act, 1958 (Act No. 7 of 1958) and amended by Amendmg Act 13 of 1959 is void. The said clause (ff) as amended by Act 13 of 1959 reads : ·

",'Purchase', with ·all its grammatical or cognate ex-press10ns, means the acquisition of goods specified in Schedule 'C' for use in the manufacture of goods for sale> f?r cash or ~eferred payment or other valuable considera-t10n otherwise than under mortgage, hypothecation charge or pledge." '

!he first l~nb of the argument is that the definition of "purchase" }s -:pore .comprehensive than the definition of "sale" under the ~n Sale of G~ods_ Act and, therefore, the State Legislature was

(l) [1963] J S.C.R. 809. -

incompetent to make law under entry "sale or purchase" in List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. The constitutional posi-tion is well settled. Entry 54 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution reads :

"Tax:es on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A of List I."

ln The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd.(') Venkatarama Aiyer, J., speaking for the Court, obser-ved:

"Thus, according to the law both of England and India, in order to constitute sale it is necessary that there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to goods which of course pre-supposes capacity to contract, that it must be supported by money consideration, and that as result of the tran-saction property must actually pass in the goods. Unless all these elements are present, there can be no sale. Thus, if merely title to the goods passes but not as result of any contract between the parties, express or implied, there is no sale."

This Court also held that the State Legislature, by enlarging the . definition of "sale", could not include transactions which were not sales according to the well established concepts of law under the Law of Contract or the Sale of Goods Act; see Sales-tax Officer v. Budh Prakash(') and George Oakes v. State of Madras([8]).

Bearing that in mind let us look at clause (ff) in section 2 of the Principal Act in which the said clause was inserted. The in-gredients of the definition of "purchase" are as follows : (i) there shall be acquisition of goods; (ii) the acquisition shall be for cash ·Or deferred payment or other valuable consideration; (iii) the said valuable consideration shall not be other than under mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge. Clause (h) of section 2 defines "sale" thus :

The in-there the said

"sale" means any transfer of property in goods other than goods specified in Schedule for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration but does not include mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge. If we turn to the Sale of Goods Act, section 4 thereof defines contract of sale of goods. It reads :

"Contract of sale of goods is contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for price .... "

(I) [1959] S .. C.R. 379, 397-398.

(21 A.l.R. 19M S.C. 459.

r3) A.LR. 1962 S.C. 1037.

The essentinl requisite of 1ulc are (i) there shall be transfer of property or agreement to trnnsfer property by one pnrty to an· other; and (Ii) it shall be for considerntion of money payment or promise thereof by the buyer. sale nnd 11 purchase are different aspects of the liume trumuctlon. lf we look at it from the stand· point of purchaser it is ~urchase and if we look at it from the standpoint of the seller it is 11 sale. Whether purchase or sale it shall have the snid ingredients hoth in common law and under the lndlnn Contract Act. 'Price' has been defined In the Sale of Ooods Act to mean money considerntion for the 111le of goods : see s. 20 0) of the Indian Sale of Oood8 Act. lt wlll, therefore, be 1een !hut the d~Hnitlon of 'purchnse' In the Act pr/ma faclr appears to be per1on wider to In onother scope Is thnn the lngr~dl~nt 'snle'. While tJf '8nle' tronsfer In genernl of l!Oods lnw, from 11equlMI· one lion of goud~, which mny In II• ~omprehen!lve 8ense 111k11 In vohm· tnry well u11 lnvoluntur. trnn8forn, l~ nn 1n11redlent of 'pureh1m1' in e111us11 (lfJ. While prlee', i.r .. money con11lderntlon, 18 the Ingredient or '8ul~', tn!h, dderrnd pnyment or My vnluable eon· 11ider11tlon l• nn ln11rndle111 of 'purehn~ll'. But 11 do11er Nerutlny tomeet8 u• to give u rnmkted menning Ill the exprn1111hm "aequlsl· tion ond "priee", Aequl11ltiort i11 the n<:t by whleh n penon 11e· quires property in n thing. "AeQ1tirn" Is Ill bl!eome the owner of the pmp~tty. One enn, therdur~. utqutrn 11 pmperty either by voluntnry or lnvolmltury trun•fer, But the Snle11 Tnx Aet opplle~ 1111ly to "•nle" us denned In the A~t. Under elnu8e (h) of seetlon :! or the! Att it l• den1wd "' n tr1m~fer of pmperty. A8 purehru;e ls only 11 dl!l'ernnt «•pg~t of •nle, kmked nt frnm the •tnndpolnt nf the purchnNer, und n~ th@ Act impo•c• tmt nt dl!terent polnt1 ln re~peet nr Nnle8, hnvlng rcJlurd tn th~ purpoKe nf the s11le, It is unrell8onuble tn U8Nume thnt the Legi8lnture contempl11rnd dllferent cute11orlM of trun~netlonw when the tnxnble event Is nt the purchnse r point. Whether It iM sole tlr purchase the tr11nuctlon iM the Hme. If it was 11 transfer l11t11r v/wis, In the ca1e ot 11 111le lt must equally be so In the cose of n purchase. Cnntext, ctlmlstency nnd nvoldance ot nnom11ly demand 11 restricted meonlnll. Thut It mu~t only meon trnn1ter is nlso mode clear by the nature of the transoctlons ex-cluded from the ucqulsltlon, numely, mortgage, hypothecntlon. charge or pledge~all ot them belong to the specle1 of trnn1fer. We must, therefore, hold that the expre11lon "ncqulshlon" in clause (ft) of section 2 of th~ Act means only "trnnsfcr".

Now, coming to the expr~•sion "price", It is no.doubt defined in !he Stile of Goods Act ns "muncy con1ideration". C'nsh or de· fcrred puymcnt in clnuse (ff) of section 2 of the Act sntistled the suid definition. rhc expression "valuable considcrution" has n wider connotntion, but the snid expression is nlso used in the 'amc collocation in the definition of "snle" in section 2(h) of the Act. The said expression must bear the sume meuning in clnuse

(ff) and clause (h} of section 2 of the Act. Itmay also be noticed that in most of the Sales Tax Acts the -same three expressions are used. It has never, been argued or decided that the said expres-sion means other than monetary. consideration. This consistent legislative practice cannot be ignored. The. expression "valuable consideration" takes colour from the preceding expression "cash or deferred payment". If so, it can only mean some other monetary payment in the nature of cash or deferred payment. We, therefore, hold that clause (ff) of section 2 of the Act is not void for legislative incompetence.Another argument to invalidate clause (ff) of section 2 of the Principal Act may also be noticed. It is said that that clause offends Art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground that by reason of the said definition the same goods if purchased by manufac-turer would be taxed but they would not be taxed if purchased by person other than manufacturer. But close scrutiny of clause (ff) of section 2 discloses that there is reasonable classi-fication in the said definition. The raw goods purchased by manufacturer are transformed on manufacture into some other goods and that is the reason. why the Legislature taxes the goods before they lose their identity. But where no manufacturer inter-venes there is no such metamorphosis and, therefore, the taxable event is the sale. There is certainly reasonable relation between the object of the statute and the differences between the two cate-gories of transactions.

The next argument turns upon the interpretation of clause (ff). The argument is, to come under the definition of "purchase" it is not enough that the acquisition of goods shall be for cash etc. J?ut that the acquisition shall be for use in the manufacture of goods for sale for cash etc. On this construction it is argued that the tax levied was excise duty and, therefore, beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The contention is that the tax on the pur-chase was in connection with the manufacture of goods and, there-fore, an excise duty. There is an essential distinction between the two imposts : while excise duty is in respect of manufacture of goods, the sales-tax is upon the sale of the goods. The question, therefore, is whether under the Act the purchase tax is imposed on the sale of the goods or in connection with the manufacture of goods. The decisions of this Court establish that "in order to be an excise duty (a} the levy must be upon 'goods' and (b} the taxable event must be the manufacture. or production of goods." : see Messrs. Shinde Brothers v. The Deputy Commissioner, Raichur(') The tax has no nexus with the manufacture of goods. The purpose for which the goods are purchased is only relevant for fixing the

(1) Civil Appeals No. 1580-1586, 1588 and 1590-1600 of 1966 (decided on 26-9-1966).

taxable event, but the tax is on the purchase of the goods. That taxable event is fixed before the goods are actually manufactured. We, therefore, hold that the tax under the Act is purchase tax and not an excise duty.

Then it is contended that while section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Act 74 of 1956) imposes restriction on the State JI not to tax at more than one stage, the amending Act by introducing the definition of "purchase" enables the State to tax the same goods at the purchase point and at the sale point. But this argu-ment misses the point that goods purchased and the goods -sold are not identical ones. Manufacture changes the identity. There-fore, the same goods are not taxed at two stages. ·C

The last argument is that the said definition only takes in the purchase of goods for use in the manufacture of goods,. but tax is imposed on the purchase of goods for producing oil. To state it differently, oil is not manufactured out of oilseeds but only pro-duced. Reliance is placed upon the user of two words in the Act, viz. manufacturing or processing in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 4 and sub-section (5) thereof and the expression "edible oils produced" in entry 57 of Schedule to the Act and con-tention is raised that the Act itself makes distinction between manufacturing and processing and manufacture and production and, therefore, oil is not manufactured but only produced from oilseeds. Support is sought to be derived for this argument from the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills('). But perusal of the judgment shows that this Court only held that refined oil produced out of seeds was only an intermediate stage in the manufacture and was, therefore, not liable to excise duty. On the other hand, the dictionary meaning of "manufacture" is "transform or fashion raw materials into changed form for use". When oil is produced out of the seeds the process certainly transforms raw material into different article for use. We cannot, therefore, accept this contention.

Now. ~oming ~o Ci~il Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965, the fast add1t1onal pomt raised 1s that when iron scrap is converted 1.nto rolled steel it does ?Ot involv~ the process of manufacture. It is contended that the said convers10n does not involve any process of manu~acture, but the scrap is made into better marketable commodity. Bef~re. the High Court this contention was not press-eg. Th.at apart, It 1s clear that scrap iron ingots undergo vital ~.~nge m the pr?cess .of manufacture and are converted into 1 erent commodity, vrz., rolled steel sections Durin th cess the ~crap iron loses its identity and become~ new ~arke t P~f­commod1ty. The process is certainly one of manufacture. 11) 119631 Supp. l s.c.R. 586.

The next argument Is that the Act ls in conflict with section l S of the Centrnl Sales Tax Act, 1956, inasmuch as It enables the levy of sales-tax at more than one stage. In these and connected appeals we are concerned only with two periods-the first period upto October 31, 1958 and the second period from November 1, 1958 to March 31, 1960. It is, therefore, necessary to notice the relevant provisions aoverning the sold two periods.

The relevant part of section 1 S of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (74 of 1956), as amended by Central Soles Tax (Amend· men!) Act 16 of I 957, rends thus :

"Every s11les tox l11w of n State shall, In so fur 118 It Imposes or llUthorlses the Imposition of 11 tax on the s1ile or purehose of declared i.ioods, be subject to the following restrictions ond eondlt!i:ms, namely :

(o) the lox p11yoble 1mdM thnt law In respect of any

snle or purehMe of sueh lfoods Inside the State slrnll be levied tJnly In re1peet tJf the Inst snle or purehue Inside th11 Stnte ond 1h11ll ntJI eirneed two per eent or the sole or p11rehos11 prle11;

(b) notwlthit1mdlng onythlng contained In cl11UM1

(Ii), no lox shall be levied In respeet of th11 last s11le or purnhu1e ln1lde the Stnte If th11 deelored goods pureh111ed or11 Intended for sale In the eo11rs1J of lnter,!!111111 !rode or ~~~

Bxpla1111tlo11. The expression "lut 111le or pureh1m1 Inside the suite meons the tronsoetlon In whleh 11 deofer re1lstered under the 111le11 lllX lnw of the St11te-

(I) sells to or purehoseN from onother such dealer

declared i.ioods for use by the purehnser In the mnnu· foeture of i.ioods for sole or for use by the purchoser In the execution of any contrnet; or

(II) purchnses dcelnred goods from nnother meh

dcolcr for sole to 11 denier not registered under the ules tax law of the Sl11te or to n consumer In the Stnte."

This 1eetlon was nmended by the Centrnl Soles Tax (Amend· menl) Act 31 of 1958 with effect from October I, 1958. The relevant port of the amended section reads :

"Every 11les tnx law of 11 State shall, in so far 111 It Impose or 11uthorises the lmpo1ltlon of 11 tax on the 1ale or purchue of declared goods, be subject to the following restrlcdons ond conditions, nllll!ely :-

(11) the tax payable under thnt law in respect of any sale or purchlllie of such goods Inside the State shall not exceed two per cent. of the sale or purchase price there·

of, and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stnae:

(b) Where tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of Jn'ter·Stute trade or commerce, the tax so levied shall I be refunded to such person in such manner and subject to such conditions may be provided In any law In force Jn that State.

While section 1 !! of the Central Sales Tax Act before the amend· ment dHcrlbed the 1tu1e at whl~h the purchHe tax can be levied, 1ectlon 15 after the amendment only declare• that It ~unnot be levied at more than one 1ta1e. Thl1 Court In M / 1 Modi Spinning Ii Wtavlng Miiia Co. Ltd. v. Comml11lon1r ol l11com1•tax. Pun· Jab Ii A11r.([1])' obHrved 11 follow1:

"The me1mln1 or the Intention of ehm1e (3) of Art.

285 11not10 dHtroy 1111 eh11ralna 1eellom In the Sale1 Tu Aet1 of the States w!Ueh 11re dl1erep11nt with 1eellcm 15(11) of the Centro! S11le1 Tu Aet, but to modify them In aeeord1mee therewith. The h1w ot the S1111e 11 deel11red to be Nubjeet lo the rHtrlcllom and eondltlon1 eon111lned In the l11w mode by Parliament 11nd the r111e In the State Act would pro ta1110 1tand modllled. The duet of Art. 286 ( 3) 11 now brought out by the 1eeond provl10 to 1. 5 (I ) . But thl1 11rovl10 11 ennoted out of 1bund1nt caution 11nd even without It the te1ult w11 the 11m11."

The ell'ect of thl1 jud1111en1 11 that the 1tn1e pre1erlbed under 1ec·

lion 15 of the Centrul Sllle1 T11x Act before the amendment and the prohibition a11lln1t tnullon at more thnn one 1t11p contnlned In llie amended 1ecllon would 11utom11tlcnlly control the provl1lon1 r of the Punjab Oencral Sale1 T11x Act, I 948. With the result upto October I, 19.58, under the State Snle1 Ta\ Act 11 tax could be levied only In re1pect of purchue of declafed aood• Inside the State and only on the purchase made by 11 dealer of 1ood1 for Ul!e by him In the manufacture of &ood•; and from October I. 1958, Ifie State c11n only levy tax at one 11111e. For the second period the Central Act by lt1 own force did not llx the sta11e.

Punuant to the provisions of 1ectlon 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, before It w111 amended, Act 7 of l 9SM added clause (fO to section 2 of the Prlnclpol Act llxln& the !lllme ~tup indicated by section 15 of the Central Act, l,1., the 1ta1e w!len the vurchue is made by dealer for use In the manufacture of goods. This sec:tion wus amended by Act 13 of 19.59 and Act 24 of 19S9 Under the !alter amendment in clause (ff) of section 2 for the words "gooqs for URt In the manufacture of 11oods for sale" the -(.,..IJ""'u""9s""'s1""'1-:s.""'c'"'.11..,.....,,,n,,..'.600:'"

words "goods specified in Schedule 'C' for use in the manufacture -0f goods for. sale" were substituted; that is to say, the stage for taxation prescribed in the earlier definition was amended. It may be recalled that under the Central Sales Tax Act, as ame!lded, the description of the stage was omitted, but that does not affect the question, for that description is maintained even under the amended clause (ff). It follows from the said discussion that the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, during the crucial period which is the subject matter of these &ppeals, in terms fixed stage for taxation, i.e., the stage of purchase by dealer for use in the manufacture -0f goods. There are, therefore, no merits in this contention either.

Now coming to Civil Appeals Nos. 81 of 1965 and 540 of 1965, three additional points are raised by Mr. Desai, namely, (i) by including in the term "purchase", read with the definition of "dealer'', where there is acquisition of cotton through commission agents, the State Legislature has exceeded its legislative power under entry 54 of List II, of Schedule 7 to the Constitution; (ii) during the relevant period tax was leviable on cotton without fixing any stage and at more than one stage in violation of section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956; and (iii) there is no rational basis to single out the three items, namely, cotton, oil-seeds and resin for imposition of purchase tax and, therefore, the relevant provi-sions offend Art. 14 of the Constitution.

We have already held in another context that there are no merits in· the second point.

The first point need not detain us, as in the High Court no specific point was raised in that regard.

On the third point also no adequate material was placed in the court below and, therefore, it does not call for our considera-tion.

In the result the appeals are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.

R.K.P.S.

Appeals dismissed.