MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION versus SHRI BALWANT REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE AMRAVATI & ORS.

MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION

SURI BALWANT REGL'LAR MOTOR SERVICE. AMRA VA TI .~ ORS.

August 22, 1968

[J. C. SHAil, V. RAMASWAMI AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J

Mo/or Vehicles ACI (4 of 1939), ss. 48(1), 57(7) and 58(1)-0rder grantillK per1nit-Period of validity not mentioned-Effect of.-Date of com111encement nor mentioned-Effect of.

Practice- ·Fillin1; up datr in earlier order-If re\·iev.'.

·If order grantin~ pennit can be oral--Obligation 10 give r1•asons in1nzediarelt>.

Writ under Art. 226··-Conduct of part_v when pr?cfudes issue of.

On May 10. 1965, the R.T.A., after considering the applications by the rcspondcnrs (priv;.1tc operators) for rene\\·al of their permits and the application hy rhe appellant for fresh grant of pcnnits, for the same routes. p<l5Sed orders dismissing the applica1ions for rene\\':-ti and granting substantive permits lo the appellant. 'fhe order wao; chairenged by the private operators in \\Tit petitions and the High (-Ourt directed th;:Lt, pend-ing the di~posal of the v.·rit petitions, status quo should he maintained hy granting temporary permits to the private opcrarors. 'I"hereafter. \\·hile the writ petitions were pending. the appellant and the private operators filed " joint application o( compromise before the R. T.A. by which the private operators agreed to \vithdraw the \\Tit petitions. The R.1°.1\ .. on Septernhcr 11, 1965. upon such assurance ;ind after hearing the parties, tlirectcd that tbc appellant. which wa• granted suhst:antive pennil• by order dated f\.1ay 10. 1965, v.·ould comrncnee operation on the routes described in Schedule to the order from November I, 1965. that the private operators \\'ould operate on remporary permits on routes men-tioned in Schedule till June 30, 1967 and that the appellant would commence operation on those routes from Julv 1, 1967. With regard to the routes 1nt!ntioned in Schedule C, the private operators agreed to, surrendt..-r their permits in favour of the appellant hut, as the appellant had not made <.1ny application for those routes. the R.T.A. decided to call for applications a~ provided for in the :f\.1otor Vehicles Act, 1939. On October 8 I 965 the private operators withdrew the writ petitions, and thereupon 'the R. l.A .. on Octoher 15. 1965. announced the decision taken on Scptemher 11. 1965, and thereafter. invited appli~ations for .ttn routcs nlentioned in S..:hcdulc lbc appellant .made its application. . The private operators also applied, hut they applied not only for pcrm1B for Schedule roti:es. hut also .in respect of the Sc_hedule routes. On April 5. 1967. permits \\'ere issued to the appella~t 1n respect of !he Schedule routes as per the orders dated ~ay ~O. 1 J65 and Septen1hcr I.I. t 965, for period of 5 years commt.'11Clng, ~ron1 Jt1.lv 1.. 1.967. At ils meeting on June 29, 1967, th~ R.T.A .. pa~scd resolutions 1n the presence of the partieo; r.r:.nting suh<ifanllve permits in respect .of Schedule roulL'"S to the appellaiit. and rejecting the applications of .pnvare operators. T,hc minutes of the meeting v.'ere formally recorded 10 a. letter of July _o• .1967, detailed reasons in support of the order v.·ere given, and the Je~cr \\'as communicated to the prJvate operators. The order dated June _9,

1967 was challenged by the private operators in w'rit petitions and the High Court allowed the petitions quashing the grant of permits to the appellant on the 'routes described in Schedules and C.

In appeal to this Court, on the questions : (1) whether the order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965, was invalid because, (a) the period of validity of the permit was not expressly mentioned, and (b) the order did not mention the date of comtpencement of the period o'f the permit; (2) whether the order of the R.T.A. dated September ll, 1965, fixing the date of conimencement of the service was invalid, because, the order was review of the order dated May 10, 1965 and Lhe R.T.A. had no power of review; (3) whether the order dated September 11, 1965, was invalid because it was passed during the subsistence of the interim order of the High Court maintainirig status quo; ( 4) whether in view of their conduct, it was not open to the private operato'rs to apply for writ for quashing the order of the R.T.A. dated September 11, 1965; and (5) whether the order of the R.T.A. dated June 29, 1967, was invalid,.because, the order was oral and no reasons \Vere given by the R.T.A. immediately for the order.

HELD: (1) (a) There is no statutory requirement that the R.T.A. should expressly mention in its order granting permit under ·s. 48 ( 1) the period for which the permit was to be granted. The order of the R.T.A. should be construed in the language of s. 48 (1) which empowers the R.T.A. to grant stage carriage permit 'in accordance with the appli-cation' or 'with such modifications as it deems fit'. As required by r. 80 of the Bombay Motor Vericles Rules, the appellant mentioned 5 years as t:he period for which the permit was to be granted. Since the R.T.A. did not make any modification it must be deemed that the grant was made fo'r 5 years, in accordance with the application. Therefore, the order dated May 10, 1965 could not be held illegal on the ground that the period \Vas not expressly mentioned. [815 H; 816 B-E]

(b) There is nothing in the Aot or in the Rules to suggest that the R.T.A. is under an obligation to mention in the order of grant of permit the actual date from which the permit was to be effective. Under s. 48 (3) (i) of the Act, the R.T.A. may specify as condition that service shall commence from specified date. But it is merely permissible and does not' apply to the order of grant of permit which is dealt with in ,y s. 48(1). Jn the absence of any express statutory provision it must be taken that the date of the commencement of the period of the permit would be the date from which it was actually issued. Therefore, the order of the R.T.A. was not invalid, because, ithe date of commencement was not mentioned. [816 F-H]

Shree Laxnii Bus Transpo'rt Co. v. The R.T.A. Rajkot, 62 Born. L.R. 958, referred to.

(2) It is not correct ,to sav that the order of the R.T.A. dated Sep-tember 11, 1965, was an order of review of the previous order dated May 10, 1965. The later order of the R.T.A., fixing the date of com-mencement of the service was only supplemental and fiiled up an omission in the previous order which was left intact. [817 E-FJ

(3) The order of the. R.T.A. dated September 11, 1965 was condi-tional Qne which was intended to come into effect only after the writ petiti~ns in. the High Court were withdr~"Yn by the private operators, •nd It \Vas In fact announced after the petitions were withdrawn. There-fO're. there is no violation of the interim order of the High Court. [818 B-C]

( 4) 'fbc privaic operators \\'Cre parties to th;:-: order dated September 11, 196:5. h;id accepted th<1t Order. acted Upl)O it, and derived henelits :ind ;idvantagco;; from it tor nearly one year and nine months. Jn thos-~ circun1-stanccs there \[1];;1~ su;;h ;1cquit.:'>ccncc in the order on the r~1rt o'f the pri\·a:c opcrator.s ;1., to dis.entitle them to grant of ;1 \\T]I under Art. ~26 of thi.: Constitution. [818 D-E. G·Hl

Moon .\fii/, Lui. v .• W. II. Mehcr. A.LR. 1967 S.C. 1450. 1454. followed.

(5) 'fhcrc is no provision either in the Act or the Rule"> \•ohich re-quires cith·~r cxprc-;..,ly or bv nccc."'"i~fry implication, that. thi.: R.T.A. should give \ ... Tiilcn dC(.;l'Sion y.;ith rcg.;ird to the gran1 ot ~ta~c c;irri,1,µc pern11t or to give rc;1son~ therefor ~tlong \\ith the \\Tittcn decision. 'I'hereforc, in 1hc :ibscnce ol anv statutory provision. there is nothing: \\"rong in principle if an ;u.Jmini:.trative tribunal ~ivcs decision or;illy ;ind subse-quently reduce.; 10 \\Titing 1hc re;ison~ 1hcrefor and comm11nica1cs i~ to the parties_ [82.'; Ci; 827 0-f.J

ProcedurL' in Engli ...

la\~· referred to.

Bha}J(/l Raja \". Union of India, I 1967] 3 S.C.R. 30:! and Prag /)as Un1ar Vnishya \'. llnio11 of India. ('.1\. No. 657 of 1967, dated Augu:.t 17, 1967, held inapplicahlc.

CIVIL APPELLATE JvRISDicno:-i : Civil Appeals Nos. 825 to 851of1968.

Appeals frnm the judµment and order dated October 19, 20. 1967 of the Bomhay High Court. J\'agpur Bench in Special Civil Applications Nos. 575 to 596. 634. 540 and 570 to 572 of 1967 ;·~specti'"~ly.

C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Santosh Chatterjee and

D. P. Singh, for the appellant (in all the appeals).

M. N. l'hadke. C. G. Madholkar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent 'Jo. 1 (in C. As. Nos. 832. 840, 842, 844 and 847 to 851of1968).

M. IV. Phndke, M. W. P11ra11ik and Naunit Lal. for respon-dent No. I (in C. As. Nos. 825 to 831 and 833 to 838 of 1968).

R. V. S. Mani. for respondent Ko. I (in C. A. No. 845 of 1968).

The Judgment of the Coun was delivered by

Ramaswami, J. These appeals are brought by certificate from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated October 20, 1967 in Special Civil Applications Nos. 540. 570 to 572, 575 to 596 and 634 of 1967 filed under Ans. 226 and 227 of the Constitu-tion of India.

The appellant is the State Road Transport Corporation of the0 State of Maharashtra constituted under the Road Transport Cor-poration Act (64 of 1950). Respondent No. I who is private

stage carriage operator alongwith other such private operators, had applied for renewal of stage carriage permits which they were holding and which permits were to expire on March 31, 1961. The Provincial Transport Services (the predecessor of the appel-lant) had been also operating the stage· carriage service in the adjoining and nearby areas and had made applications sometime in January, 1961 for grant of substantive permits for the same routes. The Provincial Transport Services had published ·scheme under s. 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (herein-after called the 'Act') under which it proposed to take over seve-ral routes in the region including the routes in respect of which renewal applications were made by the appellant and the private operators. The scheme was approved by the Chief Minister of the then Bombay State. The approval was, however, challenged by private operators in Special Civil Application No. 86 of 1962 in the High Court. By its order dated 29/30th August, 1963 passed in that case, the High Court quashed the scheme with the direction that the matter should be reconsidered by th~ approving authority. The scheme was thereafter not pursued.

By notification dated June 10, 1961 under s. 47A of the Road Transport Corporation Act of 1950 the Central Govern-ment provided for the amalgamation of the Bombay Road Trans-port Corporation with the Commercial Undertaking of the State Government namely the Provincial Transport Services. It was also provided in the notification that any application for permit made by the Provincial Transport Services would be deemed to be an application made by the Bombay Road Transport Corpora-tion. In other words, the Provincial Transport Services was substituted by the State Road Transport Corporation which is now known as Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'appellant'). The applications for renewal of permits and applications for su"bstantive permits were considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Nagpur (hereinafter called the 'R.T.A.') on October 9 and 10, 1964 and the R.T.A. passed common order by which all tlie applications for renewal made by private operators were rejected and the permits were granted to the appellant. This order of the RT.A. was challenged bv the private operators in Special Civil Application No. 603 of 1964. One of the grounds on which the order was challenged was that the RT.A. was not validly constituted. By its order dated January 14, 1965, the High Court quashed the order passed by the RT.A., holding that it was not properly constituted on October 13, 1964 when it passed the common order. Thereafter the applications for rene· wal of permits and for fresh grant of permits were again consider-ed.by the RT.A. at its meeting held on May 10, 1965. By its order on the same date, the R.T.A. dismissed all the applications

[1969) ! S.C.R.

for renewal made by the private operator:. and directc<l that substantive permits for these routes should be granted to the appellant. The order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965 was challenged by the private operators in different Civil Applications. One of the apphcations was Special Civil Application No. 488 of 1965. In this application, one of the prayers was to the effect that pending the decision of the application the R.T.A. should be directed to maintain srarus quo. Clause 3 of the prayer was to the following effect :

"That pending the decision· of this application the R.T.A. Na)!pur be directed to maintain status quo l'iZ .. to grant temporary permit to the petitioner as it has been done upto now on the routes Chikhli--Buldana and Chikhli-Deulgaonraja on which the petitioner is operating his vehicles."

On June 4, 1965 Paranjpc, J. ordered as follows

"Ruic. Expedite hearing at Kagpur on 21-6-1965. !n the meantime R.T.A. l'\a~pur to maintain srarus quo m terms of Clause 3."

The interim order was subsequently confirmed by the High Court and all the petitions were directed to be heard together. ·

During th.~ pcndency of the Special Civil Appiications in the Hi!'.h Court an application ""'" made to the R.T.A. JOtntly <ln behalf of the appellant and the private operators. copy of that application is included as document no. 17 in Special Civil Application '.\'o. 575 of 1967. The joint application stated that the appellant and the private operators. with view to end all litigation, had agreed to settle the matter on certain terms. One of the terms was that the Special Civil applications filed were to be withdrawn. The application for compromise was considered by the R.T.A. at its meeting held on September 10 and I!. 1965. The JJri,·atc operator; including r~spondem :---,1. 1 assured the R.T.A. thai they would withdraw the petitions pending in the Hi~h Court. Upon such assurance the R.T.A. considered the m;t:cr at the meeting and after hearing the parties decided that the ~rrellant who was granted substantive permits by its order dated May IO. 1965. would commence operation on the routes described in Sch. 'A' from November I. 1965. In regard to the routes mentioned in Sch. 'Tl' for which also the appellant had been granted substantive permits by the order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965. the appellant was to be permitted to com-mence operation from July !. 1965 and the private operator< in-cluding respondent \lo. I were to be allowed to operate on the11e routes on temporary permits uptil June 30. 1967. This intervaf

of time was given to the P!ivate them to wind up their busmess without havrng to ~perators .appare~tly mcu~ to any loss help. and to assure certainty of better transport to the public. With regard to the third category of routes covered by Sch: 'C' of the order of the RT.A., the private operators were operating on sub-stantive permits which they agreed to surrender in favour of _the appellant. The appellant, however, had not m~de any a~phca­B tion till then for these routes. The RT.A. decided that it had to consider these routes on merits by inviting applications as pro-vided under the Act since the private operators holding substan-tive permits in respect of these routes were voluntarily surrender-ing them. Subsequently, the Secretary, RT.A. on application& made by the parties, granted temporary permits to the appellant in respect of 20 of these routes and to the private operators in respect of 22 other routes. The decisions were actually reached by the RT.A. in presence of all the parties and subject to the condition that the private operators would withdraw their peti-tions pending in the High Court. It appears that on October 8, 1965 the private, operators including respondent No. 1 withdrew the petitions from the High Court and informed the RT.A. of. such withdrawal. The R.T.A. thereupon on October 15, 1965, announced its decisions which it had taken on September 10/11, 1965. Thereafter the RT.A. invited applications in respect of Sch. 'C' routes but the private operators including respondent no. 1 made applications not only in respect of Sch. 'C' routes in-cluding those which were being operated by the appellant, but in respect of Sch. 'B'. routes as well. These applications were made during the month of February, 1967. The appellant had also made applications in respect of Sch. 'C' rouies in January, 1967 in response to notification of the RT.A. On April 5, 1967: the Secretary, R.T.A. issued permits to the appellant for penod of five years, commencing from July 1, 1967 in respect of Sch. 'B' rou'.es, actin~ upon the order of R.T.A. dated May 10. 1965 grantmg permits to the appellant and the subsequent order of the R.T.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 allowing the appellant to commence operations from July 1, 1967.The applications of the parties for substantive permits in res-pect of Sch. 'C' routes and the applications made by the private operators in respect of Sch. 'B' routes, were considered by the RT.A. in its meeting held on June 28/29, l967. After con-si~eri_ng each case on ~erits, the RT.A. granted substantive per-mits m respect of Sch. C' routes to the appellant and rejected the applications of the private operators for the same. With regard to the applications of the private operators in respect of Sch. 'B' routes and in respect of some routes of Sch. 'C' for which they had ~PP)ied after expiry of the date prescribed for making of such P.ppl1cat10ns, the RT.A. expressed the view that such applica-tions could not be maintained in respect of Sch. 'B' routes since

substantive pennits for those routes had already been granted by the R.T.A. in favour of the appellant on May I 0, 1965. As rcg~rds Sch. 'C' routes, the applications of the private operators were held to be not maintainable as they were tiled late. There-aft~r the private operators including respondent no. I voluntarily converted their applications into applications for additional tim-ings or trips on those routes. 'Ilic RT.A. thereupon decided to postpone consideration of these applications for additio11~1l tim-ings in order to enquire and satisfy itself about the existence of the additicnal need. This order of the RT.A. dated June 28,'29. 1967 was challenged by the priva1.e operators including respon-<:lcm no. I in Special Civil Applicalions which are the subject-matlcr of these appeals. By its judgment dated October 20. 196 7. the Bombay High Court allowed the Special Ci"il Applications an<l granted \\"I it in the nature cf ccrtior11ri qua~hitl!! the crdcrs -0f the R.T.A. dated September 10/J I. 1965 and June 28/29, 1967 and the permits issued by the Secretary. R.T.A. to the appellant on April 5, 1967. With regard to the order. of the R.T.A. dated May I 0, 1965 granting 'subs1anti\'e permit> to the appellant in respect of Sch. 'A' and Sch. 'B' routes. the High Court held that the said order had become "unworkable" in r~spect of Sch. 'R' routes and hence to that extent quashed that order.

The first question arising in this case is \vhcthcr the l-ligh -Court wa' right in takin_g the view that the order of the R.T.A. dated Mav I 0. 1965 granting substantive permits to the appellant wa, invalid mcrclv because : (I l the n~rind of v"lidi1v nf 1hc permit was not ex.pressly mentioned. and (2) the order does not mention the commencement of the period of the permit. As regards th.~ first ground, there is no statutory requirement that the R.T.A. is required to expressly mention in its order for what period the permit was to be granted. Jn this connection reference mav he made to ss. 46. 48 and 58 ( l )(a) of the Ac~ which -state :

"46. An application for permit in rcsncct of service of stai!c carriae:cs or to use particular niotor v~hicle as stage car~iage (in this Chapter referred to as stage carriag.~ permit) shall. as far as may he, con-tain the following particulars. namely :

(a) the route or routes or the area or areas to ·.vhich the application relates;

(h) the mun her of vehicles it is proposed to operate in relation to each route or area and the type and seatin_g capacity of each such vehicle;

(c) the minimum and maximum number of daily <crvices proposed to he provided in relation to

each route or area and the time-table of the normal services; (d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions; (e) the arrangements intended to be made for the housing and repair of the vehicles, for the com-fort and convenience of passengers and for the storage and safe custody of luggage;

(f) such other matters as may be prescribed."

"48. ( 1) Subject to the provisions of s. 47, Re-gional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under section 46, grant stage carriage per-mit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such permit :

Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the applica-tion. ·

(2) Every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to be valid only for specified route or routes or for specified area.

(3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for service of stage carriages of specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages, and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely :

(i) that the service or any specified part thereof shall be commenced with effect from >peci-fied date; "

"58. (1) (a) stage carriage permit or contract carriage permit other than temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit."

It is true that s. 58 (1 )(a) provides that the duration of the permit should be not less than three years and not more than five years as the R.T.A. m~y specify in the permit. But there is nothing in s. 48 ( 1) of the Act which states that the R.T.A. is ,.equired to specify expressly in the order of the grant of the permit as to for what period the permit is to be effeciive. It is

SIG

manifest however in the present case that the period of validity of the permit should be deemed to be five years because the order of the R.T.A. should be construed as an order of grant of stage carria,!:e permit "in accordance with the application" under '· 48 ( I ) ot the Act. In other words the order of the R.T.A. dated May IO, 1965 should be construed in the context of the language of s. 48 (I) of the Act which empowers the R.T.A. to grant stage carriage permit "in accordance with the applica-tion" or "with such modifications as it deems fit or lo refuse to grant such permit". In the present case, the R.T.A. did not make any modification and it must therefore be deemed that the grant of the pem1it was made in accordance with the applica-tion of the appellant which expressly declares the period of validity of the permit applied for to be of five years (sec the appli-cation of the appellant printed at page 205 of Vol. n of the Paper Book). Reference may be made in this connection to Ruic 80 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules which provides for the forms of application for permits and to Form P. St. S.A. prescribed under that Rule which requires the application to mention for what period the stage carriage permit is to be grant-ed. We are accordingly of the opinion that the order of the R.T.A. dated May 10, 1965 cannot be held to be illegal merely because the period of validity of the permit has not been expressly mentioned therein. It was, however, argued by Mr. Phadke on behalf of respondent no. 1 that the period of commencement of the permit should have been mentioned hy the RT.A. in its order of May 10. 1965 and the omission of the R.T.A. to do so in-validated the order. It was pointed out hy Mr. Phadkc that the order of the grant of permit was made on May 10. 1965 hy the R.T.A. hut the permits were actually issued to the appellant on April 5. 1967 to be eflcctivc for five years from that date. There is, however, nothing in the Act or in the Rules to suggest that the RT.A. is under an obligation to mention in the order of grant of permit the actual date from which the permit was to he eflec-tivc. Mr. Phadkc. referred to s. 48 ( 3 )( i) of the Act which states that the RT.A .. if it decid.~s to grant permit. mav grant the permit for service of stage carriage of specified descrip-tion and maY. subject to anv rules that may he made under the Act. attach to the permit condition that the service or any speci-fied part thereof shall be commenced with efleet from specified date. It is manifest that this statutorv provision is merclv per-missive and it does not apply to the order of grant of permit which is dealt with in s. 48 (I) of the Act. Jn the absence of anv express statutory provision it must he taken that the date of the commencement of the period of the pennit would be the date from which the permit is actuallv issued which is April .~. 1967 in the present case. The view that we have expressed is home out by the decision of the Bombay High Court in Shree

Laxmi Bus Transport Co. v. The R.T.A. Rajkot(') in which it was said that when an application for renewal ofa stage c;arriage ~rmit is granted under s. 58 of the Act, subsequent to the date on which the period of the permit expires, the period specified in the renewal cannot be made to commence retrospectively from the date of the expiry of the permit sought to be renewed but will commence from the date on which it is actually renewed. Hence, it is not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Phadke that the order of the RT.A. dated May IO, 1965 is illegal merely be-.cause the date of commencement of the operation of the permit is not specified therein. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in holding that the order of the RT.A. dated May 10, 1965 was legally invalid either because the period of validity of the permit or the date of commencement was not mentioned therein.

The next contention put forward by Mr. Phadke is that the order of the RT.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 fixing the date of the commencement of the service was an order which was tantamount to review of the previous order of the RT.A. dated May l 0, 1965 and as no express power of review is. conferred on the RT.A. by any provision of the Act, the order of Septem-ber 10/11, 1965 was illegal and ultra vires. In this connection Mr. Phadke referred to the decisions of this Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh([2 ]) and Chunibhui v. Narayanrao([3 ]) and contended that a. tribunal of limited jurisdiction has no inherent power to review its own orders except in the matter of clerical error. We consider that there is no substance in the argument put forward on behalf of respondent no. 1. It is not correct to say that the order of the RT.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 is an order of review of the previous order dated May 10, 1965, because the later order of the RT.A. fixing the date of com-mencement of the service is only supplemental and filled up an omission in the previous order of May 10, 1965 which was left intact.

We pass on to consider the next question arising in this case, namely, whether the order of the RT.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 was invalid because it was passed during the subsistence of the stay order of the High Court dated June 4, 1965 in Special Civil Application No. 488 of 1965. The High Court has taken the view that the order of the RT.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 was invalid because it was made on compromise reached by the parties during the operation of the stay order of the High Court in Civil Application No. 488 of 1965. In our opinion, the· High Court was not right in taking the view that the RT.A. had violated the stay order. The parties had themselves approached the RT.A. on the basis of the compromise which was meant to

{fi 62 Born.LR. 958. (2) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 641.

(3) A.LR. 1965 S.C. 1457.

put an end to long protracted litigation and which allowed time to the private operators to wind up their business. On perusal of the order of the R.T.A. dated September 10/11, I %5 it is manifest that the R.T.A. was careful to say that the compromise will come into effect only after the withdrawal of the writ peti-tions by the private operators. To put it differently, the order made by the R.T.A. on September I 0; 11, 1965 was conditional order, namely, an order which was intended to come into effect only after the writ petitions in the High Court were withdrawn by the privat.~ operators. le is not disputed tliat the order of the R.T.A., though dated September JO, 11. 1965 was formally announced on October 16. 1965 after the private operators had withdrawn the writ petitions on October 8. 1965. Jn these cir-cumstances we hold that there is no violation of the stav order of the High Court and the order of the R.T.A. dated Septemher I 0'11. 1965 which was formailv announced on October 16, 1965 is not in anv way invalid. Jn any event; we are s:11isfied that it is not open to the private operators including respondent no. 1 to apply for writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order of the RT.A. dated September 10/11, 1965 in view of their conduct. It is not dis-puted that the private operators including respondent no. 1 were present in the meeting of the R.T.A. held on September 10/11, 1965 either personally or through duly appointed Counsel. Res-pondent no. I and the other private operators assured the R.T.A. at the hearing that they would withdraw the writ petitions pend-ing in the High Court. On such assurances and subject to the actual withdrawal of the writ petitions in terms of the assurance, the R.T.A. considered the matter in the said meeting and after hearing the parties. made an order giving elTect to the compro-mise. It is obvious that the private operators including respon-dent no. I were parties to the order dated September I 0/ 11, 1965. had accepted that order. acted upon it and derived bene-fits and advantages from it for nearly on.z ye;tr and 9 months. But for the said order which susnended the operation of the per-mit of the appellant till July I, 1967 the private operators includ-in.g respondent no. I could not have got temporary permits to operate on the same routes as no stage carriage permits could be issued under s. 62 of the Act during the subsistence 0f substan-iive pern1its. In these circurnslanccs \Ve consider thut there \Vas such acquiescence in the RT.A.\ order datci I 0/ 11. September 1965 on the nart of respondent no. I and other private operators as to discntitlc them to grant of writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is wcll-e<tablished that the writ of certiorari will not be ~ranted in case where there is such negligence or omis-sion on the part of the applicant to assert his right as. tak~ in conjunction with the lapse of time and other - circumstances,

.....-· •

causes prejudice io the adverse party. The principle is to great extent similar to though not identical with, the exercise of dis-~retio~ in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstronfi Hurd Abram Farewell, and John Kemp(') as follows:

"Now the doctrine of !aches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give remedy, either be-cause the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards io be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of thne and delay · are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to bar by any statnt.~ of limitations the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equit-able. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the inierval, which might affect either party and cause balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."

This passage was cited with approval by this Court in recent case-The Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Indus-trial Court, Bombay('). In our opinion the principle of this deci-sion applies to the present case and since respondent no. 1 and the other private operators had not even pleaded any circum-stances justifying the delay or their conduct, the High Court was in error in granting writ of certiorari in their favour .

· We next proceed to consider the question regarding the validity of the order of the R.T.A. dated June 29, 1967. Tue High Court has taken the view that this order is invalid for two reasons : ( 1) the order of the R.T.A. is oral and not in writing, and (2) no reasons were hnmediaiely given by the R.T.A. for the order. In the present case, what actually happened was that the orders of the R.T.A. were made at its meeting held on June 28/29, 1967. Respondent no. 1 was admittedly present at this meeting and knew of the orders of the R.T.A. It is also not dis~ outed that the orders made on June 28/29, 1967 were in the· form of resolutions and the minuies of the meeting were formally "recorded on July 20, 1967 and communicated to respondent no. t

' (2) A.1.R. 1967 S.C. 1450,1454.

and the other private operators on the same date. The letter of July 20, 1967 communicating the resolution dated June 28/29, 1907 is Anr.ernre ·N' to the Writ Petition )io. 634 of 1967. In this letter detailed reasons arc given by the R.T.A. in support of its order granting stage carriage pennits to the appellant for the routes in question. In our opinion, the procedure adopted by the RT.A. does not contravene any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder and no legal principle has been violated. Refe-rence may be made in this connection to s. 57 of the Act and Rules 67 and 68 of the Rules which are to the following dw: -

"S. 57. (I) An application for contract carriage permit or private carrier's pennit may be made at any time.

(2) An application for stage carriage pennit or public carrier's pennit shall be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the pennit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such applica-tions, on such dates.

( 3) On receipt of an application for stage carriage pennit or public carrier's pennit. the Re-gional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which. the application and any representations received will be considered :

Provided that, if the grant of any pennit in accord-ance with the application or with modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region, or in any area or on any route within the region. under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that be-half under sub-section (3) of section 47 or ·sub-section (2) of section 55, as the case may be, the Regional Transpori Authority may summarily refuse the applica-tion without following the procedure laid down in this sub-section.

( 4) No representation in connection with an appli-cation referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made

lliI

in writing before the appointed date and unles~ copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making such representation.

( S) When any representation such . as is referred to in sub-section ( 3) is made, the Reg10nal Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by duly authorised represen-tative.

( 6) When any representation has been made by

the persons or authorities referred to in section SO to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted in any region or any area within region is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or of such area, whether such representation is made in connection with particular application for the grant of confract carriage permit or otherwise, the Regional Transport Authority may take any such steps as it considers appropriate for the hearing of the representation in the presence of any persons likely to be affected thereby.

(7) When Regional Transport Authority refuses

an application for permit of any kind, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal.

" "Rule 67. Regional Transport Authorities.-( 1) The Regional Transport Authgrify shall meet at such. times and at such places as its Chairman may appomt.

Provided that it shall meet not less than once in each month unless the State Transport Authority otherwise directs.

(2) Not less than 3 days' notice shall be given to every member of any meetlng of the Regional Trans-port Autho,rify.

(3) member of the Regional Transport Autho-

rity shall attend at least six meetings in each financial year. The State Government may at any time remove any such member from office on his failure to attend the minimum number of meetings fixed under this rule. The State Government may also remove from office any member for any other cause .

( 5) Where Regional Transport Authority con-sists of more than three members. the number of mem-bers whose presence shall constitute quorum shall be one half of its members and where it consists of three members, the quornm shall be two. If within half an hour from the time appointed for the meeting quorum is not present, the meeting shall be adjourned to such day and at such time and place as the Chair-man or the Presiding Officer nominated under sub-rule (6) may appoint: and if at the adjourned meeting quorum is not present. the memhers present shall be quorum.

( 7) The Chairman or the Presiding Otlicer shall have second or casting vote."

"68.(1)

( 2) Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules and to the approval of the State Govern-ment. State or Regional Transport Authority shall have power lo make bye-laws to regulate the conduct of its business and shall likewise have power lo amend or rescind such bye-laws and the business of such Transport Authority shall be conducted according to such bye-bws under the direction of the Chairman. (3) Sav.~ in !he case of the hearing of an objec-tion to the grant of stage carriage permit or of public carrier's permit and in the case of the hearing of representation under sub-section ( 6) of section 57. State or Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may decide any matter. without holding meeting by the majority of the votes of members re-corded in .writing and sent to the Secretary (hereinafter rr.fcrrcd to as procedure by circulation).

( 6) The St;ite or the Regional Transport Autho-rity. as the case may be, may require any applicant for permit to appear before it and may withhold the consideration of the application for the pennii until the applicant has so appeared in person if so required. or by any recognised agent if so permitled. and until the applicant has furnished such infonnation as may be required bv the Transport Authority in connection with the application.

Explanation.-In this sub-rule, except in cases falling under sub-section ( 5) of section 57, the expres-sion "recounised agent" means pleader or·the father, son, broth~r, partner or employee of the applicant duly authorised by him in writing or any other person so authorised an drecognised by the Transport Autho-rity concerned as fit person to be recognised agent under its bye-laws made under sub-rule (2).

(7) Nothing contained in this ru~e shall prev~n~ State or Regional Transport Authority from deciding by following the procedure by circulation any matter which has been considered at meeting or has been the subject of hearing and upon which decision has been reserved.

(8) Where matter is decided by the votes of members present at meeting of State or Regional Transport Authority, no perscm other than member of the Transport Authority shall be entitled to be pre-sent and no record of the voting shall be kept save of the number of votes cast on either side; provided that when any matter is decided by the exercise of the se-cond or casting vote of the Chairman or the Presiding Officer the fact shall be recorded."

On behalf of respondent no. 1 Mr. Phadke conceded that the procedure adopted by the RT.A. did not contravene any section of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. Counsel, however, put forward the argument that even in the absence of any express provision statutory tribunal has to give its order in writing and no oral judgment can be legally given. It was also coniended on behalf of respondent no. 1 that it was not suffi-F cient that reasons for the decision were given subsequently by the RT.A. in its letter dated July 20, 1967 but the reasons should have been given simultaneously at the time of the resolutions on June 28/29, 1967. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. As we have already stated, there is no provision either in the Act or the Rules which requires the RT.A. to give written decision with regard to the grant of stage carriage per-mit. Nor is there anything in the Act or the Rules which by necessary implication throws duty upon the RT.A. to give written judgment in each case and to give reasons thereof alonrr with the , written decision. It is true that s. 57 (7) of the Act requires the RT.A. fo give in. writing the reasons if it refuses an application for permit ·of any kind. But in the case of grant of permit the statute does not impose any such duty upon tlle RT.A. Mr. Phadke on behalf of respondent no. 1 has been unable to point fo any section of the Act or any Rule from which necessary implicacion can be dr<1w11 ch.it -uch " ducy is thrown upon the R. T.A. Reference was, holl'cvc1, !lladc by Mr. Phaake to two decision of this Court in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of l11dia(') and in PraK Das Vmar Vaishya v. The Union of India{°). In the former case the appellant was one of sever.ii applicants for mining lease in Andhra Pradesh. The State Gov-ernment however granted it to respondent no. 3. The appellant chcn filed an application in revision, under s. :;o of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, l 957 read wich r. 54, to the Union of India. Respondent no. 3 filed counter statement and che Stat.~ Government filed its comments. The appellant tiled rejoinder. The Union Government without hearing the <tppellant rejected his revision application. An appeal was filed before this Court. The question which fell for consideration was whether it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for its decision in view of the provisions of the Act and che Rules or b.~cause the decision W<Ls liable to be questioned in appeal to this Court. It was held by this Court in these cir-- cumstances that "a speaking order is all the more necessary in the case of decision under r. 55 because !here is provision for new material being placed before the Central Government which was not there before the State Government, and further, because the decision. affecting important rights of parties, is given in summary manner without hearing being allowed to the parties and that party was entitled to know why the decision has gonl.! against him". In the result, the appeal was allowed and the orders of the Central Govemment were set aside arid the Central Government was directed to decide the review applications afresh in the light of the observations made. In the latter case, i.e., Praf? Das Umar Vaishya v. The U11ion of India(') the same prin-ciple was reiterated. It is manifest chat the material facts in the pre-sent case are different. The significant fact in the present case is that the decision of the R.T.A. on June 28/29, 1967 was given after hearing respondent no. 1 and the other private operators who were present at the meeting of the RT.A. either personally or through Counsel and reasons for the decision were also com-municated to respondent no. 1 and other private operators by registered letter dated July 20, 1967. The principle of the decision of this Court in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India(') and in Prag Das Umar Vaishya v. The Union of India(') has there-fore no bearing upon the determination of the question involved in the present case. Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rules either expressly or by necessary impli-cation we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Phadke that there is any general principle that statutory tribunal should always give its judgment in writing and should always give (I) [1967J 3 S.C.R. 30:!. •

(2) Ci\'il Appeal ~o. 657 l1i 1967 d~cidC'd on A\1('11-;r Ii. 1967 .

reasons thereof immediately with the pronouncement of the judgment.

In English law, an applicant for cert!or~ri was required to verify by his affidavit copy of the conv1ct10n or other record of adjudication complained of, or to explain his failure to do so. The ru.le in question was r. 35 of the Crown Office Rules, 1886 which seems merely to have codified the common law on the subject. This rule was later replaced by Rules of Supreme Court and 0.59 r. 8 ( 1) is substantially to the same effect. It is appa-rent that this rule, like the earlier rules, though it calls for written record when certiorari is moved for, permits its absence at the outset if the applicant accounts for his failure to lodge th~ order to the satisfaction of the Court. At Common Law the practice was that if the conviction or order attacked had not been put in writing, the applicant for the certiorari would simply so state in his affidavit, and thus its non-production would be excused at that stage. If the court was persuaded that the con-viction or order when in writing would probably be quashablc, it would grant the certiorari, and order return of the record of adjudication. It is well-settled by several English authorities that even though there was no such record when the inferior tri-bunal received the writ of· certiorari it could not defeat the writ by making return that the record was not drawn up or that it had only made an oral order. If it did so, then the return would be quashed, and the tribunal directed to enter the conviction or order and return it: R. v. Levermore([1 ]) R. v. Lichfield([2]); R. v. Coles([3 ]) and R. v. Trafford('). This was the legal posi-tion even though at common law practice had grown up of not drawing up convictions until an appeal was taken or certiorari received, which practice was continued by the Summary Convic-tion Rules, 1915, r. 53 and later by the Magistrates' Courts Rules, 1952, r. 19(1 ). These rules referred to convictions not being drawn up till needed for an appeal or other "legal purpose" . .That an oral order was legally valid order is also indicated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rex v. Newington Licensing Justices (') in which the lessee of premises in respect of which justices off-licence was in force applied for the transfer of the licence to her from the previous lessee and licensee. At the hearing of the application it appeared that the applicant had mortgaged the premises by way of sub-demise to the lessors and the justices considering the mortgage to be 'an agreement or other assurance under which the licence was to be transferred and held' within the meaning of s. 25, sub-s. 2, of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, purported to order the applicant to

(!) (1700) I Salk. 146. (2) [ 184.l] 4 Q.B. 893. (j,) [1845] 8 Q.B. 75. (4) (1855) 4 W.R. 55.

[IQ48] I K.R. 681.

produce it. It ""'" held by the Court of Appeal that the justices had no power to order the production of any document, even if it were document which the section required to be produced and that in any view the mortgage was not such document, and the order o[ the justices was therefore made without jurisdiction. The order of the justices was, however, made orally al the hearing of the application and had not been reduced into writing at the time when the motion for an order of certiorari was made. On this point the Court of Appeal held that it had no power to dca: with any order but an order in writing in proceedings for certiorari. The court, therefore, refused to give judgment ;mtil the order was reduced into writing, but consented to hear the arguments on an undertaking being given by the panic.> th3t the order would be duly reduced into writing and produced before the Court. After the Court of Appeal had beard the argi.1ments written order was drawn up by the justices and produced before the Court which thereafter delivered the judgment and quas:hed the order of the grant of writ. Reference should in this context be made tu s. 12 (3) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 ( 6 & 7 Elizabeth 2.c. 26) which contemplates that tribunal or any Minister may furnish statement, either written or oral, of the reasons for the decision if requested. on or before the g:ving or notiilcation of the decision. to state the reasor.s. Scctinn 12 provides as follows :

"(I) Subject to the provisions of thi> section. where after the appointed day-

(a) any such tribunal as is specified in the FiM Schedule to this Act gives any decision. or

(b) any Minister notifies any decision taken by hi111 after the holding by him or on his behalf of n statutory inquiry ............... .

it shall be the duty of the tribunal or Minister to furnish statement, either written or oral, of the reasons for the decision if requested, on or hcfore the giving or notification of the deci-sion. to state the reasons :

Provided that the statement may be ref,1sed, or the specification of the reasons restricted. on grounds of national security, 3~<l the tribu-nal or Minister may refuse to fun11sh the state-ment to person not primarily concerned with the decision if of opinion that to funiish it

would be contrary to the interests of any person primarily concerned.

( 3) Any statement of the reasons for such deci-sion as is mentioned in paragraph (a J or ( b) of sub-section ( 1) of this section, whether given in pursuance of that sub-section or of any other statutory provision, shall be taken to form part of the decision and accordingly to be incorpo-rated in the record. ,,

It should be noticed that under this section, the statement of reasons may be oral and any snch statement "shall be taken to be part of the decision and accordingly to be incorporated in the record". Further, the duty to give reasons arises only whe.n request to give them is made to the tribunal or to the Minister. No such duty arises under this sub-section if the requ~st is made after the decision has been given or notified.

We are therefore of the opinion that in the absence of any statutory provision there is nothing wrong in principle if an administrative tribunal gives decision orally and subsequ~ntly reduces to writing the reasons thereof and communicates it 10 the parties. We accordingly reject the argument of Mr. Phadke on this aspect of the case.

For the reasons expressed we hold that the judgwent of the Bombay High Court dated October 20, 1967 should be set asi<le and Special Civil Applications Nos. 540, 570 to 572, 575 to 596 and 634 of 1967 filed by respondent no. 1 and other private operators should be dismissed. We accordingly allow these appeals with costs-there will be one hearing fee.

Appeals allowed .