PUNITHAVALLI AMMAL versus RAMALINGAM (MINOR) AND ANR

PUNITHAVALLI AMMAL

' RAMALINGAM (MINOR) AND ANR

March 4, 1970

[J. e. SHAH, K. s: 'HEGoE '.ANo A. N. GRovER, JJ.J

Hindu La11·-Wlzet/1er full 011•11ership acquired by widow under s. 14(1) of Hindu Succession :A.ct defeasib/e by adOption 1nade afte1· the enllc:unent, -

Hindu died leaving behind his widow and daughters. The proper-ties le{t behind by the deceased were' inherited by the widow, and they \Vere in her possession when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. Subsequent to the enforcement of the Act, she adopted son and thereafter settled part of the property on one of the daughters. The_ adopted son challenged the validity of the settlen1ent deed contehdiuj? that the adoption must be deemed to relate back to the death of the 'vidow's husband and therefore she was incompetent to make the im-pu~gned alienation. Rejecting the contention1 this Court;

HELD :-The rights conferred 'on Hindu female under s. 14(1) of the Act are not restricted or limited IJy any rule of Hi.ndu law. The section plainly says that the property· possessed by Hindu female on the date the Act came into force \\'hether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act· shall be held by her as full owner thereof. The provision makes .a clear departure (rom the Hindu litw -texts or rules. Those texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain intend-ment of the provision. [897 F-GJ

'The fiction of relation back in the case of adoption under Hindu friw is 'based on Hindu la\v texts or rules or at any rate it is based ou interpretation of Hil.'ldu la\\·. Therefore. by virtue of s. 4 of the Act that rule ceased to hh.ve effect from the date the Act came into force '''ith respect to any n1atter for which provision is made under the Act. [896 F-Gl

Yan1unabai and Ant v. Rani !11aharr.j Shreedlu1r M<1haraj anfi a11r. A.T.R. 1960 Born. 463; approved.

Shrinivr.s Krislianarao Kango v. Naray'an Derji Kongo a11d ors. r1955] 1 S.C.R. p. 1; Krishna111urthi J.'nsudeorao Deshpande v. Dlrrun•araj, [1%1] 1 S.C.R. 813, referred to.

Suk/11·n111 and anl". v. Gauri Shat;kar and anr. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 4i6 referred to.

Civ1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 139 of 1967.

Appeal from the judgment and Decree dated September 3. 1963 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1021 of 1960.

B. Datta, for the appellant.

M. Srinivasall, K. N. Ba/as11brama11ian and Lily Thomas, for

respondent No. 1.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J:legde, 1. The question for decision in this appeal by cer-tificate is whether the full ownership conferred on a·Hindu femak under s. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (to be ·hereinafte1 referred to as the Actl is defeasible by the adoption made by ll her to. her deceased .husba!ld after the Act came into force.

The fdcts relevant for the purpose of deciding that question of law may now lie state<l. One Somasundra Udayar of Poon-gavur village in Tanjavoor District di.ed orior to 1937 leaving behind him his widow Sellathachi\and tV:.i daughters K..ippaimal nnd Punithavalli Ammal. The properties left behind. by !he deceased were inherited by his widow and they were in her possession when the Act came into force on- June 17, 1956. By Yirtue of s. 14(1) of the Act Sellathachi became the full owner of the properties inherited by her from her husband.. On July 13, 1956, she adopted the plaintiff-1st respondent in this appeal. Thereafter on June 19, 1957 she settled 9 acres l 6 cents of land and half share in house inherited by her frotll her husband on her daughter Punithavalli Ammal, the appellnnt in this appeal. The validity of this settlement deed was challenged by means of sui! by the adopted son ~even during the life time of Sellathachi. The settler who was impleaded as the !st defendant to the action died ·soon after the .insiitution uf the suit. Various contentions· were raised in defence but it is unnecessary to go into them. -The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that iri view of s. 14(1) Sellathachi was the full ,,._,·ner of the properties inherited by her from her husband ond hence the adopted son cannot impugn the alienation made by her. This decision was upheld in appeal but in second appeal. :t division bench of th~ High Court of Madras reversed that deci->ion holding that the adootion of the plaintiff must be deemed to relate back to the date of the death of Somasundara Udayar and therefore Sellathachi W?~ incompetent to make the-impugned alienation. This correctness of this findin!! is in issue in this arpeal. ' -

According to Hindu law texts as interpreted by courts-, on adoption _by Hindu widow, the adopted son acquires all ·the rights of an mirasa son and those rights relate ba9k to the date of the death of the adootive father-see Shri11i1'as Krish11arac• Ka11go v. Narayan Devji Kango and ors.('). Hence the estate held by widow was defeasible 'estate. Ti)e same is the case with person possessing title defeasible on adoption: not only hfs titk but also the title of all persdns claiming under hiJ11 will be

(t) [1955! l S.C.R. p. I.

extinguished on adoption-see Krishnamurthi V asudeorao Deshpande v. Dhruwaraf('). In fact under the Benaras School of Mitakshra rule where male coparcener is not entitled to alienate even for value his undivided interest in the coparcenary property without the consent of the other coparceners, the aliena-tion effected 'by sole surviving male coparccner can be success-fully challenged by a· person adopted subsequent to the alienation. The fiction of relation back has been given full effec~ by courts and consequences spelled out a5 if the fiction is fact. The adopted son is deemed for all practical purposes, subject to some minor exceptions, to have born as an aurasa son on the date his adoptive father died. Admittedly but for the relevant provi-sions in the Act the settlement in favour of the appellant could have afforded no basis for resisting the claim of the adopted son. Therefore we have to see whether the provisions of the Act have effected any change in the law as regards the fiction referred to. Section 4( 1) of the Act provides :

"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,-

( a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custoln or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;

(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act."

It is undisputed that the fiction of relation back in the case of adoption under Hindu law is based on Hindu law texts or rule <;>r at any rate it is based on interpretation of Hindu law. There-tore that rule ceased to have effect from the date the Act came into force with respect to any matter for which provision is made . under the Act. Hence we have to see whether the matter dealt with under s. 14 (1) impinges on the rule of adoption relating back to the date of death of the adoptive father.

. ~doption is ~ode of affiliation which con.ers right of mhentance under Hindu law. Under that Jaw widow in the absence of any preferential heir succeeded to the estate of her deceased husband but she took only an estate known as widow's estate. After her death the property devolved on the nearest

(l) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 813.

reversioner of her husband. Section 14(1) of the Act made an important departure in that respect. That section provides :

"Any property possessed by female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencem~t of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as limited owner."

The explanation to the section is not necessary for our present purpose. It was conceded at the bar that Sellathachi was in possession of the property in dispute on the date the Act came into force. By virtue of the aforesaid provision, she became the full owner of the property on that date. From plain reading of s. 14(1l, it is clear that the estate taken by Hindu female under that provision is an absolute one and is not defeasible under any circumstance. The ambit of that estate cannot be cut by any i.ext, rule or interpretation of Hindu law. The presumption of continuity of law is only rule of interpretation. That presump-D tion is inoperative if the language of the concerned statutory pro-vision is plain and unambiguous. The fiction mentioned earlier is abrogated to the extent it conflicts with the rights conferred on Hindu female under s. 14( 1) of the Act. In Sukhram and anr. v. Gauri Shankar and anr. (1) this Court held that though male member of Hindu family governed by the Benaras School of Hindu .law is subject to restrictions qua alienation of his interest in the joint family property but widow acquiring aii interest in that property by virtue of Hindu Succession Act is not subject to any such restrictions. This Court held in S. S. M11nna Lal v .. S. S. Rajkumar and ors. (2) that by virtue of s. 4 of the Act the legislature abrogated the rules of Hindu law on all matters in respect of which there is an express provision in the Act. In our opinion the rights conferred on Hindu female under s. 14 (1) of the Act are not restricted or limited by any rule of Hindu law. The section plainly says that the property possessed by Hindu female 0!1 the date the Act came into force whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held h\' her as full owner thereof. That provision makes clear depn:-ture from the Hindu law texts or rules. Those texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain intendment of ti provision.

In our judgment the learned judges of the Madras High Court were not right in limiting the scope of s. 14! 1) by taking the aid of the fi, tion ''lentioncd earlier. That in our opinion ;,, wholly impe 1iss! .Je. On the point under consideration the (1) [1968] J ,,C.R.476. (2) [1962] J Supp. S.C.R. 41X.

decision of the Bombay High Court in Yamunabal and anr. v. Ram Maharaj Shreedhar Maharaj and anr. {[1]) lays down the law correctly.

In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the decree nnd judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. The 1st respondent will pay the Court fee payable by the appellant in this appeal.

Appeal allowed.