DURAI MUTHUSWAMI versus N. NACHIAPPAN & ORS.

DURAi MUTHUSWAMI

N. NACHIAPPAN & ORS.

April 23, 1973

[D. G. P_ALEKAR AND A. ALAGIR!SWAMJ, JJ.)

.Reprr.se111utio1i of the Peopl'e Act, 1951-S. 81. 100. 101-Wheiher there .Mould be specific aver1nent in the petition tltat due to_ improper acceptance of Romination oaiu:r. the result of the eleclion had been marerially afiected-Whe~ ther 1he case falls wuler s. IOO(l)(a).

The first respondent was declared elected to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly defeating his nearest rival, the petitioner. This appeal arises out of the dismissal of the election petition filed by the appellant for setting aside the result of that election. Many grounds had been urged before the High Court; but only one ground, which the High Court refused to go· into was urged before this Court: i.e .• that on the date of presenting his nomination pa~r, the Ist respondent had subJisting contract with the State Government to widen road at an estimated cost of Rei. 2 lakhs and that on the eve of presentation of nomina-tion papers, he purported to surrender the contract by submitting an application for cancellation to the Division Engineer, whereas the contract was signed by the. Su_..,crintending Engineer, Madras Circle on b~haJf of the Government of Tamil Nadu, and this letter of cancellation was not valid and therefore there was noo valid cancellation of the contract. and as such, th: election of the 1st responder .. was void on that ground.

Th: Hi2h Court. however, refused to go into the allegation on the ground that 1here was no specific averment jn the petition that du~ t? alleged improper reception on the 1st respondent's nomination paper.;, 1he electio nre~ult had been materiallv affected.

AHowing the appeal,

HEW: (i) Under s. 83(1) (a), an election petition shall contain concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relics. Under s. 100(1) if the High ·court is of ODinion that on the date of his election. returned candi-date wa~ ·not qualified to b: chosen to fill the seat or that the result of the elec-tion has been materially affected by the imDroper acceDtance of any nomina-tion etc.; the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate void. Therefore. what section 100 requires is that the High Court before it declares the election of returned candidate void, should be of the opinion that the result of the election. in so far as it concerns returned candidate. ·has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomin·ation. Under s. 83', all that was necessary was concise statement of the material faCcts on which the petitioner relies.

(ii) In the present case, the appellant had stated that the election is void b~cause of th~ improDer acceptance of the 1st respondent's nomination. It was not necessary for him to further allege that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected by the im-proper acceptance of the 1st respondent's nomination. That is the obvious con-clusion to be dra\\'n from the circumstances of this case. Further. the question of the election b:ing materiailv affected does not arise in case falling under s. JOO(! )(a). All thats. 100(1 Ha) requires is that on the date of this election returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chqsen to fill the seat under the Constitution or the Act. Under this section in ortler to declare his election void it is not necessary that el~ction petition should s~ate that the result of the electi<::in was materially affected thereby. [44G]

Balakrishna y. f"arnandez, [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603,. referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 646 of 1972.

Appeal under Sec. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1972 of the Madras High Court in E.P. No. 13 of 1971.

M. Natesan, K. Jayaram and C. Chandrasekhar, for the appellant. M. C. Clwgla and A. Subhashini, for respondent No. 1.

S. Mohan and A. V. Rangam, for respondents Nos. 3 & 4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-

ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-This appeal arises out of the election held to fill up seat in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly from the San-karapuram Constituency, South Arcot District, held in March 1971 in which the first respondent obtained 28,544 votes as against 28,472 votes obtained by the petitioner and was thus declared elected. This appeal arises out of the dismissal of tlie election petition filed by the appellant for setting aside the result of that election. Though many grounds had been urged before the High Court as well as in the petition of appeal in this Court, we are now concerned only with one ground which the High Court refused to go into and was the only one which Shri Natesan .appearing for the appellant urged before us.

Before the Returning Officer another candidate by the name Ramaswami had presented an objection petition to the reception of the lst n:sponclent s nommal!on on the ground that he had subs1stmg contract with the Highways Department of the State of Tamil Nadu, and with the Panchayat Union, Thiagadurgam, and was also an agent for selling tickets in the raflle conducted by the State of Tamil Nadu. The Returning Officer rejected those contentions and accepted the nomination papers of the !st respondent. Subsequently, Ramaswami withdrew from the contest and the appellant and the 1st respondent were the only candidates in the election. In his election petition the appe.lant had mentioned that on the date of presenting his nomination papers the 1st respondent had subsisting contract with the State Government to widen and black-top the Ulundurpet-Salem road bet-ween 74 km and 86 km at an estimated cost of Rs. 2 lakhs, that on the eve of presentation of nomination papers he purported to sur-render the contract by submitting an application for cancellation to the Division Engineer, H1g.1ways, Cuddalore, whereas the contract was signed by the Superintending Engineer, Madras Circle on behalf of the Government of Tamil Nadu, that this letter of cancellation was not valid and therefore there was no valid cancellation of the contract. He, therefore, specifically urged that' the election of the 1st respondent was void on "that ground. The 1st respondent on the other hand :nain-G tainec! that the cancellation of the contract was valid and there was no snbsisting contract on the date of filing of the nomination and that the contention of the petitioner that his election was void on that ground was not legally sustainable. He also contended that as the petitioner had not alleged that by reason of such improper acceptance the result of the election, in so far as it concerned the 1st respondent, had been materially affected, that allegations cannot be inquired into. He also contended that in any case the result of the election had not been mate-rially affected. The learned Judge who dealt with this matter upheld the contention of the respondent on the ground that the allegations in the petition had not stated that the result had been materially affected

by the alleged improper reception of the (1st respondent's) nomination papers. He was of the opinion that this allegation relating to the improper acceptance of tne nomination of the first respondent cannot be considered valid ground, which could be gone into in the absence of specific averment that the election had been materially affected. To complete the narrative it is necessary to mention that the appellant had fikd an application for summoning the necessary documents in order to sustain his case. The documents necessary to be referred to, so far as the present appeal is concerned, are only four in number : 1. Objections to the nomination of the 1st respondent (N. Nachiappan) by A. Ramaswami.

2. Documents produced by the 1st respondent (N. Nachiappan) at the time of the scrutiny of nomination. 3. The signed agreement between the Superintending Engineer, Highways, Madras Circle ~nd N. Nachiappan in- respect of the contract for widening the existing black top surface to 22 ft. with Ulundurpet-Salem Road-Kilometre 74/2 to 86/ 4.

4. Proceedings of the Divisional Engineer, Highways ancl Rural Work. Cuddalore of termination of the con-tract made by Rec. No. 8280/70-B-3 dated 28-1-71.

The first two documents were to be summoned to be produced by the District Elec'.ion Officer and the other two by the Superintending Engineer, Highw.1ys, Madras Circle.

Before dealh1 with the question whether the learned Judge was right in holding t'iat he could not go into the question whether the Ist respondent's nomination has been improperly accepted because there was no allegation in the election petition that the election had been materially affected as result of such improper acceptance, we may. look into t'.1e relevant provisions of law. Under s. 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 an eledon petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (!) of section JOO and section JOi. It is not itecessarv to refer to the rest of the section. Under section 83(1)(a), in so far as it is necessary for the purposes of this case, an election petition shall contain concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies. Under section 100(1) if the High Court is of opinion-G

( a) that on the date of his election returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the 3Clt under the Constitution or this Act ....

( d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns re-turned candidate, has been materhlly affected-

(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or

(ii) ......................

...................... (iii) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

the High Court shall declare the election o~ the. returned candid1te to be void. Therefore what section 100 requires is that the High Court before it declares the election of returned candidate is void should be of opinion that the result of the election in so far ~s it concerns returned candidate has been materially affected by the improper acce?'-tance of any nomin1tion. Un~er s. 83 all th~t was n~ce~~ary was. concise statement of the matcnal facts on which the petltIOner relies. That the appellant in this case has done. He has also stated that the election is void because of the improper acceptance of the !st respon-dent's nomination and the facts given showed that the !st respondent was suffering from disqualification which will fall under section 9A. That was why it was c1lled improper acceptance. We do not consider that in the circums~ances of this case it was necessary for the peti-tioner to have also further alleged th.it the result of the elec•ion in s(J far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the 1st respondent's nominat10n. That is the obvious conclusion· to be drawn from the ci.rcumstances of this case. There was only one sea• to be filled and there we•e only two contesting candidates.. If the allegation that the !st respondent's nomi-n1tlon has bee3 improperly accepted is accepted the conclusion tnat would follow is that the appellant would have been elected as he was the only candidate validly nominated. There can be, therefore, no dispute th1t the result of the election in so far as it concerns the re-turned candidate has been materially affected by the improper accep-E tance of his nomination because but for such improper accept1nce he would not have been able to stand for the election or be declared to be el!:Cted. The petitioner had also alleged th1t the election wa.< void because of the improper acceptance of the !st respondent's nomina-ti9n. In the case of election to single member constituency if there are more than two c1ndidates and the nomination of one of the de-feated candidates had been improperly accepted the question might arise as lo whether the result of the election of the returned candidate had been materially affected by such improper reception. In such " case the 9uestion would ari~e as to what would have happened to the votes which had been cast 1n favour of the defeated candid1te whose nominati_on h.~d been improperly accepted if it had not been accepted. I.n that ClSe it would be necessary for the person challenging the elec-t!on not merely to allege but also to prove that the result of the elec-G hon . ha~ been materially affected by the improoer acceptance of the nom!nation of the other defe1ted candidate. Unless he succeeds in proymg that if th~ votes cast in favour of the candidate whose nomi-";at10"; had been improperly accepted would have gone in the peti-!1on~r s fav.our an~. he would have unt maioritv he cannot succeed '? his electio"; petition. Section !OO(l)(d) (i) deals with such con-tm~encv; It ~s M' inte"ded to orov;de cn"venient technical nleq in ~ase like t!11s where there can be no dispute at all about the election ~mg matena)lv affected by the acceotance of the improper ~omina­hon. "f>:h'.enally affe~ted" is_ not formula that has ~ot to be speci-fied but 1t is an essential requirement that is contemplated in this sec-tion. Ll\w does not contemplate more repetition of formula. The learned Judge has failed to notice the distinction between ground on which an election can be declared to be void and the allegations that are necessary in an electic:i petition in respect of such ground. The petitioner had stated the ground on which the. 1st respondent's elec-tion should be declared to be void. He had also given the material facts as required under s. 83(1)(a). We are, therefore, of opinion that the learned Judge erred in holding that it was not competent for him to go into the question whether the !st respondent's nomination had been improperly accepted. One other point which the learned Judge failed to notice is th1t on the allegations contained in the petition, if they were established, the respondent must be deemed to suffer the disqualification under s. 9A of the Ac.t and all that s. lOO(l)(a) requires is that on the date of his election returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act. In order to declare his election void it is not necessary that the election petition should state that the result of the election was materially aff<cted · thereby. The question of the election being materially affected does not arise in c1se falling under s. lOO(l)(a).

Though it is not necessary to cite any authorities we may refer to few decisions. In Ba/akrishna v. Fernandez([1]) this Court pointed out that the first sub-section of section 100 lays down the grounds for declaring an election to be void, that sections 100 and 101 deal with the substantive law on the subject of election, that these two sections circumscribe the conditions which must lie established before an elec-tion can be declared void or another candidate declared elected. It further observed :

"The heads of substantive rights in s. 100(1) are laid down in two seperate parts : the first dealing with situations in which the election must be declared void on proof of certain facts, and the second in which the election can only be dec-lared void if the result of the election, in so far as it concerns the returned candjda'e, can be held to be materially affected on proof of some other facts. . . In the first p1rt they are that the candidate lacked the necessary qualification or had incurred disqualific1tion. . . . These are grounds on vroof of which by evidence, the election can be set aside wjthout any further evidence. The second part is conditional that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns returned c1ndidate, was materially affected by the improper acceptance of nomination . . . . This condition has to be established by some evidence direct or circumstantial. It is, therefore, clear that the substantive rights to make an election petition are defined in these sections and the exercise of the right to petition is limited to tl;ie grounds specifically mentioned.

Having dealt with the substantive law on the subject of election petitions we mw now turn to •he procedural provi-sions in the Representation of the People Act. Here we

have to consider sections 81, 83 and 86 of the Act. The first provides the procedure for the presenta!ion of election petitions. The proviso to sub-section alone is material here. It provides tha.t an election petition may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section ( 1) of s. 100 and s. 101. That as we have shown above creates the substantive right. Section 83 then provides that the election petition must contain concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies. . . . . . The section is mandatory and requires first concise statement of material facts . . . . . . What is the difference between ma~enal facts and particulars ? The word 'material' shows that the facts necessary to formulate complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of single material fact leads to an ill"-comp!e•e cause of action and the statement of claim be-comes bad. The function of particulars is to present as full picture of the cause of action with such further informa-tion in detail as to make the opposite party understand, the case he will have to µteet." ' That lays down the proper test. In Konappa v. Viswanath([1]) this

That lays down the proper test. Court poin•ed out that :

"Where by _an erroneous order of the Returning Officer poll is held which, but for that order, was not necessary, the Court would be justified in declaring those contesting candi-dates elected, who, but for that order, would have been dec-lared elected."

It was urged before us by Mr. Natesan that we should summon the documents which were only four in number and decide the case ourselves. We do not know whether any further material would or would not be necessary to establish the ground sought to be made out by the appellant or whether any oral evidence wou 'd be necessary. In any case we do not consider it either necessary or expedient that we should deal with the matter directly ourselves.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of the learned Judge is set aside. He will now proceed to determ'ne onlv the ques-tion regarding the disqualification of the first respondent and, therefore, whether the acceptance of his nomination was improper. The first respondent will pay the appellant's costs.

Appeal allowed.