STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. versus ANAND SWARUP

:ISS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. v. ANAND SWARUP November 6, 1973 [P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S. N. DwNEDI AND P. K. GoSWAMI, JJ.] U.P. Govemmcnr Prcmisea (Rent Recovery & Eviction) . .Acr, 1952 Ss. 4, 6 .and prior 1210 _whcrhrr tl" passing rht of rite At't .Act-Pracllce applicable. ro a11d cast Procedu~-Wiltrit;r where lcrrullf !tad b<tn dont grounds rai.ttd before rite Higlr Court bur reicued or even nor consrdcrtd by 11 could bt t<can-wwtd in r/le Supreme Court. The District Magistrate. Ghwnbad ( ucfcndant·appdlam l is•ued noti~ ·to the plaintiff (respondent) under s. 3. of the U.P, Government PremiSe> ( Rent Recovery ood Eviction) .'l.ct, 1952 calhng upo_n lum to va~ate the Gm:emmcnt ,p,.,mises which he said were under the plamlllfs unauthonscd .occupation. By another nolicc U.ued under •· 12 of the Act he asscss~d th.e platnltff to damal!<$ The plaintiff ftled smt praying for ll permanent m;uncllon nsamst the defen--dant restraining him from recoverin~ tbe amount and f~om threatcniog io e1ict .him (rom the ~remL•es. The defendants contested the suot on the ~round, among others, that the premise• had been requisitioned under the Defence of India Rul01 in 19~6 and derequisitioned Lo 19SS nnd during the 3bove period of l'equi-si:ion tbe plaintiff remained in posse>Sior. of the suit premises without any valid .allotment order under the Act. The plnintiff was. therefore. osscsscd on occo"ot of his unauthorise<l use and occupation during the period of requisition. The trio! court Lle<reed the •uit and gmnted the relief of permonenl injunclion 3gainst tbe defendarA. ' Before the High Court tho defend;u~ts submitled that the suit premises being -Government premises .. withtn tbe meunin~ or the Act. th~ suit was barred under s, IS of the/lct. Then: waa disrute betw.cn the parties with regard to the l~lum of re~w~uoon of the pr<mises. Without dealing with this point the Hogh Court diSnmsed the appeal relying upon Its earlier decision in S/tri Sripar ./lJl/ applc:'>ble v, District to c::osc Mu~:iwhere the suate. Banartu letting and ha~ held bun that done the prior Act to cou!J the p:.;sinJ: not be of made the ;-ct. ar.d that ~nee the plaontolf camo onto possession of the prelll.i«s before .he date of p01Mtng of the A<:t. St:lte nction under the Act Wll.! invnlid and s. U ·;;;~: ~u~~r to the suiL The corrc:tness of tbK decision was questioned before Pismissinx the ~opeaJ. abl HELD:. (i) Tile conclusion of the High Court that the Act was not applic· · to =• "'here leuong had been done or requi•itioo bod been mode or ~authorLS<d occupauon bad cornmenccd prior to the passin~t of the Act clearh' nrr":a~~unter fo tb of rent mogbt IO t~e S<:heme n~t be and recovemblc purpo<e un~er or the "" Act. 4 & 6 time but •n bam:d arrear claim of real ror ·nriear •.;dc~~ery of which the period of limitation hod r.<>t expired would be The 5eCOOd co~~~t~nr~co,·ered by the proceduro oro,iJ<d for unJer .s. 4 ~nJ 6. Government poem;,..!' th~~ tho rent due should be on account of ·occupnuon fJ be perm,.sible under S enever lh<'C two cor.<litions nre "lthfied it wou. the Act. particular Ca.'lCC Before the commc tho p~~~~& 0116. ~ t~ t rhcover uvo been the let nrrears before or lite rent contmenccmtnt even thou~h ::t recoverir-1 the •rre:ors of rent"cement of tho Act •uh was the only remedy for the Hrreur< of rent 10 th 0 But the \ct Rave nnothor ren~~:dy for recovcn~ 'fiCemi>et Vested liohility hod no in Vt\lCl.! any pr~du~\erTheol. riRht . 0 :~nant There or is tre"'r:anr:r neither or v"'teJ the Go,-ernO'l(n ri~bt nor ~ rl:scd. occupoulon of any Go~~n!he ~Uil P!'~dun:. The wordl\ "j, in unauthO· provulcd tor in that ocction ~llt~rem•~' In s. 12 ,how thnt the pro:edure oprcmi,cs. outhothed Sooecup~·ion , ev~n thou~ whe, to. amlre~P:og t 1"~r pu,.ucd wn' In lor otcupotloo recovering of dama<res ony Govcrt\m<hnt for un· '"' P nmtoJT hau occupied the prenti•<"S before t •

commencement of the Act it would be open to the Government to pursue the-remedy provided for in s. 12 provided the premises were "government premises". U92A-H1

View contra i~ Sliri SriPat Ral v. The D[slrict Magistrate, Banaras [19SS} A.L.J. 681, held mcorrect.

(ii) No valid order of requisition under r. 81(2)(bb) of Defence of India Rules could be passed by the Dist. Magistrate nor was any notific!Nion containing the order of requisilior. under r. 75A produced before the High Court or thi~ Court. Besides, the power of requisition under r, 7SA was conferred upon the Government and .there was no delegation of this power by the Government under s. 2(5) of the Defence of Ir..dia Act in favour of the District Magistrate. On the material on record it was not p055ible to say that the premises in suit were requisitioned property and "Government premises" within the meaning of s. 2 (c) of the Act. [1930-F} {iii) It is wc:t setUed that party could suppoq decree on grounds raised by him aro decided against him by the •:ouns below on the analogy of the provisions of 0.41. r- 22, C.P.C. and recanvass the point here to support the decree of the Hi~ Court on grounds rejected by it or even not considered by it. The only limitauon in this behalf was tha~ the party, by relying upor.. such ground, could not be allowed to mutilate or destroy the decree. {193H; 194AJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1389 of 1967.

Appeal by special leave from the. judgment and order dated the 28th October, 1966 of. the Allahapad High Court in Second Appeal No. 993 of 1960.

G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. ·Rana, for the appellants.

P, D. Bhargava, Pramod Swarup, S. S. Khanduja and Sheila Sethi, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GoswAMI, J. This appeal by special leave at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh and the District Magistrate, Meerut (briefly the defendants) is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No, 993 of 1960 whereby the, High' Court dismissed the same. The material facts are briefly as follows : The sole described as the insti-

The sole respondent (hereinafter described as the plaintiff) insti-tuted suit No. 678 of 1956 on July 16, 1956, praying for permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from recovering certain amount and from threatening to evict him from the 3/8th portion of the premises in suit in his occupation situated in Wright Gunj, Ghaziabad. The plaintiff describes himself as duly allotted tenant of the portion of the house on monthly rental of Rs. 4/4 for some time. He had offered the said rent, but neither the Government nor the owner of the premises accepted the same. When subsequently the District Magistrate wanted to eject him from the house, the plaintiff, by some arrangement, became the direct tenant of the landlord. The District Magistrate by notice dated April 21, 1955, as stated therein, cancelled the allotment order "under which the plaintiff was holding · the 3/8th. portion of the house No. 36'' and notified the plaintiff that he [1]shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of the Govern-ment premises under section 3 of the U.P. Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act 1952", (briefly the Act). Another notice

[ 1974] 2 S.C.R.

.190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

.A It is nut necessary for this case to note the definition substituted in 1956.

The learned counsel for the appellants points out that the U .P. Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952, came into force on December 19, 1952 and the claim of the defendants for compensation involved in this suit is for period between December 8 15, 1949 and November 21, 1955. It may be appropriate here to quote the High Court's view in its own words :

"This Act cannot be made applicable to case where the letting had been done prior to the passing of this Act. Admit· tedly the plaintiff came into possession by virtue of an allot· ment order before the date of the passing of this Act. So this Act cannot be held to be applicable to this case".

The preamble of t~e Act shows that it is enacted "to provide for collection of rents from persons in occupation of Government pre-mises and for eviction from· such premises of persons continuing. to occupy the same without authority''. From the statement of objects and re<lSons, it appears ''the bill has been drafted with th.e object of making available to Government; in place of the existing lengthy pro· cedure of law suit, summary procedure to enable them ( 1) to realise arrears of rent as arrears of Land Revenue from persons occu-pying buildings owned, rented or requisitioned by the State Govern· ment and (2) to evict from such accommodation unauthorised persons or those who refuse to pay or hold back rent therefor". Section 2(f) defines that ''rent shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and includes the amounts payable by any allot· tee for use and occupation of premises". Under section 2(h), "words and expressions used but not defined in this Act shall have the mean-ings assigned to them in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882".

As already noted Government premises. means; inter alia, any premises requisitioned by the State Government. .

If the High Court is right, it will not be possible for the Govern-ment to reoover arrears of rent or compensation in respect of building~ requisitioned by it before the enforcement of the Act. It is obvious that throughout the country very large number of premises were requi-sitioned by the Government under the Defence of India Rules, 1939. The definition of Government premises will include such requisitioned property. Yet. if the High Court is right, this Act will not be available to the Government to re<:over arrears of rent for the premises or to recover damages for unauthorised occupation of such premises respecti-Vely under sections 6 and 12 of the Act. The Act provides for summary procedure of recovery of rent and of damages. Under section 14 of the Act ''except as otherwise provided in this Act or in ·any other law, no order made in exercise of any power conferred by ·or under this Act shall be called in question in any Courf'. By section 16 "the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything .contatned in ·any other law or in any it:Istrurnent having effect by virtue of any other law"~ The conclusion of the High Court that the Act is

SUPRE.ME COURt" REPORTS

not applicable to a· case where letting had been done or requisition had been made or unauthorised occupation had commenced prior to the passing of the Act, clearly runs counter to the scheme aDd purpose of the Act. Rent will include arrears of rent. Rent is payable by agree· ment in advance as well as when due. Again, rent not paid when due is said to be in arrears. Sections 4 and 6 of the Act provide for the procedure tor recovering the arrears of rent. Section 4 provides that where an arrear of rent "is payable" by any person ''for occupation of gov:ernment premises", the competent autliority may, "at any time after 30 days from the date on which rent accrued due, serve upo11 the persons liable notice of demand for the amount -due". Section 6 provides that if the said amount is not paid to the competent autho-rity within 30 days from the date of service of the notice of demand or such extended period as the competent authority may allow, the a.lTear shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The words "is payable" indicate that the liability to pay the arrears of rent should be outstanding on the date of the issue of demand. So time-barred claim for arrears of rent may not be recoverable under sections 4 and 6. But an arrear of rent, for the recovery of which the period of limi-tation has not expired, will be an arrear which "is payable". Accord-ingly it can be recovered by the procedure provided for under sections 4 and 6. This is the first condition. The second condition for the appli-cation of sections 4 ~nd 6 is that the rent due should be on account of "occupation of government premises''. Whenever these two condi-tions are satisfied, it will be permissible under sections 4 and 6 to recover the arrears of rent even though in particular case the premises might have been let before the commencement of the Act. Before the commencement qf the Act, suit was ·the only remedy for recovering the arrears of rent. But the Act gives another remedy for recovering arrears of rent to the Government. There is neither vested right nor vested liability in any procedure. The tenant or trespasser of the government premises has no vested right in the suit procedure. Section 12 provides for similar procedure for recovering damages from an unauthorised occupier of the government premises. The words "is in unauthorised occupation. of any government premises·' in section 12 are important. They show that the procedure provided for in that section mav be pursue~ for recovering damages for unautho-rised 'tlccupation where trespasser is in .occupation of any government premises. In th.e present case we are-concerned with section 12. The considerations which have persuaded us to hold that the Government can recover the arrears of rent under sections 4 and 6, even though the letting has been done before the commencement of the Act, equally govern section 12. So even though the respondent has occupied ·the premises before the commencement of the Act, it will be open to the Government to pursue the remedy provided for in section 12 provided the premises are ''Government premises". The object of the Act will b~ considerably defeated if the Government is unable to recover arrears of rent or damages on the sole ground th.at the defaulter or the trespas-H se~ is in occupa~on of building which has been let out or qccupied pnor to the passmg of the Act. We are, therefore, unable to bo1d thaf the High Court's conclusion that the Act is not applicable to cases

where letting had been done prior to the passing of the Act, is correct.. To that extent the view of the Allahabad High Court in Sripat Rai's: case (supra) is also not correct.

We sh~uld observe that we are not called upon in this case to• consider whether the Act is ultra vires or invalid on any score and also note in passing that the Act has been amended in 1970 by inser-tion of new section 15A (U.P. Act No. 30 of 1970) introducing barring provision of norr.lal procedure of recovery of re:1t or of damages and also of eviction through civil court.

Now in this case what has to be considered is whether these· pW·· mi~es were requestioned by the Government and, if by the District Magistrate, whether they were requisitioned by him in exercise of powers validly delegated to him by the Government. The learned: counsel for the appellant was conscious cf his difficulty in facing a. question from the court with regard to the existence of the requisition: order in ibis case under Rule 75A of the- Defence of India Rules. No· notification containing the order of rer;:uisition of the premises under· Rule 75A had been produced before the High Court nor before us,. notwithstanding oppOrtunity offered by the Court here. With regard: to the order of the so called requisition passed by the District: Magistrate under rule 81(2) (bb), it is sufficient to state that no valid~ order of requisition of the premises could be passed under the sub-rule. Besides the power of requisition under Rule 75A is conferredi upon the Government and 'there is no delegation of this power by the Government under section 2(5) of the Defence of India Act in this. case in favour of the District Magistrate. The only order of delegation. that was produced was that of power under rule. 81(a)(bb). On the materials on record it is not possible to say that th~premises in suit. were requisitioned property and 'Government premises' within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. Accordingly the Act does noL apply and the defendants are not entitled to recover the amount claimed! as arrears of Land Revenue under the Act.

The learned counsel for the appellants faintly argues that the· respondent cannot agitate the matter as to whether the premi~s in suit: are Government premises as that point had not been taken before the courts below. This is not correct. The point was raised in the High· Court. But the High Court did not decide the point. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the respondent can support the decree on grounds raised by him and decided against him by the courts below on the analogy of the provisions of order 41, rule: l~IA47SCI74

22, Civil Procedure Code. The respondent, therefore, is entitled to .recanvass the point here to support the decree of the High Court on ,ground rejec!ed by it or even not considered by it. The only limitation in that behalf is that the respondent by relying upon such ground .cannot be allowed to mutilate or destroy the decree. Short of that, within the ambit of the law, he can support the decree on any ground available to him. The objection of the learned counsel for the appellants is, therefore, of no avail.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties· will bear :their own costs in this Court.

Appeal dismissed.