AFLATOON AND OTHERS versus LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & OTHERS

AFLATOON AND OTHERS

LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & OTHERS August 23, 1974

[A. N. R,\Y, C.J.; K. K. MATHEW, A. ALAGDUSWAMI, P. K. GOSWAMI AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ.]

Land _Acquisition Act, Section 4, suJ;-sections (1) and (2)-lnitiation of proceedings under, valid notification sine qua non- Delay in moving the Court-Effect.

Ltind Acquisition Act, Section 23 and Co.nstilution of India, 1950, Articles 19(1)(f) 31(2) and 31(5)-Campensation with reference to valrw of property on the date of ·notification under sec. 4-Adequacy of compensation, challenge of-Challenge oonfined only to question of procedural reasonableness.

Delhi Development Act, sections 12 and 15-P/anned development of Delhi to be in accordance with the Act--Ccntral Govt., if precluded from acquiring land for planned development-Laches and acquiescence on the part of the petitioners-£ fleet.

Land Acquisition Act, Section 3 (a) and Part Vil-Acquisition of land for planned development of, Delhi..-Landi11g over portion of tile acquired property to co-operative housing societies-Provisions of Part VII of the Act, whether attracted.

notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on Nov. 13, 1959, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for public purpose, viz. the planned development of Delhi. Between 1959 and 1961, about six thousand objections were filed under sec. SA of the ·Act. The objec~ tions were ov·.::rruled. On March 18, 1966, the declaration under sec. 6 of the Act was published in respect of portion of the area. Therefore, in 1970, notices were issued under sec. 9 ( l) of the Act requiring the appellants to state their objections, if any, to the assessment of compensation. The appellants thereupon challenged the validity of proceedings for acquisition before the High Cou.rt of Delhi. 'fhe High Court negatived _their contentions a·nd dis-missed the writ petitions. In the writ p.~titions and civil appeals fil·:!d in the Supreme Cou1t it was contended : (i) The public purpose specified in the notification issued under sec. 4, nan1ely, the planned development of Delhi WM vague as neither Master Plan nor Zonal Plan was in existence on the date of the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague, the appellants and the petitioners were unable to exercisei effectively their right under sec. SA of the Act; (ii) As there was inordinate delay in finalising- the acquisition proceedings, they were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation in the value of the property between the date of notification under sec. 4 and the date of taking possession of the property. (iii) The provisions of sec. 23 of the Act laying down that compensation should be determined with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of notification under sec. 4 was an unreasonable restriCtion on the fundamental right of the appellants to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1) (b); (iv) As the acquisition of the property was for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only authority competent to issue the notification under sec. 4 'vas the Central Govt. under sec. 15 of Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were a}J initio invalid; iand ( v) Thei acquisition was not for any public purpose, but for companie~ as the major portion of the land acquired was. allotted without any development to co~operative housing "Societies which were companies within the definition of the word ''company'• in the Act and as the provisions of part VII of the Act were not complied with the proceedings for acquisition were bad.

Rejecting the contention and dis1nissing the appeals and the petitions,

HELD : . (i) valid mtiJication under s~. 4 iS sine qua non for lnitiatiolt "of pro>eedings Jor acquisition of property, ·It is neccssazy to spe<:ify !he parti-c:ular public purpo<e in tho notiJication fot which tho land is needed or likely to be needed as otherwise, the, matters specified in sub-see: (2) of sec. (4/ ~anilot be ·carried out. (807q

Munshi Singh and Others v. Union o/lndia; [191U 1 s.C.R.: 973 (975 and 984) fr/ied on. · Arnold RodriCks and A,,other v. · · Siate of Maharashtra and others, Maharashtra and others, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 88S referred to. In the case of all a~ciuisition of· large area of land comprising -~Vera.I pJots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can. only. be with reference ·to the acquisi_tioii_ of the whole area.· - Unlike in. the case of an acquisitiOn of small area, it might be practically difficult -to specify the particular purpose for which each and every- item of land comprised _in the area is. needed. [807G] ·

Arnold RodriCks and A,,other v. · · Siate of Maharashtra and others, Maharashtra and others, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 88S referred to.

c' sec. 6 Th~ was appellants did published in nol 1966. • They approached the move in the matter-even after High ihe declaraticn court with their 1n;1de1 writ petitions only in· 1970- when the notices -under sec. 9 were issued to them. That apart, the appellants did not contend- before the Hi&h'" Court that as the particulars of. public purpose wefe not specified in the notification issued und~r sec. 4, they were prejudiced_ "in that they -could not effectiv~y exercise their right under sec. SA. As the plea was not raised by them before the High · Court~ thC appellants are not entitled to have the plea tonsidered in these -appeaJs.. To have s<_1.t on the_ fence and allowed the Govt. to complete the acqu~sition proceedings on the basis of the notification under sec .. 4 .and the declatation under sec.· 6 were valid and tlien to attack the notification on grounds whii;h were available to the Writ petitioners at the _time when the no~i"". fl.cation wa-3 _ published would 00 putldng premium on dilatory ta,c!ics. The wnt Petitions ·are ·liable to .. be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitio11<rs. [808A-B; & F-G] .

Tilok Chand 1\-loti Chand arzd othl"rs .v. H: B: Munlhi and Another, f1969]2 S.C.R. 824 and Rabindranath Bose and Others v. Union of India and other1 [1970] 2 S.C.R: 697 referred to. ·

· (ii) About 6,ooo· objec!ions ~ere filed -.:inde·r seC. SA by persons- interested in the property. Several writ petitions wire also filed in 1966 and 1967 chal-lenging the. validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Govt. had necessarily to wait for the ·disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further in -the matter. The High Court was of- the_ view that there was no inordinate . delay on the p·art of the· Govt in Con1pletin_~-·-the acquisitioD. proceedings. The · conc[1]usion of the High Coe.rt is corre:t. __ [809B-C] · . .

; ' (iii) The Land Acquisitioii Act is prC-:Constitution Act. Its provision! are not, therefore, liable to be challenged on the ground that they ·are not in conformity with the requirement of Articll! 31(2) of the Constitution. What the appellants and writ petitioners complain · is that the.ir properties· were acquired by paying them compensation cpmputed with reference to the market! value of thf!' land as on the date of the notification under sec. 4 ·and that sec. 23 is, therefore, bad. This, in substance is ·nothing but a· challenge to the ade-_ quacv 'of compensation. Such challenge is precluded by reason of Art. 31(5) - of the Constitution. [809F-G] Although-. Jaw for acquisitio~ of pfooenv. must pass the test of Article 19(5), the challenge to the law would ordinarily be limited to _the question· of procedural unreasonab!eness. '[810D] · , . -· . . . -

R: C. Cooper v. U;i.ic!n of India. [1970] 3 S.C.R. S30, (577) reli<d on.

It foIJows that altho~gh sec. ·23 of the Act -~ii -b~ challen!?~d O~ the gr~~d th_at it violates the fundamental right of citizen to hold and' dispose of property under Article 19(l)(b), the challenge would practically be limited to tho question of procedural reasonablertess. Put- sec. Z3 does not deal '\\ith procedure and cannot, the~efore, suffer from any proced1.1ra1- unreasonabJene,s. -.. l~lOE-F]

(iv) The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by the Govt. before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came into force·. It is true that there· could be no planned development of Delhi except in accord-ance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force but there \Vas no inhibition in acquiring land for planned development of Delhi und.!r the Act before the l.Vlaster Plan was ready. [812E]

Patna bnprovement Trust v. Snit. Lakslinii Devi and others [1963] Sur:-r. 2 S.C.R. 812 referred to.

In other words, the fact that actual development is pern1issible in an area other than development area with th:.:i approval or sanction of the local autho-rity did not preclude the.. Central Govt. from acquiring the land fo·r planned de·velopment under the Acts. Se.ction 12 is concerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development. For planned development in an area other than development area, iti is only necessary to obtain the, sanction or approval of the local authori:y as provided in sec. 12 ( 3). The Centr:!l Govt. coulJ. acquire any property under the Act and develop it after c•btaining the approval of the local authority. As already held the appellant<> an<l the writ petitioner" cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of notification under sec. 4 on the ground of !aches and acquiescence. The plea thati the Chief Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to initiate the proceedings for acquisition by issuing the notification under sec. 4 of the Act as sec. 15 of the De1hi Development Act ,gives that power only to the Centn\l Govt. relates primarily to the validity of the notification. Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner \¥'as not so authorised, since the appellants and the writ petitioners are precluded by their laches and acquiescence from questioning the notification, the plea must be negatived. [812F-H; 813A-B]

( v) The plea that the provisions o:f Patt VII Of the Act have not been complied \vith has also to be rejected. The High_ Court \Vas correct i.n giving the finding thnt the acquisition \vas not for 'Company'. The mere fact that af~cr the acquisition the Govt. proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, portion of the property acquired for development to the co-operative hou5ing societies \V(iuld not make the acquisi\·ion one for 'company' and therefore, Part VII of the Act was not attracted. l813C-E]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 362 & 363 of 1972.

Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Civil Appeals Nos. 107, 968 to 971 and 1185 of 1972.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the September 24, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.PsAs. Nc6. 172, 177, 151, 170, 171 and 152 of 1971 respectively.

Civil Appeal No. 1168 of 1972.

Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and Order dated the 17th April, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 94 of 1971.

A. K. Sen, (in W.P. No. 362/72), L. M. Singhvi (in W.P. No. 363/72 & C.A. No. 968/72), S. K. Dhingra (in C.A. No. 968/72) and B. Dutta, for the petiticjners (in W.Ps.) and appellants (in C.AB.)

L. N. Sinha, Sol. General of India, S. N. Prasad (in W.P. No. 363/72 and C.A. No. 968 of 1972 only) and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents Nos. 1-3 (in C.A. No. 968, 970, 107/72 and W.P. Nos. 362-363 elf 1972 and respondents in other appeals.

Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya, for respon-dent No. 4 (in C.As. Nos. 107 & 968/72).

K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B. B. Sinha, for respondent Nos. 5, 6, 8 (in C.A. No. 968/72).

Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent no. 4 (in C.A. "10. 970/72).

Ashok Grover, for respondent no. 5 (in C.A. No. 107 /72).

S. K. Dholakia, for respondent no. 6 (in C.A. No. 107 /72).

T. V. S. Narasimhachari, for respondent no. 7 (in C.A. No. 107 / 72).

L. M. Singhvi and S. K. Dhingra, for the interveners.

The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by

MATHEW, J. These writ petitions and civil appeals raise commcln questions and they are, therefore, disposed of by ommon judgment. The Civil Appeals arise out of the decision of High Court of Delhi dis· missing the writ petitions filed by the appellants challenging the validity cif the proceedings for acquisition of the land in question for "planned development of Delhi". In the writ petitions, the validity of the same proceediugs is being challenged on certain additional grounds also.

notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued on November 13. 1950, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for public pnrpose, viz., the planned development of Delhi. Between 1959 and 1961, about six thousand objections were filed under s. SA of the Act. The objec-E tions were civerruled. On March 18, 1966, the declaration under s. 6 of the Act was published in respect of portion of the area. There-after, in 1970, notices were issued under s. 9 ( !) of the Act requiring the appellants to state their objections, if any, to the assessment of com· pensation. The appe!lants thereupw challenged the validity of pro-ceedings for acquisition before the High Court of Delhi on the follow-ing grounds : (I) that the acquisition was not for public purpose but for companies and so the provisions of Part VII of the Act ought to have been complied with, (2) since no part of the compensation payable came from the public exchequer, the acquisition was not for public purpose and ( 3) that the proceedings for acquisition vic!ated the fundamental right •of the appellants under Article 19(1) (f) as there was unreasonable delay between the publication of the notifica-tion under s. 4 and the issue of the notices under s. 9 of the Act with the result that the appellants were deprived of the benefit of the appre-ciatim in value of the property after the date of the notification under s. 4. The High Court negatived the contentions and dismissed the writ petitions.

The main arguments addressed before us on behalf of the appel-H lants and the writ petitioners were that the public purpose specified in the notification issued under s. 4, namely, the 'planned development of Delhi' was vague as neither Master Plan nor Zonal Plan was in existence cl1. the date of the notification and as the purpose specified

in the notification was vague, the appellants were unable to qercisc effectively their right under s. SA of the Act and that as the nc~ifica­tion under s. 4 was published in 1959, the compensation awarded was wholly inadequate with reference to the market value of the property on the date when the appellants are to be deprived of their possession of the property. In other words the content10n was that as there was inordinate delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, the appel· !ants were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation in the value c1! the property between the date of the notification under s. 4 and the date of taking possession of the property. Linked with .this contention was the submission that the prcjvisions of s. 23 of the Act which Jay down that compensation should be determined with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of the notification under s. 4 was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the appel-lants tci hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1) (f). It was further contended that as the acquisition of the property was for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only authority compe· tent to issue the notification under s. 4 was the Central GciVermnent under s. 15 of'the Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were ab initio invalid. The argument was that, as the acquisition was made for the planned development of Delhi, it cc1Uld be carried out only in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, and that, under s. 15 of that Act, it was only the Central Government which could have issued the notification under s. 4, after having fcirmed the opinion that the acquisition of the land was necessary for the planned development of Delhi and, since the notification was issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the ncltification wai .. 7oid ab initio. The last contention was that the acquisition was not for any public purpose, but for companies, as the major portion of the land acquired was allcl!ted without any development to cooperative housing societies which were companies within the definition of the word 'Company' in the Act and as the provisions of Part VII of the Act were not complied with, the proceedings for acquisition were bad.

The influx of displaced persc1ns in 1947 from West Pakistan into Delhi aggravated the problem of housing accommodation in Delhi. With the extension of industrial and commercial activities and the set· ting up of the foreign embassies, Delhi acquired enormous potential as an emplc1Yment centre. The consequent increase in the population was not accompanied by an adequate expansion of housing: facilities. There was haphazard and unplanned growth of houses in different areas; land also was not available at reasonable price as substantial portion of the available land, suitable for develcipment, had passed into the hands of private enterprisers. The Govermnent found it necessary to take effec· tive steps to check the haphazard growth of houses and to prevent sub-standard construction. Therefore, the Government framed scheme for "planned development c~ Delhi". It was in order to implement the scheme of planned development of Delhi that the Government decided to acquire 34,070 acres of land in 1959 and published the notification under s. 4 specifying the public purpose as "the planned development of Delhi".

Section 4 of the Act says that whenever it appears tel the appro-priate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette and the Collector shali cause public notice the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. According to the section, therefore, it is only necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for public purpose. The wording of s. 5A would make it further clear that all that is necessary tel be specified in notification under s. 4 is that the land is needed for public purpose. One reason for specification of the particular public purpose in the notification is to enable the person whose land is sought to be acquired to file cibjection under s. 5A. Unless person is told about the specific purpose of the acquisi-tion, it may not be possible for him to file meaningful cibjection against the acquisition under s. 5A. This Court has laid down that it is necessary to specify the particular public purpose in the notification for which the land is needed or likely to be needed as, citherwise, the matters specified in sub-section (2) of s. 4 cannot be carried out. In Munshi Singh and Others v. Union of India, etc.([1]) the Court said:

"It is apparent from sub-section (2) of s. 4 that the public purpose which has to be stated in sub-secticro. ( 1) of s. 4 has to be particularised because, unless that is done, the various matters which were mentioned in sub-section (2) cannot be carried out and if the public purpoSe stated in s. 4 (I) is planned development, without anything more, it is extremely difficnlt to comprehend hciw all the matters set out in sub-section (2) can be carried out by the officer COJ1-E cerned."

We think that the question whether the purpose specified in noti-fication under s. 4 is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under s. 5A would depend upcl:l the facts and circumstances of each case.

In Arnold Rodricks and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Others('), this Court held that notification under s. 4 of the Act which stated that the land was needed for "Development and utilisa-tion of the said lands as an industrial and residential area" was sufficient specification of public purpc6e.

In the case of an acquisition of large area of land comprising several plots belonging tci different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of small area, it might be practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.

Assuming for the moment that the public purpose was not suffi-ciently specrned in the notification, did the appellan~s make grievance of it at the appropriate time? If the appellants had really been pre· judiced by the non-specification of the public purpose for which the

--·------

(I) [1973] I SCR 973, at 975 and 984. (2) [19£6] 3 S.C.R. 885.

plots in which they were interested were needed they shonld have taken steps t~ have the no.tification qnashed on 'that gronnd within reaso~able time. They did not move in the matter even after the dedaralion under s. 6 was. publis)led in 1966. They approached the High Court with .their wnt petit10ns only in 1970 when the notices under s. 9 were 1ss.ued to them. In the concluding portion of the JUdgmcnt .m Munshi Smgh & Others v. Union ,1f India (supra) it was observed : '

"In n1atters of this nature we would have taken due notice of !aches on the part of the appellants while grant-ing the above relief but we are satisfied that so far as the present appellants are concerned they have not been guilty of !aches, delay or acquiescence at any stage." We do not think that the appellants were vigilant. That apart, the appellants did not contend before the High Court that as the particulars of the public purpose were not specified in the notification issued under s. 4, they were prejudiced in that they could not effectively exercise their right under s. SA. As the plea was not raised by the appellants in the writ petitions filed before the High Court, we do not think that the appellants are entitled to have the plea considered in these appeals.

Nor do we think that the petitioners in the wri,t petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the dec-laration under s. 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. valid notification under s. 4 is sine qua non for initiation of pro-ceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under s. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to he dismissed on the ground of !aches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand and Others v. H. B. Munshi and Another('); and Rabindra1wth Bose and Others v. Union ni India & Others(').

From the count"r affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it is clear that the Government have allotted large portion of the land after the acquisition proceedings were finalised to Cooperative housing societies. To quash the notification at this stage would disturb the rights of third parties who are not before the Court.

As regards the second contention that there was inordinate delay in finalising the acquisition proceedings, and that the appellants and writ petitioners were deprived of the appreciation in value of the land in which they were interested, it may be noted that about 6,000 ob-jections were filed under s. SA by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Government had necessarily to wait for the disposal of tne objectlons and petitions before proceeding further in the matter. Both the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the Government in completing the acquisition proceedings. We are not persuaded to come to different conclusion. Linked with the above contention was the arugment that the pro-visions of s. 23 of the Act imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the fundamental right of the appellants and writ petitioners to hold and dispose of property under Article 19 (1 )(f) of the Constitution as compensation is awardable only with reference to the value of the property on the date of notification under s. 4 however long the pro-ceedings for acquisition may drag on ,and not with reference to the market value of property when it is taken possession of. It was sub-mitted that compensation should be paid with reference to the value of the property as on the date when possession of the property is taken and the section, as it lays down that compensation should be fixed with reference to the market value as on the date of the notifica-tion under s. 4, abridges the fundamental right of citizen under Article 19 (I) (f). We find that the argument is not persuasive. Article 31 ( 5) (a) provides : ·

"(5) Nothing in clause (2) shall alfoet--

(a) the provisions of any existing law other than law to which the provisions of clause (6) apply,"

The Land Acquisition Act is pre-Constitution Act. Its pro-F visions are not, therefore, liable DJ be challenged on the grwnd that they are not in conformity with the requirement of article 31 ( 2). What the appellants and writ petitioners complain is that their properties were acquired by paying them compensation computed with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of the notification under s. 4 and that s. 23 is. therefore, bad. This, in substance, is nothing but challenge to ihe adequacy of compensation. Such challenge is precluded by reason of Article 31(5). In other words, the appeilants and the writ petitioners cannot challenge the validity of s. 23 on the ground that compensation payable under its provisions is in any way inadequate, because, such challenge would fly in the face of Article 31 ( 5).

It is noteworthy that s. 4 ( 3) of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Act, 1957 provides for payment of interest at 6 per cent of the market value after the exoiry of 3 years from the date of the !lotification under s. 4 to the date of payment of compensation. Seet10n 24 of the Act provides that any outlay or improvements on,

or disposal of, the land acquired, commenced, made or effected with-out the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication or the notification under s. 4(1) shall not be taken into consideration by the Court in awarding compensation. This provision means that any outlay or improvement made with the sanction of the Collector after the date of the notification will be taken into consideration in awarding compensation.

In R. C. Cooper v. Union of India('), this Court has observed that although law for acquisition of property must pass the test of Article 19(5), the challenge to the law would ordinarily be limited to the question of procedural unreasonableness. This is what the Court said :

" Where the law provides for compulsory acquisition of property for public purpose, it may be presumed that the acquisition or the law relating thereto imposes reason-able restriction in the interest of the general public. If there is no public purpose to sustain compulsory acquisition, the law violates Art. 31 (2). If the acquisition is for public purpose, substantive reasonableness of the restriction which includes deprivation may, unless otherwise established, be presumed, but enquiry into reasonableness of the procedural provisions will not be excluded. For instance, if tribunal is authorised by an Act to determine compensation for pro-perty compulsorily accquired, without hearing the owner of the property, the Act would be liable to be struck down under Art. 19(1)(f)." It follows that although s. 23 of the Act can be challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental right 0£ citizen to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1 )(f), the challenge would practically be limited to the question of procedural reasonableness. But section 23 does not deal with procedure and cannot, therefore, suffer from any procedural unreasonableness. When it is seen that s. 23 is not liable to be challenged on the ground that the compensa-tion provided by its provisions is inadequate in view of the provisions of Art. 31 ( 5), there is no point in the contention that it can be chal-lenged for that very reason on the basis that it imposes unreasonable restriction upon citizen's right to hold and dispose of property.

It was argued that there could be no planned development of Delhi otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act and, therefore, the notification under s. 4 of the Act should have been issued by the Central Government in view of s. 15 of that Act and not by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi.

Section 12 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 provides:

"12(1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the

!) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530, at 577.

official Gazette, declare any area in Delhi to be develop-ment area for the purposes of this Act :

Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless , proposal for such declaration has been referred by the Central Government to the Authority and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi for expressing their views thereon within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the refer-ence or within such further period as the Central Govern-ment may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired .

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Authority shall not undertake or carry out any development of land in any area which is not development area.

(3) After the commencement of this Ac.t no development of land shall be undertaken or carried out in any area by any person or body (including department of Government) unless,-

(i) where that area is development arc•, permission for such development has b~en obtained in writing from the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act;

(ii) where that area is an area other than development area, approval of, or sanction for, such development bas been obtained in writing from the local autho-rity concerned or any officer or authority thereof em-powered or authorised in this behalf, in accordance with the provisions made by or under the law govern-ing such authority or until such provisions have been made, in accordance with the provisions of the regu~ lations relating to the grant of permission for deve-lopment made under the Delhi (Control of Building Operations) Act, 1955, and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act.

Provided that the local authority concerned may subject to the provisions of s. 53A amend those regulations in their application to such area.

( 4) After the coming into operation of any of the plans in any area no development shall be undertaken or carried out in that area unless such development is also in accordance with such plans.

(5) Nc~withstanding anything contained in sub-sections (3) and ( 4) development of any land begnn by any department of Govern-ment or any local authority before the commencement of this Act may be completed by that department or local authority without compliance with the requirements of those sub-sections. ,

Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 states : "15(1) If in the opinion of the Central Government, any land is required for the purpose of development, or for any

other purpose, under thi~ Act, the Central Government may acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisi-tion Act, 1894.

(2) Where any land has been acquired by the Central Government, that Government may, after it has taken posses-s10n of the fand, transfer the land .to .the Authority or any local authority for the purpose for which the land has been a.::quired on payment by the Authority or the local authority of the compensation awarded under that Act and of thr, charges incurred by the Government in connection with the ncquisition. ''

Counsel contended that on the date when the notification und<r s. 4 was published, the Government had not declared any area in Delhi as development area under s. 12(1) of the Delhi Development Act, nor was there master plan drawn up in accordance with s. 7 of that Act and so the acquisition of the property for planned development of Delhi was illegal. Under s. 12(3) of the Delhi Development Act, no development of land can be undertaken or carried out except as provided in that' clause. Section 2 ( d) states : "development" with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of building, engineer-ing, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land includes re-development. Section 2 ( e) states "developm'1llt area" means any area declared to be development area under sub-section (1) of s. 12.The planned development of Delhi had been decided upon by tl;e Government before 1959, viz., even before the Delhi Development Act came into force. It is true that there could be no, planned deve-lopment of Delhi except in accoi:_dance with the provisions of Delhi Development Act after that Act came into force, but there was no inhibition in acquiring Jana for planned development of Delhi under the Act before the Master Plan was ready (see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi lJeri and Others('). In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible in an area other than development area with the approval or sanction of the local authority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring the lnnd for planned development under the Act. Section 12 is con-cerned only with the planned development. It has nothing to do with acquisition of property; acquisition generally precedes development. For planned development in an area other than development area it is only necessary to obtain the sanction or approval of the local authority as provided in s. 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property under the Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local authority. We do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the power to acquire the land under s. 15 was delegated by the Central Government to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. We have already held that the appellants and the writ petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of the notifica-tion under s. 4 on the ground of !aches and acquiescence. The plea that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to initiate the

proceeding for acquisition by issuing the notification under s. 4 of the Act as s. 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives that power only to the Central Government relates pnmarily to the validity of the nolHica-tion. Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was not authorized by the Central Government to issue the notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, since the appellants and the writ petitioners are precluded by their !aches and acquiescence from ques-B tioning the notification, the contention must, in any event, be negatived and we do so.

It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the acquisition was reolly for the cooperative housjng societies which are compaines within the definition of the word 'company' in s. 3 ( e) of the Act, and, therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied with. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view that the acquisition was not for 'company. We sec no reason to differ from their view. The mere fact that alter the acquisition the Government proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, portion of the property acquired for development to the cooperative housing societies would not make the acquisition one foe 'company'. Nor are we satisfied that there is any merit in the contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came from the consideration paid by the cooperative societies. In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petitions here, it is diilicult to hold that it was cooperatives which provided the fund for the acquisition. Merely because the Government allotted part of the property to cooperative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for cooperative societies, and therefore, Part VU of the Act was attracted.

It may be noted that the validity of the notification under s. 4 am! the declaration under s. 6 was in issue in Udai Ram Sharma and Others v. Unio!l uf India(!) anJ this Court upheld their validity.

We see no merit in the appeals and the writ petitions. They arc, thcrefo1e, dismissed with costs.

Petitiom dismissed.