FIRM OF PRATAPCHAND NOPAJI versus FIRM OF KOTRIKE VENKATTA SETTY & SONS ETC.

FIRM OF PRATAPCHAND NOPAJl

FIRM OF KOTRIKE VENKATTA SETTY & SONS ETC. December 12, 1974

[M. H. BEG, V. R. KRISHNA !YER AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]

Indian Co111ract Act (9 of 1872) Section 23, 222 and 224-Scope of-Col-lateral aweement, whm illegal.

The appellant firm sued for amounts as due to indemnify it under s. 222 of the Contract Act, on the strength of payments said to have been made by the firm to third parties on behalf of the respondents who were alleged to have directed the appellant to enter into 'Badia' transactions for them. These transactions are contracts for speculation in rise and fall of price of groundnut and oilseeds purchased only notionally without any intention to actually deliver them to the purchasers. In such transaction, the purchaser is not at all expected to make demand for actual delivery of goods ostensibly sold.

Confirming the judgment of the High Court, held that, having regard to the objects of the prohibitio·n imposed by the Central Government on forward contracts on groundnut seeds and oilseeds in the interest of general public, so that supply at reasonable rates of those essential commodities is not jeopar-dised; the absolute terms of the prohil)ition; the penalties imposed for its infringement; and the careful manner in which only those contracts which are for actual delivery and supply to bona fide purchasers are excluded from the prohibition; the contracts were tainted with unlawfulness of their object and are forbidden by law, and hence are strnck by the provisions of s. 23 of the Contract Act. [19B-D; 20 D-E}

( l) If an agreement iE merely collateral to another or constitutes an aid facilitating the carrying out of the object of the other agreement which, though void, is not in itself prohibited within meaning of s. 23, it may be enforced as collateral agreement. If, -Un the other hand, it is part of mechanism meant to defeat what the law has actually prohibited, the courts will not countenance claim based upon the agreement, because, it will be tainted with an illegality of the object sought to be achieved which is hit by the section. The object of an agreement cannot be said to be forbidden or unlawful merely because the agreement results in what is known as 'void contract'. void agreement when coupled with other facts, may become part of transaction which creates legal rights, but this is no so. if the object is prohibited or 'ma/ in Jc'. [12D-G]

(2) The question whether the parties through whom the appellant. actually alleged carrying out the contracts set up between himself and defendants, could -themselves be regarded as principals .or agents of the appellants, will be im-material if the objects of the contracts are found to be tained with the kind of illegality which is struck bv s. 23 of the Contract Act. Again, the mere fact that the contrad& .were entered into at Kurnool in the State of Andhta Prndesh would also not, make any difference in principle if the object of the contrJcts which were to ·be carried out at Bombay weu; of such kind as to be hit by the section. fl 3A-Cl

· (3) The contracts between the appellant and the respondents are not wager-ing contracts, though each party knew that their oblect was to indulge in speculation. · [l OC-D]

Bhagwand9s Parasram v. Burjori Ruttomii Boma1tji 45 I.A. 29, 33, refer-red to. ' '>':" ·"·

( 4) But. the forward contracts violated the provisions of two Orders is-med under s. 2(2) of the Bombay Forward Contrncts Control Act. 1947. · [!6A-Bl

[!6A-Bl

2L379Sup.CT (75

(5) Moreover, s. 17 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 kept alive the provisions of the Oil-seeds (Forward Contracts Prohibi-tion i Order, 1943. The Central Act is enacted for the control of production, supply and distribution of essential commoditie$ and covers food stuffs. Under s. 2(1:) of the Act food stuffs include edible oilseeds and oils, and s. 7(2) makes the contravention of anv Order under s. 3, relating to food stuffs crime and punishable with imprisonment. [16E; 17A-DJ

(6) The Central Government has issued notification under s. 5 of the Oil-seeds (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order but the two conditions im-posed for excluding contracts relating the groundnuts are not satisfied in the present case. They are (al the contracts must be in respect of specifi1:d quali-ties or types, and (b) must be for specific deliveries and are not tralllsferable to 3rd parties. The word 'and' cannot be read as 'or' and both conditions must be satisfied. The contracts, in the instant case, set up by the appellant. were not and could not have been for actual delivery because they were only 'Badla' transactions. If the contracts were not for genuine or actual delivery but only for speculation on differences in prices the condition for the exclusion of the contracts from the purview of the control Order, which contemplates actually intended delivery, would not be satisfied. The contracts were, therefore, pro-hibited under the provisions of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946 mad with Central Order of 1943, and hence the contracts were not merely void but illegal in the sense that their objects are forbidden. [18F-19B]

(7) claim for indemnification under s. 222, Contract .Act. is only main-tainable if the acts, which the agent is employed to do, are lawful. Agree-ments to commit criminal acts are expressly and specifically excluded by s. 224 from the scope of any right to an indemnity. The provisions of the Order of 1943 are applicable thr,oughout India are not confined to forward •::Ontracts entered into or meant to be carried out in any particular part of India and their violation is crime. The objects of th'e contracts set up by the appel-J;.ats cannot be carried out by m~rely entering into them outside Bombay or engaging third parties as sub-agents or in any other capaCity to execute them. [20C-D]

(8) The High Court rightly relied on those decisions holding agreements collateral to prohibited contracts to be also unenforceable, because, 1the taint attaches to them which make_s them also contrary to public policy. Such agreements fall within the class of cases mentioned in Gherulal Parakll v. Mttlza-deodas Maiya & Ors. [1959) (2) Suppl. S.C.R. 406, where harmful n:sults of permitting the contracts, in terms of. injury to the public at laree. are: evident -and indisputable. [190-H]

ARGUMENTS:

For the Appellants : (1) The only contested point which survives in the appeal is whether the plaintiffs acted lawfully when they entered into contracts with the firms of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 on behalf of the defendants.

(2) In considering the above question it is important to notice that the firms of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were tht~mselves the commission agent1; of the plaintiffs in these transactions. The findings of both the lower courts are (a) that the plaintiffs were the commission agents of the defendants for the said transaction; (b) that the plaintiffs acting as principals (i.e. without disclosing their position as agents of the defendants) employed the firms of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 as commission agents to carry out the tra~actions and ( c) the firms of P.W. 2 and J>.W. 3 acting as principals entered into the transactions with the firms of P.W. I.

(3) These being the relevant fai;ts, the question is whether the 1:ontrncts 'between the plaintiffs on the one hand and firms of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 on the ·o.iier were unlawful by virtue of (a) Bombay Act III of 1865, (b) the Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act. beinir Act LXIV of 1947 and (c) the Oil ·Seeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943.

(4) The contracts between the plaintiffs and firms of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 were not unlawful under the 1865 Bombay Act for the following reasons :-

(a) The plaintiffs did not enter into any agreements "by way of wager" (in the words of section _30 of the Contract Act) with the firms of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 as they had nothing to gain or to lose by the .rise or fall of the forward market rates of oil seeds. wagering contract requires that the gain of one party to the; contract should be the loss of the other party theret,o (vide 45 I-A, 29; 39 Born. L.R. 1083; 1879 Q.B.D. 685; Pollocj; & 1\Iulla s Indian Contract and Specific Relief .Acts, page 313; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition Vol. 1 para 809). By the same test, the principal con-tracts between the firms of P.W. 2-3 and the firm of P.W. 1 were also not wagering contracts. The fact is that the defendants indulged in speculative transactions through the agencv of the plaintiffs, but it is well settled that speculative transactions du not by themselves result in wagering agreements. The courts below erroneously held, merely from the fact that no· deliveries were given or taken, that the transactions were ·by way of wager. The loWl!r courts failed to realise that when one party to the transactions (defendants in this case) is interested in speculating on market fluctuations, he cancels one contract by cross contract, with the result that no delivery takes place, although both the contracts are for delivery. Since there were no wagers in the present case, the Bombay 1865 Act has no application.

(b) The 1865 Bombay Act does not contain any punitive pro\Js1on. It merely declares certain agreements to be void. Even supposing the agreements between the plaintiffs and the firms of P.W. 2-3 were for wager (which they clearly were not), they would merelv be void and not unlawful by Yirtue of the Bombay Act. Even in that casi;. the plaintiffs as agents are entitled to recover their dues from the defendants, as held by this Hon'ble Court in Gherum<IA Parakli's case [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R . .406. Obviously the Bombay I 865 A.I was not operative in the region where the contracts between th~ plaintiffs and defendants took place.

(5) The ·contracts between tl\e plaintiffs and the firms of P.W. 2-3 were not unlawful under the Bombay For].Vard Contracts Control Act No. LXIV of 1947 for the following reasons :-

(a) Even the principal contracts between the firms of P.W. 2-3 and the firm of P.W. l were not unlawful under s. 8 of the Act. The contracts did not violate clause l( a) of s. 8 of the said Act, because the defendants falied to Jl()int out any bye-law of the Bombay Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd. which ren-dered agieements ma4ii in contravention thereof unlawful ( vide 59 Born. L.R. 4). The agreement also did not contravene clause 1 (b) of s. 8 since one of contracting parties, namely the firm of P.W. 1 was a. member of the Bombay Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd. (vide page 32 line 21 and tiage 55 line 26.)

(b) In any case, the transactions between the plaintiffs on the one hand. and the firms of P.W. 2~3 on the other, were as between principal and agent. and since these transactions did not 1:ome under the definition of forward contracts, they were not aff~cted by the provisions of the 1947 Bombay A~ .

(6) The transactions between the plaintiffs and the firms of P.W. 2-3 were not unlawful under the Oil Seeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order. 1943 read with the Notification issued thereunder (page 285 of the paper book) for the following reasons :-

(a) The contracts between the firms of P.W. 2-3 and the firm of P.W. l were "forward contracts" as defined bv clause 2(ii) of the 1943 Order, but not the agency contracts between the pjaintiffs on the one hand and the firms of P.W. 2-3 on the other. These latter contracts \Vere therefore not affected by the 1943 order and were not unlawful. As deposed to bv the plaintiffs' partner P.W. 4 (Paper book page 83 line 11), the plaintiffs had never authorised the firms of P.W. 2-3 to enter with anv illegal contracts. The Bad!~ transactions, which the plaintiffs had authorised the firms of P.W. 2-3 to

enter into, could have been brought about by P .W. 2-3 without infringing the conditions. laid down in the Notifications issued under the 1943 Order. The two conditions in the Notifications were that the contracts should be for specific delivery and that the deliveries thereunder should not be transl'erable to third parties. There is nothing in the nature of Badia transactions which requires that they should not be for specific delivery or that the deliveries thereunder shuuicl be transferable. Since it was open to the firms of P.W. 2-3 to carry out the instructions of the plaintiffs in lawful manner, the act of the plain-tiffs in entering into the contracts with. the firms of P.W. 2-3 was nor an "unlawfol Act" within the meaning of s. 222 of the Contract Act and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to be indemnified by the defendants.

( b) The High Court was, with respect, wrong in differing from the trial court which held that the contracts between the firms of P.W. 2-3 and the firm of P. W. I were for specific delivery. In the case of Badia trnnsactions, the mere fact that no deliveries actually take place should Pnt lead to the inference that the contracts were not for specific delivery. l!oth the cross contracts in Badia transactions are for specific delivery, bu~ no delivery takes place because the later contract cancels the effect of the earlier one. This is dear from the evidence of P .W. 2 from pages 39 to 43, were the witness gives details of specific delivery contracts for the purchase of 400 tons of groundnut of particular date (vaida), subsequent cross contracts for the sale of 400 tons of groundnut of the ~;:ime vaida, and contemporaneous con-tracts for the purchase of 400 tons of groundnut of the next vaida. Each of these. c0ntr:icts were for specific delivery. On the other question of trans-ferab1!Jty, .however, both the courts below, have held that the deliv~ries under these contracts were not made non-transferable. To that extent the co~tracts between the firms of P.W. 2-3 and P.W. 1 may come under the mis-chief of the 1943 Order. · It was, however, open to the firms of P.W. 2-3 to carry out the instructions of the plaintiffs in lawful manner.

(cl Having entered into lawful contracts with the firms of P.W. 2 and 3, the plaintiffs were justified in paying the losses incurred in these transactions. It was no part of the duty of the plaintiffs to go to Bombay andl find out whether there was any lacuna in the contracts between the firms of P.W. 2-3 arid the firm of P.W. 1 so as to enable the plaintiffs' to avoid paying the dues of the firms of P.W. 2-3 (vide Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. I paras 808: ancl 809; also s. 223 Contract Act.)

(d) S. 224 of the Contract Act has no application to the facis of the present case, because the plainiffs did not commit any criminal act in enter-ing into contracts with the firms of P.W. 2-3 while carrying out the instmc-tions of th(~ defendants.

( e) After the issue of the notifications on 31st May, 1943, the provisions of the 1943 Order were no more prohibitory. The provisions were only regulatory.

For th[0 ]Respondents :

!. Concurrent Findings of 1he Courts Below :

l. l. There are concurrent findings of the High Court and the trial court, holdine inter alia,

(a) that the sllit contracts between the plaintiffs and the defendants would defeat the provisions of law or are prohibited by law and Would thus become unenforceable under s. 23 of the Jndbn Contract Act;

(b) that the suit contracts are in the nature of wagering contracts and are not capable of enforcement;

(c) hat the plaintiffs are not entitled to indemnification from t:1e defen-dJnts ;mder s. 222 of the Contract Act.

2. S. 23 of the Contri:oct Act :

2.1. The suit agreements fall within the ambit of s. 23 of the· Contract M in that" thev are (a) forbidden by law and (b) if permitted · they would defeat the provisions of law. ·

2.2 . .The suit contracts have as their 'object' or 'consideration' (mentioned in s. 23 of the Contract Act) the doing of something which is forbidden Under the Central Ordoer of 1943 or under the relevant Bombay Act of 1947.

2.3. No question of extra-terriioriality of the Bombav Acts w~ld arise in view of the fact that although the Bombay Acts would apply only to Bombay State, nevertheless, .the Agreements between the parties \!BS with the solo object of breaking the said law. The terms 'object' 'consideration', 'forbid· den by law' and 'defeat' the provisions of any law', under s. 23 of the Con· tract .Act on true and 12roper construction operate in respect of any law · and there is no requirement in the said sc:ction that such law m~t be en-. forced· ·at the place where such an agreement to break the said law · was entered into. It is enough to attract tbe provisions of s. 23 . that the Agree-ment is entered into with _the _object of defeating law al14 it is not an additional requirement that such law which is sought to be defeated sh11uld be in force at the spot or the place where the aareemeni is entered i11to. "'If the contrary interpretation urged by the plaintiffs is accepted, it would lead to perpetuation of device to defeat the proviSions of law. To take an instance. supposing there is law of prohibition of intoxicating liquor in fofee in Delhi, and if !wo people want to enter into an agreement to break that law against manufacturing and selling such liquor and make the ·agreement enforceable, all that they need do is to step acrpss the border into Haryana little beyond Palam Airport, enter into an agreement and cross back to 1'elhi and still make an agreement enforceable in the Haryana Courts. Such an interpre-tation would not be in consonance with' the tenor of s. 23 of the Conti:act Act..

2.4. Even if the suit agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants were independent agreements, they would be hit by s. 23. As matter of fact, the said agreement between the plaintiffs and P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4, in Bombay and only in that sense have been termed .. collateral and such 'collateral' agree· ments woul_d equally come within the ambit of s. 23. .

2.5. The illegality of the agreement would also ari5e by being devoid of any consideration on Jaw since P.W. 4 was under no lawful obligation to pay the mo~ys to P.W, 2 and 3 in respect of the said agreement nor were P.W. 2 and 3 under legal .obligation to pay moneys to P.W. J,

3. Forward Contract Prohibited by law_ :

3, l. The suit transancts, as concurrently held by the Courts b~low, are forward contracts, prohibited bv the Central Order of 1943 and !I.!~. Bombay Act of 1947. Both the Courts below have also found that transacts are not exempted under the notifications of exemption since the transactions 'were ad-G mittedly of transfer~ble nature (as admitted by P.W. 1 himse1f).

3.2. In finding the lega1itv of the suit transants and the plea of exemption in respect of them, what is relevant is whether the transactions generally are transferable (as admitted by P.W. 1) and not whether each transaction was in fact transferred or not. ·

4. /11dem11ification under s. 222 of Contradt Act:

4.1. The suit agreements are in the nature of an employment of the pla.in-tiffs by the defendants and of P.W. 2 and 3 by. "'.>.V(. 1 and to do acts which are criminal according to the concerned laws m view of the fact that such offences render the concerned person liable to fine or iolprosnment. By rea-

the defendants are not liable in law to sons o s. 222 [of ][the ][Contract Act ]· ' · th 'd ·mi al acts for indemnify the plaintiffs against the consequences of sai en n violating the concerned Jaws. •

4.2. s. 222 of the Contract Act requires that the defendants should indem-nify p W 4 only if the said P.W. 4 was bound to make payment for the illegal ~gi'.eements to P.W.s. 2 and 3. P.W. 4 was not so bound and therefore the defendants were not liable to indemnify P.W. 4. Since the agreeme~t of agency was null and void, unlawful and ille~al a°:d was furl.her deyo1d . of consideration, it cannot form legal and vahd basis for the mdemmfica!lon claim.

4:3. The agreement of agency in this case cann~t be disass~ciate:d from the. consideration or the object of the agreement withm the meamng of. s. 23 of the Contra.ct Act in deciding .whether the said agreement of agency 1s null and void, unlawful and illegal.

4 4. The agreements for the sale and purchase of oil seeds in Bombay are in fact between the defendants (represented by P.W. 4) and P.Ws. 2 and 3. The transactions between P.Ws. 2 and 3 on the one hand and P.W. 1 on the other do not militate against the fact of the illegal agreements between P.W. 4 on one side: and P.Ws. 2 and 3 on the ot]ler, acting towards each other as pri:icipals on either side. P.W. 4 paid P.Ws. 2 and 3 on the basis that P.Ws. 2 and 3 are the principals with whom he was dealing as principal himself, that P.Ws. 2 and 3 and P.W. 4 himself were commission agents does not ~ffect this fact. This fact of their having acted as principals is finding on an issue given by the High Court and the trial court.

4.5. Jf P.W. 2 and 3 were not the principal Parties to the illegal: agree-ments P.W. 4 had no justification at all to pay them in respect of the said agreements ·and to claim indemnification from the defendants under s. 222.

4.6. There is no implication of extra territorial jurisdiction in either the Bombay legislature or in the Bombay Courts involved in the plea of the defendants. The agreements between the defendants (acting through P.W. 4) and P.Ws. 2 and 3 (or even P.W. 4) are agreements to which the !Bombay Law applies and the lawful enforceability of which agreement in ttJe JBombay State must be established before r.w. 4 can call upon the defendants to indemnify him for payments made in the Bombay state in respect of the said agreements. The payments are even otherwise invalid under the laws relating to .sale and purchase of oilseeds in India.

relating

5. Wai;erinR Contracts :

5.1. The four sets of agreements (a) between P.W. 4 and P.W. 2, (bl between P.W. 4 and P.W. 3. (c) between P.W. 2 and P.W. I and (d) between P. W. 3 and P. W. 1 for the purchase and sale of groundnut and castor seed were contracts as between principal and principaJ and amounted to wagering contracts prohibited and rendered null and void, unla'Yful and illegal by Born .. bay Act JIJ of 1865.

5.2. The law in Bombay state relating to wagers and the law in Tndia relatin11 to p1:ohibition of sale and purchase of oil seeds cannot be circum-vented hv th~ a_ereements. referred to i!J ~aragraphs above be in~ made 'between agents of prmclpals and. mstead of prmc1pals themselves. Oui facit per alium facit per se. person might not do by means of another what he 'is prohibited from doing himself.

5.3. wagering contract does not cease to be one by the intervention of commission a1tents or by principal or his agent entering into such eontract with another agent or that al!ent's prineljlal. •

5.4. The decision in [1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 406 and [1955]1 S.C.R. 439 do not apply to this case because firstly they do not deal with prohibited

forward contracts in Bombay or elsewhere and secondly they do not involve violation of the law of wagering contracts to the State of Bombay under Bombav Act III of 1865. ·

5.5. j1 is to be further noticed that the suit transactions do not conform to the requirements o( bye law 123 concerned because there were neither no contracts notes at all or in few cases (in which ther.e were contract notes) . they wer~ not in conformity with the prescribed forms.

5.6. The duty of courts in Kurnool .to prevent the circumve1;tion and vio-lation of Bombay law cannot be less than the duty of British courts to prevent circumvention and violation of foreign law when the foreign law is no repug-. nant to British law and when the foreign country is a. friendly co,untry.

6. 'Badia' Tr1111sactions :

6.1. 'Badia' automatically involves two or more forward contr.acts.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2382 to 2384 of 1968.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment & decree dated the 27th September, 1967 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A. No.- 4-6/ 1962

M. C. Chagla, V. M. Tarkunde, H. K. Puri and K. K. Mohan, for the appellant. (In all the appeals)

B. V. Subramanian, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respond·

ent Nos. 2 & 3 (In C.A. No. 2382/68). and for respondent nos. 1 & 5. (In C.A'. No. 2384/68) . .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B.Ec., J,-"" The three consolidated appeals before us by grant of special leave are directed against ,common judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, by. whtch the plaintiff's appeals in three . suits, filed on similar facts, wered.ismissed. They can be ~de~ided by us on the question whether the contracts set up by the plamtlff-appel-lant were struck by the provisions of Section 23 of the Contract Act. The section reads as follows :

"23. The . consideration or object of an agreement is law-ful. unless~it is forbidden by law; or · · .· . · :

is of .such nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or

is fraudulent; or

involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or ·

the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public polieiy.

In each of these .cases, the consideration or object of .an agreement is said t<;> be ~nla~ul. Every _agre~~~nt of which the object or cons1derat1on 1s unlawful, 1s v01d .

The appellant, Firm of Pratapchand NopaF, is the plaintiff in all the three suits but the defendants of each smt, the respondents be-fore us, are different. The plaintiff claimed Rs .. 78,~~l.15 ~ns. in original suit No. 106 of 1954, Rs. ~3,97.8.,4 ans .. m ongmal smt No. 107 of 1954 and Rs. 91,697.4 ·ans. m ongmal suit No. 114of 1954, as amounts due to indemnify him under section 222 of the Contract Act on the strength of payments said to have been made by the plain-tiff to third parties on behalf of the defendants who are alle:ged to have directed the plaintiff to enter into "badla" transactions for them. Three othe:r suits, claiming amounts alleged to have been borrowed, also filed by the same plaintiff, were tried together with these three suits; but, we are not ooncerned here with the other three suits from the dismissal 1Jf which no appeal was preferred.

The~ character of the contract set up in each case is brought out . by paragiaph 3 of the original suit No. 106 of 1954 where the plain. tiff S(.lid ; ·

"The defendants are big merchants and have been carrying on trade outside Dhone, even in places like Bombay. They wanted to do the business of purchasing and selling ground-nut seeds and oil seeds in Bombay market and for this pur-D pose engaged the plaintiffs a~ commission agents to contact with Bombay Commission Agents, who were entering into contracts with customers for. purchasing or selling ground-n\!t seeds and castor oil seeds, according to the orders of the dlefendants which the ~laintiffs were communicating to them. The Bombay oomm1ssion agents used to give intima-E tion to the plaintiffs of the fact of having executed the orders (the contracts of sale or purchase) and the terms, the rate etc., of the contracts. The plaintiffs were immediately com-municating the information to the defendants. The business was according to the custom prevaili.ng in the Bombay market, viz. the custom of Badia. The defendants not only agreed in general to abide by the custom of Badia, but spe-F cifically consented to every such Badla. At the requei;t of the defendants the transactions were settled after undergoing few badlas. Such settlements were beneficial to the .1fofen-dants as the market was falJing and delay would have meant greater los~ when the marke:t was falling ,the Bombay agents were pressmg for cash settlement on pain of declaring them as ~efaulters which will result in ~isability to do any further busmess. The defendants knew this state of affairs and they realised that settlement was the only course beneficial to them. So they specifu:ally told the plaintiffs that they must at any cost preserve their reputation in the Bombay market and with plaintiffs. The defendants hence agreed to pay the ~moun~ and on their request and on their behalf the plain-tiffs pa.id all amounts ~ue to the Bombay Commission Agents accordmg to the Patties sent by the Bombay Agents in res-pect of the transactions relating to the defendants. The defen· dants also agreed to pay to the plaintiffs interest 011 the

amounts so advanced by the plaintiffs for payment to the Bombay agents. The Bombay Commission agents were sending patties of transactions to the plaintiffs. As already stated; at the request of the defendants, the plaintiffs paid all such losses and other charges according to the patties sent by Bombay Commission agents on the promise Of the defendants to repay all such amounts to the ·plaintiffs with interest. The extracts of the accounts filed with this plaint show the transactions and the amoiJnts paid by the plaintiffs at the request of and on behalf of the defendants".

The plaintiff's case was that the authority to engage in Badia . transactions on forward contracts, which are contracts for the delir [very ][of ][specified goods on future dates, implied what ][is ][known ][as ]"continuation" or "carrying over" .in the. terminology of the Sto<:k Exchange. The meaning of such trans-action is given, in Halsbury's Laws of England-3rd Edn. Vol. 36 at p. 547 (para 842) as follows:

"ff purchaser of securities during dealii;ig period does not wish to co:ylete his purchase during the next following settlement peri he may arrange to resell for the current account the securities which he has ·agreed to~bd for that account, and to purchase for the new acoount._ onversely, seller of securities during dealing period who does not wish to deliver during the next following settlement period may arrange tio repurchase for the current account the secu-rities which he has agreed to sell, and to sell for the new account. 4Such an arrangement is known as continuation or carrying over".

or carrying over". This is explained further and· distinguished from loan (at page 548--l para 845) : ; . ,

"Continuation or carrying-over is in form· and in law sale and repurchase, or purchase and resale, as the case may be. It is new contract, and not merely getting further · time for the performance of the old contract. ·

continuation being contract of sale and repurchase and not loan, the original seller becomes again the absolute owner of the securities carried over, and is not .'bound to re-deliver the identical securities but an equal amount of. simi-lar securities. If, therefore, he sells the securities taken in by him and makes profit thereon, he may retain it ·to his own use. In the ~ of loan, however, if the lender sells the securitieli deposited, the borrower may charge him with the price obtained for them if he finds it to his interest to do ao". '

Under the Defence pf India Rules, the detiniti9n of Badia provides that it "includes contang(> and backwardation and any other arranpment whereby the performance of any

ob~;ation under contract to take or give delivery of ·secu-

rities: within stipulated period is postponed t? some. future date in consideration of thi~ payment or receipt of mterest or olther chargea".

"CarryinBk>ver or "continuation" is also given as one of the me:rnings of the te:rm "contango" or "back-wardation" in'Halsbury's Laws of England--3rd Edn. Vol. 36 at p. 548. If we substitute "goods", in resi;>ect · oJ~ which forward contracts are made, for "securitieg", we get the exact nature of the transactions set up by the plaintiff in each case. They are nothing short of contracts or speculation in rise and fall of prices of goods purchased only notionally without any inten-tion to actually deliver the:n to the purchasers. In such transaction, purchaser is not at au expected to make demand for ac;tual deli-very of goods oEtcnsibly sold. · ·

We fu1d considerable force in the plaintiff's contention that at least contracts between the plaintiffs and defendants were not wagering , contracts although we think, in agreement with the High Court, that each party knew that their object was to indulge in speculation. In Bhagwt111das Parasram (A firm) v. · Bur;ori R,uttom;i Bomanji,(l) after exam.inin!! the facts of case hi which firm of "pucca adatias" was authcirised, by defendant intending to speculate in differences, to sell and then to recsell for the purpose of making profits, .~t was found that, as the plaintiff oould not be said to either lose •:>r benefit correspondinglv from variations in price, there could be no agreement ·in the nature of wager between the principal and the agent whatever may have been intentions of the principal. It was held that, in w~eriag contraC'I, there has to be mutuality in the sense tha1: the _gain of one party would be the loss of the other on the happening of the uncertain event which is the subjc:ct matter of wager. It was point· ed out th1:re (at p.33) : •

adatias" .~t was benefit in

"Spec:ulation does not necessarily involve contract by way of wager, and to constitute such contract common intention to wager is essential. No such intention has been proved".

We, therefore, accept the oontention of the appellant that 1there was no wagering contract between the plaintiff and any of the d1:fendants.

· The n1~xt question we may consider is whether the contracts set up could be E:aid to be collateral contracts quite unaffected by the objects or intenticms ~f defendants in entering into these contracts •which in-volved making of other contracts which may or may not be wagering contracts but were not "prohibited". Strong reliance wu placed upon Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya cl Or.r.;(2) where the object of contract or partnership was to enter into 'forward contrac1s for the purchase and sale of wheat so as Jo--spa:ulate in rise and fall of price of wheat in future. The oblect of the partnership was held to be not illegal, within the meaning of section 23 of the Contract Act, although (1) 4S I.A. p. 29 @ 33. (2) [1959) 2 supp. S.C.R. 406, 431.

the business for which the partnership was formed was held to involve wagering. The position was thus summarised there (at p. 431) :-

"The aforesaid discussion 1yields the following results : -,

{ 1) Under the common Law of England contract of wager is valid and therefore both the' primary 1.:ontract- as well as the collateral agreement in respect thereof are enforceable; (2) after the enactment of the Gaming Act, 1845, wager is made void but not illegal in the sense of being forbidden by law, and thereafter primary agreement of wager is void but collateral agreement is enforceable; (3) there was con-flict on the question whether the second part of s.18 of the Gaming Act, 1845, would cover case for the recovery of money or valuable thing alleged to be won 'Jpop any wager under substituted contract between the sa1ne /parties ; the House of Lords i~ Hill's case (1921}(2) K.B. 351) had finally resolved the conflict by holding that such claim was not sustainable whether it was made under the original contract of wager between the parties or under substituted agreement between them; ( 4) under the Gaming Act; l89~, .. 0 in view of its wide and comprehensive phraseology, even' collater<!l -contracts, including partnership agreements, are not enforceable; (53) s. '30 of the Indian Contract Act is based upon the provisions .of s. 18 of the Gaming Act, 1845, and though wager is void and unenforceable, it is not forbidden by_ law .and therefcye the object of collateral agreement is not unlawful under s.23 of the Contract Act; and (6) partnership being an agreement within the meaning .of s.23 of ·the Indian Contract Act, it is not unlawful, though its -_objecUs to_ carry on wagering transactions. We, therefore, hold that in the present case the partnership is not 1inlawful within the meaning of s. 23 (A) of the Contract Act.

Re. (ii) Public Policy : The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the concept of public policy is very comprehensive and that in India, particularly after independ-ence, its content should be measured., having regard to poli· · · tic al, social and economic policies of welfare State, : and the · traditions of this ancient country reflected in, Srutis, Smritis and Nibandas. Before adverting. to the argument of the learned Counsel, it would be convenient at the outset to as-G certain the meaning of this concept and to note how the· Courts in England and India have applied i'. to different situations. Ch~hire and Fifoot in their book on "Law of · Contract", 3rd &In., obs~rve at page 280 thus : _ ·

The public interests which it is designed to protect are _ so comprehensive and heterogeneous, and opinions as to what is injurious must of necessify vary so greatly with the social and moral convictions,. and at times even with the political views; of different judges, that it forms treacherous and um.table ground for legal decision. . . . . . . . These questions;

have agitated the Courts in the past, but the present siate of the Jaw would appear to be reasonably clear. Two cbserva-tions may be made with some, degree of assurance.

First, although the rules already established by prect:-dent mlllSt be moulded to fit the new conditions of changin.3 world, it is no longer legitimate for the Courts to invent new head of public policy. judge is not free to speculate upon what, in his opinion, is for the good of the community. He mur.t be content to apply, either directly or py way of analogy, the principles laid down in previous decisions. He must expound, not expand, this particular branch of the law.

Seccmdly, even though the contract is one which prima jacie falls under one of the recogniz.ed heads of public policy, it will .not be ·held illegal! unless its harmful qualities are indisputable. The doctrine, as Lord Atkin remarked in leading case, should only be invoked in clear cases in whkh the harm to the public is substantially incontestable, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of· fe:w ·judicial minds . . . . . . In popular language . . . . . . the contr{lct sboul~ be given the benefit of the doubt."

If an agreement is mere~y collateral to another or constitutes an aid facilitating the carrying out of the object of the other agreement which, though void, is not in itself prohibited, within· the meaning of section .23 i0f the Contract Act, it may be enforced as collateral asr~ent. If, on the other hand, it is part of mechanism meant to defeat what the law has actu~ly prohibited, the Courts will not countc~nce claim based upon the agreement because it will be tainted with an illegality of the object sought to be achieved which is bit by S«:ticm 23 of the Contract Act. Itis well established that the ~ of. an agreement cannot be said to be forbidden or unlawful inerely because the agreement results in what is known a~ "void contract". void agreement, when coupled with other facts, may become part of tr;utsaction wh,!ch creates legal rights, but this is not so if the object is prohibited or "mala in se". Therefore, the real question before us is : Does the agreement between the p:irties in each . case, which was to be carried out in Bombay, so connected with the execution of an object prohibited by either law applicable in B_nmbay or law more widely applicable so as to be hit by Section 23 of the Contract Ac:t ?

qu~tion which has been raised before us is whether th:: plain-tiff, who e11tered into contracts with third parties, who. appeared as . witnesses in the cases now before us, so that these third partie:s made the purchases aod settlements in Bombay, the payments for which are the subject matter of suits, was dealing with them as principal to principal. The High Court bad found that the relationship between the plaintiff and the third parties he employed to conclude the trans-actions was that of principal to principal. The question whe1tb0r the

parties through whom the plaintiff actually alleged carrying out ot the contract set up between the plaintiff and the defendants. could the!hsel-ves be regardeq as piincipals or agents of the plaintiffs will bec9me quite immaterial if the objects bf the contracts are found to be tained with the kind of illegality which is struck by Sec. 23 of the Contract Act. Again, the mere fact that the contracts between the plaintiff and the defendants were entered into at Kurnool in the State of Andhra Pradesh would also not make any difference in principle if the objects of the contracts which were to be carried out at Bombay were of such kind as to be hit by Sec. 23 of the. Act. The principle which would apply, if the objects . are 5truck by Sec. 23 of the Contract Act, is embodied in the maxim : "Qui facit per alium facit per se" (What one does through another is done by oneself). To put it in another form. that which cannot be done directly may not be done indirectly by engaging another outside the prohibited area. to <lo the illegal act with-in the prohibited area. It is immaterial whether, for the doing of such· an illegal act, the agent employed- is given the wider powers or authority of the "pucca adatia", or, as the High Court had held, he is clothed with the powers of an ordinary commission agent only. In view o~ the opinion already expressed by us, that, at anv rate, the initial contracts between the plaintiff and the defendants were not really wagering contracts. we need not de.al with the provisions of the Bombay Act No. 3 of 1865 for Avoiding Wages which are declared void by Sec. 30 of the Indian Coritract Act. We will, however, con-sider the applicability of the provisions of Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act, No. 64 of 194 7 (hereinafter reforred to as the· 'Bombay Act') and of the Oilseeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order. 1943, (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order). which was kept alive by the .provisions of Sec. 17 of the Essential Supplies (Tempo-rary Powers) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Central Act').

Sec. 2, sub s. (3) lays down :

"Contract" means contract entered into, made or to be ' performed in whole or in part in any nolified area relating . to the sale or purchase of any goods to which this Act appli-es:

Provided that the Provincial Government may by notifica-tion in the Official Gazet~ direct any contract or class of · contracts h> be excluded from the provisions ·of this Act, subject to such conditions as the Provincial Government may deem fit to impose"; ,

Sec. 2, sub-s. (3) lays down:

" 'Forward Contract' ·means contract for the delivery of goods at future date and which is not ready delivery con-tract:"

Sec. 2, Sub. s. ( 4) enacts :

" 'Goods' means any kind of movable property and includes securities .but .does not include money or actionable claims;" Sec. 2, sub. s. (7) reads :

" 'Option in goods' means contract for th.e purchase or sale of right to buy, or right to sell, or .. nght to ~uy or s~!l goods in future and includes gully, 1e11, ma11d1 or te11-mandi in goods;"

Sec. 2, sub. s. (9) says :

"Ready delivery contract' mi:ans contract which provides for delivery and pa1yment of price either ·immediately or within such number of days not exceeding seven after the date of tht: contract and under such conditions as the Gazf'tte, specify in this behalf in respect of any particular goods";

Sec. 2, sub. s. ( 1) provides :

"' 'Recognised association' means an association which is for the tii;ne being recognised by the Provincial Government as 1[provided ][in ][Section ][3"; ]

'The recognition of associations is governed by Sec. 3 of the Act, and Sec. 6, sub. s. (1) gives the power to every recognised association to "subject to the sanction of the Provincial Government, make and, from time to time, add to, vary or rescind bye-laws for the regula-D tion and control of forward contracts in goods for which such associa-tion has been recognised".

Sec. 6, sub. s.(2) (f) refers specifically to the power of the re-. cognised Association to lay down, "the terms, conditions and incidents · of contracts and the forms of such contracts as are in writing"; and, Sec:. 6, sub,.s.(2)(g) covers:

"regulating the entering into, making, performance, rescis-sion and termination of contracts, including contracts l:et-ween members, or between commission agent and his con-stituent or between broker and his constituent or betw::en . jatthuwala or muccadum and his constituent or between member of the recognised association, and person who is not member, and the consequences of insolvency on the part of seller or buyer or intermediary, the consequences of . breach or omission biy seller or buyer and the responsi-bility of commission agents, muccadums and brokers not parties to such contracts";

:Section 6, sub. s. (2) (i) indicates that ''the method and procedure for settlement of claims and disputes including settlement by arbitrations"; :Section 6, sub. s. (3) says :

"The bye-laws rnay provide that the contravention of any of the bye-laws shall-·

(i) make contract which is entered into, made or is to be pt:rformed otherwise than in accordance with the bye-laws voiJ or illegal; · (ii) render the member liable to explusion, suspension, :fine or other non-monetary penalty".

Sec. 8 of the Bombay Act ileals with the illegality of the contracts and its consequencies as follows :

"(1 ) Every forward contract for the sale or purchase of, or relating to, any goods, specified in the notification under sub-section ( 3) of section 1 which is entered into, made or to be performed in any notified area shall be illegal if it is not entered into, made or to be performed-

( a) in accordance with such b,y-laws, made under section 6 or 7 relating to the entering into, making or perfo1mance of such contracts, as may be specified in the bye-laws, or

(b) (i) between members of recognised association, (ii) through member of recognised association, or

(iii) with member of recognised association, provided that such member has previously secur-ed the written authority or consent, which shall be in writing if the bye-laws so provide, of the persons entering into or making the contract, and no claim of any description in respect of such contract shall be entertained in any civil COU{t.

(2) Any person entering into or making such illegal contract shall, on conviction, be punish-able with imprisonment for term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both".

Section 9 of the Bombay Act lays down :

"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force on notification being issued by the Provincial Government in .~he Official Gazette, options or such kinds of options in snch good~ and in the whole of the Province of Bombay or such part there-of as may be specified in the' notification shall be illegal.

(2) Any person entering into any option made illegal under sub-section (1) shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine or with both". ·

The Andhra Pradesh High Court had reached the conclusion that it was not necessary to decide the question whether provisions of Sec. 8 clause 1 (a) had been contravened probably because no bye-law made under Section 6 or 7 of the Bombay Act had been placed be-fore it. No such bye-law has been pointed out to us. We. arc, 1here-fore, not in position to bold that there has been an infringement of any bye-law. The High Court had, however, held that there had been contravention of Sec. 8(1 )(b) of the Bombay Act inasmuch as only one of the third parties, namely, Shivdanmal Agarwal & Co., whose partner Ganga Ram was examined as P.W.l, was shown to be

member CJf recognised association. We do not consider it neces-A sary to decide this question either as it appears to us that the Andhra Pradesh High Court was correct in holding that the forward contracts under consideration violated the provisions of the two orders set out below:

(1) No. 7561133-0(4), which reads:

"Jn ext:rcise of the powers conferred by the proviso to clause (2) of section 2 of the Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act, 1947 (Born. LXIV of 1947), the Government of Bom- · bay is pleased to direct that the following contracts shall be exclud<:d from the provisions of the said Act namely :---Forward contract for specific delivel1y of any variety of oil seeds for specified price the delivery order, railway re-c ceipts 1)r bill of lading against which are not transferred to the third parties, made or entemd into before the 19th Decem-ber, 1950, and outstanding on that date". (2) No. 7561/33-0(2) which says: · "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section ( 1 ) of Section 9 of the Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act, 1947 (Born. LXIV of 1947) the Government of Bombay is pleased· to direct that all options irt all varieties 'bf oil see:ds shall be illegal in Greater Bombay". Moreover, as regards oil seeds, we find that the Centra1l Act enacted for the control of production, supply, and distribution o.E easen-tial commodities, covers ''food-stuffs" which, under Sec. 2(c:), "in· elude edible oilseeds and oils". Section 3(2)(c) to (g) of. the Cent-ral Act authorises the Central Government to pass orders for the purposes given as follows : · · "(c) for controlling the prices at which any essential com-modity may ge bought or sold; _ ( d} for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transpo1 t, distribution, disposal, acqu_isitic!ll, · use or consumption of any essential commodity; · ( e) for prohibiting the withhol9ing from sale of ally essential commodity ordinarily kept for sale; (f) for requiring any person holding stock of an essential commodity to sel.I the whole '1r specified part of the· stock at such pnces and to such persons or Class of · persons or in such circumstances, as may be ~e.d in the order; (g) for regul~ting or prohibitin_it any class of commen:iial or fi.nanc1al transactions. relating to ~ or cott~ textiles. which, in the opinion of the ~fy making _the order are, or if unrcplated are likely to be, detrimental, to public interest;"

Section 7(2) of the Central Act provides that:

"If any person contravenes any order under Section· 3 relating to 'foodstuffs, ....

(a) he 3hall be punishable with imprisonment for term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine, unless for reasons to be recorded the . court is of opinion that sentence of fine only will meet the ends of justice; and

(b) any property in respect of which the order has been contravened or such part thereof as to the court may seem fit sltall be forfeited to the Government. ..... "

As already indicated, Sec. 17 of the Central Act keeps alive the provisions of Oil-seeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943. The provisions of this Control Order appear to us to be so impcrtant for the decision of the question before us that we reproduce it below in toto. It runs as follows :

"1. This order may be called the Oilseeds (Forward Contracts Prohibition) Order, 1943.

(2) It extends to the whole of British India.

(3) It shall come into force at once.

2. In this order ....

(i) "contract" means contract made, or to be perlionn-ed in whole e>r in pa~t in British India relating to the sale or purchase of oilseeds; . .

(ii) "forward contract" me•a[1]11s contract for the delivery of oilseeds at some future date;

(iii) "oilseeds" means any of the oilseeds for the time being specified in the first column of the schedule to this Order; . .

(iv) 'specified date' in relation to a:ny oilseeds means the date specified against those oilseeds in the second column of the schedule to this Order.

3. No person shali after the specified date for any class of oilseeds, enter into any forward contract in any of those oilseeds.

4. Notwithstanding any custom, usage or practice ofl the trade,· or the terms of any contract or any regulation of an association relati.rig to any contract. . . . ~

( 1 ) every forward. contract ~n any class of oilseeds outstanding at the clcse of business on the specified date shall be deemed to be closed out at such rate as the Central Government.may by notification in the Official Gazette fix in this behalf, and different rates may be fixed for different classes of contracts; 3-L379 Sup. CI}75

(2) all differences arising out of. any contract so deeemed to be · closed out shall be payable on the basis of the rate fixed as aforesaid and·the seller shall not be found to give and the buyer shall not be bound to take c1elivery; /

( 3) payment of all differences legally due from member elf) an associatiE)n to another member of such association in respe<~t of any forward contract closed out under this clause shall be made to• the clear-ing house of the association and Jbr the purposes of calculating such differences the rate fixed by the Central Government under sub-clause (1) shall lie deemed to be the settlement rate fiJ!;.ed by the association under its bye-laws or other regulations which shall, for the relevant purpose, continue to have effect subject to the provisions of this Order.

(5) The Central Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, exclude any contract or class of contracts from the provisions of thts Order. (Noti. No. P and S.C, 75(1)/43, dated 31st May, 1943) ."

Notification was issued on 31-5-1943 under Sec. 5 of the above mentioned Order, the. relevant part of which reads as follows:

"I. Forward Contracts for groundnut, linseed, mustard seed, rapeseed or toriaseed of specified qualities or types and for specific delivery at specified pri<:e .... not transfer-able to third parties are excluded from the provisions of this Order (Noti. No. P & S.C. 75 (2) I 43, dated 31st May, 1943)

II. No P.& S.C. 75(A)l/43.-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause 5 of the Oilseeds (Forward Contracts Prnhibition) Order, 1943, the Central Government is pleased to exclude the following class of contracts from the provisions of the said Order, namely:-

. "Forward contracts for castor seed, cotton seed or sesa-mum (til or jinjil) or specific qualities or types and for speci-fie delivery orders, railway receipts or bills of lading against which contracts are not transferable. to third parties."

Learned Counsel ~or the appellant contended that th1~ contracts under c-Onsideration for groundnut seeds and castor seeds are excluded under the above mentioned notification because they satisfy, in each case, the first of the two alternative conditions of exclusion. These con-ditions for contracts for sale of ground-nut seeds are : ( 1) they must relate to specified qualities or types for specific deliveries at specified price; and, (2) they should not be transferable to.third parties. Exclud1-cd forward contracts for castor seeds must (a) be in respect of specified qualities or types; and (b) be for specific delivery orders, railway receipts, or bills of lading against which are not transferable to third parties. The Trial Court had accepted the contentiQ,U. that it is enough that one of the two conditions are satisfied and had relld-th1~ word 'and' in the above mentioned notification is the equivalent of the disjunctive

'or'. The contention of the respon~ents, thatthe High Court rightly held that the word "and" cannot be converted into an "or" and that both the conditiops must be satisfied for an exemption, appears to us to be correct. We,, therefore, hold that the contracts under considera-tion before us were prohibited under the provisions of the Essential Supplies Act read with the Central Order of 1943. They were not shown to be covered by the conditions for their exemption from pro-hibition.

Having regard to the objects of the prohibition imposed by the Central Government on forward contracts on, inter-alia, ground-nut seeds and oil-seeds, in the interest of the general public, so that the supply at reasonable prices_ of commodities essential to the life and well being of masses of the people is not jeopardized, the absolute terms of the .prohibition, the penalties imposed for its infringement, and the care-ful manner in which only those contracts are excluded from the prohibi-tion which are for actual delivery and supply to bon.a fide purchasers, we agree witi). the High Court that the contracts under consideration are tainted with an unlawfulness of their object a~d are forbidden by law.The High Court had given very good reasons for accepting the view of the Trial Court that the contracts under consideration could not possibly be for actual delivery. It observed that the total quantity of groundnut seeds alone shown to have been originally purchased on be-half of the defendants was 950 tons which would have required two special goods trains to transport them from Bombay to Kumool, where such huge quantity o.£ greund-nut seeds could not possibly be required. Indeed, Kurnool itself has so much of groundnut seeds that, far from importing any, it exports them. The plaintiff did not specifically set up any case of contracts for actually intended delivery. On the other . hand, contracts set-up were for Badia transactions, which are not, as we have already indicated, understood to be contracts fo_r actual delivery. To assume in intention to demand actual deliveries from the mere form of the contracts would be to believe, very naively, that they were contracts for the proverbial carrying of coals to Newcastle. If, as both the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held, the con-tracts were not for genuine or actual delivery but only for speculation on differences in price, even the first condition for exclusion of these transactions from the purview o~ the control order, which contemplates actually intended delivery, would not be satisfied. Hence, we have no doubt in our minds that the contracts were not merely void but illegal in the sense that their obiects are forbidden. _

We think that the High Court correctly distinguished and refused to apply authorities recognising the enf9rceabilitv of agreements collate-ral to what are merely void agreements. It rightly relied on decisions holding agreements collateral to prohibited contracts also to be un-enforcible because taint attacfues to them which makes them also contrary t0 public poliCy. Such agreements ,tlall within the class of cases mentioned in Gherulal Parakh's case (supra) where harmful results on permitting the contracts, in terms of injury to the public at large, are evident and indisputable. ··

In Shivnaravan Kabra v. The State of Madras([1]), this Court deal-ing with the objects of similar legislation contained in the Forward Con-tract (Regulation) Act, 1952, said at page 144 :-·

" ... the Act was passed in order to put stop to undesir-able forms of speculation in forward trading and to correct the abuses of certain forms of forward trading in the wider interests of the community and, hi particular, the interests of the consumers for whom adequate safeguards were essential. In our opinion, speculative contracts of the type covered in the present case are included within purview of the ActM.

The result is that we think that he objects of contracts set up by the plaintiff cannot be carried out by merely entering into them outside Bombay or engaging third parties as sub-agents, or, in any · other capacity, to execute them. The provisions of the Control Order are applicable throughout India and are not confined to forward contracts entered into or meant to be carried out in any particular part of India. Their violation is criminal offence. claim for indemnification, under Sec. 222 Contract Act, is only maintainable if the acts, which the agent is employed to do, are lawful. Agreements to commit crimi-nal acts are expressly and specifically excluded, by Section 224 of the Contract Act, from the scope of any right to an indemnity. These appeals are, therefore, liable to be dismissed on merits, but, inasmuch as both sides to the unlawful agreements are in "pari de/icto'', we set aside the decrees for costs awarded to the defendants and direct that the parties will bear their own costs throughout. Subject to this modifica-tion of decrees for costs we dismiss in three appeals before us.

Appeals dismissed.