HLGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA ETC. versus STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ETC.

HlGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA ETC.

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ETC. January 24, 1975

[A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW, M. H. BEG AND Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, JJ .J

Constitwion of India 1950, Article 233, 234 a11d 235-"Contro/ orer district u'.urts a11d Co11.rts .111h-ordi1111te ther1•to"-"Cflwro::', 111<•1111i11g of-Co11firmatio11 .01 pe1·sons appo111ted to be District J11dge.1·, if lilithin the co11trol of Hig/1 Court.

Constitution of /11di"· 1950, Article 235 11111/ Puniab S11perior Judlcial Sen•ice !Rules, 1963, Rufr IO-Pro111otio11 of person to·he District J11dge-R11/c co11fer-fi11g poll'er of co11finw1tio11 011 the Govem?'" ifi valid.

Constit11tio11 of /11di11. 1950, Article 235 and P11ni"b Ciril Serrice (P11ni.1hmenr 1111£1 Appe11/ J R11.'es. R11/e 9-Di.\"cip/i11ary proceedings agai11st District Judges-~11q111ry by Gorcm111c11t ll'ithout tl1e conc111n11ce of High Court, if 1·11/id.

Before Rao 1rns appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge under Rul~ 9 .of the Punjab Superior Judicial Services Rules I 963. he wus functioning as D1stnct Attorney. He assumed charge and completed two years of probation. 0 On the receipt of the complaint against him, the High Court entruited to Justice Gurnam Sing~ :1n cnquirr i~to the complaint. Rao was tr~1nsferred to A!11ba1~ and later to Kamal as D1stncl and Sessions Judge. The High Court considered the report of .lustic~ Gurnam Singh who cume to the conclmion thut the charges uguinst Rao were not substantiated. On J 9 April, 197~ the High Court promoted Rao as purmuncnt District and Sessions Judge, with effect from Murch ·30, 1973. The Government on the same day wrote to the High Court. saying that the view of the High Court about competency to confirm District and Sessions Judges was .legally. untenable. The High Court was requested to reconsider the matter and the i~suance of notification confirming Rao WH! withheld. Un 4 May, 1973 the High Court confirmed Rao as District and Sessions Judge with effect from July 7. 1972 on which date he completed the period of probation. On 1\-lay 26. I 973 the Governm~nt wrote to the High Court stating that the Government did not reco-gnise the order of confirmation issued by the High Court. The Government fur-ther said thllflfao would be deemed to_ be under extended period of probation. The Governn1ent said that the HiglfCourt wo11ld.li_e-welL1d,.ised to re"iew their _ carlicr-·decision:.:i11d--send·the ·requisite record without any further delay. On I June, 1973 the Co1ernment wrote to the High Court saying that the Government were of opinion that in view of the probationary period of Rao having been found !o be unsatisfactory he was not fit to be retained on the post of District/Additional District and Sessions Judge and should be reverted to his sub3tantive post of Dis-trict Attorney. The Government further requested the High Court that the matter might be placed before the Judges immediately so that the views of the High Court would be available to the Governor before the High Court went into vacation. On 2 June. 1973 the High Court replied that the matter was under consideration of !he Judg~s and their views would be communicated to the State Government early. The vacation commenced on 2 June, 1973. On 12 June. 1973 the Government wrote to the High Court saying that if the views of the High Court were not re· ceived, the State Government would have no alternative but to take final de· cision. On 14 June. 1973 the High Court wrote to the Government that reply would be sent after the reopening of the High Comt. The High Court. reope~ed on 15 Julv. 1973. On 21 June. 1973 the Governor wrote n note approvmg actton propcised by the Council of Ministe.rs. There was gazette notification reverting Rao from the post of District and Sessions Judge. Amba!a to his former nost of District Attornev. Rao challenged the order of the Governor in an application under ;A.rticle 226 in the High Court.The High Court held that the order of confirmation of District/ Additional District & Sessions J.udge on ·probation ha• to be nassed bv the Governor in con-sultation with the High Court and in this view of the matter the order of confirma-!'-42; SCT/75

tion of Rao passed by t~e High Court was ineffective. The alleg*ion that the orders were the result ot the mala fides has not been sub5tantiated. The orders were. invalid .b~causc they were _based on an enquiry cond111:ted by the Director, S~ecial Enqlllry Agency, otherwise than through or with the concurrence of the High Court and as such were violative of Article 235. The impugned orders were passed without effective consultation with the High Court and were l'iol;1tive of Article 233 of the Coostitution. Appeals have been preferred to this Court bv the State as well as by Rao. The High Court has also preferred an ·appeal. ·

HELD (i) The confirmation of persons appointed to be or promoted to be District Judges is clearly within the control of the High Court. When persons are appointed to be Oi~trict Judges or persons are promoted to be District Judges the act of appointment as w<:II as the act of promotion is complete and nothing more remains to be done. Confirmation of an officer on successful completion of his period of probation is neither fresh appointment nor completion of appointment. Such meaning of confirmation would make appointment continuing process till confirmation. Confirmation of District Judges is vested in the control of the High Court 'for the rcarnn that if after the appointment of District Judges the Governor will retain control over District Judges until confirmation there will be dual control of District Judges. The High Court in that case could ha\'e control over confirmed District Judges and the Governor would have control over uncon-firm~d District Judges. That is not Article 235. [378 G·HJ

(ii) The Governor has power to pass an order of dismissal, removal ·Or ter• mination on the recommendations of the High Court which are made in exercise of the power of control vested iri 'the High Court. The High Court under this control cannot terminate the services or impose any punishment on District Judges by removal or reduction. The control over District Judges is that disciplinary proceedings ar~ commenced by the High Court. It as result of any di>ciplinary proceedings any Distnct Judge is to be removed fro~ service or any punbhment is to be impos<~d that will be in accordance with the conditions cf service. [379 D-E].

(iii) The conclusion of the majority judgment of the High Court that th<: order of confirmation is to be passed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court is erroneous and has. therefore, to be set aside. Rule 10 which c:onfers power on the Governor to confirm is ultra l'ires the ConstitutiOQ, The ordter of confirmation of District and Sessions Judge is to be passed by the High Court. The High Court was right in quasing the order passed by the Governor directing the removal because the sam~ was based on enquiry conducted by the Director, Spe-cial Enquiry Agency, oth(,rwise than through or with the concurrence of thi~ High Court. The High Court was also right in holding that Rule 9 of the Rules has not been complied with. [379 F-G]

State of Avsam v. S. N. Sen [19721 2 S.C.R. 251 State of Assam\'. Kusewar Seikia & nr. [l.9701 2 S.C.R. 928, The State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bartclri [19661 1 S.C.R. 771; Hi1/11 Court. Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy [19631 1 S.C.R. 437 Chandra Mo'1a11 v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [19671 1 S.C.R. 77: State 'of Assam v. R@ga Mohammad & Ors. [1967[ 1 S.C.R. 454, G. S. Naomoti v. The State of Mysore [1969] 3 S.C.R. 325; Chandramoulashwar .Prasad v. Patna Higli Cow·t & Ors. [197012 S.C.R. 666, Slzamsher Singh v. State of Pun/ab & Anr. fl975) 1 .S.C.R. 814 and lshwar Chand Aggarwal v. State of Punjab (Civil Appeal No. 632 of 1974) dedded on 23 August, 1974 referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 852, 854 and 1503 of 1974.

From the Judgment and Order dated the. 6th November, 1973 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in C.W. No. 2147 of 1973.

R. K. Garg (In C.A. Nos. 854 and 1503 of 1974), Anand Swarup (Jn CA Nos. 854 and 1503/74) S. P. Nayar, for the appellants (In C.A. 852/74) and Respondent No. 3 (In CAs. 854 & 1503/74) ..

Jagan Nath Kaushal, Advocate General, Haryana, Dewan Chetan Das, Addi. Advocate-General, Haryana, Naunit Lal and Lalita Kohli, for the appellants (In CA No. 852/74) and Respondent Ne.'. 3 (In CAs .. 854 & 1503/74).

Hardev Singh; R. S. Sodhi, K. P, Bhandari and Surinder Singh for the appellant (In CA No. 1503/74) and Respondent No. 3 (In CA No. 852/74) and Respondent No. 1 (In CA No. 854/74).

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAY, C.J. These appeals by certificate raise the question as to whether the confirmation of N. S. Rao was to be made by the Governor or by the High Court. ·C Rao was appointed on 23 June, 1970 on probation under Rule 9 of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules 1963. He was appoint-ed as District/ Additiom1l District & Sessions Judge. He assumed charged on 7 July, 1970. On 7 July, 1972 he completed two years of probation. On J 3 July, 1972 the High Court received complaint from Mangat Rai Gaoa. The High Court entrusted to Justice Gurnam Singh an enquiry into the'complaint. On 1 September, 1972 Rao was transferred to Ambala as District and Sessions Judge. On 5 Sep1.ember 1972 there was an order posting Rao as District & Sessions Judge, Karna!. On 13 October, 1972 there was letter from the State Government to the High Court, declining to issue notifications under sections 20 and 21 of the Punjab Courts Act.

On 13 February, 1973 the State Government addressed letter to the High Court to send its views about the completion of probation by Rao. The High Court on 26 February, 1973 considered the report of Justice Gurnam Singh who came to the conclusion t.b.at the charges agaiast Rao were not substantiated. On 8 March, 1973 the Govern-ment wrote another letter to the High Court asking for the record of servict> of Rao and the views of the High Court about the completion of probation by Rao. The Government also asked about the result of the enquiry along with the report. On 10 April, 1973 the High · Court replied to the above two letters saying that the matter of confir-' mation of promotees as well as of Rao direct recruit was wita the High Court and not with the Government.

On 19 April, 1973 the High Court promoted Rao as permanent District and Sessions Judge, with effect from 30 March, 1973. The Government on the same day wrote to the High Court saying that the view of the High Court about compt1~ency to confirm District and Sessions Judges was legally untenable.· The High Court was requested to consider the matter and withhold issuance of notification con-firming Rao. On 4 May, 1973 the High Court in modification of the earlier notification of 19 April. 1973 confirmed Rao as District and Sessions Judge with effect from 7 July 1972 on which date he com-H pleted the period of probation.

On 26 May, 1973 the Government wrote to the High Court stating that the Government did not recognise the order of confirmation issued

by the High Court. The Government further said that Rao would be deemed to be under extended period of probation. The Govern-ment said that the High Court would be well advised to review their earlier decision and send >the, requisite record without any further delay. On l June, 197 3 the Government wrote to the High Court saying that the Government were of opinion that in view of the probationary period of Rao having been found to be unsatisfactory he was not fit to be retained on the post of Di,gtrict/ Additional District and Sessions Judge and should be reverted to his substantive post of District Attorney. It may be stated here that Rao before he was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge was District Attorney. The Government further requested the High Court that the matter might be placed before the Judges immediately so that the views of the High Court would be available to the Governor before the High Court went into vacation. On 2 June, 1973 the High Court replied that the matter was under consideration of the Judges and their views would be communicated to the State Government early. It may be stated here that the vac:ation commenced on 2 June, 1973. On 12 June, 1973 the Government wrote to the High Court saying that if the views of the High Court were not received, the State Government would have no alternative but to take final decision. On 14 June, 1973 the High Court wrote to the Government that reply would be sent after the reopening of the High Court. The High Court reopened on 15 July, 1973. 0.n 21 June, 1973 the Governor wrote note upproving uction proposed by the Council of Ministers. There was gazette notification reverting Rao from the post of District and Sessions Judge, Ambala to his former post of District AtJorney.

Rao challenged th<: order of the Governor in an application under Article 226 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

The High Court by majorit~· judgment held that the power to con-firm is part of the power to appoint, and, therefore, the Governor being the appointing authority the confirmation is to · be by the Governor on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The majority view of the High Court was that confirmation is not matter of con-trol of District Courts by the High Court.

The other findings of the High Court are as follows :

First. all enquiries against an officer of the subordinate judiciary. whether for the purpose of punishing him, if found guilty, or for ascer-. taining his suitability or otherwise for confirmation, can be initiated · and conducted by the High Court alone. The Government or any other authority without the concurrence of the High Court is not competent to initiat..: or hold any enquiry against District Judge or member of the Judicial Services of the Stak. The control vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution read together with the mandate of Article 233 of thi.: Constitution, makes it clear that the High Court alon~ is competent to ccrtify1'recomm'!nd, advise, as to whether or not the probationer Rao had satisfactorily completed the period of probation. ·

Second, there has been both direct and indirect non-compliance with the constitutional mandate, viz., not consulting the High .Court and consulting ot[1]1cr persons who were not entitled to advise him. In making the order the Governor was influenced by an extraneous con-sideration, viz., the. report of the Director, Special Enquiny Agency and thereby the provisions of Articles 233 and 135 were contravented.

Third, Rule 9 of the Appeal Rules was attracted and non-com-pliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 9 is fatal to the order terminating the services of Rao.

Fourth, the ordGr was not one of punishment, and, therefore, Article . 3 11 was not attracted.

Fifth, no provision of the Constitution or statutory rules has been brought to the notice of the Court which makes consultation with the High Court ob!igafory for the Governor before framing and issuing such Rules. though as matter of sound administrative policy the Governor should before framing rules for the Judicial Services of the State, consult the High Court. Before amending and promulgating the amendment on 21 April, 1972, the Government solicited the views of the High Court. ·

Sixth, there is no force in the contention that regulation of ~eniority is entirely matter for the control of the High Court. This is condi-tion of service which can be regulated by the Governor in exercise of his legislative power under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, though the fixation of seniority in accordance with such rule would he matter within the jurisdiction of the High Court.

The High Court held that the order of confirmation of District/ . Additional District and Sessions Judge on probation bas to be passed hy the Governor in consultation with the High Court and in this view of the matter the order of confirmation of Rao passed by the High Court was ineffective. The allegation that the orders were the result of the mala {ides has not been substantiated. The orders were invalid beca,u'se they were based on an enquiry conducted by the Director, Special Enquiry Agency, otherwise than through or with the concur-rence of the High Court and as such were violative of Article 235. The impugned orders were passed without effective consultation witl:l the High Court and were violative of Article 235 of the Constitution. The mandate of Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, l 952 hereinafter referred to as the Punishment Rules has not been complied with.

Appeals. were preferred by the State as well. as by Rao. The High Court also preferred an appeal.

On behalf of the State it is contended that the control of the High Court under Article 235 is neither absolute nor complete. It is subje'ct to prescribed limitations as mentioned in Article 235. The Advocate: 'General of Haryana contended that Article 233 applies to confirmation of appointments by direct recruitment and promotion. He relied on the

decisions of this Court in Seate of Assam v. S. N. Sen(!) and State of Assam v. Kuseswar Seikia & Anr. (") in support of the proposition that the appointing authority is the confirming authority.

The contentions of the Advocate G\~neral were these. Confirma-tion is the last step in the process of appointment which is made in the first instance on probation.

Confirmation is nothing but the substantive appointment to service. The earlier tenure is precarious. Confirmation makes it firm. On parity of reasoning given in S. N. Sen's case (supra) that the authority which promotes should confirm it stands to reason that the power of confirmation shou'.d vest in the authority which appoints. Confirma-tion m1d non-confirmation arc so inextricably mixed that it will be anomalous to say that the power of confirmation is with the High Court and the power of termination on non-confirmation is with the Govern-. ment. Transfer _has no analogy with confirmation. Transfer brings in no change in tenure of service while confirmation does. Confirma-tion can be on appointment as well as promotion. Since both powers of appointment and promotion are with the Governor under Article 233 the confirming authority is the Governor. Either confirmation is power of appointment or it is condition of service. In both the situations the power lies with the Governor. Rule 10(2) of the Punjab Superior J udic:ial Service Rules hereinafter referred to as the Service Rules which states that on the completion of the period of probation the Governor may in consultation with the High Court confirm the direct recruit on cadre post with effect from date not earlier than the date on which be completes the period of probation, is condlition of service and is therefore not ultra vires.

1 t is necessary at this stage to refer to the order of appointment of Rao. The order is as follows :-

''In exercise of the powers conferred under rule 9, of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963 the Governor of Haryana, on the recommendations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, is pleased to appoint, on probation, Shri Narendcr Singh Rao, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana as District/ Additional District and Sessions Judge, in the State of Haryana in the scale of Rs. 900-50-1000-·-60-1600-50-1800 with effect from the date he assume> charge of the said Act.

2 .. In all matters pertaining to seniority. probation etc. he will be governed by the provisions of Punjab Superior Judcial Service Rules, 1963.

3. Order relating to initial pay to be allowed to Shri __ Narender Singh Rao, will be issued separate.

(Dc1972Jls:ER:--251. (2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 9~'1 .

No(e 2 : Pt1oposals regarding the fixation of pay of Shri Narender Singh Rao, on appointment as District/ Additional District & Sessions Judge, Haryana, may please be forwarded to Government as early as possible"

Rule 9 of the Service Rules speaks of appointment of direct recruits. Rule 10 of the Service Rules speaks of probation of direct recruits. Direct recruits shall remain on probation for period of two years, which may be so extended by the Governor in consultation with the High Court, us not to exceed total period of three years. On the completion of the period of probation tne Governor in consultation with the High Court confirms the direct recruit on cadre post with effect from the date not earlier than date on which he ·completes the period of probation. If the work or conduct .of direct recruit has, in the opinion of the Governor, not been satisfactory he may, at any time during the period of proba-uon or the extended period of probation, if any, in consultation with the High Court and without assigning any reason dispense with the services of such direct recruit.The Advocate Gcr.eral relied on the notes to rule 2.45 of the Punjab Civil 'Service Rules which defines the probationer. Rule 2.49. is as follows : ·' ''Probationer" means Government servant employed c1n probation or against substantive vacancy in the cadre L'f department. This term does not however cover Go-\'crnment servant who holds substantively ·a permanent post in cadre and is merely appointed "on probation'', ~o another post". It is stated in note 2 that no person appointed substantively to permanent post in cadre is probationer unless definite conditions of probation have been attached to his appointment, such as the condition that he must remain on probation pending the passing of certain examinations. It is said by the State that this is not the present case. Note 3 states that the provisions of rule 2.49 and note 2 are to be taken as complementary. Taken together :note 3 states that they contaiti the essence of the tests for determining when Government servant should be regarded as probationer, or as merely 'on probation' irrespective of whether he is already permanent Government servant or is merely- Government servant without lien on any permanent post. While probJtioner is one appointed in or against post substantively vacant with definite con-ditions of probation, person on probation is one appointed to post not necessarily vacant substantively for determining his fitness for eventual substantive appoii~tment to that post. There is nothing in this rule to prevent Government servant substantive in one cadre from being appointed as probationer in or against post borne on another cadre with definite co~ditions of probation such as the passing of de-partmental examination which are prescribee. In such case the Gov-ernment servant should be treated as probationer.

It is_ said by the Advocate General that no definite conditions of probation were attached to th~ appointment of Rao and he is ~ot probatiortcr but on probation, and, therefore, rule 9 of the Service Rules is not attracted. Rule 9 is as follows :-

"Where it is proposed to terminate the employment of proba·ioner, whether during or at the end of the period of probation, for any specific fault or on ac~ount. of the unsatisfactory record or unfavourable reports 1mplymg the unsuitability for the service, the probationer shall be appris-ed of the grounds of such proposal, and given an oppor-tunity to show cause against it, before orders are passed by the authority competent to terminate the appointment".

He gave two reasons as to why Rule 9 is not attracted. ·First, Rao is on probation and not probationer and Rule 9 only :>peaks of probationer. Second, it is not case of termination of employ-·ment because Rao was under the order asked to go back lo his substantive post of District Attorney, and, therefore, it was not case of termination.

It is true that the order of appointment of Rao 'states that he is appointed on probation with effect from the date he assumes charge of the post. Rule 10 of the Service Rules provides that the probation is for two years and that it can be extended. It is appa-rent that Rao was appointed on the condition that he had to give satisfactory performanace with regard to his work and \:Onduct during the period of probation in order to qualify for confirmation. Rao was directly recruited on probation in substantive vacancy in lhc cadre of the Superior Judicial Service. Mere use of the words "on probation" is not conclusive. Rao was probationer because he was appointed against post substantively vacant with definite conditions of probation. Rao therefore became probationer. His proh1tion could be extended so as not to exceed three years.

Article 233 states that appointments of persons to be, and the postmg and promotion of district Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor- of the State in consultation with the Hi2h Court exercisiog jurisdiction. ~

. Article 234 states that appointments of persons other than district Judges to the Judicial service of State shall be made bv the GO\ ::rnor of the State in accordance with rules made by him-in that bclmlf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction i·a relation to such State.

Article 235 states that the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to. pers.ons belonging to the judicial service of State and holdinl!' any Post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vest-ed in the High Conrt but nothing in this article shail be construed a~

takin~ away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the· Jaw regulating the conditions of his service or autho-rising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with th~ conditions of his servic'e prescribed under such law.

Article 236 states that the expression "District Judge" includes judge of city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, 8 assistant district judge, chief judge of small cause court, chief presi-dency magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge.

The appointment of persons to be District Judges; is vested in the Gov·ernor of the State under Article 233. The words "posting and promotion of district judge'' in Article 233 have been constru·ed by this Court to mean posting and promotion of persons to be district judges. The words '·appointment of persons to be and the posting"' in Article 233 have been held by this Court to mean initial appoint-ment by dire{:t recruitment of persons to! be district judges and the posting mentioned there is the initial posting. Promotion of district judges has heen expanded to mean promotion of persons to be district judges.

The Advocate General submitted that the control of the High -court under Article 235 is subject to limitation. These limitations arc-laws regulating conditions of service. Ther·e may not only be right of appeal under the conditions of service but in the present case Rule 10 of the Service Rules being the conditions of service speaks of confirma-tion .al.p_n:~bationer by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. Such rules are said by the Advocate General to be prokct::d under ·\rtick 235 within the conditions of service and excluded from the control of the High Court.

The question of control by High Court of Subordinate Coun.; was i considered by this Court in The State of West Bengal v. Nrire;:drn · \, Nath Bagchi(i). Bagchi was Additional District and Sessions Judge. "\ Bagchi of-liciatcd as District and Sessions Judge, but was not conlirmcd \1 as "such. Bagchi was du;~ to retire on 31 July, 1953. By an crdcr j' dated 14 July, 1953, the State Government ordered that Bag.chi be retained in service for period of two months commencing 1 August. 1953. By another order dated 20 July, 1953 Bagchi was p!:tccd under susp·~nsion. On the following day Bagchi was served with 11 charges. An enquiry into the charges was made by an officer ap;ioint-G cd for the purpose. The Enquiry Officer reported that some of the charges were proved. Bagchi was asked to show cause on 18 March. 1954 as to why he should not be dismissed from service. Bagch: 1ras dismissed on 27 May, 1954.

This Court in Bagchi's case (supra) considered two · questions. First. whether the enquiry ordered by the Government and conducted by an executive officer of tJ-.e Government against the District and Sessions Judge contravened the provisions of Article 235 of the Con-stitution which vests in the High Court the control over clistrkt c0urts

Second, whether rule 75(a) or the

anJ l'uurts subordinate thereto. Second, whether rule 75(a) or the \Vest Bengal Service Rules could be utilised to extend the service of Bagchi bc)'ond the normal ag:e of retirement.

This Cour~ hdd in flogchi'.1 ~asc (supra) tlrnt the rule wcis moJel-kLI on Ruk 56(a J of the Fundamental Rules and was not d<:signed to b,· used for 1hc purpose of r~taining: person in service for enquiry against him but to keep in employment persons with meritorious n:cord of service and whose retention in service is considered ncccssarv on public grounds. If retention in service for enquiry was needed a· rule 'i111il,1r to rule> 56(~1) of the Fundamental Rules was required.

On the question of control by the High Court under Article 235 this Cuurt hdd in Bagclti's case (supr~) that the word "control" as used in Arlid: 235 includes disciplinary control or jurisdiction over di,!rict jud!.!Cs. This control is vested in the High Court to effec:tua!e purpose, ~iamely, the securing of the independe~cc of the subordinak j11Jici~1ry and unless it includes disciplinary control the very object would be frustrated. The word "control'' is accompani·~d by the word "vest'' which shol''S that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary. Control is not merely the power to ~11Tangc the day to d<1y working of the court but contemplated discip-linary jurisdiction on lhc pn'siding judg:.c. The word "control" inc:bdes sorn2thing in addition to mere superintendence over these courts. The contr,11 is over the conduct and discipline of judges. The inclusion of right or appeal ~1g:iinst the orders of the High Court in the conditions or smicc indicates an order p<lSScd i'n disciplinary jurisdiction. The word "deal" in Article 235 also indicates that the control is over discipli1rnry and not i11Cl'C administrative jurisdiction. The word "court" in th<~ term 'idistrict court' is used compendiousiy to d.enote n;1t oril\ the court pron;r but also the prc:;iding judge. The control which is wstcd in th(: High Court is complete control subject only to the pnwC'r of the Governor in the matter of appointment including dis-misd :incl removal and initial posting and promotion of District Judges. Within thL' cxl'rcisc' of the control vested in the High Court, the High Court c:111 hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal subject howcvC'r to the conditions of service, to right of ::ppcal if grnntcd by the conditions of service and to the giving of an opportunity of showing: cause as required b\' Article 311 (2) unless such :rn opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under the' nr,wisos. ( h) and ( c) to tha: clamc. The High Court alone will make :nquiry into disciplinary conduct.

The Advocate· Gcn0ral on behalf of the State submitted that the control nf the Hit[1]h Cnurt is subject to lirnitations and these limitations :ire w11ditio11s of scnice. If under the conditions of service confir-m:1tion i-; to he m:1de 111 the Governor, this is said to h~ limitDtion on the' c',rnt1 nl of the High Court. Th:it turns on the prinnry ques-tion \\'hcth,~r confir111atic111 is 1Yithin the polV<.'r \lf appointment. -.l 1;, the Hi!.;11 (',,.,,.,, Calrnua v. Al/111! K111•wr Ra1·([1]) the respon-dent ::,keel f11r ;1 dccltr:1:i,,n t'1:1t he 'n,: srnior in the: cadre of Sub-1.ll [1%)] I 5.C.R. -ir

ordi11a1c Judges if no -;u lcrsessions had taken place. This Court held Jn: .\rtic:ie 2:<5 read w th service rules showed -that Munsif had ne rigiH w pro111l1[1].ion whic;i could be enforced through court. It is n0t \.:\~rr.c~ to s;1' that the High Court should have consulted the State Public Sccvic,: Crnnmiss•on because Article 320 (3) ( c) contemplated disciµJinary rn;:ttcrs. There was no reduction in rank of ·the respon-d~;]( in that case. All ~<1L,ordinate judges were in the same cadre Ui'• [1 ]B held 1hc sam~ rank irrespective of seniority. Losing place in tli<' seniorit) Es~ cid not amo~mt to reduction in rank.

1'1 Cliwdra Mohan v. State of VIiar Pradesh & Ors.(1) this Cou1. consid·.:rcd Article 233 and the question of· appointment of Distr:. llld~cs. The appellant in that case challenged the recruitment of trice .lucl!.!cs. The Governor under the Rules decided on the num:. ca:1didatcs to be selected. Selection Committee was constiu:.:. under the Rules. The High Court submitted to the Government .:' · of candidates considered suitable for appointment. The Govern, mad.: the appointments from the fot. It was contended that unu..: Article 233 the Governor has to make the appointments in consultation with the Hi1rh Court concerned and under the rules he had to consult the Sckctio11 Committee, and, therefore, the appointments made in con-D sultation with two authorities instead of one were illegal.

It was held in Chandra. Mofwn's case (supra) that under Article 233 the Governor can appoL1t 'a person to the post of district judge from the services only in consultation with the High Court. This Court said that Judicial Service is defined in Article 236 (b). The definition is exhaustive of the serYice because the expression means &crvice consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial post i•aferior to the post of district hidf:l'. The judicial service is the exclusive service of judicial officers. In the case of 2-ppointment of persons to the Judicial Service othe" than District Judges, they will be made by the Governor in accorda.1 ·with rules framed by him in consultation with the High Court and : · Public Service Commission. But the High Co.urt has control over the district courts and courts subordinate thereto, subject to certau. p(cscrib~d limitations.

The Selectio"1 Committee under Rule 13 in Chandra Mohan' s case (supra) was to consist of two judges of the High Court and the Judi-c:Oal Secretary to the Government. The Selection Committee under Rule 17 was to draw up list of candidates selected. The High Court was to submit to the Governor the list of candidates considered suita-ble for appointment from two sources of recruitment, viz., d[rect rec-ruitment and recruitment by prom0tion. This Court said that the· Selection Committee reduced the High Court to the position of traas-mitrin2 authority. The High Court could not scrutinise the other appli-cations which were screened by the Selection Committee .. The High Court could not recommend persons for •appointment not found in the list. This Court thereiore held the Rules regarding Selection Commit-tee to be uncaastitutional.

(l) [1967! 1 S.C.R. 77.

In State of Assam v. Ranga Molzammed & Ors.(') this Court cc~-sidcrcd as to whether the High Court or the State Government wa;; the competent authority for transfer of district Judge. The Hi~h ,Court held that the High Court alone could order transfer aml in any . event the High Court was'to be consulted and was not consulted b<:foc~ ·the orders were made. This Court held that the Governor is only ccn-ccrncU with the appointment, promotion and posting to thi3: cadre o: Dis!rict Judges and not with the District Judges already appointed, pc0-mow] and posted to the Cadre. The word ""postin~'' in Artie!.! 233 . \Vas held to nican to station sonic one at place ·or~ to assign som~0;;.: to post. The \Vords '"appoint1ncnt, posting and pron1otion.·· indi..:3:..:· 1hc stage \vhcre person first gets position or job and "posting .. t~y. association means the ao;signmcnt of an appointee or pron1otce to po.;;!-· tion in tho;:: cadre of District Judges. The \Vord "posting'' ca1mct :-.~ und~rstooU in the scnsl! of '"transfer"' \\'hen the idea of appoirttn1.:-;1-. a11d pr·")n1otion is involved in the con1bination. If p::>sting: \\'3~ intcntl1..-J to moan tr:msfcr tho draftsman would have hardly chosen l<> place it b('l\V('Cll .. appoint1ncnf' and ~·pro111otion".

The Governor under Article 233 is only concerned with 1ho a;:--pointmcnt, promotion and posting to the cadre of district judges btit· not with the tramfcr of district judges already appointed o;- prnmot~,; and posted to the· cadre. Transfer is matter of control over district . courts \\·hich is ves.tcJ in the High Court. Jn Article 23~ thl) qu·~st!.J:: of appointment of persons other than district judges to the judi..:;.:il ' scr,·icc is conten1platc<l. ln Article 235 the p05ting and pron1otioi1 .,,i persons bclongi'.1g to the judic;•JI service pf the State and l10lding any position inferior to the post of <li~trict judge is contc111pla~d-; _Tb.:. 'vord •·post"' i.:; used t\vicc in J-\rticlc 235 to n1can the position. t..lf jcO and not the station or p?acc and therefore posting n1cans assignnr.:n: to position or job. In Ranga .Mahan1111ad's case (supra) thi~ Cour: ·said that transfer of incumbents is matter wi<hin the control- <>f di<-trict Courts including the control of persons presiding there nml tho High Court is the authority to 1nakc transf1..~r~ and there is no questi.._.n -1' of con-.ultation on that tr:round. The State Gorcrnn1..:-nt is 1'10[ t!~.: · -authority to order tra.1sfers.

In . . ). •"'·iag111oti v. The Shue of J..1ysore('2) this Court' consit~r.:-.. ~ the meaning of the word "'control"' in Article 235 .. At the requ,,st ,-:, the High Court the Government appointed judge to hold the de;i~::c.- · mental enquiry into the conduct of judic::il officer. The kartL',' ' Judge of .the High Court held the departmental enquiry anJ foun,' the Judicial Officer guilty of the charge.. He rccon1n1cndcd tl· · Govcr.ior that the Judicial Otllccr .n1ight be reduced in rank a1Hl n1~ _ not be considered for promotion for two years. 'The GoYcrnor cc. pulsorily retired the Judicial Officer from sen'ice. The Judicial Oflic thereafter filed writ pe!ition contendin~ that the colflpulsory retire n1cnt \Vas in contraYention of Article 235 hcc.iusc it ._.,.as thc-Hh:d1 (\"~i--L alone \\'hich has· po\\·er of holding disciplinary proceC"tj_ings . -ag'iiinst tl~.:-·-tll [1967] 1 S.C.R. 454. (2) [1969] 3 S.C.R. ;:;.

an additional sessions judge. they rank above those persO'as whose promotion is vested in the High Court. It is the function of the Governor to prornqte Additional District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge to be District Judges.

This Court held that under Articie 233 the appointment as well .as promotion of persons to be District Judges is matter for the Govemor in consultation with the High Court. District judges are directly appointed or arc promoted from the subordinate rank of tht judiciary. The initial appoint mcnt as wtll as the initial promotion of persons to be district Judges is with the Governor.

In Kuseswar Seikia's ca~c \supra) this Court said that ·· ftirther promotion of District Judges is matter of control of the High Court. Therefore, the initial appointm1:nt of persons to be District Judges as well as the initi'al promotion of pcrsom to be District Judges· is with the Governor. Once they arc appointed and promoted to be Dist-rict Judges the entire control i~ thereafter wstcd in the High Court. As to what further promoti0'.1 of District Judges can be, is illustrated by their appointment to Selrrtion Grade posts.

In State of Assam & Anr v. S. N. Sen & 11r. (supra) question arose as to who was the proper authority for confirming member of the Assam Judicial Service. Sc:n was confirmed by the High Court in Judicial Service Grade I agr,inst the post of Subordinate Judge. The relevant rule provided th;11 ",,. \~n person is appointed to permanen~ post he will be confirmed ah;r the period of probation in the case of · Deputy Registrar and Assi~t·rnt Registrar by the High Court and in. other cases it will be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court." The Account~nt General refused to accept the confirma-tion made by the High Court. This Court held that under Article 235 the power of promotion of persons holding posts inferior to that of the District Judge being in the High Court, the power to confirm such promotions is also in the High Court. The Advocate General relied on this decision·a·ad said that if the power of appointmenrwas with the Governor under Article 233 the power of confirmation was with the Governor because the process of appointment is not complete until contfrmation.

The confirmation of persm1s appointed to be or promoted to be District Judges is clearly within the control of the High Court for these reasons. When pasons 'trc~ appointed to be District Judges or persons are promoted to 'nc Di;.trid Judges the act of appqintment as well as the act of promotion is rnmplete and nothing more remains to be done. Confirmation of a•,1 otticer on successful completion of his period of ·probation is nei'.her fre,h appointment nor completion of appoint-ment. Such me•aning of confirmation would make appointment continuing process till confirmation. Confirmation of District Judges is vested in th~ contrn! of t!tc High Court for the reason that if after the appointment of District Judges the Governor will retain control over District Judges unti; wafirmation there will be dual control of District Judges. ~The High Court in that case would haw control over confirmed Distrd Judge;: and the Governor would have control over unconfirmed fi~;trict J1!ds;es: That is not Article 235.

-.iudicial Officers. This Court held that the word "control'". in Article 235 includes disciplinary control and jurisdiction over Distnct Judges. The control of the High Court is not merely the .Po.w~r to a:ra.ng~ ~ay to day working of the c;ourt but contemplates d1sc1plmary 1unsd1c~1on over the presiding Judge. This Court did not exam1~e t~e contcnt10~s -~f 'the Judicial Officer beC'ause the High Court had d1sm1ssr~d the pctt-ition in li111i11e. The matter was remitted to the High Court for d1spo-.. .sl1 in accordance with law.

Jn Clzandramuu/eshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court & Ors.([1]) it W<1s said that under Article 233 the appointment of person to. be rh9trict Judge rests with the Governor but he must make the appo101-'ll\?nt in consultation with the High Court. The Governor should make ·1p his mind after there has been deliberation with the High Court. The comultation is not complete or effective before the parties thereto ;:nake their re~iectivc points of view known to the other or others. It was said that the Governor cannot discharge his functions under Arti-de 23:i if he makes the appointment of ~person without ascertaining :~ powns of view of the High Court with reg•ard thereto.

In State of Assam & 11r. I'. Kuseswar Seiki & Ors. (supra) ,.'.\rtidc 233 was considered as to whether the appointmeat of person ··~lom!ing to the State Judicial Service to officiate as Additional District afld s(:ssions Judge was within the power of the Governor or the High Court. The High Court held that the prom9tion of Rajkhowa by the Government as Additional District Judge was void because he could «1)y be promoted by the High Court under Article 235. The Assam ·"Judicial Service consisted of the senior branch and the jtraior branch. :Jhe scr.ior branch consisted of two grades. The first grade consisted of the posts of Registrar, Legal Remembrancer, District Judges. The &ccond grade consisted of the post of Additional District and Sessions Jooges. The Junior branch in Grade I consisted of the post of Subor-Jinatc Judges a'.1d Deputy Registrar. The Junior Branch in Grade II consisted -vf Munsif and Assistant Registrar. Rajkhowa was appoint-ed as 'Deputy Registrar from the grade of M unsif. Thereafter the Governor appointed Rajkhowa to officiate as Additional District .and Sessions Judge.

This Court held in Kuseswar Seikia's case (supra) that the Higlt Court has control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto induding the posting and promotion of and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the Judicial Service of State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge.

The expression "Judicial Service'' is defined in Art. 236 to mean _,;_ sc'.vic~ consisting exclu~iyely ~f yersons intended to fiU the post of d_1stnct Judge · . .md other civil Judicial posts inferior to the post of dist-•· rn:t J udgc. The expression '"district Judge" includes among others an ~dd~tional_ district J udgc and an additiO'aal sessions Judge. The pro-mot1?n ol persm~s ~elo~ging to the judicial service but holding post mfcnor to the chstnct Judge vests in the High Court. Because the expression '·cJi~~~c'._ iudge'' includes an additional district judge and

(II [1970] 2 S.C.R. 666.

In the recent decision irt Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab & 11r. ( [1]) this Court held that the High Court under Article 235 is vested with the control over Subordinate Judiciary. This Court said that before Probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is >atisfactory or he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing the probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude tile pro-bationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The suitability of person to post is of permanent importance in considering th~ question of contlrmation.

District Judges C'an be promoted to sclcct1on grade posts. Simi-c larly grant of leave to the District Judge is vested in the High Court The control over District J udgcs includes also the posting of District Judges. · The Governor has power to pass an order of dismissal. removal or termination o·a the recommendations of the High Court which are made in exercise of the power of control vested in the High Court. The High Court of course under this control cannot terminate the services or impose any punishment on District Judges by removal or reduction. The control· over District Judges is· that disciplinary pro-ceedings arc commc'.1ced by the High Court. lf •as result c,f any disci-plinary proceedings any District Judge is to be removed from service or any pu'.1ishmcnt is to be imposed that will be in accordance with the conditions of service.

The order passed by the Governor shows that the State considered Rao to have committed serious irregularities which made him unfit for confirmation. It is indisputable that Rao was promoted to the post of District and Sessions Judge. His reversion carries stigma as well as reduction in rank, and, therefore, he was entitled to be given an opportunity to show cause again~! the proposed action within Rule 9. The conclusion of the majority judgment that the order or con-firmation is to be passed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court is erwaeous and is set aside. Ruic 10 which confers power on the Governor to confirm is ultra_vires the Constitution. The order' of confirmation of District and Sessions Judge. is to be passed by the High Court. The unanimous view qumhing the order passed by the Governor directing the removal because the same was based on en-quiry conducted by the Director, Special Enquiry Agency, otherwise than through or with the concurrence of the High Court is upheld. The unanimous view that provisions of Ruic 9 of the Punjab Civil Ser-vice (Punishment and Appeal) Rules urc not complied with is up-held.

This Court in the majority view in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. ( [1]). and lshwar Chand Aggerwal v. State of Punjab ([2]).

(I) [197511 S, C.R. 814.

(2) C.A. 623 of 1974 cb~ickd ~n 23rd Augu>t, 1974.

pointed out that the High Court is to hold the eQ_quiry preferably through District Judges. The members of the subordinate judi-. ciary look up to the High Court for discipline and dignity. The en-quiry conducted by the Director of Special Enquiry was unconstitu-tional.

The majority view of the High Court upheld the seniority ruk in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963. This quest.ion was not in issue before the High Court. We have not ga,1c into the question. We express 110 opinion on the seniority rule which is Rule 12 in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963.

For those reasons, the appe.:il of Rao is accepted and the appeal of the State is dismissed. The appeal of the High Court is disposed 0f accordingly. Tbc appellam Rao i' cntiikd to costs in this appeal. There will be one set of costs to be paid by the State.

For th..: sake of abundant caution it is madt: clear that in other cases where the order of confirmation of District Judge has already been passed by the Governor of State in consultation with the High. Court this jU'dgment shall not affect the validity of those instance> of confirmation.

Appeal partly a//01\·ed.