STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. versus CHITRA VENKATA RAO

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STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

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CHITRA ~TA RAO August 29, 1975

[A. N. RAY, C.J., K, K. MATHEW AND Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950, A.rt. 22&-Scope ·of High Court's power in rela-tion to depa1tn1ental enquiries intd guilt of goYernment servants .

(1) The jurisdictiQn of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari under ~rt. 226 is supervisory jurisdiction, and not as an appellate court. 'fhe. fip.d1ngs of.fact reached by an inferior court or tribun<l!l as result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in these proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of record can be corrected but not an error of . fact, however, grave it may be. In regard to finding of fact recorded by tribunal writ can be issued if it i!'I shown that the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again, if finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of la\V which can be corrected by writ of certiorc:!fi, but if there is somo evidence which may reasonably supPort the conclusion, its adequacy or sufficiency and the inference of fact drawn, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. The Court is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an autho-rity competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Therefore, in departmental enquries relating to the guilt of delinquent officers, the High Court may interfere only where the departmental authorities have held the proceeding1 against the delinquent officer in manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching fair deci-sion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case, or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevMJt considerations, or where the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and Capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. [525-E-527B]

State of Andhra PradesH v. S. Sree Rama Rao [1963) 3 S.C.R. 25; Railway Board, representing the Union cJf JndW, New Delhi & Anr. v. Niranjan Sinrh [1969] 3 S.C.R. 548 and Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhaknslman & Ors. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64, referred to.

(2) There is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a. public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him the rule followed in criminal trials, namely, that an offence is not established unless proved beyond reason-able doubt, must be applied. [525F.G]

In the present case, charges that the respondent fradulently claimed travelline allowance were inquired int9 by the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal. The Tribunal found him guilty and recommended dismissal. The Government accept-ed the recommendation and dismissed the respondent. In writ petition, challenging the order of dismissal, the High Court equated the charge of mis-conduct to charge under s.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, discussed the eviden:::e and findings of the Tribunal on that basis and held, that the ·prosecution did not adduce m~terial and essential evidence namely, the oonductor's chart which would show whether the respondent travelled on particular day, that statement made by the respondent during investigation was not admissible in evidence, that it wa! not safe to rely on it. and set aside the order of dismissal.

Allowing the appeal to this Court.

HELD: (a) The High Court was not correct in holding that the dome!tic inttuiry before the . Tribunal. was the .same as prosecution in criminal case. fl'I"' ' ~ [525C·DJ 3-L925SupCl/75

(b) The respondent was. given full opportunity to explain the statement made by him during investigation. Further, the Tribunal did not base its find-ing only on that statement. It had given its reasons for its conclusion and it is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at that conclusion. The High Court had accepted the explanation that the conductors' charts were destroyed and therefore could not be produced. Moreover, the conductor's chart would not show the names of the persons pay-ing the money. The High Court reviewed and re·assessed the evidence and then rejected evidence as no evidence, and this is precisely what the High Court, in exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226, should not do. [525C; 5278-D]

(c) The respondent's contention that the Tribunal relied upon certain reports which were not available to the respondent is not correct. reference to the inquiry report of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal had not relied upon those documents for finding-the respondent guilty. I527G-528B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1974.

2040 of

Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th June, 1974 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 2145 of 1972.

Niren De, Attorney-General of India and P. P. Rao, for the ap-pellant.

A. Subba Rao for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAY, C.J. This appeal is by special leave from the judgment dated 13 June, 19.74 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashing an order of dismissal. The principal question canvassed by the Attorney-General is that the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of the Tribunal.

The State Government in the year 1964 received certain complaints alleging misconduct against the respondent. The Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau was asked to inquire and make report. The Government in the light of advice tendered by the Vigilance Commis-sion referred the matter to the Tribunal constituted under Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960,

Three charges were framed against the respondent. Broadly stated the charges were that the respondent claimed false travelling allow-ance on certain days in the months of January, April and September, 1964. The respondent denied the charges and submitted written statement on 4 November, 1968. The Tribunal made inquiries and on 9 December, 1968 recommended dismissal of the respondent from the service.

The Government thereafter gave notice to the respondent on 22 February, 1969 to show cause why the penalty of dismissal from service should not be imposed on him. On 20 March, 1969 the respondent submitted his written explanation. The Government after considering the explanation of the respondent, by an order dated 24 May, 1969 dismissed the respondent from service.

The respondent challenged the order of dismissal in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The High Court by judgment dated 27 July, 1970 set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that the recom· meudatious of the Tribun.al were not communicated to the respondent alongwith the notice regarding the proposed punishment of dismissal. The High CoJirt observed that it was open to the punishing authority to issue fresh show cause notice regarding the proposed punishment after communicating the enquiry report and the recommendations of the Tribunal.

The Government thereafter complied with the directions of the High Court. The Government cancelled the order of dismissal dated 24 May, 1969. The Government, however, ordered that the respon-dent shall be deemed to have been under suspension from service from 21 May, 1969 until further orders. The order of suspension was challenged by the respondent and set aside by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 22 March, 1970. The Government then issued fresh notices dated 16 September, 1970 and 25 September, 1970 to the respondent and communicated the report of the Tribunal and the recommendations of the Tribunal and the Vigilance Commission regarding the proposed penalty. The respondent submitted his explanation on 6 and 23 October, 1970. The Government considered the same. The Commerce Department thereafter by an order dated 5 May, 1972 dismissed the respondent from service.

The charge§ against the respondent were that he made three false claims for travelling allowflnce for three journeys. The first .iOUfll.ey was on 3 January, 1969 from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad. The second journey was on 19 April, 1964 from Rajamundry to Hydera· bad and Hyderabad to Rajahmundry on 24 April, 1964. The third journey was from Rajahmundry to Guntur on 13 September, 1964 and Guntur to .Rajahmundry on 16 September, 1964.

The respondent in his written statement filed before the Tribunal denied the charges and maintained that he travelled by first class on the days mentioned in the claim for travelling allowance. He stated that he travelled by first class from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on 3 January, 1964 in accordance with his tour programme and claimed the travelling allowance. He also said that he traveiled by first class from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on 19 April, 1964 and from Hy· derabad to Raiahmundry on 24 April, 1964 and claimed travelling allowance.

Io Exhibit P-45 which was his signed statement dated 8 January, 1967, he stated that on 3 January, 1964 he went with his Joint Director from Vijayorgram from Raiahmundry in car. In that statement he said that he went from Hyderabad to Waltair on 7 January, 1964 and he claimed travelling allowance from Vijayawada to Hyderabad. In Exhibit P-45 he said that on 19 April, 1964 he travelled ·from Rajah· mundry to Vijayawada by first class and he went to Hyderabad · by first class on 19 April, 1964. In Exhibit P-45 he said that he did not

travel on 24 April, 1964 from Hyderabad to Rajahmundry because there was no accommodatiO!n. He waited at Hyderabad. On 28 April, 1964 he got reservation and travelled to Rajahmundry.

He waited at Hyderabad. On 28

The Tribunal on enquiry found the responde'nt guilty of charges 1 and 2. In the Enquiry Report dated 9 December, 1968, the Tri-bunal recommended dismissal of the respondelnt.

The respondent in the High Court challenged the order of dismis-sal. The High Court set aside the order of dismissal on the grounds that the prosecution did not adduce every material and essential evid-ence to make out the charges and that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal was not based on evidence. The High Court held that Exhi-bit P-45 was not admissible in evidence according to the Evidence Act and it was not safe to rely on such statement as matter of prud-ence.

The High Court said that corruption or misconduct under rule 2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, has the same meaning as criminal misconduct in the discharge of offi_cial duties in section 5 (I ) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The High Court in that background discussed the evidence an_d findings of the Tribunal as to whether the prosecu-tion placed evi<Jence in respect of the ingredients of the charge under section 5(1){d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.The High Court referred to these features in regard to the finding of the Tribunal. Four years elaP.sed between the _journeys forming subject-matter of the charge and the framing of the charge. The res-pendent in his evidence said that he secured accommodation through the Conductor-in-charge of the first class compartment after the arri-val of the train. It was possible that the respondent might have con-verted his ticket to first class one once he found that first class accom-modation ·was available on the train even though he had purchased ticket of lower denomination. The conductor's chart· is the only basis for showing whether particular person travelled by first class by particular train and not by copy of the reservation chart kept at the starting station. Though the prosecution oroduced evidence to show that the respondent did not purchase or reserve first class accom-modation in advance, the prosecution failed to produce the Conduc-tor's charts relating to the trains in question. Accordmg to the High Court "The prosecution utterly failed to adduce any evidence to exclude these possibilities".

The High Court said that it was doubtful whether Exhibit P-45 was admissible in evidence. It was said to be taken during the course of investigation. The High Court said that even if the statement is accepted, it only shows that the respondent did not actually travel on the days mentioned in the tour programme according to which travel-ling allowance was paid.

The respondent made the statement marked Exhibit P-45 on 8 January, 1967. The charge-sheet was framed on 17 November,

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1967. The respondent filed the writtein statement on 2 August, 1968. He filed an additional written statement on 4 November, 1968. It is apparent that the charge-sheets were framed after investigation .

lt transpired on evidence before the TribU11al that ope first class ticket bearing No. 03834 was collected at Hyd.erabad on 4 January,, 1964. The further evidence about ticket No. 03834 was that it was issued to on~P. Ramachandra Raju who travelled from Rajahmundry to Hyderaba<J on the night of 3 January, 1964. The fUrther evidence before the Tribunal was that one first class ticket bearing No. 04049 for the journey from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad was sold to one A. S. Murty for the journey dn 19 April, 1964.

The Tribunal examined the respondent. The respondent was given full opportunity to deal with Exhibit P-45.

The High Court was not correct in holding that the domestic enquiry before the Tribunal was the same as prosecution in crurunal case. The High Court was also in error in holding that Conductor's chart would show whether the respondent travelled or not. The High Court accepted the explanation that Conductor's charts were burnt and, therefore, they could not be produced. Further, Conduc-tor's chart could not show the name of the persons paying the money. There was positive evidence before the Tribunal of tickets being pur-chased by persons other than respondent on 3 January, 1964 and 19 April, 1964. These features figured prominently before the Tribu· nal.

The High Court all throughout treated the enquiry before the Tri· bunal as criminal prosecution.

The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao(!). First, there is no warrant for the view that ln considering whether public officer is guility of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by domestic Tribunal of Inquiry the High Court in petition under Article 226 of the Con· stitution is not competent to declare the order ot the authorities holding departmental inquiry invalid. The High Court is not Court of Appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding departmental enquiry against public servant. The Court is concern-ed to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and acdording to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural .iustice are not violated. Secdnd, where ther is some evidence which the authorities entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reason· ably support the conclusion that the delinqu~nt officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence

(1) [1963] l S.C.R. 25.

and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the. departmental authonttes. have held the proceedings against the delinquent in manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescnbmg the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching fair decision by some consideratwns extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by a!lowmg themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reason-able person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The depart-mental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal. evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or rehabihty of that evidence is not matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in proceeding for writ under Article 226.

Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi & Anr. v. Niranjan Singh(!) said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority uin-less the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such finding. 1n Niranjan Singh's case (supra) this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumelntal in compelling the shut-d1own of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31 May, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did 'not agree with the Enquiry Com-mittee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the Committee. This Court held that the conclusic<~ reached by the disciplinary autho-rity should prevail and the High Court should not have intefered with the conclusion.The jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari under Article 226 is supervisorv jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an Appellate Court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or ques-tioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to finding of fact recorded by Tribunal. writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refus~d to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impmrned find-ing. Again if finding of fact is based on no evidence, that-would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected bv writ of cer-tiorari. finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be chal-

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lenged on the ground that the relevant and. material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustaln finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on point and the inference of fact to be drawn· from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan & Ors([1]).

The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not corre~ finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the con-clusion that th~re is no evidence which would j)lstify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tri-bunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, re-assessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High COurt in exercising jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari should not do.The respondent raised another cdntention that the State did not give the respondent document described as 'B' Report and Investi-gation Report of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. The ground advanced by the respondent in the petition before the High Court was that 'B' Report and Investigation Report to which the reference is made by the Tribunal in its report and which are relied on to support the charges, were not made available to the respondent. The High Court did not express any opinion on ihis question because the High Court set aside the dismissal on the ground that there was no evidence for the Tribunal to come to that conclusion. The ·State in the affidavit filed in the High Court in answer to the respondent's petition said that 'B' Report and Investigation Report are secret reports which are intended for the reference of the Tribunal of Disciplinary Proceedings and the Govennment and, therefore, lhese reports are not supplied to the officers. We need not expres~. any opinion on that answer of the State i11_the affidavit. The respondent in answer to the affidavit of the State said that the Tribunal nsed the 'B' Report and the Investi-gation Report against the respondent and did not supply copies. It is because the respondent alleged in the writ petition that the Tribunal relied on 'B' Report and Investigation Report, we looked into the Inquiry Report of the Tribunal to find out whether that was correct state!Jlent. We find that there is reference, to 'B' Report by the Tribunal only because the respondent challenged the genuinelness and authenticity of Exhibit P-45. The respondent's case was that if he made statement like Exhibit P-45, the Investigating Officer would have' sent it along with his report. The Inquiry Officer says that the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the respqndent. The Tribunal has not relied on 'B' Report or Investigation Report. The

(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64.

[1976) 1 S.C.R.

respondent never demrunded 'B' Report and Investigation Report. The respondent was interested before the Tribunal to displace Exhibit P· 45 by doubting its genuineness. The Tribunal found that Exhibit P-45 was genuine find was statement made and signed by the respon-dent in the presence of the Investigating Officer. It does not appear that the Tribunal based its finding only on Exhibit P-45.

For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and re·assessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.

Appeal allowed.

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