KRISHAN MURARI LAL SEHGAL versus STATE OF PUNJAB

KRISHAN MURARI LAL SEHGAL

STATE OF Pl.JNJAB

February 9, 1977

[P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]

Constitutio11 of 111dia-A rticle 311 (1), dismissal by person subordinate to appointing authority-States Reorganisation Act, 1956-Sec. 115(7), 116(1) -Varying conditions of service of an allocated Gol'emmelll servaiit to llis disadvantage-Effect of reorganisation-Different a111hority i11 state before and after reorganisation-Patiala & East Puniab States Unio11 Civil Serl'ices (P1111ish-111ent & Appeals) Rules, 1953-Pepsu General Clauses Act-Sec. 2(41 )-Meaning of State r.ovemment-Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Service Class Ill) Rules, 1957-Central Government Circular dated 11-5-1957 issued under States Reorga11isatio11 ct, 1956.

The appellant was appointed as clerk in the Patiala State in 1948. On the formation of the new State of Punjab in 1956, the appellant was integrated in the service of the new State of Punjab as permanent Assistant. The appell-ant overstayed leave and, therefore, after holding an enquiry the Financial Commissioner. Punjab dismissed him from service in October, 1959. Appell-ant filed two suits. one for declaration that his dismissal order was void and illegal second for arrears of salary on the basis that the dismissal was illegal. The trial Court decreed both the suits. The High Court in appeal reversed the decrees of the trial Court and dismissed the suits.

In the appeals by certificate the appellant contended that the aopellant was confirmed in the State of Patiala bv the order of the Raj Pram1ikh. Before its integraiion he was governed by the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1953 which were made in exer-cise of powers conferred by proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution. By notification of the Punjab Government dated 9-2-1957 the said 1953 Rules were made applicable to the corresponding services from !st November, 1956 ·onwards till further orders in the new State of Punjab. Under the 1953 Rules, the State Government was tlie appropriate authority for dismissing members of Class III and IV. Under section 2(46) of the Pepsu General Clauses Act, 1953. ·state Government means the Rai Pramukh. The appellant. therefore, contended that he cannot he removed from service by any authority subordinate to the Governor of Punjab and since the Financial Commissioner is an authority subordinate to the Governor. he was not competent to pass the order of dis-missal.

The respondent contended that the appointing authority for the post held by the appellant in the State of Punjab is the Financial Commissioner and, therefore. he is the appropriate authority under s. 116 (I) of the States Reorga-nisation Act, 1956 to impose the penalty of dismissal. Secondly, in the present case the Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Services Class Ill) Rnles. 1957. applv. Although the said rules are more disadvantageous to the appellant since they have received the approval of the Central Govern-ment by the General Circular dated 11-5-1957, the appellant was rightly dis-missed bv the Financial Commissioner.

Allowing the apDeals,

HELD: I. Section 116(1) merely provides that the appellant shall continue to hold the same post in the new State of Punja·b and shall be d.eemed to have been duly appointed to such post by the Government of Pun1ab. The f~ct that in the new State of Punjab the Financial Comm!ssioner is the appro-priate authority for appointing Assistants is abs?]utely meleyant. 1:,Jnder s. 115(7) of the Sta·tes Reorganisation Act the cond1hons of service apphcaole to

-KRrSHAN ~MURARILAL v. PUNJA_B (Goswami., !.)

.a civil servant immediately before the appointed day cannot be varied to his disadva·ntage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. ·One of the condition ·of service of the apellant on the appointed day was tha-t since he was appointed by 1'.he State Government of Pepsu he could only be .. dismissed by the State Go\!ernment of Pepsu if he had contin.ued there.

[961 H, 962 A]

·2. The Memorandum of 11-5-1957 cannot be called in aid as previous ·approval :·because the Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office Rules 1957 were . promulgated on "28'2C1957 before the Circular dated 11-5-1957 was issued. No approval of the Central Government has been produced. Therefore, authority subordinate to the Governor of Punjab was not competent'to pass an order of ··dismissed of the apellant. T962 D-El

The Court set aside the judgment and decrees of the High Court and res-' -·tored those of the trial Court. (963 El

Takhatray Shivdatray Mankad v. Stale of Gujarat [1970] (1) SCR 244 a[0]nd 8/10/anath J. Thaker v. The State of Snurashtra AIR 1'.l54 SC 680, followed.

N. Raghavendra Rao v. Deputy Commissioner, South Kamara, Mnngalore ·(1964] (7) SCR 549 and Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. etc. v. Union of Ti1dia .& Ors. etc. f19751 (1) SCR 449, distinguished. ·

Raji-i Amar Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, [1958] SCR 1013, distinguished.

Mysore State and Road Transport Corporation etc. v. Miria Khasim Ali, Beg & Anr., C. As. 'Nos. 1601-1609 and 2402-2405 of 1968 dt. 1-12-1976 •followed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1298 and 1299 of 1969.

Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 9th August, 1966 ·of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular First Appeals Nos. 134 and 120 of 1963.

N. H. Hingorani for the Appellant.

0. P. Sharma for Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered

GoswAMI, J.-These appeals are by certificate of the High Court -of Punjab and Haryana. Civil Appeal No. 1299 of 1969 is concerned with the appellant's suit for declaration of his dismissal order dated October 21, 1959, as void and illegal. Civil Appeal No. 1298 of 1969 ·arises out of his suit for arrears of salary. Both the matters were heard together in the High Court and the judgment out of which Civil Appeal No. 1299 of 1969 arises is the principal judgment follow-ing which short order was passed by the High Court dismissing the other suit of the appellant for arrears of salary. The High Court granted certificates in both the appeals. It will be sufficient to deal with Civil Appeal No. 1299 of 1969 in this judgment as the decision therein will govern the other appeal.

The facts may now be briefly stated :

The appellant who was the plaintiff in the court below was appoint-ed as Clerk in the Pa ti ala State some time in July 1948. On the formation of the new State of Punjab on November 1, 1956, with the

merger of the erstwhile Pepsu and Punjab States the appellant was integrated in the service of the new State of Punjab as permanent Assistant in the grade of Rs. 150-10-300/- and was actually getting Rs. 170/- per month on October 21, 1959, the date of his dismissal in the office of the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. The appe.ll~nt instituted suit in March 1962 challenging his order of dismissal dated October 21, 1959, as VIQid and unconstitu-tional praying for declaration that he continued to be in service of the Punjab St(lt~. In June 1962 he instituted second suit .as pauper claiming decree for about Rs. 8,689/- as arrears of his salary and allowances and also further decree for Rs. 278/12/- per mensem from 5.6.1962 to 4.7.1962 and Rs. 290/- per mensem from -5. 7.1962 upto the date of the decree. Both the suits were decreed by the trial court.According to the plaint, the appellant, due to ~rious illness of .his mother, proceeded from Simla where he was working to Patiala on casual leave on 8th July, 1958, with the sanction of the competent authority. He obtained extension of leave on account of illness of his mother, wife and daughter. Meanwhile the appellant himself be-D came seriously ill and prayed for leave from 1.11.1958 to 28.2.1959 on the basis of medical certificate granted by Dr. lnder Singh Sodhi, Retired Civil Surgeon, Pepsu, Patiala. The authoriti,es declined to sanction the leave. The appellant also continued to be seriously ill and was unable to attend his duties. When he recovered he reported for duty at Simla on March 2, 1959 and he was permited to resume his duty on furnishing certificate. of fitness granted by the aforesaid Retired Civil Surgeon.

On January 27, 1959, the appellant was served with chargesheet by the Financial Commissioner (Development) Punjab asking him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from Government ser-vice for his wilfol absence from duty after the expiry of the earned leave sanctioned to him upto October 31, 1958, which was described as "misbehaviour". The chargesheet, inter alia, stated :

"(1) ...... You deliberately deed the orders and again applied for extension of leave upto ~he 31st Decem-ber, 1958 feigning yourself to be ill, and also threat-ened that iii case leave was not allowed, you might be granted interview with the Rev\!nue Minister .... "

(2) That on the one hand you have bf:en applying for grant of extension of leave on account of your own illness and on the other, you have requested that you may be allowed to appear in B.A. Examination to be held in April, 1959. This, therefore, clearly shows that you are not actually ill but are malingering;. and have knowingly defi11d Government orders..

(3) That your wilful absence from duty after the expiry · of earned leave sanctioned to you upto the 31st October, 1958, is misbehaviour".

The appellant submitted his explanation on March 11, 1959. There was an enquiry by the Deputy Secretary (Development) in May 1959. He was served with second show cause notice on August 14, 1959, enclosing the report of the Enquiry Officer. The appellant submitted his representation to the said notice on October 6, 1959. On October 21, 1959, the Financial Commissioner (Revenue) passed the order of dismissal. As already stated, two suits were filed by the appellant in 1962. The Subordinate Judge, First Class, Patiala, decreed bot.h the suits on January 15, 1963. The State Government appealed to the High Court and the same was allowed on August 9, 1966 and both the suits were dismissed. That is how these appeals came before us on certificates. ·

We are concerned in these appeals with oHly one point which, if it is held in favour of the· appellant, will conclude the matter and it will not be necessary to deal with the other questions with reference to the illegalities in the course of the departmental enquiry alleged by the appellant.

It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the order of dis-missal is invalid on account of violation of Article 311 ( l) of the Constitution. The following facts are relied upon by the appellant in order to mstain his submission.

It is admitted by the respondent that the appellant initially joined i;ervice in the State of Pafiala in 1948 as Clerk and he was confirmed as an Assistant in the Pepsu Civil Secretariat by an order dated Octo-ber 31, 1956, of His Highness the Rajpramukh, which is the previous day of the 'appointed day' under the State Reorganisation Act, 1956. Thus he was integrated in _the new State of Punjab as confim1ed Assistant. Before hfs integration in Punjab he was governed by the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Civil Services (Pu~i;;_hment and Appeal) Rules, 195} (bri~fly th~ Pepsu Rules) which were made in ·exercise of the powers conferred by tM prov:~~ t0 Artie!~ 399 of !he ·Constitution. By Notification of the Punjab Government No. 916'°: GII-00 /2499; dated February 9, 1957, these Pepsu Rules continue to apply asrfrom 1st Noyember, 1956, to the corresponding services, posts and personnel of the new State of Punjab till further orders .. . Rule 6 of the Pepsu Rules provides as follows :-· ··

"6. Authority to impose punishment-Subject to the provisions of clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, the authorities competent to impose any of the penalties specified in rule 4 upon the persons to whom these rules apply, shall be such as may be prescribed by· ·Government in the rules regulating the 2ppoiritment and ·conditions of service of such persons". ,

[1977] i s.c.~;

under Article 309 of the Constitution by notification in the Pepsu Gazette of June 27, 1954, made appropriate rules on 14th June, 1954, determining the authorities competent to impose penalties on. members of certain services and holders of certain posts in connection with the affairs of the State. Item No. 14 in the Schedule to these rules mentions "Members of Class III and IV Services in Sectt." and. the punishing authority for dismissal of such employees is the State Government. It is, therefore, clear that under the Pepsu Rules which governed his conditions of service the State Government alone was competent to impose the punishment of dismissal. Under the Pepsu General Clauses Act, 1953, "State Government shall mean, in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Con--stitution, the Rajpramukh". (See section 2 ( 46).

As noted earlier, factually, the appellant was confirmed and neces--sarily appointed by the Rajpramukh. Under the Pepsu Rules the Rajpramukh alone was the appointing authority. The appellant· therefore, cannot be removed from service by any authority subordi-nate to the Governor in Punjab. The coordinate authority in Punjab· is the State Government. The Governor of Punjab alone, therefore, was competent to pass the order of dismissal of the appellant. The Financial Commissioner (Revenue) is an authority subordinate to the· Governor. He was, therefore, not competent to pass the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal is violative of Article 311 ( 1) of the Constitution and is, therefore, invalid and is liable to be struck down.

Mr. Sharma, on behalf of the respondent, submits that there is no violation of Article 311 ( 1) of the Constitution. The appointing authority for post heldi by the appellant in the State of Punjab is the Financial Commissioner (Revenue). He submits that the appointing· authority of the appellant before his integration into the State of Punjab does not come into the picture. He adds that this submis~ion of his is in consonance with the provisions of section 116 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (briefly the Act). We may, therefore, read' section 116 of the Act :

"116 (1) Every person who immediately beforo the· appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of ariy post or office in connection with the affairs of the Union or of an existing State in any area which on that day falls with-in another existing State or new Part State or Part State shall, except where by virtue or in consequence of the provisions of this Act such post or office ceases to exist on that day, continue to hold the same post or office in the other existing State or new Part State or Part State in which such area is included on that day, and shall be deemed as from that day to have been duly appointed to such post or office by the Government of, or other appropriate autho-rity in, such State, or by the Central Government or other appropriate authority in such Part State, as the case may be

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent competent authority, after the appointed day, from pass-ing in relation to any such person any order affecting his co_!ltinuance in such post or office".

Mr. Sharma submits, relying upon the provisions of section 116(1), that since the appointing authority for an Assistant in the State of Punjab is the Financial Commissioner (Revenue) it follows that he is the appropriate authority under section 116 ( 1) to impose the penalty of dismissal. This submission follows from what the High Court accepted in the impugned judgment in the following words :

"Our attention has not been drawn on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent to any rule according to which the Governor of Punjab, as is contended, is the pro-per authority for the appointment of Assistants. Indeed, it is not disputed that if the plaintiff had been appointed as Assistant in the State of Punjab, then the Financial Commis-sioner (Revenue) would have been the appropriate autho-rity competent to enquire into the petitioner's conduct and impose the penalty _of dismissal; in other words, in that case, the appointing authority could not have been higher in rank than the Financial Commissioner (Revenue). It is certainly not the plaintiff's-respondent's case that appro-priate authority for appointing Assistants in the State of Punjab is the Governor".

We are unable to appreciate the above line of reasoning of the High Court. Section 116 (1) is very clear. To concretise the appel-lant's case in terms of section 116(1), it is sufficient to state1 that the appellant who, immediately before the appointed day, was holding the post of an Assistant in the former State of Pepsu, shall continue to hold the same post in the new State of Punjab and shall be deemed as from that day to have been: duly appointed to such post by the Govern-ment of Punjab. We are not concerned in the instant case about the appointment being deemed to be made by "other appropriate autho-rity" in the State of Punjab since the appellant had been appointed by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu which is equivalent to the State Government of Pepsu and the coordinate authority in the new State of Punjab is the Governor of Punjab. The argument that in the new State of Punjab the Financial Commissioneu (Revenue) is the appropriate authority for appointing Assistants is absolutely irrelevant in the con-text of section 116 (1) which enables the status quo ante to continue except where the post ceases to exist under the provisions of the Act. It is also important to bear in mind the provisions of se'ction 115 ( 7) of the Act where under the proviso thereto "the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub-section ( 1) or sub-section (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government".

One of the conditions of service of the appellant was that having been appointed by the State Government of Pepsu he co~ld be only dismissed by the State Gover~nment of Pepsu if he had contmued there.

Under section 116 when he is integrated in the new State of Punjab he carries with him 'that condition of service with regard to his termi~ nation of employment and it cannot be varied to his disadvantage under section 115 (7) of the Act except with the previous approval of the Central Govermrient. (See Takhatray Shivdatray Mankad v. State of Gu;arat(') and Bholanath J. Thakar v. The State of Saurashtra('). .No such approval of the Central Government in the instant case is produced before us. It is, therefore, clear that an authority subordinate to the Governor of Punjab was not competent to pass the order of dismissal of the appellant.

Mr. Sharma submits that the Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Service Class Ill) Rules, 1957, are ap'plicable in the instant case. Therefore, under rule 4 thereof the Financial Commis-c sioner is the appointing authority for Assistants, the category to which the appellant belongs. He add;i· that even though these Rules may be disadvantageous to the appella1 t he cannot complain on account of the approval of these Rules by the Central Government under section 115 (7) of the Act. Mr. Sharma submits that these Rules received the approval of the Central Government as will appear from the general circular dated May 11, 1957, to all the State Governments. He further submits that in N. Rag'1avendra Rao v. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore([3]) ahd in recent decision in Mohammad Shujat Ali & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.,([4 ]) this Court referred to that circular of May 11, 1957, and held that that circular amounted to general approval under the proviso to section 115(7) of the Act. We are, however, unable to see how this memorandum o~ May 11, 1957, can be called ip. aid as 'previous approval' under sec-E tion 115(7) of the Act when tpe Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Service, Class III) Rules, 1957 were already promulgated on February 28, 1957. Approval under section 115(7) is previous approval and not subsequent ratification. The above decisions, therefore, do not come to the aid of the respondent.

Mr. Sharma also drew our !attention to decision of this Court in -F Rajvi Amar Singh v. The State of Rajasthan([5 ]) which is clearly di's-tinguishable on facts. This Court was not called upon in that case to consider the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act.

Our attention has been dra,wn by the appellant to an unreported judgment of this Court in Mys~re State and Road Transport Corpora-tion, etc. v. Mirja KhaS<im Ali Beg & Anr. etc. ([6]) pronounced on December 1, 1976. This Court had to deal with similar question although appertaining to the "competent authority" under section 116(2) of the Act in the background of Article 311 (1) of the Consti-tution. The following passage from that decision will make the point clear :

(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 244.

(2) A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 680.

(3) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 549.

(4) [1975] l S.C.R. 449. (5) [1958) S.C.R. ion.

(6) C. A.S. Nos. 1601-1609 & 2402-2405 of 1968 dated 1-12-1976.

"In the instant cases, the first respondents were un-deniably appointed by the Superintendent of the Traffic Department of the ·erstwhile State of Hyderabad who was the head of the Road Transport Department of that State. On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, on November 1, 1956, they were to he deemed by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 116 of the States Re-organisation Act to have been appointed with effect from that date to the posts held by them on that date by the appro-priate authority in the new State of Mysore which could not in the context mean an authority other than the one equiva-lent to or coordinate in rank with the aforesaid authority in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad. The authority equivalent to or coordinate in rank with the aforesaid authority on the . relevant date being the General Manager of the Mysore G(wemment Road Transport Department aq::ording to the appellants' own admission as contained in answer to the aforesaid interrogatories served on them by the first respon-dents, he alone could be considered to be the 'competent authority' in terms of sub-section (2) of section 116 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The fact that there was :no post of Superintendent of the Traffic in· the Mysore Gov-ernment Road Transport Department in the State of Mysore is of 110 consequence. Such being the position, the first respondent could not have been dismissed from service by an authority lower or subordinate in rank to the General Manager of the Transport Department as it would tanta-mount to deprivation of the guarantee enshrined in Arti~le 311 of the Constitution read with section 115 ( 7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 ...... ".

Jn the result both the judgments 0£ the High Court are set aside ~ and the judgments and decrees of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, ., Patiala, stand restored. The appeals are allowed with costs. We are thankful to Mr. Hingorani for his assistance as amicus curiae in these appeals.

P.H.P .

Appeals allowed.