BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS. versus LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS.

BANARSI DASS CHADHA & BROS.

LT. GOVERNOR, DELHI ADMN. & ORS. August 21, 1978

[V. R. KIUSHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND 0. CllINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.J

Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, S. 3(e)-Brick-earth. whether minor mineral, within the meaninR of that expression 'Minor Mineral', as defined ins. 3(e).

S. 3(e) of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 defiues "'Minor Mineral' as meaning building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by Notification in the offi· cial Gazette declare to be minor mineral". In exercise of the power con-ferred by s. 3 (e) of the Act the Central Government declared inter-alia brick· earth as 'minor mineral'.

Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court

HEID : (!) The word 'mineral' has no fixed but contextual connota-tion. If 'mineral' is not term of art it is word of common parlance, capable of multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. The word is occaaionally used in very wide sense to denote any substance that is neither animal nor vegetable. Sometimes it is used in narrow sense to mean no more than precious metals like gold and silver. Again the word 'minerals' is often used to indicate substances obtained from underneath the surface of the earth by digging or quarrying, though it is not always so. [273 A-C, 274 Fl

In the context of the 'Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, the 1rord Mineral is of sufficient amplitude to include brick-earth. If the expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act, includes 'ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand', there is no earthly rea.son why brick-earth sbOuld not be held to be 'any other mineral' which may be declared as 'minor mineral'. [275 B-C]

Rhagwu11 Dais v. State of U.P., [1976] 3 SCR 869, applied.

Laddu ·Mal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Pat. 491; Amar Modilaf Siugh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 Punjab <.nd Haryana 356; Sharnia & Co. v. State of U.P., AIR 1975 All. 386 approved.

State of West Bengal v. Jagdamba Prasad, AIR 1969 Cal. 281; overruled.

Todd Birlesto11 & Co. v. The North Eastern Railway. Co., [1903] 1 K.B. 603; qaotcd with approval.

(2) substance must first be mineral before it can be notified as minor n1ineral pursuant to the power vested in the Central Governn1ent under s. 3(e) of the Act. Brick-earth being mineral, the Central Government has correctly notified it as 'minor mineral'. [272 G-H]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. I 278 Of 1978.

Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order l 5-11-1976 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 96 of 1971.

B. Dutta for the Appellant.

Soli J. Sorabjee, Addi. Sol. General and R. N. Sachthey for Res-pondents I and 2.

The Jud~ment of the Court was delivered by

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J._:_We granted special leave and heard argu-ments on the limited que<stion whether "brick-earth" is 'minor mineral' within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 3 ( e) of ·the Mine<s and Minerals (Regulation a'nd Development) Act, I 957.

The definition is as follows :

"Minor mineral' means building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed pur-poses, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette declare to be minor mineral;"

In exercise of the power conferred by Section 3 ( e) of the Act, the Central Government declared the following minerals to be minor minerals :

"Boulder, Shingle, Chalcedony pebbles used for ball mill purposes only, limesbel! kanker and limestone used for lime-burning, murrum, brick-earth, fuller's earth, bentonite road metal, reh-matti, slate and shale when used for building material;"

The submission of the leamod Counsel for the appellant was that substance had to be mineral before it could be notified as minor mineral pursuant to the power under Section 3 ( e) of the Mi'nes and Minorals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. He urged that brick-earth was not mineral and, therefore, it could not be notified minor mineral.

We agree with the learned Counsel that substance musL first be mineral before it ca'n be notified as minor mineral pursuant to the power vested in the Central Government under Section 3 ( e) of the Act. The question, therefore, is whether brick-earth is mineral. The expression "Minor Mineral" as defined in Section 3 ( e) includes 'Ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand'. If the expression "minor mineral" as defined in Section 3 ( e) of the Act includes 'ordinary clay' and

'ordinary sand', there is no reason why earth used for the purpose of making bricks should not be comprehended within the meaning of the word "any other mineral" which may be declared as "minor mineral" by the Government. The word "mineral" is not term of art. It is word of common parlance, capable of multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. For example the word is occasionally used in very wide sense to denote any substance that is '.neither animal nor vegetable. Sometimes it is used in narrow sense to m~an no more than precious metals like gold and silver. Again, the word "minerals" is often used to indicate substances obtain-ed from underneath the surface of the earth by digging or quarrying. But this is not always so as pointed out by Chandrachud, J (as he then was) in Bhagwan Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(') where the learned judge said (at p. 87 4) :

·'It was urged that the sand and gravel are deposited on the surface of the land and not under the surface of the soil and ther~fore they cannot be called minerals and equally so, any operation by which they are collected or gathered cannot properly be called mini'ng operation. It is in the first place wrong to assume that mi11es and minerals mU1St always be sub-soil and that there can be no minerals on the surface of the earth. Such an assumption is contrary to informed ex-perience. In any case, the definition of mining operations and minor minerals in section 3 ( d) and ( e) of the Act of 1957 and Rule 2(5) and (7) of the Rules of 1963 shows that min~rals need not be subterranean and that mining opera-tions cover every operation undertaken for the purpose of "winning" any minor mineral. "Winni'ng" does not imply hazardous or perilous activity. The word simply means "extracting mineral" and is used generally to indicate auy activity by which mineral is secured. "Extracting" in tum means drawing out or obtaining. tooth is 'extracted' as much as the fruit juice and as much as mineral. Only that the effort varies from tooth to tooth, from fruit to fruit and from mineral to mineral".

We may also refer to Northern Pacific Railway Company· v. John A. Sodrberg([2 ]) where the Supreme Court of United States observed as follows (at page 581) :

"The word 'mineral' is used in so many senses, depen-dant upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but little light upon its significance in --·----(1) [1976] 3 S.C.R. 869. (2) 47 L. Ed. 575.

given case. Thus, the scientific division of all matter into the animal, vegetable. or mi!l'oral ki·ngdom would be absurd as applied to grant of lands, since all lands belong to the mineral kingdom, and therefore, could not be excepted from the grant without being d•::structive of it. Upon the other hand, definition which would co"nfine it to the precious metals-gold and silver-would so limit its application as to destroy at once half the value of the exception. Equally BUb-versive of the grant would be the definition of minerals found in the Century Dictionary : as "any constituent of the earth's crust"; and that of Beinbridge on Mines : "All the sub-stances that now form, or which once formed, part of the solid body of the earth". Nor do we approximate much more closely to the meaning of the word by treating minerals as substances which are "mi"ned" as distinguished from those are "quarried", since many valuable deposits of gold, copper, iron, and coal lie upon or near the surface of the earth, and some of the most valuable building stone, such for instance, as the Caen stone in France, is excavated from mines ru"nning far beneath the surface. This distinction betwe>~n under-ground mines and open workings was expressly repudiated in Midland R.C. v. Haunchwood Brick & Tile Co. IL.R. 10 Ch. Div. 552) and in Hext v. Gill (L.R. 7 Ch. 699)". •

The Supreme Court of United States also referred to several Englilih cases where stone for road making or paving was held to be 'minerals' as also granite, sandstone, flint stone, gravel. marble, fire clay, brick-clay, a"nd the like. It is clear that the word 'mineral' has no fixed but contextual connotation.

The learned Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Todd Birleston and Co. v. The North Eastern Railway Co.(') and to Stoud's Judicial Dictionary to urge that clay, brick-earth and the like have sometimes been bold not to he minerals by English Courts. As we said earlier the word mine-ral is an elastic word whose meaning depends upon the setting in which it is used. For instance, in the case cited, the question was whether clay forming the surface or subsoil, and constituting the "land" compulsorily taken for the purposes of railway, was not mineral within the meaning of Sections 77, 78 or 79 o1 the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. The answer was that 'clay' was not mineral for· the purposes of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act. Any other conclusion, in the context of the Act, would have led to the absurd

(1) [1903] I K.B. 60~.

· IB. D. CHADHA v. LT. GOVERNOR DELIIl (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 275

result that the original owner whose land had been taken would be ·entitled to dig and take away the clay from the land on which the Railway was constructed, thus defe_ating the very object of the compul-sory taking. On the other hand, as noticed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in several English cases clay, gravel, sand, stone etc. had been held to be minerals. That is why we say the word mineral has no definite meaning but has variety of meanings, depending on , the context of its use. In the context of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, we have no' doubt that the word 'mineral' is of sufficient amplitude to include 'brick-earth'. As already ·observed by us, if the expression 'minor mineral' as defined in the Act include' 'ordinary clay' and 'ordinary sand'. there is no earthly reason why 'brick-earth' should not be held to be 'any other mineral' which may he declared as 'minor mineral.. We do not think it necessary to pursue the matter further except to sa~ that this was lhe view taken in Laddu Mal v. State of Bihar,(I) Amar Singh Modilal v. State of Haryana([2]) and Sharma & Co. v. State of U.P.([8]). We do not agree with the view of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal v. !agadamba Prasad(') that because speaks of 'ordinary e~h' as mineral it is not minor mineral as defined in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act. The appeal is accordingly dis-missed with costs.

Appeal disn11:1sed.

{I) A.l.R. 1965 Patna 491.

{2) A.l.R. 1972 Punj. & Har. >56.

(3) A.LR. 1975 All. 86.

{4) A.l.R. 1969 Cal. 281.