LILLY KURIAN versus SR. LEWINA AND ORS.

sio . ~ . .. ' ·-·-~·

- -- .! LILLY KURIAN r :..: ,. -.•. -' . .-. SR. 0LEWINA AND v. ORS. . ' September 15, 1978 . •. ·_o ;;_· •.• _• '; ~' [¥. 'V. t11ANDRAc11uo, c.J., R. s. SARKARIA, N. L. UNTWALL\, _; _ _: : . . . A. D. KosHAL AND A. P. SEN, 11~1 .. --• :· --- . -. ' .-. . -• - . • ·' -•• '! ! c.,~onstitution of India-Article 30(1)-Scope a1nbit and n1Jiure of ri§lit" of linguistic und religiouJ mi1t0ri1ies-Whether regulatory restrictions can be imposetl -Whai are the litnits.:.....Iriterference l\--·iih ·righ1·10 appoint and dtsniiss- .teaching ~nd otlier staff-1Yhether providing right of appeal-against dismissal permissible~

The Appellarit Y.'as appointed·as PrinciPal--of uio"Si. Joseph Training ·coueg~ for \Vomen,\Ernakulam ill the Year ·_1957.~ -In~Octobcr~_t969,·there was:'. an unfortunate lliCiderit bctWcen the Appellant and one.Rajaratnam a·lecturCr Of tlt.C College" placed on deputation by the Governffi.Cnt. On thC b"asis of complaint' by. Rajaratnam, the l\fmaging Board initiated disciplinary ·pr6ceedings .agaiJ¥t the Apf>ellant.and appointed retired Principal of College-to be_an inquiry Officer. The Appellant did not participate in the proce6dingS. The Inqui_ry Officer -held the Appellant guilty of. misconduct. show cause . notice wit.3. gi.ven to the Appellant. The AppcllMt however, filed su.it challenging the Validity of the proce"edings. An interim i.Ojunction was issued by the! Ch.ii Court restraining the ~tanagement from implementing the decision, if any, taken· fu the meeting. The l\fanaging Board after due notice to the· Appellant £60.nd that the charges of misconduct .were proved.· Subsequently, the Court held that the dismissal of the Appellant \V<loS legal and proper. During this period the-Appellant \\'M functioning as Principal aD.d had sent two· communications· tO the Secretary to the Goverfiment calling for termination of" deputation of Rajil~ ratnai:ri."' The ~fainaging Bo<ird vie\\·ed ihe sending Of these communications by the ·.Appellant without reference to it as an act of insubordination, and there.fore, decided to conduct inquiry against the Appellant and she -y..·as suspended pending inquiry. substitute Principal \Vas appointed. The Appellant filed: an appeal against the· Order of suspension and the Vice-Chancellor directed that the status quo be maintained. The substitute Principal filed suit for an injunction re:s:-training the . appellant from functioning or interfering v.·ith the discharge of duties of the substitute Principal which was granted by the ~funsif. The. ViCe-Chancenor by bis orders held that the orders of dismissal and suspension passed against the Appellant were in breach of natural ju~tice. and fair play and \Vere conseciuently illegal, null and void. He therefore, ilirected the ~fanagement to allow the _Appellant to function as Principal. The Kera-Ia University Act, 1957 was enacted to reconstitute the University of Travancore into teaching University for the \vhole of the State of Kerala. The definifiorr of "'teacher" in section 2(j) of the Act is wide enough to take in Principail. Section 19 empo\\·ers the Syndicate to make ordinances fixing the conditiOD.! of service of teachers. The Ker.:..Ja University j\ct 1957 \Vas repealed by the Kerala University Act, 1969. The earlier ordinances h:ive been saved and continued under the new Act. Ordinarnce 33 provides for an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor against any order passed by the Managemenf in respect of the penalties including · penalty of dismis•al •

. The·Mana~ement filed .suit in the Munsif's Court. The substitute Pflnoipal also filed il further suit against the Appellant and the po<;tal authorities for prohibitin& the postal authorities· from delivering and the Appellant from receiving the articles addressed to the Principal of the College.

The Trial Coun dismissed the suits holding that the Appellate power con' ferred on the Vice Chancellor by ordinance framed by the Syndical~ was valid confermen~ of power and even after the commencement Of the Kerala University Act, 1969, both the Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate had cc;>ncurrent powers of Appeal. It, therefore, upheld the orders of the Vice-Ohancellor directing re-instatement of the Appellant in service. On appeal the District Judge held I\ that the orders of the Vice-C!llmcellor were perfectly valid and with junsdiction and that his. direction to· the ManagementJ to continue the Appellant as Prine! raJ was legal. The Kerala High Court 'reversed the judgment of the Courts below holding that: the conferment by the Syndicate of the right to appeal to teacb.:r against the order of dismissal from service to the Vice-Chancellor cannot be said to be in excess of the permissible limits of the power to prescribe the duties and c-onJitions of service of teachers in private colleges in terms of s. 19(j) ot the Kerala University Act, 1957, and the provisions for right to appeal were not violative of the rights guaranteed to the reiigious minorities under Anicte 30(1) and were, therefore, valid. According to the High Court although the Vice Chancellor had the power to heM" an appeal against an order of dismissal he did not have expressly or impliedly, the power to order reinstatement or even to grant declaration that the services of the appellant bad been wrongly terminated. It was held that statutory tribunal like Vice-Choo.ceUor could not grant such relief as the same would amount to specifically enforcing tfie contract of service.

Disrriissing the appeals the Court,

HELD : I.' The expression conditions of Service includes everything from the stage 'of oppointinent to the stage of termination of ser\."ice and even beyond and relates to matters pertaining to disciplinary action. The High Court thus, rightly held that the right of the appeal conferred by ordinance 33(4) forms \,part of the conditions of service and is, therefo:-e, valid. [828F··G, 829A]

,,J · ;,,W.F. Province v. Suraj Narai111 75 I.A. 343, State of U.P. v. Babu Ra1i.< [1961] Z SCR 679 and State of M.P. and Ors. v. Shardul Singh, [1970] 3 S.CR. 302; relied on.

2. Protection of the minorities is an article of faith in the Constitution of India. The right is subject to the regulatory power of the State. Article 30(1) is not charter for mal-administration; however reg'ulation, so th<f the right to administer may be better exercised· for ·the benefits of the institlition, is permis-sible;. but ·the moment one goes beyond that 3.nd imposes what is in truth not inere regulation but an impairment of the right to· administer the Article co1nes into play and the interference cainnot be justified by pleading the interests of the general public, the interests justifying interference can only be the interests of the n1iilority concerned. [837C-EJ

3. It is clear from the judgment in St. Xaviers College case that 7 out ot 9 judges held that the provisiO!ls containec\ i_n c[aijsei (b) of sub sections I ood 2 of Section 5l(A) of the Ac( therein'providing for the disciplinary control of Iii<> 20-549 SCI/78

M3I\3l1ement, over the staff pf its odueational institution wore not applicable to an education institution established and managed by religious'aod linguistic minorities. The reasons given by the majority were ~ the _power of the 1\-lanag~.ment to terminate the services of any member of the teachiiig or other academic and non-academic staff was based on the relationship between the employer and his employees and no encroachment can be made on Ihm right to dispense with their servicee under the contract of employment, which was an integral part of the right lo administer. [842B-D]

4. Tue High Court went wrong in holding that the Vice-Chancellor while exercising the appellate powers under Ordinance 33(4) cannot Jirect rein-statement of teacher or grant declaration that his dismissal was wrongful. It also fell into error in holding that the right of appeal before the Vice-Chancellor against the teachers of Private Colleges in the matter of suspension and dismissal was not violative of the rights of religious minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. [829B-Q]

AJ11ned<1bad St. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of GujaraJ and Allf. [1975] I SCR 173; relied on.

5. Unlike Article 19, the fundarnontal freedom under Article 30(1) is absolute in terms; it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated in Article 19 may be subjected to. ,All minorities, linguistic or religious have by article 30(1) an absolute right to establish and administer educational institution of their- choice, and any law or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Article 30(1) wonld be to that extent void. [835F-G]

Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay, [1963) 3 S.C.R. 837.

6. The conferment of right of appeal to an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) takes away the disciplinary power of minority educational authority. The right of the Vice Chancellor to veto the disciplinary power of the minority institution is clear interference with its right. It amounts to fetter on the riiht of administration under Article 30(1). [837E-G]

7. The power of appeal conferred on the Vice Chancellor in ordinance rJ 33(4) is not only grave encroachment on the right of the institution to en- ' forre and cover discipline in its administration but it is uncanalised and un~ guided in the sense that no 'restrictions' are placed on the exercise of the power. The extent of the appellate power of the Vice Chancellor is unlimited and undefined. The grounds on which the Vice Chancellor can interfere are not defined and indeed, the powers are unlimited. He can even interfere agallist the infliction of punishment. There is complete interference with the discip-linary power 6f minority institution. In the absence of any guidelines, it cannot be held that power of the Vice Chancellor under order 33(4) was merely check on mal-administration'. The ratio of St. Xavier Colleges case is fully applicable. [842G-H, 843A-B]

8. Accordingly, the judgment of the Hiah Court setting aside the two orders of the Vice Chancellor upheld by this Court although for different reasons. [844E-FJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTION : .. Civil Appeal Nos. 728-730 of 1975.

LILLY KURIAN v. LEWINA (Seit, 1.) 823

· Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dllted 19-7-1973 of the Kerala High Court in S.A. Nos. 340 and 341/73 and A.S. No. 176/73.

M. K. Ramamurthy, Amicus Curiae, S.

Balakrishnan, Amicus

Curiae, Miss R. Vaigai and Lilly Kurian (In person) for the Appel-lant. V. A; Seyid Muhammed and K. R. Nambiar for the State of Kerala.

L. N. Sinha (for RR l, 2 and 11 in CA 728), M. I. Joseph • (CA 729), l'. P. Singh, (C.A. 729, 728 and 730/78) A. G. Pud· dissery (C.A. 730/75) and K. M. K. Nair for RR 1, 2, 11 and 12 in C.A. 728, RR. 3, 11, 12 and 13 and RR 1, 3-5 in C.A. 730/75.

D. Namboodiry,

P. K. Keshava Pillai, Frank Anthony, M. K. D. Namboodiry, K. R. Choudhury, Baby Krishnan, B. Parthasarthi and Panduranga Rao for the Interveners.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SEN, J.-These appeals by special leave directed against the Judg-ment of the Kerala High Court dated July 19, 1973, raise question of far reaching importance. The question is whether an educational institution established and managed by religious or linguistic minority is bound by the provisions of Ordinance 3 3 ( 4), Chapter L VII of tha Ordinances framed ·by the Syndicate of the University of Kerala, under section 19(j) of the Kerala University Act, 1957.

Smt. Lilly Kurian, the appellant herein, was appointed as Principal of the St. Joseph Training College for Women, Ernakulam in the year 1957. ·The College was established by the Congregation of the Mothers of Carma!, which is religious society of Nnus belonging to the. Roman Catholic Church, and is affiliated to the University of Kera.la. It is administered by Managing Board, and the Provincial of the Congregation is its President.

On October 30, 1969, there was an unfortunate incident between the appellant and one P. K. Rajaratnam, lecturer of the College, placed on deputation by the Govemmen!. On the basis of com-plaint by Rajaratnam, the Managing Board initiated disciplinary pro-ceedings against the appellant and appointed retired Principal of · the Maharaja's College, Ernakulam, to be the Enquiry Officer. The appellant did not participate in the proceedings. · The attitude adopted by the appellant·unfortunately was one of supreme indifference, taking the stand that the Managing Board had no competence whatsoever to initiate any such ·disciplinary action. Tllo Enquiry Qffic~r by hi&

[197911 S.C.R.

SUPRU1:E .. CQURT RE~ORT~

report dated November 27, 1969,. held. the _appellant guilty of..miscon-duct. The Secretary of the Managing Board accordingly served her with notice dated December 2, 1969. stating that meeting of the Board was to be held on December 19. 1969, to consider the repre-sentation, if any, made by her and also the punishment to be imposed, on the basis of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer.

In the wake of the disciplinary action, on December 16, 1969, the appellant filed suit O.S. No. 819 of 1969 in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam, challenging .the validity of the proceedings of the Manag-ing Board. On December 19, 1969 the Munsiff issued an interim injunction restraining the Management from implementing the decision, if any, taken by it at the mee.ting to be held on that day. meeting of the Board had, in fact, been held and decision was taken to remove the appellant from service. The Provincial of the Congrega-tion by virtue of her office as the President of the Managing Board, by order dated January 2, 1970, dismissed the appellant from service. It" was stated that the Managing Board had after giving due notice to 0 the appellant, and on careful consideration of the enquiry report, and the findings thereon, found th•at the charges of misconduct were proved. The appellant was accordingly directed to handover all papers, files, vouchers and documents connected with the College to Sr. Lewina, Profossor, without further delay, stating that the order for her dismissal from service would be implemented immediately after the decision of the Munsiff on the applic>ation for temporary injunction.

On January 17, 1970, the Munsiff held that the dismissal of the appellant was free from any infirmity and was by the competent autho-rity, that is the Managing Board, •and, therefore, she had no prbna facie case. The Munsiff accordingly vacated the injunction with direction that temporary injunction already issued will remain in force for two weeks to enable the appellant, if she wanted to move the Vice-Chancellor and obtain from him stay of the order of dismissal. The appellant had, in the meanwhile, on January 9, 1970; already. filed an •appeal before the Vice-Chancellor under . Ordinance 33(4.), 'chapter L VII of the Ordinance framed by the Syndicate, against· the order of dismissal. The Vice;Chancellor by his order dated January 24, 1970, staY,ed the operation of the order of dismissal. The suit filed by the appellant was subsequently dismissed .bY the Munsiff as withdrawn. · · .~. 'C'.c

It appears that the appellant was a)! t!i"wl,lile fuooti911ing.as princi-pal of the College. It was brought to ·ligjlt,),hat she h~<l- sent two communications ·dated October ·G,o; 1969, 'and.:No\'e!llb.er· 5,- 1969, to

the Secretary to the Government, Education Department, calling for termination of deputation· of Rajaratnam, appointed as Lecturer fn the College by the Management, •as result of which his deputation was cancelled by the Government on December 9, I 969. The Manag-ing Board viewed the sending 0f these communications by the appel-lant without reference to it as an act of insubordination, and, there-fore, decided to conduct an enquiry against the appellant and she was · suspended pending enquiry. substitute Principal, Sr. Lewina, was appointed and the appellant was relieved of the duties on April 10, 1970. On April 13, 1970 the appellant filed an appeal to the Vice-Chancellor against the order of suspension under Ordinance 33 (1) of Chapter L Vil, and the Vice-Chancellor by his order dated April 20, 1970 directed that the status quo be maintained. In view of this order, the Management was presumably apprehensive that the appel-lant might focce herself upon the College. The substitute Principal, Sr. Lewina, appointed by the Management in place of the appellant accordingly on July 2, 1970 filed the suit O.S. No. 405 of 1970 in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam for an injunction restraining the appel-lant from functioning and from interfering with ·her discharging the duties as Principal. The Munsiff granted temporary injunction, in the terms prayed for, which was subsequently confirmed.

The Vice-Chancellor, University of Kerala, by his two orders dated October 19, 1970 held that the order of dismissal from service and the order of suspension passed against the appellant were in breach of the rules of natural justice and fmr play and were conse-quently illegal and null and . void, and accordingly direeted t.he Management to allow her to function as Principal. Before the orders were communicated, the Management filed the suit O.S. No. 110 of 1970 in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam on Octob,r, 22, 1970, seeking an injunction restraining the appellant from functioning as Principal of the College and obtained temporary injunction. While these two '• injunctions were in force, the appellant wrote to the Superintendent of the Post Offices demanding delivery of lett.ers addressed to , the Principal at her residence. The non-delivery of letters creoated dead-· 'G lock in the administration of the College. On July 22, 1972, the <ubstitute Principal, Sr. Lawine accordingly filed suit O.S. No. 569 of 1972 in the Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam against the appellant and the Postal Authorities -for prohibiting the one from receiving ~n·d the other from delivering, thec'postal articles addressed to the Principal of the College. All the tllree suits pending in the Munsiff's Court, Ernaku-lam were transfllffed/''by'th~' otiler of the District Judge, Ernakulam to the !st Additional Sub-Court, Ernakulam for disposal.

(1979) l s.c.11..

SUPREME COURT 11.EPOll.TS

The trial court by its judgment dated December 6, 1972 dismissed the suits holding that the appellate power conferred on the Vice-Chance!lor by els. ( 1) and ( 4) of Ordinance 33, Chapter LVII of the Ordinance framed by the Syndicate under s. 19(j) of the Act, wasa valid conferment of power on the Vice-Chancellor and even after the commencement of the Kerala University Act, ! 969, both the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate had concurrent powers of appeal. It, therefore, upheld the orders of the Vice-Chancellor directing reinstate-ment of the appellant in service. On appeal, the District Judge, Ernakulam by his judgment dated March 17, 1973 held that the orders of the Vice-Chancellor were perfectly valid and within jurisdiction, and that his direction to the Management to continue the appellant as Principal in her office was also legal. He, accordingly dismissed the appeals.

The Kerala High Court, however, by its judgment dated July 19, 1973 reversed the judgment and decree of the court below and decreed the plaintiffs' suit holding that (i) the conferment by the Syndicate of right of appeal to teacher against his order of dismissal from service to the Vice-Chancellor cannot be said to be in excess of the pennissible limits of the power to prescribe the duties and conditions of service of teachers in private colleges in terms of s. 19 (j) of the Act, and (ii) the provisions for right of appeal contained in Ordinance 33(1) and (4), Chapter LVII of the Ordinance were not violative of the rights guaranteed to the religious minorities under Article 30(1), and were, therefore, valid, following certain observa-tions of its earlier Full Bench decision in V. Rev. Mother Provincial v. State of Kera/a('). According to the High Court, although the Vice-Chancellor had the power to hear an appeal against an order of dismissal under Ordinance 33(4), he had not, expressly or impliedly, the power to order reinstatement or even to grant declaration that the services of the 'appellant had been wrongly terminated. It held that statutory tribunal like the Vice-Chancellor could not grant such relief as the same would amount to specifically enforcing the con-tract of service. In reaching the conclusion, the High Court observes that this, in effect, "amounts to eviscerating the right of appeal to the Vice-Clrancellor, but the remedy lies elsewhere", in the light of the authorities cited by it.

The Kerala University Act, 1957, "the Act", as the preamble shows, was enacted to reconstitute the University of Travancore into teaching University for the whole of the State of Kerala. Section 2(a) defines "college" to mean college maintained by, or affiliate<!

(I) I. L. R. 196912 Kera la 642 ..

to the University. TI1e definition of "teacher" in section 2(j) of the Act is wide enough to take in Principal, as any 'other person impart-ing instruction'. Section 5(viii) confers power on the University to affiliate to itself colleges wit)lin the State in accordance with the con-ditions to be prescribed in the statutes regarding management, salary aud terms of service of members of the staff, and other such matters, and to withdraw affiliation from colleges. Section 15 (2)(ii) enjoins that the Senate shall make, amend or repeal statutes of its own motion or on the motion of the Syndicate. The powers of the Syndicate are enumerated in section 19, the relevant provisions of which read :

"19. Powers of the Syndicate-Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, the _Executive Authority of the University including the general superintendence and control over the institutions of the University shall be vested in the Syndicate; and subject likewise, the Syndicate shall have the following powers, namely :-

(a) to affiliate institutions in accordance with the condi-tions prescribed in the Statutes;

(b) to make Ordinance and to amend or repeal the same;

x x x x x x x x

(j) to fix the emoluments and prescribe the duties and the conditions of service of teachers and other em-ployees in Private Colleges."

The Kerala University Act, 1957 was repealed by the Kerala University Act, 1969 which ca.me into force with effect from February 28, 1969. Section 75 (2) of the Act provides that the statutes, ordi-nances, rules and byefaws in force immediately before the commence-ment of the Act shall, in so· far as they are not inconsistent with its provisions, continue to be in force unless they are replaced.

The material provisims of Ordinance 33, Chapter LVII of the Ordinances framed by the Syndicate under section 19(g) are as follows:-

"33 ( 1) Suspension : The management may at any time place teacher under suspension where disciplinary pro-ceedings against him is contemplated or is pending. He shall be paid subsistence allowance and other allowances by the management duriag the period of suspension at such rates as may be specified by the University in each case. The teacher

shall have. right to app·~al against the order of suspension to the Vice-Chancellor of the University within period of two months from the date on which he receives the order of suspension.

(2) Nature of pena!t•~s : The following penalties may for good and sufficient reasms be imposed on teacher by the Ma'nagement :-

( i) Censure.

(ii) Withholding of increment

(iii) Recovery from pay of any pecuniary loss caused to the institution/monetary value equivalent to the amount of increment ordered to be withheld.

(iv) Reduction to lower rank i·a the seniority list or to lower grade or post

( v) Dismissal from service.

The Management shall b~ the Discipli'nary Authority in imposing the penalties.

x x x x

( 4) Appeal : teacher shall be entitled to appeal to the Vice-Chancellor of the University against any order pa55ed by the management in respect of the penalties referred to in items (ii) to (v). Such ·appeal shall be submitted within period of 60 days the appel\a·at receives the order of punish-ment."

The expression "conditions of service" covers wide , range, as exphined by the Privy Council in N.W.F. Province v. Suraj Narain(') which was approved by this Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram.(') These decisions and ahso later decision of this Court in State of M.P. · & Ors. v. Shardul Singh(") have made it clear that the expression 'conditions of service' bcludes everything from the stage of appoint-ment to the stage of terminatio'n of service and even beyond, and relates to matt.ors pertaining to disciplinary action.' Thus, the expres-sion 'conditions of service' as explained in the decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court includes the power to take disciplinary action. The rules regarding these matters are contaihed in Chapter LVII of the Ordinances. The Management of private college under Ordinance 33 (2) i• constituted the appointing and the disciplinary

(1) 75 I. 343.

(2) [1961] 2 S. C. R. 679.

(3) [1970] 3 . C. R. 302.

' ,t· )~ •

authority in respect of imposition of punishment. 111 the course of any disciplinary proceeding, right of appeal before the Vice-Chancellor is given to teacher dismissed from service under Ordinance 33(4) of the Ordinances. The High Court thus rightly held that the right of appeal conferred by Ordinance 33( 4) forms part of the 'conditions of service' and, therefore, is valid.

The High Court was, however. wro'ng in two ways. Firstly, it fell hlto an error in holding that the Vic•,-Chancellor while exercising the appellat!" powers under Ordinance 33 ( 4), had not the power to direct reinstatement of teacher or grant declaration that his dismissal was wrongful. It also fell into an error in holding that right of appeal before the Vice-Chancellor given to the teachers of private colleges under Ordinance 3 3 ( 1 ) and ( 4) , h1 the matter of suspension and dis-missal, was not violative of the rights of religious minorities under article 30(1) of the Constitution.

Under Ordinance 33 ( 1), teacher placed under suspension, has right of app,al agai\J5t the order of suspension to the Vice-Chancellor. Uader Ordinance 33(4), teacher shall be entitled to appeal to the Vice-Chancellor against any order passed by the management in resp,ct of penalties referred to in items (ii) to (v) of Ordinance 33(2). Merely because right of appeal is provided without defining the powers of the appellate authority, it cannot be implied that such right does not include the power to direct reinstatement. The confer-ment of power to hear an appeal necessarily invests the appellate authority with tile power to annnl, vary or set aside the order appealed from. Such power is incidental to or is implied in, the power to hear an appeal. It necessarily has the power to grant an appropriate relief. Indeed, the extent of tile appellate power under Ordinance 33(4) is 'not defined. When teacher is dismissed from service, the Vice-Chancellor can not only direct reinstatement but also modify the natu.re of punishment. The whole matter is at large before hinl.

In V. Rev. Mother Provincial v. State of Kera/a (supra) Full Bench of the Kerala High Court while dealing with section 56(4) of the Kerala University AcJ., 1969, observed that the right of appeal to the Syndicate, which being large body comprising of as many as seventeen members will be subject to pnlls and pressures, was not body which could be e·atrusted with judicial. function of this nature. In tilat view, it held that sub-~ection (4) suffers from the defect of the appeal being to forum which seems to be entirely unsuitable for the purpose, being unreasonable, and so much against tile interests of the

institution, that it can hardly be justified either as regulation of, or as reasonable restriction on the power of the manag~mcnt. Incidentally, it observed :

"Though the appeal lies not, as one would have expec-ted, to judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal but to an executive body which, having regard to its comp<l6ition, would hardly be able to produce what is ordinarily called speaking order."

The High Court has react more into the Full Bench decision than there is, and from the mere observation that the proper remedy against a;zy abuse of the disciplinary power would be an appeal, seem to assume that provision like Ordihance 33(4) would not affect the right guaranteed to minority under Article 30(1 ), in matters per-taining to discipline. On the contrary, the Full Bench observed :·--

"TI1e Vice-Chancellor can hardly be expected to have the time to deal with such matters, and in any case, the lcY:lg delay that will necessarily be involved would, by itself rehde-r the managing body's powers of disciplinary control largely ineffectual."

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the right to adminis-ter guaranteed by Article 30( 1) of the Constitution does not carry with it 'right to maladminister'. It is urged that while autonomy in admiitlstration means right to administer effectively and to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution, the University will always have right to sec that there is no maladministraticm. If there is malad-ministration, the University must take steps to cure the same. The right to administer is, therefore to be tampered with regulatory measures to facilitate smooth administration. Regulations which will serve the interests of the students, regulations which will serve the interestl; of the teachers are of paramount importance under good administration. Regulations the interest of efficiency of teachers, diB-cipline and fairness in administration are necessary for preserving har-mony among affiliated institutiohs. It is urged that if the State has any role to play in the system of general education, its power camiot be confined merely to the laying down of prescn'bed standard of educa-tion for minority educational institutions but should also extend to all necessary measures to secure an orderly, efficient and sound admmis-tration of such institutions. Once the role of the State in the system of general educ;ition is properly understood its regulatory power over the minority educational institutions, it is submitted, would depend upon the :iature or type of the educational institutions set up by minority a'nd all other relevant factors, and no universal or general test can be

laid down, The degree of permissive State control must depend upon the circumstances of each case, The right under Article 30 (1) forms part of complex and inter-dependent group of diven;e social interests, There cannot be any perpetually fixed adjustment of the right and those social interests, They would need adjustment and readjust-ment from tim~ to time and in varying circumstances, Undoubtedly, the management of minority institution could not be displaced by the regulat-Ory measure, But the State has power to regulate through the age::icy of the University the service conditions of teache11S and to secure fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against them, These safeguards must necessarily result in the security of tenure of teachers and must attract competent and qualified staff and thus could ultimately improve the ~xcellence and efficiency of the educa-tional institution,

It is further urged that the reconciliation of minority rights in education with wider social and educational objectives is inevitably necessary and this involves the judicial task of balancing the guarante-ed rights under Article 30 (1) with social, national or educational values sought to be regulated or protected by the impugned legislation, It has to bo kept in mi:ld that today the education has to be so designed which would subserve not only the well being of the citizens in the intellectual, ethical and financial spheres but would inculcate amongst tbem scns•o of individual and social consciousness to con-tribute to the welfare ffnd prosperity of an egalitarian society, rt is, therefore, urged that Ordinance 33 ( 4) , Chapter LVII of the Ordi-uances framed by the Syndicate under s,l9(j) of the Act is not violative of Article 30 (1) as it seeks to ensure justice and fair play to the teachers against arbitrary actions of the management

It is next urged that the Vice-Chancellor, while exercising his uppellate power under Ordinance 33 ( 4) is i:ldeed clothed with tbe State's inherent judicial power to deal with disputes lntween the parties and determine them on the merits, fairly and objectively,

It is urged that the contention that the impugned order passed by the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) affects the fundamental rights of minority religious institutions under Article 30(1), is based on complete misconception about the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions, If this basic and judicial aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it is submittted, it would be plain that the decision given by th~ Vice-Chancellor cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 30(1), The remedy for person aggrieved by tl1e decision of competent judicial tribunal is to approach for redress superior tribunal, if there be one,

Lastly it is urged that the rights of the religious and linguistic mino-rities in respect of their educational institutions, however, liberally construed, cannot be allowed to dominate every other fundamental rights, dil'.'clive principles of State policy and broad ideals of the Constitution. Article 30 (I) enables the minorities to establish and administer educaticmal institutions of their choice but it is said they cannot be entitled to exact unjustifiable preferential or discriminatory treatment for minority institutions so as to obtai·n benefits but to reject obligations of statutory rights. We fail to see the relevance of these submissions while adjudging the validity of Ordinance 33 (I) a:ad ( 4) in the light of Article 30(1 ).

The appellant, who appeared in person, supplemented the argu-ments of the learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae and urged that if the Court does not uphold the powers of the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) it would be ta:atamount to negation of the State's regulatory power to prevent or cure the abuse of power by the management and throw the teachers to their arbitrary actions without any security of tenure. She urged that the religious, cultural a'nd linguistic minorities though deserve generous and sympathetic treatment, cannot at the same time be absolved of their obligations to conform to the norms of natural justice and fair employment.

In assailing the view of the High Court, learned counsel for the Management contends that the right of administration of minority educational institutions rests with the Management and the right of appointment, suspension and dismissal of the staff also is part and parcel of the administration. In private college, t'he appointing and disciplinary authority is the management. Ordinance 33 relating to the service conditions of teach~rs in private colleges· authorises the \_ management to take any disciplinary proceedings. The University has no power to interfere into the administration of the college or into the disciplinary action taken agai'nst member of the staff. The creation of an appellate authority like the Vice-Chancdllor, which is an outside agency, itself is an illegal abridgment of the right of management enshrined in Article 30(1). That apart, directing dismissed Principal, who is the academic h~ad of the college, to hold office against the wishes of the founders of the college without specific power in that regard, is an anathema to the right of adminisiration guaranteed by Article 30( 1) of the Constitution. If the Vice-Chancellor were to have power of rebstatement of dismissed teacher, the restllt would be, in effect, appointing person against the will of the founders of the institution. The conferment of such power on the Vice.Chancellor is destructive of the right of management. In support of the contention

ULLY KURIAN v. LEWINA (Sen, J.) 833

that Ordinance 33 (I) and ( 4) were violative of Article 30(1), reliance was placed on the decision in Ahmedabad St. Xa.viers College Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.(').

Learned counsel for the interveners contends that the interposition of an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor, demits the entire discipli:iary po'WW of minority educational institution to the Vice-Chance,:lor. Under Ordinance 33 ( 4) the Vice-Chancellor has the power to veto i:s disciplinary control. There is complete interference with the disciplinary power of the minority institution. The State may 'regulate' the exercise of the right of administration, but it has no power 1o impose any "restriction' which is destructive of the right itself. In matters relati"ag to discipli"ne, the process of decision musr be left to 1he institution. There is direct interference with this right. The post of principal is of pivotal importance in the life of college, around whom wheds the tone and temper of the institution, on whom depends the continuity of its traditions, maintena-:ice of discipline and the efficiency of its teaching. The character of the institution depends on the right choice of the principal by the management. The right to choose the principal is perhaps the most importa1)J facet of the right to adminis'-ter college. In the same way, the right to dispense with the servio~s of the principal is a:i equally important facet of the same right. The imposition of any trammel, thereon, except to the extent of prescribing the requisite qualifications and the experience or otherwise fostering the interests of the institution itself, cannot but b" considered as violation of the right warranted under Article 30 ( 1 ) .

Learned counsel appearing for the State of Kerala, however, while conceding that conferral of arbitrary and unguided powers on an out-.L side agency like the Vice-Chancellor, would be destructive of the right of management under Article 30 (I), contends that the power of the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) to hear an appeal agai:ist an order of dismissal does not suffer from this vice. He tries to limit the appellate power of the Vice-Chancellor under.Ordinance 33(4) to case where the action of the management is ma/a fide or where the order of dismissal is nullity or where the management has acted i':t breach of the rules of natural justice. When so read, it is urged, that the conferment of the right of appeal to the Vke-Chancellor in case of disciplinary powers of minority educational institution, amounts only to regulation of such power, and, therefore, Ordinance 33 ( 4) is not violative of Article 30 ( l ) .

Article 30( I) of the Constitution provides :-

[1979] l S.C.R.

"30. (1) All minorities, wheth::r based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."

It is clear beyond doubt that Article 30 ( 1), though couched in absolute and spacious terms in marked contrast with other fundamental rights-in Part III, has to be read subject to the regulatory power of the State. Though this Court has co·nsistenlly recognized this power of the State as constituting au implied limitation up011 the right guaranteed under Article 30 ( 1), the entire controversy has centred around the extent of its regulatory power over minority educational institutions.

In re the Kerala Education Bill, 1957('), S. R. Das, C.J. explained the co'ntent of the right under Article 30 ( 1) of the Ccrastitution, in these words :-

"We have a~rcady observed that Article 30( I) gives two rights to the minorities, (I) to establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to malad-minister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recogni-tion for a·n educational institutiO'n run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subver-sive o{ the welfare of the scholars. It sta'nds to reason, then, that th~ constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to e'nsure the excellence of the institutions to be aided."

Thus, contention based on the absolute freedom from State control of the minorifos' right to administer their educational institu-tions was expressly negatived in this case. The Court clearly laid down principle, ·namely, regulation, which is not destructive or annihi-lative of the core or the substance of the right under Article 30(1), could legitimately be imposed.

The right of minority commuaity to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice was subject matter of decision by this Court in more than one case.

In Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai vc State of Bombay,(') Shah J. (as he II then was) speaking for the Court, negatived an argument advanced on

(I) [1959] S. C.R. 995.

(2) [1963] S. C.R. 837.

behaif of the State that law could not be deemed to be unreasonable unless it was totally destructive or annihilative of the right under Article 30 ( 1), stating :

·The right established by Art. 30(1) is fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19, it is '.not subject to reason-able restrictions. It is intended to be real right for the pro-tection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of educational institutions of their own choice. The right is in-tended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by se>-ealled regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as whoie. If every order which while maintaining the formal character of minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national i'.n~~rest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Art. 30 ( 1) will be but 'teasing illusion', promise of unreality."

The learned Judge then we;it on to say :

"Regulation which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the insti-tution while retaining its character as minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy dual test-the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the insti-tution and is conducive to making the institution an effec-tive vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it."Unlike Article 19 (1) the fundamental freedom under Article 30{1) is absolute in ~!rms; it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated i'n Article 19 may be subjected to. All minorities, linguistic or religious. have by Article 30( I) an absolute right to estab'.ish and administer educational rnstitutions of their choice; and any law or executive direction which seeks to infringe the substance of that right under Article 30(1) would to that extent b~ void.

The extent of the regulatory power of the State was explained by Shah J ., thus :

"This, however, is not to say that it is not open to the State to impose regulations upori the exercise of this right.

The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions : it is right to establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions. institu-tions which cater to the educational needs of the citizens, or sections thereof. Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on the sub-stance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the pro-per functioning of the institution, in matters educational." In Rev. Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.([1]) Hidayatullah C.J. while dealing with Articles 29(1) and 30(1), said :

"In our opinion, the width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Art. 29 ( 1) is based. The latter article is general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. The former is special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institution, seeking to conserve langu-age, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established a·n educational insti-tution of its choice also admits members of other commu-nities. That is circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article 30 (1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied, although it is possible that they may meet in iiven case."

Incidentally, in dealing with the right under Article 30(1) and the extent of the State's power of regulatory control of such right, this Court in State of Kera/a v. V. Rev. Mother Provincial(') observed

"Administration means 'management of the affairs' of the institution. This management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. No part of this management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encroachment upon the guaranteed right.

There is, however, an exception to this and it is that the standards of education are not part of management as such. These standards concern the body politic and are dictated

(I) [1969} 2 S. C. R. 73.

(2) [1971] l S. C.R. 734. ·

by considerations of the advancement of the country and its people. Therefore, if universities establish syllabi for exami-nations they must be followed, subject however to special subjects which the institutions may seek to teach, and to certain extent the State may also regulate the.conditions of employment of teachers and the health and hygiene of stu-B dents. Such regulations do not bear directly up<in manage-ment as such although they may indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate e(lucation, educational standards and allied matters cannot be denied. The minority institu-tions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of ex-ceUance expected of educational institutions, o'r under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow the general pattern. While the management must be left to them, they may be compelled to keep in step with others." Projection of the minorities is an article of faith in the Constitution of India. The right to the administration of-institutions of minority's ,choice enshrined in Article 30(1) means 'management of the affairs' ,of the institution. This right is, however, subject to the regulatory power of the State. Article 30( I) is not charter for maladministra-'tion; regulation, so that the right to administer may be better exercised for the benefit of the institution is permissible; but the moment one goes beyond that and imposes, what is in truth, not mere regulation but an impairment of the right to administer, the Article comes in~ play and the interference cannot be justified by pleading the interests of the general public; the interests justifying interference can only be the interests of tbe minority concerned.

The conferment of right of appeal to an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) takes away the disciplinary power of minority educational authority. The Vice-Chancellor has , the power to veto its disciplinary control. There is clear interference with the disciplinary power of the minority institution. The State may 'regulate' the exercise of the right of administration but it has no '}JOWer to impose any 'restriction' which is destructive of the right it-self. The conferment of such wide powers on the Vice-Chancellor amounts in reality, to fetter on the right of administration under Arti-cle 30(1). This, it seems to us, would so affect the disciplinary cont-'TOl of minority educational institution as to be sub\'ersive of its con-stitutional rights and can hardly be regarded as 'regulation' or "restriction' in the interest of the institution.

In St. Xaviers College v. Gujarat (supra) Bench of nine Judges, 'by majority of seven to two, held that clauses (b) of sub-sections ( 1) :and (2) of s. 51A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 were violative

[ 1979 j 1 s.c.R.

of Article 30(1). Section 51A(l) (b) enacts that no member of the teaching, other academic and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed in clause (a) and the penalty to be inflicted on him is approved by the Vice-Chancel-lor or any other officer of the University authorised by the Viee-B Chancellor in this behalf. Similarly, clause (b) of sub-section (2) requires that such termination should be approved by the Vice-Chan-cellor or any officer of the University authorised by the Vic;. Chancellor in this behalf.It was argued that the requirement that such termination must be with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, creates fetter in matters relating to disciplinary control over the members of the teaching and non-teaching staff. The approval by the Vice-Chancellor, it was said, may be intended. to be check on the administration but there were no guidelines provided and, therefore, clauses (b) of sub-section (1) and (2) of section 51A cannot be said to be permissive regula-tory measure. These contentions were upheld by the majority.

While seven Judges who constituted the majority upheld the provi-sions of clauses (a) of sub-se.ction ( 1) and (2) of section 51A, as they provided for reasonab!e opportunity of showing cause against penalty to be imposed as being 'regulatory', they held that clauses (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51A of the Act, which confer blanket power on the Vic~Chancellor to interfere with the discipli-nary control of the miinagement of minority educational institution over its teachers, make serious inroad on the right of the minority to administer an educational institution guaranteed under Article 30( 1).

To appreciate the point involved, we may refer to certain passages of the judgment. In dealing with the question, Ray C.J., with whom Palekar, J. agreed, observed :

"In short, unlimited and undefined power is conferred on the Vice-Chancellor. The approval of the Vice-Chancel-lor may be intended to be check on the administration. The· provision contained in section SlA, clause (b) of the Act cannot be said to be ru permissive regulatory measure inasmuch as it confers arbitrary power on the Vic~Chancel­lor to take away the right of administration of the minority institutions. Section 51A of the Act cannot, therefore. apply to minority institutions." •

The provision for approval of the Vic~Chancellor was held to be bad because it acted as check on administration. Further, it WR!f

held to confer arbitrary powers on the Vice-Chancellor because there was no guidelines on the basis of which the Vice-Chancellor could withhold his approval.

Jaganmohan Reddy J., speaking for himself and for Alagiriswami J. agreed with the opinion of Ray C.J.

In explaining the extent of regulatory control, Khanna J. stated

"Although disciplinary control over the teachers of amino-rity educational institution wpuld be with the governing council, regulations, in any opinion, can be made for ensur-ing proper conditions of s_ervice of the teachers and for secu-ring fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against the teachers. Such provisions which are calculated to safeguard the interest of teachers would result in security of tenure and thus inevitably attract competent persons for the posts of teachers. Such provision would also eliminate potential cause of frustration amongst the teachers. Regu-lations made for this. purpose should 15e considered to be in the interest of minority educational institi.Itions and as such they would not violate article 30(1 )."

He accordingly upheld the validity of clause (a) stating :

"Clause (a) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section SIA of the impugned Act which make provision for giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause against penalty to be proposed on member of the staff of an educational insti-tution would consequently be held to' be valid."

But he held clause (b) to be invalid saying :

"Clause (b) of those sub-sections which gives power to the Vice-Chancellor and officer of the Universi!y authorised by him to veto the action of the managing body of an ednca-tional institution in awarding punishment to _member of the staff, in my opinion, .interfere with the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers. It is significant that the power of approval conferred by clause (b) in each of the two sub-sections of section SlA on the Vice-Chancellor or other officer authorised by him is blanket power. No guide-lines are laid down fqr the exercise of that power and it is ndt provided that the approval is to be withheld only in case the dismissal. removal, reduction in rank or termination of ser-vice is mala fide or by way of victimisation or other similar cause. The confern;ient of such blanket power on the Vice-

[ 1979] I s.c.R.

Chancellor or other officer authorised by him for vetoing the disciplinary action of the managing body of an educational institution makes serious inroad on the right of the manag-ing body to administer an educational institution. Clause (b) of each of the two sub-sections of section 51A should, therefore, be held to be violative of article 30( 1) so far as minority educational institutions are concerned."

It was held that clause (b) interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers. The provision does not res-trict its operation in cases of mala {ides or victimisation, etc. In other words, the power of the Vice-Chancellor was complete. He could refuse his approval on facts, that is to say, on reachbg conclusion that the action of the management was improper or invalid.

Mathew J., speaking for himself and one of us, Chandrachnd J. (as he then was) observed :

"It was argued for the petitioners that clause ( 1) (b) of s.51 has the effect of vesting in the Vice-Chancellor general power of veto on the right of the management to dismiss teacher. The exact scope of the power of the Vice-Cha-:icellor or of the officer of the University authorised by him in this sub-section is not clear. If the purpose of the approval is to see that the provisions of sub-section 5 IA(l) (a) are complied with, there can possibly be no objection in lodging the power of approval even in nominee of the Vice-Chancellor. But a'n uncanalised power without any guidelbe to withhold approval would be direct abridgement of the right of the management to dismiss or remov•e teacher or inflict any other penalty after conducting an enquiry."

The Learned Judge then proceeded to observe :

"The relationship between the management and teach•er is that of all employer and employee and it passes cme's understanding why the management cannot terminate the services of teacher on the basis of the contract of employ-ment. Of course, it is open to the State in the exercise of its regulatory power to require that before the services of teacher are terminated, he should be given an opportu..'1ity of being heard in bis defeilce. But to require that for termi-nating the services of teacher after an inquiry has been conducted, the management should have the approval of an outside agency like the Vice-Chancellor or of his nominee would be a'a abridgement of its right to administer the edu-cational i'nsti tution. No guidelines are provided by the legis-

lature to the Vice-Chancellor for the exercise of his power. The fact that the power can be delegated by the Vice-Chan-cellor to any officer of the University means that any petty officer to whom the power is delegated can exercise general pow;:r of veto. There is no obligation under the sub-sections (! )(b) and 2 (b) that the Vice Chanc~lor or his ':lominee should give any reason for disapproval. As we said blanket power withO'Ut any guideline to disapprove the action of the management would certainly encroach upon the right of the management to dismiss or terminate the services of teacher after an enquiry."

He was of the opinioa that such provision constitutes direct abridgement of the right of the management to dismiss or remove teacher or inflict any other penalty, after conducting an enquiry. Dissenting, two of the other Judges, namely Beg. and Dwivedi, J. struck discordant note. Beg J. (as he then was) observed :

Dwivedi,

"Section SI of the Act appears to me to lay down general conditions for the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank and termination of services of members of the staff of all colleges to which it applies. Again, we have not to con-sider here either the wisdom or unwisdom of such provi-sion or the validity of any part of section SIA of the Act on the grouad that it violates a'ny fundamentrll right other than the ones ·conferred by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution."

Dwivedi J. sta~~d :

"The purpose of s. SIA is to check this kind of misuse of the right to fire an employee. So the Vice-Chancellor's power of approval is not unguided and unreasonable. After the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor is the next highest officer of the University. It should be presumed that in granting or withholding approval 'he would act according to reason and justice'.

When the matter goes before the Vice-Chancellor for approval, both the management and the teacher or the mem-ber of the non-teaching staff should be heard by him. Hear-ing both parties is necessarily implied, because without hear-ing either of them it will be difficult for him to make up his mi'.nd whether he should grant or withhold approval to the action proposed by the managing body of the educational instituti()';l. It would also.follow that while granting approval

or disapproval, the Vice-Chancellor should record reasons, for the exercise of his power is subject to control by courts. The statute does not make his order final, and courts would surely nullify his order if it is arbitrary, ma/a fide or illegal."'

An analysis of the judgments in St. Xaviers College's case (supra) clearly shows that seve'n out of nin~ Judges held that the provisions contained in clauses (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section SIA of the Act were not applicable to an educational institution established and managed by religious or linguistic minority as they interfere with the disciplinary control of the management over the staff of its educa-tional institutioos. The reasons given by the majority were that the power of the management to terminate the services of any member of the teaching or other academic and non-academic staff was based on the relationship between an employer and his employees and no encroachment could be made o;i this right to dispense with their ser-vices under the contract of employment, which was an integral part of the right to administer, and that these provisions conferred on the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by him, uncanalised, ungnided and umimited power to veto the action6 of the management. According to the majority view, the conferment of such blanket pow;:r on the Vice-Chancellor and his nominee was an infringement of the right of administratioo guaranteed under Art. 30(1) to the minority institutions, religious and linguistic. The majority was accordingly of the view that the provisions contained in clauses (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51A of the Act had the effect of destroying the mi;:iority institutions's disciplinary control over the teaching and non-teaching staff of the college as no punishment could be inflicted py the management on member of the staff unless it gets approval from an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor er an officer of the University authorised by him. On the cootrary, the two dissenting Judges were of the view that these provisions were per-missive regulatory measures.

The power of appeal conferred on thoo Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) is not only grave encroachment on the institution's right to enforce and ensure discipline in its administrative affairs but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictioos are placed on the exericise of the power. The extent of the appellate power of the Vice-Chan<Xllor is not defined; and, indeed, his powers are unlimited. The grounds on which the Vice-Chancellor can inter-H fere in such appeals are also not defined. He may not only set aside an order of dismissal of teacher and order his reinstatement, but may also interfere with any of the punishments enumerated in it~ms-

(ii) to (v) of Ordinance 33(2); that is to say, he can even interfere against the infliction of minor punishments. I'n the absence of any guidelbes. it cannot b.: held that the power of the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 4) was merely check on maladministration.

As laid down by the majority in St. Xavitrs College's case (supra), such blanket power directly interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing body of minority education institution over its teachers. The majority decision i·a St. Xaviers College's case square-ly applies to the facts of the present case and accordingly it must be held that the impugned Ordinance 33(4) of the University of Kerala is violative of Article 30 ( 1) of tl1e Constitution. If the conferment of such power dn an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor, which while maintaining the formal character of minority institutiaa d<IB-troys the power of administration, that is, its disciplinary control, is held justifiable because it is in the public and national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaranteed by Article 30 ( 1) will be, to use the well-known expression, 'teasing

illusion', 'promise of unreality'.

distinction is, homver, sought to be drawn between the provi-sions contained in clauses (b) of sub-sectiaa (1) a'nd (2) of section 51A of the Gujarat Univernity Act, 1949 which provided that no penalty could be inflicted on member of the teaching staff without the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor or his nominee, and that contained in Ordinance 33 ( 4) which comers on the Vice-Chancellor the power to hear an appeal against an order of dismissal. It is said that while provision making the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor condition precedent against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee creates fetter on the exercise of disciplinary control, which the employer undoubtedly has, the provision comerring on the Vice-Chancellor power to hear an appeal leaves the power of the employer untouched. We are afraid, the distinction tried to be drawn is without any basis. We must, accordingly, hold that Ordinance·33(4), Chapter LVll of tlle Ordinances framed by .the Syndicate of the University under section 19(J) of the Kerala University Act, 1969 would not be applicable to a'n educatio:aal institution established and managed by religious or linguistic minority like St. Joseph's Training College for Women, Ernakulam.

Incidentally, the Kerala University Act, 1969 has been repealed by the Kerala University Act, 1974, which has come into force with effect from August 18, 1974. Section 65 of that Act confers power on the Government to constitute a'<l Appellate Tribunal. Any

teacher aggrieved by an order in any disciplinary proceedings taken against him may under section 60(7) appeal to the Appellate Tri-bunal and th~ Appellate Tribunal may, after giving parties an oppor-tunity of beiag heard, and after such further inquiry as may be necessary, pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit, including an order of reinstatement of the teacher concerned. Section 61 of the Act provides that (i) pending disputes between the management of private college and any teacher relating to the caaditions of service are to be decided under and in accordance with the provisioll'S of the Act, and (ii) past disputes of such nature which have arisen after August 1, 1967, and had been disposed of before the com-mencement of the Act, shall, if the management or the teacher applies to the Appellate Tribunal i'n that behalf withi·a thirty days of the commencement of the Act, be reopened and decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We have been informed that the appellant has filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribullal, Kerala under section 61 (a) of the Kerala Univernity Act. 1974. We refrain from making a·ay observation with regard to that appeal. We wish to say that the validity of sections 60(7), 61 and 65 was not in question before us, and so we express no opinion in regard theretQ. The result, therefore, is that the appeals fail and are dismissed. The judgment of the High Court setting aside the two orders of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Kerala dated October 19, 1970, is upheld though on different grou:ad, namely, the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33 ( 1) and ( 4) had no power to entertain the appeals from the impugned orders of dismissal or suspension of the appellant. The costs shall be borne by the parties throughout as incurred. We are thankful to Sri M. K. Ramamurthi, who appeared as an amicus curiae for the appellant, for the able assistance he has re-a-1dered. '

Appeals dismissed.