FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN versus THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI & ORS.

FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN

' .. [. ]

THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI & ORS. January 13, 1981 [P. N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.]

Right of the detenu under Conservation of Foreig11 Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activitiea Act, to have interview wilh lawyer and the mtm· bm of hu family-Section 3(b)({) &: (ii) read with rule 559A and 550 of the Punjab Manual of the Superintendence and Management of lail.J-Whethtr voilate3 Article.J 14 and 21 of the Constitution and hence invalid-Di3tirlctioll between pre~·mtive detention with punitive detention-Constitution ,of Indf~ 1950 Article 21, scope of.

Allowing the writ petition, the Court

HEll> : ( 1) While considering the question of validity of conditiom of detention coum must necessarily bear in mind the vital distinction betm:en preventive detention and ptmitive detention. Punitive detention is intended to inflict punishment on person, who is found by the judicial process to have committed an offence, while preventive detention is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to pre-empt pe~on from indulging in conduct injurio\18 to tho society. [523 A·B]

(2) Tho power of preventive detention has been recognised as noces-eary evil and is tolerated in free society in the larger interest of security of th,e State and maintenance of public order. It is drastic power to detain person without trial and in many countries it is not allowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. The Indian Constitution does recognise the existence of this power, but it is hedged-in by various safeguards set out in Articles 21 and 22. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7) d.t1lls specifically with safeguards against preventive detention and enjoins that any law of preventive detention or action by way of preventive detention taken under such law m111t be in confonnity with the restrictions laid down by those clause! on pain of -.-.... invalidation, Article 21 also lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. [523 B-DJ

Article 21 as interpreted in Mantka Gandhi'3 callt requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure establish-ed by law and this procWure must be rea!lonablo, fair and just and not arbi-trary, whimsical or fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its corutitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in given ca.se is by procedure, which is reasonable, falr and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention must, therefore, pass the test not only of Article 22 but also of Article 21. But, despite these II safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts. the power of preventive detention is frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences affectin~ personal liberty, which is the moet cheri8hed

and prized possession of man in a. civilised society. It i.~ power to be exer~ cised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused, inasmuch as the preventive detention is quilitatively different from punitive detention and their purposes are diiferent. In case of punitive detention, the person has full~t opportunity to defend himself, while in case of preventive detention, the opportunity that be has for contesting the action of the Executive is very limited. There-fore, the "restrictions placed on person preventively detained must, consis-B tently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal". [524 A-G]

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1979] 1 SCC 248; M.O. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra, [1979] 1 SCR 192; Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 81; Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration, (1979] 1 SCR 392; Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 2 SCR 557, re-ferred to.

Sampat Prakash v. Stflte of Jammu and Kashmir, [1969] 3 SCR 574, follnwed.

3. The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarcera.tion. prisoner or detenu is not stripped of his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court will immet!iately spring into action and run to his rescue. [525 B-C, 526 G-H, 521 A]

Sunil Batra (/) v. Delhi Administration, [19791 1 SCR 392~ Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, [1980l 2 SCR 551, State of Maharashtra v. Pra-bhakar Sanzgiri, [19661 1 SCR 702; D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [19751 2 SCR 24. followed.

bhakar Sanzgiri, [19661 1 SCR 702; D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh, .£ [19751 2 SCR 24. followed. Eve Pall's Case, 417 US 817: 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 495; Charles Wolff's Case, 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 935, quoted with approval. (4) While arriving at the proper meaning and content of the right to life, the attempt of the court should always be to expand the reach and ambit of :,r- -the fundan1ental right rather than to a.ttenuate its meaning and content. · · constitutional provision must be construed, not in narrow and constricted sense, but in wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of chllnging conditions and purposes so tha.t the constitutional provision does not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems ap.d challenges. This principle applies with greater force in relation to fundamental right enacted by .the Constitution. The funda-G mental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpreted in broad and ex-pansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. [527 C-D, 528 A-C]

Weems v. U.S. 54 Lawyers Edition 801, quoted with approval.

(5) The right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival.

[1981}2S.C) KR

AEvery limb or faculty throughwhich]|fe1Senjoyed is|thUSsprotectedbyArticle 2! andQQforitorari,this wowd include the faculties of thinking andfeeling.Now deprivationwhich.is inhibited by Article may be total or par-tial, neither any limb or facultyCabe totally destroyed nor can it be parttially|damagzed.Moreoverit1s every kindof deprivationthat is hit by Article21,wheihersuchdeprivationbe permanent or temporary and,|furthermore,deprivation is not an act which)1S|completeOnce and for all: itiSa continuing|Bactandso long as it lasts, it must be in accordance with procedure establishedby law.|Therefore any act which damages orinjures|Or interferesith the!use of any limb orfacultyof person either permanently or even temporarily,|would be within the inhibition of Article 21. [528 D, G-H, 529 A]

KharakSinghVv.StateofUttar Pradesh,11964) 1 SCR 232, followed.

MunnVv.Illinois11877] 94 US 133, referred to.C

Sunil BatraVv,DelhiAdmini stration,[1980] 2 SCR 557, applied.

(6) Theright!to life imcludes the right to live with human dignity andainat goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries|of.lifesuchas|adequate nutrition, clothingand|shelter and facilities for reading, writing and_|expressing oneself in diverse forms, freelymovingabout andmixing and.Dcommingling with fellow human beings.The magnitude and content of the|components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter,include theright to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such fwuntions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human|self.Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would cons-titudeprivationPro.tantoof this right to live and itwould have to be inEaccordance with reasonable, fairanjust procedure established by law which|standthe test of other fundamental rights.Therefore, any form of tortureor cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment wouldbeoffensive to human dignityand constitute an inroad into this right to live anditwould, on this view, beprohibited by Article 21 unless it is In accordance with procedure prescribedby law, but no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to suctorture or cmelty, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of¥reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and_|void as being violative of Article 14 and 21. [529 B-F]|

(7) There is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against tortureor cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Articl5=eJiof the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7|of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.Thright tolive which is comprehended within the broad connotation of theright to lifGcan concededly be abridged according to procedure established by law antherefore when person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is boundto suffer attenuation to the extent10which it is incapable of enjoyment by|reason ofincarceration.Theprisoner or detenuobviously cannotmoveabout freely by going outside the prison walls norCabe socialise athifreewill with persons outside the jail.But, as part of the rightolive with!humadignity and therefore, as necessary coOmponoftherighttolife,Q|7he would be entitledto have interviews with the membersofhisfamily andfriends and noO prison regulation or procedure laid down by prison regulatiregulating the rightTOhave interviews with the members of the family and

F, Cc. MULLIN V.UNION TERRITORY

friends can be upheld as constitutionally valid under Article 14 and 21, unlessit is reasonable, fair and Just.|

Considered from the point of view also of the right to personal libertyenshrined in Article 21, the right to have interviews with members of the familyand friends is clearly part of personal liberty guaranteed under that Article.The expression “personal liberty” occurring inArticle 2]isOf|thewidesamplitude and it covers variety of rights which go to coustitute thepersonalliberty of man and it also includes rights which “have been raised to the|statusof distinctFundamental Rightsandgiven additional protection underArticle19”,|Therefore, personal liberty would include the rightosocialise|with members of the family and friends subject, of course, to any valid prison|regulations and under Articles 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be|and non-arbitrary.itany prison regulation or procedure laid down|frends 1sarbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck downasinvalid as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. [530 B-E]it regulating the right to have interviews with members of the family and_|

y,Union of India, [197911SCC 248, applied.

(8) Sub-clause (ii) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Orderis violative of Articles 14 and 21 in so far as it permits only one interview!in month to detenu.|When an undertrial prisoner1Sgranted the facilityof interviews with relatives and friends twice ina|week under Rule SS9A andalconvicted prisoner is permitted to have interviews|withhirelatives|and|friends, once in week under Rule 550, sub-clause (ii) of clause 3(b) of theConditions of Detention Order, which restricts the interview only to one ina|month in case of detenu, is unreasonable and arbitrary, particularly whealdetenu stands on highest pedestal than an undertrial prisoner a|convict.A detenu mustbepermitted to have at least two interviews in week withrelatives and friends and it should be possible for|GIrelative or friend to haveinterview with the detenu at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission from|the Superintendent of the Jail and it should not be necessary to seek thepermission of the District Magistrate, Delhi, as the latter procedure would becumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view of security and hence un-reasonable.Even independently of Rules 550 and 559A, of the Punjab Manual|for the Superintendence and Management of Jails, the present norm of twointerviews in week for prisoners furnishes reasonable ‘and non-arbitrarycriterion, [530 F-H, 531A-B}

rSampath Prakash|VeState of Jammu and Kashmir, [1969]3)SCR574,applied.

(9) Sub-clause|(1)of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of DetentionOrderregulating the right of detenu to have interview withalegal adviser of hichoice is violative of Article 14 and 21 and therefore unconstitutiona! and void,It would be quite reasonable if detenu were to be entitled to have interviewwith his legal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appoint-ment from the Superintendent of the Jail, which appointment should ‘be givenby the Superintendent without any avoidable delay.The interview need not!Necessarily take place in the presence of nominated officeof Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement but if the presence of suchofficer can be convenily securedatthe time of the interview without involving any postponementof the interview, than such officer anif his presenccannot be so|SecT€d,|

SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS

then any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but in month to detenu. When an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility [532C-F]

(10) The right of detcnu to consult legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in criminal proceeding but also for securing release from preventive detention or filing writ petition or prosecu-B ting any claim or proceeding, civil or crimine.I is obviously included in the right to live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of the detenu be inter-fered with except in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure estab-lished by valid law. [531 C-E]

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 3042 of 1980.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)

N. M. Ghatate (Dr.) and S. V. Deshpande for the Petitioner.

lfardayal Hardy and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents Nos. 1-2.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BnAGWATI, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution raises question in regard of the right of detenu under the Conser-vation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act) to have interview with lawyer and the members of his family. The facts giving rise to the petition are few and undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows:

The petitioner, who is British national, was arrested and detained in the Central Jail, Tihar under an Order dated 23rd November 1979 issued under section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. She preferred petition ih this Court for writ of habeas corpus challeng-ing her detention, but by judgment delivered by this Court on~ 2'1fh February 1980, her petition was rejected with the result that she continued to remain under detention in the Tihar Central Jail. Whilst under detention, the petitioner experienced considerable difficulty in t. having interview with her lawyer and the members of her family. Her daughter aged about five years and her sister, who was looking .~ after the daughter, were pemiitted to have interview with her only once in month and she was not allowed to meet her daughter more often, though child of very tender age. It seems that some criminal proceeding was pending against the petitioner for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country and for the purpo~e of her defence in such criminal proceeding, it was necessary for her to con-sult her lawyer, but even her lawyer found it difficult to obtain an interview with her because in order to arrange an interview, h0 wa~

522SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1981] 2S.C.R.|

and (11) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of DetentionOrderandJpraying that the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi andthe Superintendent of Tihar Central Jail|bedirected to permit her tohave interview with her lawyer and the members of her family with-out complying with the restrictions laid down in those sub-clauses,

The principal ground on which the constitutional validity of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of DetentionOrder was challenged was that these provisions werviolativeof|Articles 14 and 21of the Constitutioninasmuch as_ they werearbitrary and unreasonable. It was contended on behalf of the peti-\,Ccrelatives and friends twice in week under Rule 559A and convicted|prisoners were permitted to have interview with their rclatives andfriends once in week under Rule 550 of the Rules set out in the:Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Jatsin|theDPunjab. The petitioner also urged that detenu wasentitledunderArticle22.of the Constitution to consult and be defended by legalpractitioner of his choice and she was, therefore entitled to the facility|of interview with lawyer whom he wanted to consult or appear forhim in legal proceeding and the requirement of prior appointmentKkfor interview and of the presence of Customs or Excise Officer athe interview was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore violative|of Articles 14 and 21. The respondents resisted the contentions ofthe petitioner and submitted that sub-clauses|(1)and(11)of clause3(b) were not violative of Articles 14 and 21, since the restrictionsimposed by them were reasonable, fair and just, but stated that they,FRwould have no objectionIinstead of monthly interview, the peti-tioner was granted the facility of interview with herdaughterandsister twice in week as in the case of uhdertrial prisoners and sofar as interview with the lawyer is concerned, they would not insison the presence of customs or excise officer at the interview. Thougthese two concessions were made on behalf of the respondents at theGhearing of the petition before us, the question still remains whethersub-clause (i) and (ii) of cl. 3(b) are valid and it is necessary thatwe should examinethquestion in the context of our constitutionalvalues, since there arealargenumberOf|detenusunder.theCOFEPOSA Act and the conditions of their detention in regard tointerviews must be finally settled by this Court,wher unadertrial prisoners were granted the facility of interview withOnce in month was discriminatory and unreasonable.particularlytioner that allowing interview with the members of the family only

AYOWit is necessary fo bear in mind the distinction be‘erventive detention’ and punitive detention’, when we are consideri

the question of validity of con~tions of detenti~n. TJ;t.e~~ }~ . ~ ~it~F 1 distinction between these two. kinds of detention. 1p'unitive deten~19.!'.;~. is intended to • ' inflict punishment on person,' . ' who\ is f~uhd "bi th't . . I judicial process to have committeCI an offence, while 'preventive <kt~mi6n' is .riot by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to: JSte:~mpt ~: ~rson from indulging in conduct ~njur.ious to the . society. . The power of preventive detention has been recognised as n~cessary:. evil and is tolerated in free society in the larger in,terest of[1]security . of the State and maintenance of public order. It is drastic power to · detain person without trial and there are many countries where it · is not aHowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. -~ ~~j ~tnfitit~tion, do.es 1~ec.~ise _the exi~tence. of ~is power, but it is • heiigchl!ifl:>by ""' ' ' '- : · ,_ < v~nous ' safeguards ' • set out • m r Articles •• ' :. ~ 21 \o • • and ..J }. 22. ' .. ...,., Art. 22 • < 0 ' n:i ~clauses ( 4) to (7), . deals spe<;rfically w1th saf(.:g_u~rd~ ~~;:qn~~ pr!!-ventive detention and .ally law of preventive. d,et~ntjon-.Pt -~·c.mm by . formity way of preventive detention with the restri~tions ~e~ laid· 11fid~r down s,uch by tho~e l~w. ).Clauses ~~st "~e 3on :in . p,ain con-of i~va!idation. But apart from Art. 22, there is also Ari. 21 whiCh lays · do\%. ·resttictions on the power of preventive detention. Until the deci-sfon ·~r tbts·· Court in Maneka Gandh~ v. Union of lndia(l), very narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Art. 21 and that article was understood to embody only that aspect of the rule of law, which requires that no one shall be deprived of. his life or personal liberty without the authority of law. It was E. construed only as ·a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as there was some law, which prescribed pro-ce:d~re authorising depriv~tion of life or personal ~berty, it _ was . sdpPO~~d ~o tneet .the ~equlre~ent of Art. 21. But in Maneka, Gandhi's ca~e . {supra),. this .cou~ Jor t4e _first time opened-up _ne~ gilp~nsion of Art. 2l and laid down that Art. 21 is not. only guarantee against ·-.ei.e~qtive action unsupported by law, butfs also re~~ri~iio~ on .law ' ll:iaking .. It is not enough to secure compliance wit4 the . prescription .. of Adic;le -21 that thefe should be law prescribing some semblanee of 'proqedore fot' depriving t>erson of his life or personal liberty, but · tli'e pi-oc~l:ue· t>rescribed by the law must be reasonable, · fair and G· just and if it is not so, the law would be void as violating the guarantee of Art. 21. This Court expanded the scope and ambit of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Art. 21 and sowed_ the seed for future development of the law enlarging this most fun~a­mental of Fundamental Rights. This decision in Maneka Gandhi's case became the starting point-the-spri'ng-board-for most spectacular evolution of the law culminating in the decisions in M. 0. Hoscot v. (l) [1979] 1 sec 248

of law. Once his freedom is curtailed by incarceration in jail, does he have any fundamental rights at all or does he leave them behind, when he enters the prison gate? The answer to this question is no longer res integra. It has been held by this Court in the two Sunil Batra cases that "fundamental rights do not flee the person as he enters the prison although they may suffer shrinkage necessitated by incarceration .. , The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. Even before the two Sunil Batra cases, this position was impliedly accepted in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri(l) and it was spelt-out clearly -~ and in no uncertain terms by Chandrachud, J. as he then was, in

D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh([2 ]) :

"Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. compulsion under the authority of law, following upon conviction. to live in prison-house entails to by its own force the deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India or the right to ''practise" profession. man of profession would thus stand stripped of his right to hold consultations while serving out his sentence. But the Constitution guarantees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property for the exercise of which incarceration can be no impediment. Likew:se, even convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution that he shall not be deprived of his life or pe~son~ liberty except according to procedure established by law."

This statement of the law was affirmed by Bench of five Judges of X this Court in the first Sunil Batra case (supra) and by Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in the second Sunil Batra case (supra). Krishna Iyer, J. in the latter case pror.:leded to add in his characteristic style; "The jurisdictional reach and range of this Court's writ to hold prison caprice and cruelty in constitutional leash t is incontestable" and concluded by observing; "Thus it is now clear law that prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom even behind · bars a'nd that on breach thereof by lawless officials the law will respond to his distress signals through 'writ' aid. The Indian human has constant companion-the Court armed with the Constitution." (1) [1966] 1 SCR 702 (2) [1975] 2 SCR 24.

books. but an activist institution which is the cynosure of public ho~; will immediately spring into action and run to his ·rescue.

We must therefore proceed to consider whether any of the Fundamental Rights of the detenu are violated by sub-climses -(i) · and (ii) of clause 3(b) so as to result in their invalidation wh9Uy Qr i~ I>¥t : Yi.e will fu~t t!ife -~!? for considerat~oll: the}~un~~~_pt_al j:i~ ~f :the <letenu under Article 21 because that is Fundam~nt~ R,!ght which has, after the decision in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), highly activist magnitude and it embodies constitutional value of supreme importance in democratic society. It provides that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to ~oce~ure established by law and such procedure shall be reasonable fair, .and just.- Now what is the true scope and ambit of the right to ~~e ,J~a~anteed under· -t~i_s :~~cle ? While arri~iii~ at the pro.Per meaning and content of the right to life, we must .remember t!tat it is constitutional provision which we are expounding and moreover it is provision enacting a· Fundamental right and the attempt of the court should always be t<> ·expand· the reaeh and ambit of the fund~..: mental right· xathet than· to ·attenuate its: meaning and cnntent. The luminous· guideline ·in ·the interpretation of constitutional provision is::. provided. by the Supreme Court· of United States in Weems v. il.s._ 54 -~awyers Edition 801.

"Legislation, both statutory and constitutional'is enacted, it is true, fto:tn an experience of · evils, but-its general language sliollld ,not, therefore, be necessarily colllined to the form that evil had, ·therefore taken . .Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and : purwses. · J:}!e(e-fore, principle,· to~ be vital, must- be capable-of · wider a}.1plieation tha:n m.isch_ief. which gave it -birth. ·This is pecu-F liary true of Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enact-ments designed to meet passing occasions. TMy are, to use the word~ of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immOrality as nearly as htima'n institutions cim apPr~ach1t~. The "future is their care, ~nd provisions for evenrs. bf'go6d arid ·bad tendencies ·a.f which no prophecy· can ·t;e· made. In the. application of a:. constitution, therefore: 6'\ir . contempla-tion cimnO't' be only of what has been, 'buf Of ·wnat 'may' be.' Under any other rule constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be con-verted by precedent into important and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in the words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognised. The meaning and vitality of the

[1981] 2 S.C.R.

Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction."

This principle of interpretation which requires that Constitutional provision must be construed, not in narrow and constricted sense_, but in wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that the Constitutional pro-vision does not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and chall~nges, app1ies with greater force in relation to fundamental right enacted by the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most pre-cious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpretated in broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Now obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 can not be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival. In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Prade.~h(l) Subba Rao J. quoted with approval the fo11owing passage from the judgment of Field J. in Munn v. lllinois([2]) to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 : *"By the term "life" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the· body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out, of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the. body through which the soul communicates with the outer world." and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of thls Court in the first Sunil Batra case {supra). Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21 and fortiorari. this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Artide 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, depriva-H (1) [1964] l S.C.R. 232 (2) [1877) 94 u.s. 113 *Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. P. 503.

tion is not an act which is complete once and for all : it is cont-nuing act and so lClng as it lasts, it must be in accordance. with pro-cedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21.

But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to 1ive with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, cloth-ing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-c self in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and comming-ling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and con-tent of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include tne right to the basic necessities of life and also J) the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights. Now obviously. any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, bu~ no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, in-human or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonable-II' ness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. n would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This right to live which is comprehended within the broad connotation of the right to life can concededly be abridged according to procedure established by law and therefore when person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is bound to suffer attenuation to the extent to which it is incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. The prisoner or detenu obviously cannot move about freely by going outside the prison walls nor can he socia-lise at his free will with persons outside the jail. But, as part of the.·A right ~ live with human dignity ~nd th~efore . as. ·neces?a_ry: c,qD!pO; nent of the right to life, ,h_e wo~d l:!e entit_ledto have_in~e.rvi~~~w!~ ~h~ .. IJ1Cmb~rs :o~ his: fa~ly and friends aQd no pri_s~:m ·regulflf!ew;~ p~ure l;eid : dewp.. ·by :Prison regulation regulating the right -m ~ve ~nterviews with the members of the family and friends can be upheld as constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 21, unless it is reason-B able, fai~ an~ j~t. The sanie consequence would follow even if this problem is consi-dered from the point of view of the right to personal Uberty enshrined · in Article 21, for the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is clearly part of personal liberty guaranteed under that Article. The expression 'personal liberty' occurring in Article 21 has been given broad and liberal interpretation in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) and it has been held in that case that the expression 'personal liberty used in that' Artjcle ·is of the widest · amplitude and it covers variety of rights which ·go to constitute the personal liberty of man and it also iricludes rights which "have be~n raised to the:status of dis~ tinct 'F~.uitlamental ' ~igbtS' and given.~- aaditionai p;rotectien . 'uflder ArtiCte ··19"'. - There 'can . therefore· be-- n5: doub't -that ·'persoriaf tiblriy' wourn-incliide •the. dgh:tto . sO<:iatis·e 'wifli members otth'e fatrrlly' ami ftlehels Si.ib]ect,· csf C'outse,· to any valid prison regulations· · aiid under Articles· 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by it re-gulating the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is arbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck d·owri . as invalid as being violative . -of Articles 14 and 21. Now obviously \fhen an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility of interviews , with relatives and friends twice in week under Rule 55~A. and . oonviciect · p~o~r is ~~t~ - to have. inte~i~~ ~t)l .._ his .. r~latives· ami .friends ·onee irr wee~· under .Rule 550, it. is :diffi.eult \ to Understand how 6Ub-clause (.ii) of-CJ.ause •3 (b) of·the C~~.tion~ " Of Detention Order, which restricts the interview oil.ly to ·one in .a .month in case of detenu, can possibly be regarded as reasonable and non-G arbitrary, particularly when detenu stands on higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or convict and, as held by this Court in Sampath Prakash's case (supra) restrictions placed on detenu must. "consistent ~t!J;:th~ etJ:ectiv~qess _of detention,· be minimal." We would . tq~~~f~r_c -u1tt!~it~tingly.:ho!d sub-clause (ii) of ~l~1:1se ·3(b} to be vi~affi'~# }\JtiGl~: 14-~nd 21· if!. so-far: as i~ ·permitr. only_ one inte:r~,r~~:--, ~~-to. a,detenu. -W~:;are-of the.view that a-detenU-J!l.US~ ~;'~~t­Je4-t~~~ye-atleast two ~iews in week with relatiyes ·~.Jtiends and·it sbould be possible-_for relative or friend to have inteniew with

p, c. MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwa01 J.)

at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission J .l . l t [dctcoil ]S pcrintendent o t a1 an 1t s ou not be necessary to ) fr ~. [rn ][the ]he [0 ]rmission of t D' 1s t · net 1v "·I · ag1strate, Delhi, as the latter • S<"<k ·~ure~ould be cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view . [1 ]prOC· 'ty and hence unreasonable. We would go so far as to say tha\ of secun I 550 559 . "'pendently of Ru es an ,.,., we would regard the pre· scnt e~en uorm tn"" of two interviews . m_ • wee k or pnsoners . as furnishing cri-tenon•nu . , ... b,t we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary •

The same reasoning must also result in invalidation of sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order which pres-, cnbes that detenu can have interview with legal adviser only after obtaining prior permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi and the interview has to take place in the presence of an offtcer of Customs/ · 1 Central Excise/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector uf CustomsjCentral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who bas sponsored the case for detention. The right of detenu to con-mit 11 legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limi-ted to defence in criminal proceeding but also for securing release fro?I preventive detention of filing writ petition or prosecuting any ~aun or proceeding, civil or criminal, is obviously included in the fight lo live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of ~~ dete~u be interfered with except in acc~rd'ance with reasonable, ~~~and Just procedure established by valid Jaw. prison regula-U~nb may, therefore, regulate the right of detcnu to have interview "[11]it Blegalad' VtSer · m manner which is reasonable, fau · an d' JUst bt u -lat~annot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure for regu-A:gl 1&uch an interview and if it does 50 it would be violative of • es 14 21 ' · . \1ve · . [0 ]• Now in the present case the kg'Jl viscr can ' tntervicw · · ing pe • • Wit n dctcnu only by prior appointment n ter o t~tn--tly ca:SSIOO or the District Magistrate, Delhi. This would obvi?U-.\)U}d &reat hardship and inconvenience because the legal adviser 'r.d lht:ve to apply to the District Mugistrate, Delhi well in a~vance ~ be _also the time fixed by the District M:~gistrate, Delhi may I 1 ~ittitj~UJ!able to the legal adviser who would ordinarily be busy riV!t to :ns and, in that event, from practicnl point of view the the lntervie ult [8 ]legal adviser would be rendered illusory. Moreover, ~a! l: V.: rnust take place in the presence of an officer of Customs/ ~ Cq_~torn:~~/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collect~r 'Ponso entral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement w o o ::able p/~d the detention and this too would seem to be an uttrea•

; ; ; '

w o o 11 1

<~Ce ti{ :~ural requirement because in order to secure the yJ;~i 1 officer at the interview, the District Magistrate,

. - ... --

- .. -~---- -..... - ·-·

would have to fix the time for the interview in consultation w·th "E .. I ~ Collector of Customs/Central ~elSe or t epu~y Director of En-forcement and it ~ay ~come d~cult to s~ncbro'nise tbe time which suits the legal adviser With the. time convement to the concemed ofli. • cer and furthermore if the nommated officer does not, for any reaso 0attend at the appointed time, as seems to have happened on quite ' few occasions in. the case of the petitioner, the interview cannot ~ held at all and the legal adviser would have to go back without m~t- · ing the detenu and the entire procedure for applying for an appointment to the District Magistrate, Delhi would have to be gone through once again. We may point out that no s-atisfactory explanation has been , given on behalf of the respondents disclosing the rationale of this re-'1 . ' qwrement. ..,We are therefore of view that sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) regu-lating the right of detenu to have interview with legal adviser of his choice is violative of Arts. 14 and 21 and must be held to be unconsti-D tutional and void. We think that it would be quite reasonable if detenu were to be entitled to have interview with his kgal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail, which appointment should be given by th~ Superintendent without any avoidable delay. We may odd that ~~ intcrvie\Y heed not necessarily take place in the presence of notiU· .£ nated officer of CustomsjCentral Excise/Enforcement but if the pre-sence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of th: interview without involving any postponement of the interview, then liuch officer and if his presence cannot be so secured, tbcn any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but .not [50 ]as to be within hearing distance of the detenu and the Jagal adVISe!•

We accordingly allow the writ petition and grant relief to the e~~~:nt -1. indicated above. .

Petition II 11V" [.-·(J. ]