GOPALAKRISHNA MENON AND ANOTHER versus D. RAJA REDDY AND ANOTHER

. .OOPALAKRISHNA ~ . MENON AND ANOTHER

•.D .. RAIA REDDY AND ANOTHER

September 5, 1983

(D. A. DESAI AND RANOANATH MISRA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-S. 195(/)(b)(il}-Scope of-In absence of con1p!aint from appropriate civil court proseruUon for offenre punishable under s. 467 l.P.C. not sustainable.

lnJian Penal Code-S. 467 read withs. 463-Scope of-Offence punishable under. s. 467 is offence described in 5. 463.

The appellants filed civil.suit a1ainst the rcsPondents for ~ecovery of certain a1nount of money and produced som~ c:>ri~nal documents with the 'plaint. The first respondent filed complaint aaainst the appellants alleging forgery of his sig(\ature on one such document and thereby commission of olf<nces punishable under sections 467 and 471 I.P.C. The appellants objected to maintainability of the cri!_'ninal action and later moved the Hi&h Court for quashing the said proceedings.· The appellants contended that in the absence of con1plaint from the civil court the prosecution was barred in view of s. 195 (l)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court dismissed the application and observed that s. 463 l.P.C. cannot be construed to include s. 467.

Allowing the appeal,

HELD ; The prosecution would not be sustain~ble. [842 BJ

Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described ins. 463 ... -of the Penal Code, when such offence is aUeg~d to have been committed in respect of document produced .. in procee.diog in any Court ... except on the complaint in writing of that Court. Section 463 of the Penal Code in sense defines the offence of f0rgery and the offence which is made punishable under s. 467 is in respect of'an offence d~scribed in s. 463. Once it is a1:cepted that s. 463 ·defines forgery ands. 467 p1;.nishcs forgery of particular category, the pro-vision ins. 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would.im1nediately be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under s. 467 of the Peaal Code is all offence' described ins. 463, in the absence of con1plaint by the Court the prosecution would ~ot be maintainable.

[839 E·G, 840 D, E, H;841 A·B]

Patel Laljib/iai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 834; nod S. L. Goswami v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 385, referred to. ·

o. MENON Y. DR.. REDDY (Ranganath Misra, J.)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURIS\>ICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 307 '

of 1983

Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the ~th November, 1982 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1936 of 1.982.

A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.

B. Kanta Rao for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. -The short question ansmg in this appeal by .special leave is whether in the absence of necessary com-plaint by the Civil Court where money receipt alleged to have been forged was produced, prosecution for offences punishable under sections 467 and 471 read· with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code would be maintaioabfo. The accused are the appellants and they challange the dismissal of their application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Code' for short) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.The appellants are father and son respectively. They took printing press from the !st respondent in terms of an 'agreement dated December 3, 1980, with view· to carryi'lg on the printing business. The agreement stipulated that ·the _appellants would have 'to deposit Rs. 20,000 with the'lst respondent and pay Rs. 500 p.m. as also 50% of the net profits _•to !st respondent. Dispute arose between the parties over the compliance of the terms of the agreement whereupon the 1st respondent filed against the appellants O.S. No. 609/81 for mandatory injunction and O.S. No. I 140/81 for recov.ery of damages. Appellants filed O.S. No. 358/81 for refund of Rs. 20,000 claimed to have been deposited with !st respondent and for recovery of,Rs. 8638 on the footing that the same had been paid to I st respondent by cheques· and in cash. , Along with their plaint appellants ·produced the original contrac_t as also the money receipt . for Rs. 20,000 in· support of tbe claim in the suit. After production of the money receipt in Court, !st respondent filed complaint against the appellants alleging_ forgery of his signature on the money. receipt arid thereby commission of offences punishable under se~tions 467 and 471, I.P.C. On receiving summonses from the Court, the appella_nts objected to maintainability of the criminal action anc.l

later moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for quashing the said proceedings by contending thai in the absence o'f complaint from . the Court the prosecution was barred in view of s. 195 (I) (b) (ii) of the Code. In support of this contention reliance was placed on s. 340 of the Code. The High Court referred to the provisions of ss. 463, 465, 467, 471 and 474 of the Penal Code and observed: 1

"From the above provisions, it is quite manifest that the offence which is mentioned in the complaint carries greater punishment, namely, 10 years imprisonment,. whereas under s. 463, I.P.C. the punishment is infinitely lesser than the one under s. 467, namely 2 years of fine or both. That apart, in case reported in 1979 Cr!. L.R. at 228, it has been held by the Gujarat High Court that the offences laid down under ss. 474 and 471, I.P.C. are distinct. In that case it was contended thai com plaint by to police under s. 47 4 that was in possession of forged documents with intention to use them in Court proceedings and thereafter P,roducing documents · in Court and thereby committing offence under s. 471 did not wipe out the offence under s. 474. The High Court held under ·these circumstances. that the Magistrate can proceed with case under s. 474 against grounding the reason that s. 195' (I) (b) (ii) is not attracted ..

. . The penal provisions as it is fairly settled ought to be interpreted very strictly' and therefore on the foregoing analysis I have no hesitation in holding that s. 463 can-not be construed to include s. 4'67 as well and, therefore, certainly it is competent for the Magistrate to take cognizance of and try the same as it is needless to follow the case. Hence the contention on the basis of the provisions in s. 340 of the Code ·of Criminal Procedure fails and the same ls rejected".

There 'is ·no dispute that ·the · alleged forged document was produced in the suit brought by the appellants. Section 340 of .the Code provides :

"340. (1) When, upon an application made io it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion tffat 'it j; expedient ·in the interest of justice that an inquiry

(b) (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under sectiim 47l, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, wheii such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of document produced or given in evidence in proceeding in any Court, . . . except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or ·of some-G other 'Court to which that Court is subordinate". (underlining is ours)

Ifs. 195 (I) (b) (ii) is attracted to the facts of the present _case, in the absence of complaint in· writii:ig _of the Civil Court \vhW'e the alleged forged rec~ip\ has been produced, ·taking of cognizance of the offence would. be bad in law and the prosecution· being not·,-maintainable, there would · be alisolutely no jusiification · to harass ·

983} j s.c.i<..

SUPREME COURT REPoRTS

the appellants by allowing prosecution to have - full dressed trial. Section 195 (I) (b) (ii) uses two different expressions: in regard. to S· - 463 of the Indian Penal Code it says, "offence described", while in regard toss. 471 and 475 or 476 of the I.P.C. it says, "punishable" . . The High Court has not made any reference to s. 471 of I.P.C. while rejecting the submissions of the appellants apparently because s. 471 in terms has been mentioned in the provision. So far as s. 463 is concerned, the High Court has taken the view as we have already indicated that "section 463 cannot be construed to include ·s. 467". Section 463 of the l.P .C. provides :

"463. Forgery -Whoever makes any false document or part of document, witil intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that ·rraud may be committed, commits forgery".

It is the opening section of Chapter XVlll of the Penal Code dealing with offences relating to documents Md to property· marks. This opening scctjon in .sense defines the offence of forgery. Section· 467 of the.Penal Code provides:

"467. Forgery of valuable security, will, ·etc. -Whoever forges document which purports to be valuable security or will, or an aµthorlty to adopt son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable seeurity' or to receive the principal, interest, or dividends th~eon, or to receive or deliver any money, moviible propehy; or valuitb)e security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery o.f any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to ten years, and . . . shall also be liable to fine".

H' >'»· ,.

•.. '.•

The purpose of our extracting the two sections of the Penal Code is to show the offence which is made punishable under s. 467 of

the Penal Code.is in respect of an offence described in s. 463. Once it is accepted that s. 463 defines forgery and s. 467 punishes for-aery ofa particular category, the provision ins. 195 (I) (h) (ii) of the Code would immediately be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under s .. 467 of the Penal Code is an offence described in s. 463, in the absence of complaint by the Court the prosecution would not be 111aintainable.. We have no do.ubt in our mind that the High .Court took worng view of the matter.We may briefly refer to two decisions of this Court. In Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat,(') the accused had filed suit .for recovery of certain money on the basis of · forged cheque and private complaint had been filed before .the Court of the Judicial Magistrate alleging offences under ss. 467 and 471 of the I.P.C. The appellant raised an objection that in view of s. 195 (I) (c) of the Code 'of Criminal Procedure cognizance' of the offence could not be taken on private complaint. The ·High Court upheld the order of commitment by finding that though there ~ould be bar for prosecution for offences punishable un.der ss. 467 and 471 of the I.P.C.·on private complaint, in the facts of the case that question did not arise and this Court refused to interfere. by holding that the alleged offences had been committed at time when the accused was not party to the civil proceeding. Not the· conclusion but the ratio supports our view.

In S.L. Goswami v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabbalpur,(') to which one of us wa;_ party, it was held that an offence under s. 466, I.P.C. was covered by clause (c) of s. 195· (I) of the Code _and it came within the purview of the section as the offence under s. 463, T.P.C: is dealt ·with in s. 466, I.P.C. Section 466, I P.C., it wa~ pointed out, was an aggravated form of forgery in that the forgery should relate to document specified in that section. Section 466, I.P.C. was, therefore, an offence as described ins. 463; I.P.C. which was committed in relation to record or proceeding of or in Court of justice. What was said in tire' afore· said decision in regard to the offence under s. 466, I.P.C. has full application to an offence under s. 467, I.P.C. Therefore, the ratio of the last cited decision has full application to the present case.

SUJ'.RllME COURT REPORTS

In view of what we have said above, the prosecution in the instant case on the basis of private complaint and in the absence of complaint from the appropriate civil court where the alleged fraudulent receipt has been produced, would not be sustainable.· As we are of the view that if the prosecution is allowed to continue serious prejudice would be caused to the appellants and they would be called upon to face trial which would not be sustainable, we allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court ·and quash the complaint case filed against the appellants.

H.S.J<..

Appeal allowed.

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