ANOOP JAISWAL versus GOVERNMENT OF INDIA & ANR.

ANOOP JAISWAL

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA & ANR .

Jani;pry 24, 1984 ·

{ E. S. VBNKATARAMIAR AND R .. B. MISRA, .JJ)

Constitution of India-Art. 311 (2)-.-Applicability of. Protectton . under Art. 311 (2) available if the order of dischcirge is JOund to be by ·way of .1untshment. To. see whether an "order of discharge is,by way of pllnishment,form oftheorde;ti irot decisil'~. Court must g~ behilid the form and ascertain the tru~ character of the order.

The appellant who had been selected for appOintment in the"' Indian Police Service was undergoing training'lfis probationer in the National __ Police Ac~demy. On June 22, 1981 due. to rain the appellant as well .other probationers reached late by few minutes 3.t the _·changed venue for· conducting :P. T. For this delay explantion was cal.led from all the probationers. In his explanation the appellant sincerely regretted the lapse. The ap~~lant was" considered to be·one of- the ring-leaders. ~who was res~onsible for the delay. The Director of ~the Ac3.derny wiihout holding ·an enquiry into the alleged misconduct recommended to the Government that the appellant should be discharged from service. On the basis of that iecommendation the- Government by its order dated November Q, 1981 discharged the appellant from service. The Government rejeCted· the appellant's repiesent~tion against the order discharging him. The appellant ·challenged the vaiidity of the ·order under Aft. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petiti0n at the·admis.sion sta_gc. Hence this appeal. The appeUa~t contend.ed that the order discharging him wa~ in reality an' order terminating "his services on the ground of rilisconduct and f'S415uch could ·not ·have been passed without Holding an enquiry as contemplated under Art 311 (2) of the Constitution and. the relevant rules governing such an enquiry. ' .

Allowing the appeal ..

HELD : The impllgned order of discharge is set aside .

Where ·uie form of the order i_s mere_Iy cam<;iufiage for an order of dismissal for misco_nduct ~t is always _open to the Court before which the order js challenged to go behind the fo~ and_ascertain t_he true character of the order .. If the Court . holds. t~at the .order -though in_ the_ form is merely determination of employ~ ment is in reality cloak for an order of punishment, the Court ·would not be debarred, merely b~ause of the form·of the order, in giving effect to the rights' <Wnferred by law upon the employee. [563 E-F]

Parshotam Lai Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] · S. C. R. 828; Shl/msher .Singh & Anr. v. State oj'Punjab, [1975] I S. C, R. 814; State of Punjab & Anr.

f!984] 2 S.C.R ..

. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . . .

v. Shri Silkh Raj Bahadur, · (1969] 3 S.C.C:. 603;· Stale of Bihar & Ors. 'v. ·Shiva .· Bhikshuk Mishra, (1971] 2 S. C.R. 191; R.S. Sia/ v . .The.State of U. p, & Ors., . [197.4p S. C. R. 754; State .of U.P. v; Ram Chandra· Trivedi, [1977] 1 ·s. C. R .. 462; and I. N. Sakseno v. State of Madhya Pradesh; [1967] 2 S. C. R. 496;. referred to. · , .

In the instarit case, on. gOing· through the rccQrd· ·and taking. intojaccount all the attendant 'circumstances the Court, "is_ satisfied that the __ alleged l'ct of mis-. condl.!:ct On JunC 22, 1981 Was· t.he : real f0und-ation for the· action taken. against the aPPellant.-:lnd _that the othei- iristances stated .in the· course of the co~nter affl.9.avit ~re mere allegations which ar~ put forward orily for purposes of strengtti~ning the· defcllce which ·is otheiwise ve'rY weak.· The case is one which attracted ArtiC1e··311 (2) of ·the.Constitution ·as ··the. iffipug·nCd order amounts tp tefmination of se.rvice by. way Of punish1nent anct·an eilquiry should have been held in accordariCe with-the -said· Constitutional provision. That admittt:dlY. havirtg hot ~~n·.d.one, tfie .imp~gned. o.rd_er is liable. to _be Struck dowq. ,[4~5 B·C]

C1VIL APPELLATE Jrni.iS;ICTION Jrni.iS;ICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3040 of 1982 . 1982 . . . . . ·. . .•.... · Appoal by Spo.cia] leave from the Judgtnent and Order dated the 30th August, 1982 of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. 1580 of l 982j. · . ·

C1VIL APPELLATE Jrni.iS;ICTION Jrni.iS;ICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3040 of 1982 . 1982 . .

.•.... ·

. .....

K.N. Bbatt for the Appellant.

M.S. Gujra/ and G.S. Narain for the Respondent .

.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

VENKATARAMIAH, J. June 22, 1981 was really bad day f°' the . app~llant A1ioop Jaiswa·J w))n having .. been selecied by the Union Public Service Commission for· appointment in the Indian Police· Service was. undergoing training as proba.tioner at the Sardar Valla-bhbhai Patel National Police· Academy, Hyderabad alongwitk ofoer probationers, On that day all the probatio.riers were expected to. be present at 5.50 A.M. at the field where the ceremonial ilrill practice was to be conducted.· Sinceit ~as raining at that time it appears thar the. venue was shifted to the Gymnasium .Hall wtete it was proposed. · to cond.uct P.T./unartned combat practice. and intimation was sent ta· the .trainees at the: Mess. When .the Assistant Director (Outdoor Trai~ing) reached the Gymnasium at S.50 A.M. none of the pr~ba: tion.ers had ·.reached there. They ali reached the place 22 minutes · late i.e. by 6.15 A.M. when the rains had abated a~d the parade c~m~ menced at 6.15 A.M .. It appears that earlier when a.messenger sent . by the Assistant Director had gone to rnll the probationers tl1ey had

asked for vehicle to ·go to tile place as it ·was. r~ining. This ,delay . was considered as an inddent which called for an enquiry. · Explapa-tion was· called from all 'the probationers. The appellant was coy- · sidered to be one of the ring leaders who:was responsible for the delay. • When t.he appellant was asked lfbout ihe incident, he gave his explana, t1on to the Director of the National Police Academy which read thus:

· The .Director,

National Police Academy,

• Hyd.erabad.

Dear Sir,

. fn reply to your Momo. dated 22nd June,.1981 I.humbly s~bmit that as for iny being late in P,T. by IO mts,, I sincerely regret the lapse: But the ·second charge that I instigated oihe~s to do 'so is totally baseless and without single iota of truth. . I request you .Sir to make thorough enquiry fo~o. such an allegation. I never had ·nor have such plebian . mentallv. · . J •• · Thanking you, Yours'·sincerely, sd/-Anoop Jaiswal'~ . ·• ..

It would appear·that .the Director without holding· an enquiry into the alleged misconduct recommended to the. Qovernment of India that the appellant should be discharged from the service. On •ihe .basis of the above report, the G'overnment of India passed the order of discharge dated November 5, 19Sland 'communicated it .to the ,appellant. The material part of the order.reads thus.:

''No. Ic220l 1/9/81 Pers. HI

Government of India/Bharat. Sarkar M nistry of Home Arfairs/Grih Mantralaya N~w Delhi-110001, the 9 Nov. 1981

·• ORDER

Whereas the· Central Government is satisfied that Shri Anoop Jai3wal, appoi~ti;ci to the lndi.an Police Service on pro-

(1984] 2 S.C.R.

SUPRE'J:E COURT REPORTS

bation on the result of the c;vil Service E~amination held in the year 1979, is unsuitable for bein,g memb~r of the said service, he is hereby discharged under clause (b) of Rule 12 of the Indian Police Service (P•cbation) Rules, 1954.

. The order\ of discharge. will take dfect from the date on which it is served on the said Shri Anoop Jaiswal. ' .

In the name of and on behalf of the President of India .

. , sd/-(NARENDRA PRASA~ . , D'IR.ECTOR" · ; •

On, receipt of the above order of discharge, the app€llant made representation on November 14, 1981 to the Government of India . .. :· · to reconsider the ma tier. ·It appears that the Director of the jlational Police Academy on this occasion recommended that the appellant may be rei11stated. That representation was rejected by the Govern-ment ~of India 'On April° 8, 1982. Thereafter,. he filed petition under Art.icle ·226 of the Con·stitution before the High Court of Delhi ~·contending that the·.order of discharge was violative of Article 311(2) a1~d Article 1.4 of the Constitution. That petition was dismissed by . •the High Court at the stage of admission on August 30,1982 after hearing the counsel· for the .Union of India. Against the judgment of the· High C:ourt.-ihe appe:lant has filed this appeal with special. leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The main contention . of the appellant before us is that the order ' djscharging the petitioner though on the face of it appears to carry• . .no stigmais in reality an order terminating his service on the ground of ·misconduct alleged to have been committed by him on June: 22, 1981 in acting as one of the ring leaders who were responsible for tlie delay of about twenty-two minutes in the arrival of the probationers at the Gymnasium and that such an order could not have been passed without holding an enquiry as contemplate51 under Article 311(2) of " the Constitution and ihe relevant ·rules governing such an enquiry. He has also contended that the m•tler is based· on conjunctures and surm.ises and by way of illustration he has referred us to paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit which reads thus ;

"P.ara 13 ;

The petitioner did not conduct himself fully in accordance with the p~esotibed rules and regulations during his training· period. On one. occasion"when he was sanctioned '!eave for 16 days in the month Qf May, 1981, he did not report himself for duty in time. ·He absented himself wilfully o.n !.6.1981 without applying for. leave for the day. For this action, he was warned by the Director against recurrence of· such con-quct The period of his wilful absence fof one day was treated as leave without pay. On two earlier occasions; the petitioner's conduct w~s found prejudicial to good order and discipline, on the first occ~sion lie was verbally counselled by the Chief. Drill Instruc_tor and.on the.second occasion • Memo mas issued to ~him. ·

There was no gradation maintained Jn tile Atademy · · about the aitendauce, in terms of which the petitioner had the record of being second (or may be third) highest in the Academy. However, -thisrecord in this respect was other.wise satisfactory,"

· The reply of the appellant to the above allegation is found in paragraph· 6 of the rojoinder.affidavit filed by the appellant which reads : ·

"Re: Paral3: The avermentsma de in;iara 13 of the petition are reiterated and the contentions of, the respondent to the contrary are denied as incorrect. It is reiterated that the petitioner conducted himsel( full in accordance with · rules and regulations. The allegatiol). made by the respondent that I absented myself wilfully on 1.6.1981 without applying for leave for. the day is highly misleading.· The correct fact is that J was sanctioned my Earned Leave on 1s:s.81 for period o( 16days, and I was to report back for duty on 1.6.81 before 12.00 noon. I made arrangemen_t .to reach Hyderabad l:iefore 8.00 a.m. on 1.6.1981. However' en account.of late running of train ·in which I wµs travelling and C<rn1;equently missing the connecting train, I could reach Hyderabad only around noon and I report 'lt 1.00 p.m. .AU-these facts were duly.explained to the Asstt. Director, Outdoor Training; and he· permitted. to attend the afternoon classes on 1.6.81 which J did. (However, at this sugg<slion, !applied ·f6r leave for the day and the leave was sanctioned without pay). It is

incorrect to say that I was warned for'this. AU that the Director said was that o.n suc.h situations, the proper course was to .apply for day's leavt ·which I did as stated earlier. It is, therefore, very unreasonable to characterise the said incident as ·wilful absence:. The further allegation. that . on the earlier occasions, the· petitioner's c~nduct was found prej"dioial to good crrder and disoipline, is very vague and without any . ·particulars. Counselling by the Instructor . concerned -i; routine affair and, in fact, the Instructors are . .. . \ meant. to counsel.· ·Even rega,rding the second occasion, wlien memo was said to. have issued, it is not stated as to. what the ·offence was. His significarti to note that ··the. respondent has ·not denied tl\e allegation made by ' . ' me . that . J · was not the· only one who received such memos and that without exception all the probationary officers had at some time or the other received such me;,.,os. J de11y tlie rest of the .allegations an<>l reiterate the. averments made in para l3 of tlie petition.'.'

The .. Jearned counsei for the parties have cited number of. decisions before us in· support of·their respective cases. On going ·'through theh1 we are of the view that there is not much divergence in them as to the true Jega./ principles· to be follo;,,ed in ma!ters of this nature but the ·real proble~ appears to be· one of applicati_on of thpse pri~cipl's iri given case in determining whether the parti- . cular action taken amounts to punishment attracting Article 311(2} · of the Constituti~n or a· mere discharge s;mPJiciter not requiring the holding of .a·n: enquiry as contemplated under Article 311(2). .We shall now deal with two leading cases having bearing on the question before us. In Parshotam• Lal Dhingta. v. Uni~1i of India<" this Court after. a.n elaborate consideration of· the relevant· provisions of the \:onstitution and judicial . . . ' decisi~ns ' . ... . cited before them observed.: . -.

:'The net ·1;esu!t is-that "it.iS cnly iri thcsc_ C-asrs ~l.cre 11·.e . Govcr,)Jn~nt intends to inflict those_ three ·fcnns of punis)1-ments .tl1at the Govern1nent S·:'!Jva'nt must be give"n reason-able opp0rtunity:ofsho\Ying cau~e against the actibn propos·ed fo be taken ill regard to them. It fol!O\vs, ·therefore, that ff the· termin.c1tfon of nvice is sought to be brougU about otherwise than by way of punishment then the Gove.rnment _servant \Yhose s·ervice IS so terminated· Cannot claim· the· I .

. (I) [1958] S.C.R. 828 .

[, ]' +

·'°' 1 • [\ ]

protection of Art: 3 I I (2) and the decisions cited before 0us and refetre.d to above, in so far as they lay.down that principle, must be held to be rightly decided,

The rofegoing conclusion, however, does not .sol.ve the .. entire problem, for· it lias yet to be ascertained as to when an order for the termination of service is inflicted .as and by way of punishment and when it is not" .. "" " ......... .

. Wliere person is appointed' to permanent post in Governm~nt service on probation, the terminati.on of his service during· or at the end' of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be punishment, for ·the Govern-me.nt servant, so appointed; has no ·right to continue to hold such post any more:thaq the servant employed on pw-. batio.n by private empl0yer is entitled to do. Such termination does not operate ·as forfeiture ·.of any right of the servant to. hold th.e post, for he has no such right and obviously cannot. be dismissal, removal or reduction in. rank by way of punishment .. · ... _ ...................... .

ft does not~ however, follow that;.exceptin the three cases . mentioned .above, in. all" other cases, fer1niii.ation of service · of Government servant who has ·no ·right to h{s post, e.g., where he was appointed ·to post, temporary or permanent, either on probation or on an officiating basis and had not acquired quasi-permanent status, the termination cannot, in any circumstances, be dismissal or removal from service by way of punishme~t. , ....... : ' , ................ : ..... .

Jn short, if the termination of service is· founded on the · right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not punishment and carries with ·it ·no evil .consequences and so Art. .311 is not attracted . But even if the Govermpeni has, by contract. or .under the rules, the .right to terminate the empioyment without going thro\Ighthe procedure prescribed for inflictihg the punish1'1ent of dismissal or remo.val or reduction in rank, .the .Govern' m>:nt may, nevertheless, choo.se to punish the se.rva1\t and· if the te~mination of servite is sought· to be founded on mis-cond net, negligence, · inefficiency· or other disqualification, · then· it is punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with."

[1984] 2 S.C.R.

|Anr. Vv. State of Punjab” decigeThe case ofen Sing Court irectly deals with the “cedby Bench aie -¢ discharged from service without complyingof Pra) of the Constitution.In that case two Tudicia|ie acs of the Punjab Judicial Service were involved. For purpose,of the present appeal it is sufficient if we refer to the case pertainingto Ishwar Chand Agarwal who was at the material ume serving as aprobationer in the Punjab CivilService (Judicial Branch). By anorder dated December 15,1969 his services were terminated.Thesaid order did not contain any statetement which would attach anyStigma to the career of the officer concerned.It read as follows ;°

“On the recommendation of the High Court of Punjaband Haryana, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to dispensewith the services of Shri Ishwar ChandAgarwal, P.C.S.(Judicial Branch), with immediate effect, under Rule 7(3)in Part ‘D’ of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch)Rules, 1951,as amended from time to time’’.”’

Rule-7(3) of the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules,1951 relied on in the above order provided that on the completionof the period of probation ofany member of the service, the Governormight on the recommendation of the High Court confirm him in his|appointment if he was working against permanenf vacancy, or ifhis work or conduct was reported by the High Coart to be unsatis-_factory, dispénse with his services or revert him to his former-sub-_ Stantive post, if any, or extend his period of probation and thereafter"pass such orders as he could have passed on the*expiry of the firstPeriodofhis judgment of probation. thus’:In this case Ray, C.J. observed in the course

the“No abstract propositioncan be laid down that where— services of probationer are terminated without sayingin the facts and circumstance: wee amount toa punishmentor for similar reason without ehvetetaarhatanaA!his getting reasonable[o][ 2][ Propoer][ enquiry][ and][ without]against his discharge}opportunity ofshowing causefrom.ee it may ina given case amount to removal service within the mean;“stitution.aning of Article 311(2) of the Con-

eee

(1) (1975]1S.C.R. 814.

ANOOP TAISWALVY. GOVT. OF INDIA (Venkataramiah, J.)

Refore probationeris confirmed the authority concernedis under an obligation to consider whether the work of theprobationer 1s satisfactory or whether he is suitable for thepost. In the absence of any Rules governing probationer inthis respect the authority may come fo the conclusion that onaccount of inadequacy for the job or for any termperamentalor other obiect not involving moral turpitude the probationerig unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged.No punishmentis involved in this.The authority may insomecases be of the view that the conduct of the proba-tioner may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry.Butin those cases the authority may nothold an inquiry andmay simply discharge the probationer with view to givinghim chanceto make good in other walks of life withouta stigmaat the time of termination of probation.If, onthe other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on' charges of misconduct of inefficiency or corruption, and ifhis services are terminated without following the provisions

of Artiele 311(2) he can claim protection.”’

Having said so, the learned Chief Justice proceeded to examinethe facts of the case and found that an enquiry officer nominated bythe Director of Vigilance had recorded statements of some witness€s_—behind the back of the offycer concerned in respect of certain allega-tions of misconduct and had on that basis made report to the HighCourt and that the High Court had after accepting the said report,made recommendation to the Governor to the effect that the officerwas not suitable person to be retained in service.The order oftermination was because of the recommendations in the report.Thethe learged Chief Justice observed:

“The order of termination of the services of Ishwar.Chand Agarwal is clearly by way of punishment in the factsand circumstances of the case. The High Court not only deni-ed Ishwar Chand Agarwal the protection under Arti¢le 311 butalso denied itself the dignifiedcontrol over thesubordinatejudiciary.The form of the order is not decisive as to whetherthe order is by way ofpunishment.Even an innocuouslyworded order terminating the service may in the fact and.circumstances of-the case establish that an enquiry intoallegations of serious and gravecharacter of misconductinvolving stigma has been made in infraction of the provision311.In such a.case the simplicity of the form of

ee\. Hts

[1984] 2 s.c.r.

the order will not give any sancity. That ts exactly what hasof termination ts illegal and must be set aside.”happened in the case of Ishwar Chand Agarwal. The Order ]

Krishna Lyer, J. who agreed with the learned Chief Justice hadat the end of this judgment this to say ;

‘‘Again, could it be that if you summarily pack off

probationer, the order is judicially unscrutable and immune ?_ Tf you conscientously seek to satisfy yourself about allega-- tions by some sort of enquiry you get caught in the coilsof law, however harmlessly the order may be phrased ?And, so this sphinx-complex has had to give way in later cascs. xIn some cases the rule of guidance has been stated to be‘the substance of the matter’; and the ‘foundation’ of theorder. When does ‘motive’ trespass into ‘foundation’ ?When do we lift the veil of form to touch the ‘substance’ ?~ When the Court says So.. These ‘Freudian’ frontiers obviouslyfail in the -work-a-day wotld and Dre Tripathi’s observa-tions in this context are not without force.He says:

fhis

“As already explained, in situation where the orderof termination purports to be mere order of dischargewithout stating the ‘stigmatizing results of the depart-mental enquiry search for the ‘substance of the matter’will be indistinguishablefrom asearch for the motive(real, unrevealed object) of the order.Failure to appre-ciate . this relationship between motive (the real, butunrevealed object) and from (the apparent, of. officiallyrevealed object) in the present context has led to anunreal interplay of words and phrases wherein symbolslike ‘motive’, ‘substance’ ‘form’ or ‘direct’ parade indifferent combinations without communicating precisesituations or entities in the world of facts.”

On behalf of the Union of India reliance has been placed onState ofPunjab & Anr.v.Shri SukhRaj Bahadur, Union ofIndia & Ors.v. R.S. Dhaba,’ State ofBihar & Ors.v.Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra,® R.S. “

(2) (1969) 3 S.C.C. 603.(1) 11968) 3 S.C.R. 234.G)971] 2 SCR. 191,

Sialv. The State of U.P.&Ors."),State af U.P.v.RamChandraTrivediand /.N. Saksena v. State ofMadhya Pradesh.“® We have gone throughthese decisions.Except the case of Ram Chandra Trivedi (supra)all other cases referred to above were decided prior to the decisions inShamsher Singh’s case (supra’ which is judgment delivered by aBench of seven Judges.As pointed out by us in all these cases inclu-ding the case of Ram Chandra Trivedi (supra) the principle applied_is the one enunciated by Parshotam Lal Dhingra’s case (supra) whichwe have referred to earlier.It is urged relying upon the observationin Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur’s case (supra) that it is only when there is afull scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311(2). of theConstitution i.e. an enquiry officer is appointed, charge sheet sub-*mitted, explanation called for and considered, any termination madethereafter will attract the operation.of Article 311(2)..It is significantthat in the very same decision it is stated that the circumstancespre-ceding or.attendant on the order of termination of service have to be- examined ineach case,the motive behind it beingimmaterial.|As observed by. Ray, C.J. in. Shamsher Singh’s case (supra) the formof the order is not decisive as to whether thé order is by way of punishement and that even an innocuouslyworded order terminating. theservice may in the fact ‘and circumstances of the case establish thatan enquiry into allegations ofserious and grave character of misconductinvolving“stigma has been made in infraction of the provision ofArticle 311(2), -;

It is, therefore, now well-settled that where the form of theorder is merely camouflage for an order of dismissalfor ‘misconductit is always open to the Court before which the order is challengedto go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order.If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a;determination of employment is in reality cloak for an order ofpunishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of theform offhe order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law uponthe employee.=,

'»-In the instant case, the. period of probation had not yet beenover. The impugned order of discharge was passed in the middleof the probationary period.An explanation was called for from -the’appellant regarding the alleged act of indiscipline, namely, arriving

(1) [1974] 3 S.C.R. 754,+ (2) [1977]1 S.C:R. 462,

“+(3) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 496.

[1984] 2 S.C.R.

'SUPREME COURT RNPORT.S

fate at the G¥mnasium and acting as oile of !he ring leaders on the occasion and his explanation was obtained. Similar explanations we.re called for from other probationers and. enquiries were made . behind the back of the appellant, . only the .case of the appellant was dealt with severely in the end. The cases Of other probationers who were also considered to. be ring leaders were not seriously_taken note of. Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it .cannot stand alone. Though the notfog in the file of the Government . may be irrelevant, the- cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for· the order should ·be read alongwith the order for the purpose of deter-mining its true character. Jf on reading the two together the Court . teacll!'s the .conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct ·was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground· as the appellant has not been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided m Article 311(2) of the Constitution.

The Union of India has placed before us.all the relevant material including the recommendation of the Directo~ of the National Police Academy that the appellant may be reinstated.· In this ca;e, as stated above, explanation was called for form the appellant and. other pro-bationers: Bx,planations were received and ·an the probationers , Including the aJ?pellant were individually interviewed in order to ascertain' facts. Explanation submitted by him .and the answers given by others had weighed with the Director before making the recci1l!men- · dation to the Government of India on the basis of which action was tak~n. The only ground which ultimately prevailed upon the Director was that the appellant had not shqwn any sign u( repentance without informing him that his case would be dealt with leniently if he showed anv sign of repentance. In fact in the ·very. first reply he gave to the Director on being asked about the incident which took place on June 22, 1981, the · ~ppelhnt stated '.I sincer.elv regret ti1e lapse,' Neither in the·letter which the Director first wrote to the Central Government, nor in the counter affidavit filed fo. this Court, due importance ·has been given to the said expression of regret and it is further seen that no additional lapse on the part of the appellant between June 22, 1981 and the date on which the Director wrote the letter to the central Government, which would show that the apP"llant had not shown any sign of repentance is pointed out, although th~re is reference to his reporting to duty late on an earlier date oil June !, 1981. On . goihg .through. the above record before the' Court and .taking into •

account all the attendant circumstances we are satisfied. that the Director wished to make the case of the appellaµt an example· for others including those other probationers who were similarly situated so that they may learn a. Jesson therefrom.

narration Of the facts of the case leaves. no doubt that the alleged act of misconduct on June 22, 1981 was the real foundation for the action taken against the appellant and that the other instances 'stated in the course of the counter affidavit are mere allegations which are put forward on!)' for purposes of strengthenipg the defence which is otherwise ver 1 weak. The case is one which attrac.ted Article 311(2) '(. .. of the Constitu'tion as the impugned order amounts tb termination of service by way of punishment and an enquiry.should have been held in accordance with the said' constitutional provision. That admittedly having not been done, the impugned order is liable to be struck down. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 5, 1981 discharging the appellant from service. The appellant should no\\ be re-· instated in service with the sa.me rank and seniority he was entitled to before the impugned order was passed as if it had not been passed at all. He is also entitled to all consequentiai benefits including the appropriate year.of allotment and the arrears of salary and allowances upto the 'date of his reinstatement. The appeaHs accofdingly allowed.

The appellant had to face this case just at the ~ommencement of his career. We ha,ve allowed his claim in the name of the Con-stitution. This should help him to regain his spirit and also encourage him to turn out to be public servant in the true sense of that expression.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we 'feel that the parties should be directed to bear their own costs. '

A.ppea/ allowed.