CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF AND OTHERS versus MAJOR DHARAM PAL KUKRETY

) • ...

CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF AND OTHERS

MAJOR DHARAM PAL KUKRElY

March 21, 1985

[Y.V, CllANDRACHUD, C. J., D.P. MADON, AND RANGANATH MISRA, J.J.} .

,, ~·Constitution of India Article 226-Mairttainab/lity of writ petition at the , .stage Of show cau.Se notice to terminate the services of service personnel by the Chief of the Army staff when the finding of court martial even on revision ·. is perverse or ogaist the weight of-evidence on record-Army Act, 1950 sect!oru ·· 18 to 24, .108, 121, 127, 153, 154, 160(1),)91and1he Army Rules 1954 Rules i 14 arid 68 to 71, scope of-Competency of the Chief of the Army Staff to have recourse to Rule 14 of the Army Rules, when the general court martial orlginOl/y ~and on re11ision returned verdict of '"Not gui/ty''-Principle of double jeopardy -: Aufrefois Acquit applicability-Constitution of India Article 20(2} read rt.'ith ; Army Act, section 121. · ·

The r~spOndent, permanent Commissi~ned officer. of the Indian Army holding the . substantive rank of captain and the acting rank of major, as result of certain incidentS which are alleged to have taken p13.ce on November '5_ a~d 6, 1975 was Ordered to be tried by general court martial. · Oq March :. 13, · 1976, the court martial announced its finding subject to confirmation, ibe - finding being "'Not guilty of all the charges." The General Officer COminin-· : the' Confirming authority, did "ctiD~ Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and not OrissaArea, the third .. confirm the verdict and appel13:Dt,'~WliCi-Was b)t0 his order dated : April 3, 1976, sent back.the finding for revision.· :Tue· ·same'- generar cO~rt ".F inartial, therCfore, reassembled on April 14, 1976, and after hearing both sides ·-and taking into consideratiOn the observations made by the third appeltant : in his said ordef dated April 3, 1976, adhered to .its original' view and ·once .iga~ annouDced the finding subject to confifmation, that the resPondent ·was .·'·Not iuilty- of all the charges". ·The third appellant· reserved·· confirmation .::of ihe finding on revision by superior authority, namCty; the General Officer, ·.'~minanding-in-Chief, Central_ Comm3.n~ Lucknow,.: .the second appeJiaD.t, :.and forwarded the papers to him. ·By his order dated May 2S, ·1976, 'the · second apPellant ·did not confirm the finding on revision Of thC ge.D.eral cciurt· martial. The charges made against the respondent, the finding and the DOD· confirmation thereof were promulgated as required by Rule 71 of the Army ·Rules. Ther~ter, the Chief. of the Anny Staff under Rule 14 · of the Army ~Rules 1954 issued· the impugned. show cause notice dated November 12 1976 [4 ]- stating that the Chief of the Anny Staff had carefully considered . the fa.;ts . of I lH·7. the 'Case aS also .the respondent's, defenCe at the trial and . being satisfied that ... ; .. • ·,.' ' . ,

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fresh trial by court martial for the said offences· was inexpddicnt, he was of the opinion that the respondent's misconduct as disclosed in the proceedina;s rendered his further retention in the service undesirable. and called upon th• respondent to submit his explanation and defence, if any, within twenty-five days of the receipt of the said notice. Along with the said notice copies of abstracts of evidence and the court~n1artial proceedings were forwarded to tbe respondent. The 'respondent, thereupon, filed in the Higli Court of Allahabad writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 84 of 1.976, which was allowed by Division Bench ef the said High Court. Hence the appeal by special leave.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. Where the threat of prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdictic'>ri, person cannot be asked to wait for the injury to be ca.used to him before seeking the Court's protection. If, on the other hand, the Chief of the· 'Army Staff had the power in law to issue the said notice, it would not be open to the respondent to approach the court under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage of notice only and in such an event his writ petition -could be said to be premature. This was, however, not contention which cOuld have been decided at the threshold until the co,urt had comC to finding with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the impugned notice. Having held that the impugned notice was issued without any jurisdiction, the High Court was right in further holding that the respon-dent's writ petition was not pren1ature and was maintainable. l420C-EJ

2. Whether the Chief of the Army Staff was competent to issue the impUgned notice of show cause depends upon the relevant provisions of the .Ai-my Act 1950 and the Army Rules 1954. Under Section 153 of the Army Act, Do fulding or sentence of general, district or summary general, court--nlartial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the Army, Act. Under Section 160 of the Army Act, the confirming authority baS the power to dire~t revision of the finding of court martial only once. There is no power in the confirming authority, if it does not agree with the ~finding ori. revision, to direct second revision of such finding. In the absence ~f ally su~h confirmation, whetller of the original finding or of the findine on revision,.by reason of the provisions of Section 153 the findina is not valid. Therefore, irl the case of the respondent, the finding of the general court-martial -On revisio~ not having been confirmed was not valid. Equally, there is, ·however, no express provision in the Army Act which empowers the holding· ef fresh court-martial when the finding of court-martial on revision is not _confirmed. l427C-FJ

3. Though it is open to the Central Government or the Chief of the ,Army Staff to have recourse to Rule "14 of the first instance ·without directing · trial by court-martial .of the concerned officer, there is no provision in the ,Anny Act o~ in Rule 14 or any of the other Rules of the Army Rules whic"ll

.• e~Jlip .OP ARMY STAPF v. D. ii. KtlKRiitY (Madon, ),)

prohibits .. t~• Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff from resor• ting in such case to Rule 14. (429F-G(

In the present case, the Chief of the Army Staff had, on the one hand, the finding of general court-martial which had not been confirmed and the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the further retention of the resp0i{dent. in the service was undesirable and, on the other hand; there were three differenee conflicting decisions of different High Courts on this point which point was not concluded by definitive pronouncement of this CO'urt. In such circllmstances, to order fresh trial by court-martia I could certainly be said to be both inexpedient and impracticable aild the only expedient and practic-able course, therefore, open to the Chief of the Army Staff would be to take action against the respondent under Rule 14, which he did. The action of the Chief of the Army Staff in issuing the impugned notice was, therefo;e, neither without jurisdiction nor unwarranted in law. (430B-D] ·

Capt. Kashmir Singh Shergill v. The Union of India & Anothe"r, Civil Writ No. 553 of 1974 decided on Nove~ber 6, 1974 by Prakash Narain, J., ·approved.

G.B. Singh v. Union of India and Others, (1973) Crl. L.J. 485; Major Manohar Lal v. The Union of India and Anr., 1971 (I) S.L.R. 717; J.C. 13018 Subedar Surat Singh v. The Chief Engineer Projects (Beacon) C/o.56 A.P.O . AIR 1970 J. & K 179 referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 663 of 1978.

From the Judgment and Order dt. 9.3.77' of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 84/77. j 1 ' (

Dr. Anand Prakash, V.B. Saharaya and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Appellants

H. S. Parihar, for the Respondent.

The judgment of the Court was delivered ·by

MADON, J. This Appeal by Special Leave granted by this _ Court is preferred against the judgment and order of Division Bench of the Allahabad High Conrt allowing the writ petition ·filed by the Respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution of India .and quashing show cause notice dated November 12,1976 issued · by the First Appellant, the Chief of the Army Staff, under Rule 14 of the Army Rules, 1954.

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The facts which have given rise to this Appeal lie in narrow compass. The Rc>pondent is a' permanent commissioned officer of the Indian Army holding the substantive rank of Captain and the acting rank of Major. In November 1975, he was posted in .the Army School of Mechanical Transport, Faizabad. As result of certain incidents .which are alleged to have taken place on November 6 and 7, 1975, the Respondent was tried by general court-martial on four charges. It is unnecessary to reproduce the charges made against the Respondent. The charge-sheet was dated January 20, 1976, and was issued by the Commandant, Ordinance Depot, Fort Allahabad. On January 24, 1976, the Respondent was ordered to be tried by general court·martial. The Respondent pleaded not guilty and his trial took place at Lucknow before general court-martial consisting of one Brigadier, two Majors and two Captains. Both the prosecution and the Respondent Jed evidence. On March 13, 1976, the court-martial announced its finding subject to confirmation, the finding being "Not guilty of all the charges". The General Officer, Commanding Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa Area, the Third Appellant, who was the confirming authority, did not confirm the verdict and by his ori:Ier dated April 3, 1976, sent back the finding for revision. The same general court-martial, therefore, re-assembled on April 14, 1976, and after hearing both sides and taking into .consideration the observations made by the Third Appellant in his said order dated April 3, 1976, adheredJto its original view and once again announced the finding tt at the Respondent was "Not guilty of all the charges". The said finding was also expressly announced as being subject to confinr ation. The Third Appellant reserved confirmation of the finding on nvision by superior authority, namely, the General Officer,· Coinma 1ding-in-Chief, Central Command, Lucknow, the Second Appellar t, and forwarded the papers to him. By his order dated May 25, 1976, the Second Appellant did not confirm the finding on revision of the general court-martial. The charges made against the Respo ldent, the finding and the non-confirmation thereof were promulgated as required by Rule 71 of the Army Rules.

Thereafter the Chief of the Army Staff under Rule 14 of the Army Rules issued the impugned show cause notice dated Nov >mber 12, 1976.'. It was stated in the said notice that the Chief )f the Army Staff had carefully considered the facts of the case as.also ·the Respondent's defence at the trial and being satisfied that fresh ·. t.rial 'by court-martial for the said offiences was inexpedie 1t,. he

' ;. ' ':fafIEp OF ARMY StAFF v. o. r, i.urut'f (Madon, }.)

:.was of.the. opinion that the_ Respondent's. misconduct.as.: disclosed l . in the. proceedings 'rendered i his further . retention in: the ser,vice . , undesirable. The : Respondent was called upon by; the ·said :_notice · ·to submit his explanation and defence, if any, within· twen\y.five days of the receipt of the .said notice. : Along with the ,said notice · : _copies. of. abstracts of, evidence· and the, court-martial;: proceedings ·.were forwaded to the Respondent. , The Respondent thereupon filed U in the, High Court of Allahabad ~rit petition under Artk!~:226 of the Constitution of India being Civil Miscellaneous .Writ.~o_. 84 of 1976, which, as .aforesaid, was allowed. ,. . ·.;, , , . "

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. . . . Ii was the contention of the 'Respondent in his writ pet.ition that.under.the Army Act, 1950 (Act No. 46of1950), and th~ Army rules ... there .was an , initial option' either. to. have: the conc~fncd . officer tried by. court·martial or to take action ,against him. under Rule 14 a·nd that in.his case the.option .having been, exercised :to, try· , him by, court-martial, the Chief of Jhe _Army, Staff was .not .com--~ petent to have recourse._ to Rule 14 after the .Respondent • was .. acquitted both at the time of the original trial and on revision .. :.This . contention found favour_ with the High Court. The High <;::ourt •held · _ , that as the Respondent had in fact been tried by court-martial which · . both at the time or the original trial and. on .revision had, returned a. verdict of 'not guilty', it could not .be said that it was inexpedient to try the Respondent by court-martial and, therefore, the impug--· 'ned notice under Rule 14 was is.ued ·.without' any jurisdiction. At the hearing of the ; said writ petition , preliminary, objection· was . raised- by the, Appellants thai the. said· writ: petition lwas ''not : maintainable as b~ing premature. The High Court 'held that as the '-'-.impugned notice. was issued without jurisdiction,' it l~ould be expos-, Ing the Respondent to jeopardy to require him to submit his "reply to the said notice and to wait until his services were terminated~'

:. ·were taken before· us ' · · · The same contentions; as were ' -at ' the· ' hearing • • '-rai~ed. of this, Appeal. ·before the '.High Court ' • • "We\vill -'first , deal with the Appellants' preliminary'. ,objection -that the · Respon-dent's writ petition was· not maintainable as being' premature:' It was the Respondent's case that the Chief of the Army Staff had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned show cause' ri6tice: 'art~r he had, · ... been again found not guilty by 'the court·martial'ori'revision: 'The said notice expressly stated that the Chife of the Army- Staff-was ' of the ·· opinion:· that the ·Respondent's i misconduC:t i: as; di.Closed l, ~ in the proceedings rendered his further retention in serYice undcsir-'lib!~ and asked him to submit his explanation and defen~e.~if'liiiy, t¢ tlie charges made against him. If the Respondent's contention ·· with respect to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Staff to . ·issue ·the said notice were corre9t, the Respondent was·certainiy ' exposed to the jeopardy of having his explanation and defenee ' ·'rejected and he being· removed or dismissed from services. Were "B the said notice issued without jurisdiction, the Respondent would '. have then suffered 11 grave, prejudicial injury by an act which Was without jurisdiction. Where the threat of prejudicial action is wholly without jurisdiction, person cannot be asked to wait for the. injury to be caused to him before seeking the Court's protec· 'fli tion. If, on the other hand, the Chief of the Army Staff had the - r· • power in law to issue the said notice, it would not be open to the · · ~ Respondent to approach the court under Article 226 6f the ·constitution at the stage of notice only and in such an event his 'writ petition could be said to be premature. This was, however, · not contention which could have been decided at the threshold until the court had come to finding with respect to the jurisdic-tion of the Chief of the Army Staff to issue the impugned ·notice. Having held that the impugned notice was issued without any jurisdiction, the High Court was right in further holding that the .. Respondent's writ petition was not premature and was maintain-able.

Before considering the rival contentions with respect to the validity of the impugned notice, we may mention that learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court has held in the case of Capt. · Kashmir Singh Shergi/I v. The Union of India and Another ([1]) that the Chief of the Army Staff was competent to issue show cause n.otice . under' Rule 14 even though the court-martial had affirmed its x verdict on revision. . . ·

. The answer to the question whether the Chief of the Army .Staff was competent to issue the impugned notice depends upon the . relevant provisions of the Army Act and the Army Rules to which ;i we now turn.

Chapter IV of the Army Act, which consists of Section· 18· to 24, deals with the conditions of service of persons .appointed. under

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(1) Civil Writ No. 553 of 1974 decided on November 6, 1914·by Prakash Narain, J.

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· '' disdosure any such report or portion thereof, in his opinion,· its disclosure is not in the interest of the security of the State.

In the event of the explanation of the officer being considered · unsatisfactory by the Chief the Army Staff, or when so directed by the Central Government, the case shall be submitted to the Central Government with the officer's defence and the recommendation of the Chief of the Army· Staff as to the termination of the officer's service in the manner specified in sub-rule (4).

(3) Where, upon the conviction of an officer by criminal court, the Central Government or the Chief of the Army staff consi-c ders that the conduct of the officer which has led to bis conviction renders his further retention in service undesirable, certified copy of the judgment of the criminal court convicting him ·shall · be submitted to the Central Government with the recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff as to the termination of the officer's service in the manner specified in sub-rule (4).

· ( 4) When submitting case to the Central Government under the provisions of sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3), the Chief of the Army Staff shall make bis .recommendation whether the officer's service should be terminated, and if so, whether the officer should be-

(a) dismissed from the service ; or

(b) removed from the service ; or

(c) called upon to retire ; or

(d) [called upon to resign. ]

(5) The Central Government after considering the reports and the officer's defence, if any, or the judgment of the criminal court, as the case may be, and the. recommendation of the Chief of the Army Staff, may dismiss · or remove the officer with or with-out pension or call upon him to retire or resign, and on bis refusing to do so, the officer may be compul-. sorily retired or removed from the service on pension or gratuity, if any, admissible to him."

We are not concerned in this Appeal with case wherjl al! .. officer has been· convicted by criminal court or with case wher.~ , · the Central Government is satisfied that it is not expedient or· reasonably practicable to give to the officer an opportunity of showing cause. show cause notice was in fact issued to · the Respondent by the Chief of the Army Staff. ·Under sub-rule (2) of R~le 14, the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff to issue show cause notice is the satisfaction of the· Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff after considering the reports of an officer's miscon-duct that the trial of the officer by court-martial is inexpedien't or impracticable.and the opinion formed that tlie further retention of the officer in the service is undesirable. · ·

The contention before us . was that in the circumstances of this case it cannot be said that the .trial of the Respondent by court-martial was inexpedient or impracticable as in fact· the Respondent had been tried by court-martial. · It was also· submit-ted that on true construction of Rule 14, the Central ·G<)vernment or the Chief.of the Army· Staff has an initial option to have the officer tried by court-martial or to take action against him under Rule· 14 and if it were decided that he should be tried by court-.. · martial, then action under Rule 14 was not permissible i~ case of his acquittal by the court-martial.

To test the correctness of these submissions, we· must examine the provisions of the Army Act relating to courts-martial. Section 108 provides for four kinds of courts-martial, namely.

(1) general courts-martial ;

(2) district courts-martial ;

(~)· summary general courts-martial ; and

(<I) summary courts-martial. ' -, '

As. the Respondent was tried by general court-marti3.J, we are ?ot concerned here with any other type of courts-martial. Under section 109, general court-martial.may be convened by. the ;Central G?vernment or the . Chief of the Army .Staff or by any officer .. emp?wered in that behalf by warrant of the Chief of the Army:Staff; .. Sect1op ,! 13 provjpes that 11enernl court-martial shall. c01;1sist .. of,

court and· · court-martial both have jurisdiction . in -respect of an offence, it is in the discretion of the officer commanding the army, army crops, division or independent brigade in which the accused person is serving or such other officer as may be prescribed bY the Army Rules to drcide before which court the proceedings shall'be instituted. Under section 127., person convicted or acquit,ted by court;martial may, with the previous sanction of the Central Govern-me~t, be tried again by criminal court for the same 'offence or on the 'same facts. There. is, however, no provision for the trial by court-martial for the same 'offence or on the same facts where per-'li.- son: has been convicted or ~cquitted by criminal. court. Sec-~- tions 153; 154 and 160(1) provide as follows :

"153. Finding and sentence not valid, unless confirmed.-. No finding. or sentence of general, district or summary :·general, court-martial shall be valid except so far as it may · be confirmed as provided by this Act.

"154. ·Power to confirm finding aud sentence of general court-martial.~ , ..

- The findings and sentences of general courts-martial may be confirmed by the Central Government, or by any officer empowered in this behalf by warrant · of the Central Government. ·

'' . ~ .· "160. · Revision of finding or sentence.-

-·· (!) Any finding or sentence of court-martial 'which reqiii-·res ·confirmation may be once revised by order of the p confirming authority and on such revision, the con~t. if so (lirected by the confirming authority, may take additional " evidence: . --. . ,

Jn this connection it . will also be relevant to set out the ·provisions of Rules 68, 69, 70 and 71 of the Army Rules. These Rules provide as follows:

'68. Revision. (I) Where the finding is sent back: for revision under se91i!ln ! 60, the Court shall reassemble in open court,

(1985) 3 S.C.R,

·the revision order shall be read, and if the court is directed

· "to take fresh evidence, such evidence shall also be taken in 1"1 ·open court. The court shall then deliberate on -its finding • in closed court.

(2)' Where the finding -is sent back for revision and the court .does not adhere to its former finding,. it shall revoke the finding and sentence, and record the new finding, and if .. such new finding involves sentenc~. pass senteµce afresh;

·~ (3) Where th.e sentence alone is sent back for revision,. the court shall not revise the finding.

1 [(4) After the revision, the presiding officer. shall date ][and ]"sign th< decision of t!ie court, and the proceedings, upon " being signed by thejudge-advocate, if any, shall at once be transmitted for confirmation.

"69. Review of court-martial proceedings. -

,,T!'e .proceedings of general court-martial shall be sub-.• mitted by the judge-advocate at the trial for review to .the deputy or assistant judge-advocate general of the command ~·ho shall then forward it to the confirming officer. The proceedings of district court-martial shall be sent by the presiding officer or the judge-advocate direct to the con-firming officer who must, in all cases, where the sentence is . dismissal or above, seek advice of the deputy or assistant 'judge-advocate general of the command before confirma-'.:' iioii.'."

"70. Confirmation-Upon receiving the proceedings of general or district court-martial, the confirming autho.rity may confirm or refuse confirmation, or reserve confir-mation for superior authority, and the confirmation, . · non-c.onfirmation, or reservation shall be entered in and .. form part .of the proceedings."

"71. Promulgation-The charge, finding, and sentence, and ariY- recommendation to mercy shall, together with the con· · firmatiop or 'p0it-¢onfirmation of the proceedings, be

. r. ' '.CHIEF OF ARMY·STAFF v. D. P. ICUKRETY (Madon, J.)

promulgated -in such manner as the confirming authority may ilirect ; ahd if no direction is given, according to the · custom of the service. Until promulgation has been effected, confirmation ·is not complete and the finding and sentence • sllall not be"l1eld to have been confirmed until they have been ptom'ulgated."

It is pertineni to .note that under Section 160 the confirming authority has the power to direct revision of the finding of court-martial only once. There is no power in the confirming authority, if it does not agree with the finding on revision, to direct second revi-sion of su.ch finding: In the absence of any such confirmation, whether of the original finding or of the finding on revision, by reason of the provisions of section 153 the finding is not valid. Therefore, in the case of the Respondent, the finding of the general court-martial on revision not having been confirmed was not valid. Could he, tberC:-l'ore, be 'tried again by another court-martial on tbe same charges ? Under Section 121, person subject to the Army Act, who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence . by court-martial or by criminal COUit, is not liable to be tried again for the same Offence by court-martial. It can well be argued that. by reason of the pro-visions of section 153 under which no finding or sentence of general, district or summary general court-mar'tial is valid except in ·so far as it is confirmed as provided by the Army Act person cannot be said to have been acquitted or convicted by court-martial until the finding of "guilty" or "not guilty" in his case has been confirmed by the confirming authority. There is, however, no ~i<press provision in the Army Act which empowers the holding of fresh ·court-martial when the finding of court-martial on revision is Mt confirmed .

The decisions of three High Courts may be referred to in this connection, Tlie first decision is that of Allahabad High .Court in G.B. Singh v:Unlon' of India and Others. ([1]) That was case under ,the Air Force Act, 1950 (Act No.'45 of 1950) . .,In that case, the ·officer was found guilty by geµeral ·court-martial and sentenced to be dismissed from service. ·The finding and sentence was referred to the confirming. authority. The confirming authority passed an order reserving the same for confirm ti on by superior authority and forwarded the proceedings to the Chief of the Air Staff. The

Chief of the Air staff passed an order not confirming the finding or sentence awarded by the court-martial. The finding and sentence which were not confirmed by the Chief of Air Staff were promulgated after the lapse of about ten months. fresh general court-martial was con-vened to ~etry the office. On enquiry the officer was informed that the findings and sentence of the general court-martial had not been confirmed as it was found that the proceedings were not in order am;!, therefore, there was no valid order convicting or acquitting the officer. After considering the relevant provi.sions of the Air Force Act and the Air Force Rules, 1969,. which are in pari materia with the corresponding provisions of the Army Act and the. Army Rules .• learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that the effect .of non-confirmation was that though the finding and sentence passed by the court-martial existed, they could not be put into effect unless they had been confirmed under the provisions ' of ' the Air Force Act, and that in such case section 120 of the Air Force Act (which is in pari materia with section 121 of the Army Act) barred second trial by court-martial. Jn Major Manohar Lal v. The Union of India and Anr. (1) the petitioner was fried by general court-martial which found hini not guilty. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief held the proceedings to be null and void on the ground that one of the members of the court·martial was of the rank of Captain and was thus lower in the rank to the petitioner and no certificate had been recorded by the officer convening the court-martial as required by Rule 40(2) of the Army Rules, that an officer of the ra:nk of the petitioner· was not available and he1 therefore; ordered retrial. learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that· under the Army Act and the Ariny: Rules,.a Captain was · eligible to be made member of general court-martial and the mere fact that the convening officer did not append the certificate that an officer of ihe rank · of the petitioner was ·not available. did not· make th.e constitution of the general court martial invalid or the finding given by it to be without jurisdiction or the proceedings of the trial before it to be null .and ¥oid; · He· further held that as.the.petitioner had no say .in the cons-titution cif the general .court-ma_rtial and had suffered the, trial before it; the proceedings. could not have been declared null and :void on highly technical ground.. The learned Single Judge, ther~­fore, came to the conclusion that the second trial of the petitioner·

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was without jurisdiction and the sentence imposed upon him in con-.':-sequence of that trial was wholly illegal. In J:C. I 3018 Subedar . Surat Singh v. The Chief Engineer Projects (Beacon). Co, ~6 A.P,O ... (I). Division Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that though every finding of general court-martial.-·whether of acquittal or of guilt, cannot be recorded as valid unless it is confirmed by the competent authority, the Legislature could not have reasonably intended that an officer conve.ning general court:; martial can go on dissolving· such court-martials and .re onstituting· them ad infinitum until he obtained verdict or finding of his own • liking. The Division Bench further held that such, position would , not only be against public policy and the ancient maxim "nemo ,, debet bis veuri pro una et eadem·causa" (no man ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause) but would -also reduce the pro-·., visions of the Army Act to mockery and give an appearance <;if . nili/afides. According to the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in . such case the . proper course for the confirming authority would .. be to refer the case to its superior authority for confirmation.:· This being the position, what then is the course open to the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff when the finding · of court-martial even on revision is perverse or against the ~eight· of evidence on record? The High Court in its judgment under · appeal has also held that in sucli case fresh trial by another' court-martial is not permissible. The crucial question, therefore, is· whether . the. Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff can have resort to Rule 14 of the Army Rules. Though iiis open to the Central Government of the Chief of the Army Staff to 'have: recourse to that Rule in the first instance without directing irial by court-martial of the concernefl officer, there is no provision in· the Army Act or in Rule 14 or any of the other rules of'the Army. Rules which prohibils the Central Government or the Chief of· the Army Staff from resorting in such case to Rule 14~ Can it,· however, be said ·that in such case trial by couri-martial is: inexpedient or impracticable? The Shorter Oxford English Diction:: ary, Thir.d Edilion, defines the word. "inexpedient" as meaning "not ·expeaieni; ·disadvantageous in the circumst~nces, llnadvisable, impolitic". The same dictionary defines "expedient'' inter a/id· as' meaning "advantageous; fit, proper, or suitable to the circumstances o -the case". Webster's Third New International Dictionary also

[1985) 3 S.C.!l.

defines the term "expedient" inter a/ia as meaning "characterized by suitability, practicality, and efficiency in achieving particular end: fit, proper, or advantageous under the circumstances".

Jn the present case, the Chief of the Army Staff had, on the one hand, the finding of general court-martial which had not been confirmed and the Chief of the Army Staff was of the opinion that the further retention of the Respondent in the service was undesir-able and, on the other hand, there were the above three High Court decisions and the point was not concluded by definitive pro-nouncement of this Court. Jn such circumstances, to order fresh trial by court-martial could certainly be said to be both inexpedient . and impracticable and the only ·expedient and practicable course, therefore, open to the Chief of the Army Staff would be to take action against the Respondent under Rule 14, which he did, The action of the Chief of the Army Staff in issuing the impugned notice was, therefore, neither without jurisdiction nor unwarraned in law.

Jn the result, this Appeal must succeed and is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court under Appeal is reversed and the order passed by it is set aside. The writ petition filed by the Respondent in the Allahabad High Court, namely, Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 84 of 1977, is hereby dismissed.

Before parting with this Appeal, we would like to observe that the alleged incidents in respect of which the Respondent was tried before the general court-martial took place nearly ten years ago. We, therefore, feel that the Chief of the Army Staff should take into account the conduct and behaviour of the Respondent during the intervening period and if they have been in conformity with good order and military discipline and the high traditions of the Indian Army, be may consider the desirability of proceeding further in the matter.

In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as .to costs throughout.